A Project on Intelligent Design

I have decided to start a new project, and I would like to ask for advice on how best to proceed. We need a simple book, suitable for Jr. High School students, that explains the issues surrounding intelligent design.

The standard response to the challenge of intelligent design on the secular side of this dispute has been to simply argue that we should not talk about it. Schools should simply ignore the subject and not talk about it. The problem with this strategy is that it leaves the whole population substantially ignorant of the problems with intelligent design, and that this substantially ignorant population is left defenseless to the well-funded propaganda of those elements of society selling this particular brand of snake oil.

What we need to do is to explain the problems with intelligent design, and to do so in a way that students can understand this issues while they are taking science classes in school.

The Moral Dimension

The moral dimension of this particular posting is that we are being entirely irrational in insisting that schools not discuss the issue of intelligent design. The purpose of the school system is to educate children, and this is clearly an area where children are being poorly educated. More importantly, this is an area where people seem to insist that children not be educated, even though widespread public ignorance on this issue is proving to be extremely costly.

First, we must look at the amount of time, money, and other resources that go into promoting intelligent design. These are resources that are devoted to promoting fiction, effectively making a substantial portion of the population stupider than it would have otherwise been.

Second, an uninformed population is less capable of making intelligent decisions on national policies that depend on that particular field of knowledge. In this case, the policy decisions made by a population that is substantially more ignorant of the biological facts than they would have otherwise been are less capable of making intelligent policy decisions in fields of health, the environment, and even criminal law. After all, a better understanding of evolution gives us, among other things, a better understanding of criminal (and non-criminal) behavior.

There is little doubt that we, as a society, are worse off than we would have otherwise been – particularly worse off in terms of health care, environmental care, and criminal law, than we would have otherwise been. The result is a lower quality of health, a more noxious environment, and a lessened ability to deal with crimes (with its subsequent costs) than we would have otherwise had.

This is not to say that proponents of intelligent design are solely responsible for the fact that we do not live un a utiopia. Our problems have a wide number of sources, and this is just one of them. However, even a slight improvement in our understanding in any of these areas implies improvements in the quality of life (and even the survival) of millions of people.

So, if the public school system is politically incapable of educating the children in our society of the facts concerning intelligent design, then those concerned with the quality of life in this world have reason to take up the challenge themselves. For that, they need high-quality tools, and in particular need tools that they can use in the education of young children.

Qualifications

I have no particular talent for writing text books for seventh graders, so I cannot claim to be the best qualified to execute this particular project. However, I also hold that it is better to do something than to sit back and wait for others to act. Of course, this policy should come with a recognition of one’s own competencies, and to leave room for more knowledgable people to provide input. In this way, we can avoid situations like the Iraq War, where incompetent people decide to do something with full disregard of their own incompetence.

So, I would like this to be an online project. However, I would like the project to have the aim of producing a book, which can then be funded and distributed to students in the age range of 12 to 14.

There will, of course, be questions of credit and authorship. On these matters, I am thnking of something that would work much like “open source” works in programming or a Wikipedia works. Some site will be set up that will allow different individuals to contribute. However, in this case, all contributions will be judged by whether young teenagers can understand what was written. This will not be a “talk-origins” like project which is likely to be filled with complex details written in a manner appropriate for a PhD dissertation.

Ultimately, there will be a question of publication and distribution. I would like to see some non-profit science organization ultimately take the project and use it to produce a book. The organization will seek funding (contributions) for the purpose of printing and distributing the book to people in the Jr. High School age range, perhaps through organizations such as Camp Quest or science and secular web sites. Whatever organization takes up the project of printing and distributing the content will be allowed to keep whatever income it can generate from this product.

First Step: Existing Efforts

In a project such as this, the first thing to do is to determine that it has not already been done, or is not already being done. I have done my own online searches for something like this, and I have asked others to point me to something that meets these criteria. I have been informed of some useful resources, but nothing like what I would like to see made available – a relatively complete discussion of the issue of intelligent design suitable for 12-year-old children.

If I am wrong in this, I would like to know now. I would like to encourage any reader to let me know of anything that meets this objective. I would further like to ask any reader to ask others who might know of anything that meets this objective. I certainly have no interest in wasting effort on something that has already been done.

If something like this already exists, I would be more than happy to spread the word here on this site, and encourage others to do the same.

Second Step: Set Up a Project

The second step, then, would be to set something up where people can start building the text. I am not an expert in the resources that are available. I have recently learned of Wiki scratchpad, which has a great deal of functionality that can be hijacked for such a project. I am wondering if there is a service like this available for more conventional writing projects – for example, to be used by people wanting to collaborate on a book or manuscript.

If anybody has any advice to offer in this regards, please, let me know. I would hate for such a project to get off on the wrong foot.

Third Step: Solicit for Expert Assistance

Of course, I would like to draw people to this project that have particularly strong skills in understanding the issue of intelligent design and communicating those issues in language that 12 to 14 year olds can understand. Once the project is set up, I would like to encourage readers to point it out to those who could make meaningful contributions in the hopes that they will see the project as worth at least a little of their time.

Auxiliary Step

I would also like to hear any advice one might have regarding the ownership and rights for such a project. I would like contributors to understand that they will have no rights to the content. The rights to the content will go to whatever organization seeks to use the content to create and distribute a book. This will be a voluntary effort – a freely given contribution to the greater well-being of society.

Predictions

Actually, if I were to make predictions on how such a project would turn out, I would predict that there will be some serious disagreements about how to write such a book. These political disputes will express themselves in the form of factions. Eventually, each faction will get fed up with the incompetence expressed by competing ideas, they will break off, and they will develop independent projects.

In particular, I expect that one faction will form around the desire to present the issue in terms of NOMA – the idea that science and religion represent two Non-Overlapping Majestrata, where neither has anything to say about the other. They would find themselves at odds with a faction that wants to present the issue in terms of The God Hypothesis – the idea that the existence of a God is a scientific claim that describes events in the real world.

I would not be surprised to see these factions splitting into separate projects, if this project should ever get that far.

On this issue, I’m afraid that I would find myself favoring the camp seeking to represent religion in terms of a God Hypothesis, a hypothesis that absolutely fails any and all scientific testing.

However, I would not object to advocates of NOMA producing their own version of the project. It will likely reach people that will simply dismiss The God Hypothesis. Even though I hold that this view is mistaken, it is less mistaken than the alternative, and a lesser mistake is at least some measure of improvement.

Addendum

I have started my project. I will be slowly writing and editing the project at a place on my web site.

Democracy in the Middle East

Crooks and Liars had a video clip from The Cafferty Files in which Jack Cafferty chided President Bush for the failed attempts to turn the Middle East into a bastion of democracy.

Cafferty: When there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, President Bush immediately seized on the idea of bringing freedom and democracy. How’s that working out for you, Mr. President? The United States also pressured the Palestinians to hold elections. They elected Hamas, a terrorist organization. How’s that working out for you, Mr. President? Hamas has now seized Gaza. The Abbas government has been dismantled and Hamas militants have been on a rampage, pillaging government institutions. It’s very unlikely they’ll be dipping their fingers in ink wells there, any time soon.

My first question is: Is instituting something like a democratic, open society in the Middle East such a bad idea? I mean . . . are we going to argue that theocratic dictatorship is the preferred option, and that the last thing we should ever consider is replacing theocratic dictatorship with secular democracy?

On this particular issue, I believe it is very important to clearly distinguish between means and ends.

When Bush started his campaign to turn Iraq into a democracy, I expressed the attitude that the objective was certainly sound. However, I was against the policy. The reasons that I offered at the time were that Bush was incompetent and would almost certainly screw things up, doing more harm than good. It is not that the objective was a bad idea, but that Bush and his team in the White House could not possibly pick the best means towards that particular end.

So, the news items today tell us the following:

The Taliban in Afghanistan are starting to use the same tactics used in the Iraqi insurgency, punctuated today by a headline that says, “At least 35 killed in Afghan bus explosion.”

Among the Palestinians, we have to deal with the fact that Hamas has a great deal of popular support, enough to support an uprising in Gaza.

And the situation in Iraq does not seem to be getting any better.

The main problem centers around the fact that the people in these regions do not have the moral foundation for a democracy, which requires, among other things, a decision not to use violence to obtain political ends, and to fight all battles on the airwaves.

The Bush Administration thought that all they needed to do was to remove the dictator, and the people will instantly create a thriving democratic state in its midst. It did not recognize that democracies can only be built on a particular moral foundation, and the moral foundation for a democracy did not exist. There were too many people in Iraq willing to use force of arms to execute their political will, and had too weak of an aversion to killing.

I have suggested throughout this blog that the tools to be used in promoting useful desires and aversions are praise and condemnation.

Here is where the secular, liberal political establishment has failed for the past several decades.

Sam Harris like to blame ‘religious moderates’ for the idea that one may not criticize other cultures and traditions. However, that particular fault can be more accurately assigned to progressive liberals. For decades, they promoted the idea that all value is subjective and that it makes no sense to criticize another culture. Moral and cultural institutions were like differences in diet and clothing styles. A person in one culture might be able to say, “I would not like that for myself,” but that is the worst form of criticism that a person can give.

In fact, the idea that all cultures are the same, that nobody is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in matters of value, is quite at odds with most religious teachings. Those teachings say that certain acts are right and wrong. Where other cultures have different teachings, our tolerance of them is more of a matter of tolerating other people’s mistakes in order to keep the peace, than in a genuine assertion that their truth is just as good as our truth.

As such, it was the secular liberals, not religious moderates, who gave would-be dictators and theocrats moral permission to set up their oppressive regimes.

It is way past time for secular liberals to become critical, to face people who do stupid and evil things, and to call them stupid and evil – to condemn them for what they do wrong, and to praise them for what they do right.

One of the common responses that others will give to this type of behavior is to say, “You are trying to destroy our way of life. You are engaging in intolerant, militant, and even fundamentalist behavior against this target group.”

“No, in fact, what I am trying to do is to convince you that some of the things that you believe are in error.” Imagine that you have a friend or family member that you are trying to get off of alcohol, drugs, or tobacco. While you argue about the health effects of their activity, somebody comes up to you and says, “You are simply trying to destroy their way of life. You are engaging in intolerant, militant, and fundamentalist behavior against this target group.”

These charges are entirely out of line. The ‘militant’ charge, in particular, is completely slanderous in the absence of evidence that the person it is being used against has actually threatened to take up arms against their target group. If the only weapons being used are words and private actions, then there is no militancy. There is no militancy without violence. The accusation of militancy is an accusation that the accused is at least on the verge of using military force (violence) to impose his views on others. In most cases, those accusations are themselves nothing but lies intending to promote fear.

The charges of ‘intolerance’ and ‘fundamentalism’ are themselves out of line, unless attempts to convince people to give up smoking or drug use are examples of intolerance and fundamentalism against an alternative lifestyle.

Even here, the problems with smoking and other forms of drug use is that these behaviors primarily harm only the person who engages in them. They harm others to the degree that others care about the person who is destroying her own life, or insofar as they cause the person to act irresponsibility (e.g., drunk driving or to steal for drugs).

This is not the case for those who suffer from an insufficiently strong aversion to killing others to obtain a political end. Imagine condemning somebody with an insufficiently strong aversion to killing others to obtain a political end, and hearing in response, “You are an intolerant bigot who merely wants to destroy our way of life.”

“Well, since your way of life includes killing others to obtain a political end, then, yes, actually, I am intolerant of that life style and I wish to see it destroyed. Sorry, I do not see how we have a lot of options in this matter. I would be perfectly willing to tolerate your lifestyle, if not for the fact that you are killing people to obtain a political end.”

Contrary to the secular/political ideologies of the last part of the 20th Century, criticism is quite appropriate. In many cases, the absence of criticism is what we need to condemn. Praise and condemnation are important tools that need to be put into place in order to develop a set of desires and aversions where democracy can grow.

Without it, we will continue to be less effective than we could otherwise be at replacing theocratic dictatorships with democratic institutions.

Mill's Utilitarianism: Part II

As I wrote last week, I am starting a project where I want to explain some of the roots of desire utilitarianism. Last week I wrote a post in which I quoted John Stuart Mill’s “Utilitarianism”, where he said some things that are consistent with desire utilitarianism. However, the true heart of Mill’s theory is found in Chapter 4 of his book, where he presents, “Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible.”

From the time of Aristotle, philosophers in the Greek tradition have distinguished between two types of values. Something can have value as a means or as a tool for bringing about other things of value, and something can have value as an end or an ultimate objective which has value “for its own sake.” For example, a person does not purchase a pound of nails because he has an urge to own nails. He wants the nails for a purpose – to build a house. At the same time, a person does not seek to avoid pain or obtain sex not because it is useful. People will avoid pain and obtain sex even when it is not useful. Pain and sex have value “for their own sake” (negative value, in the case of pain) – independent of what might come from them.

In the philosophy of value, one of the enduring questions has been to characterize ‘ends’.

The classic way characterizing this distinction is to speak in terms of the value of means as ‘instrumental value’ or the value that something can have as an instrument or tool, useful for doing something else. This is contrasted with ‘intrinsic value’, or the value that something has for its own sake, and not for the sake of what can be done with it.

However, this begs an important question. It assumes (incorrectly, I argue) that the value something can have as an end is an intrinsic property. “Valued for its own sake” is not the same thing as “valued for its own sake in virtue of its intrinsic properties.” It is dangerous to make these assumptions.

Assumptions such as this are constantly written into our language. The ancient Greeks came up with the idea that the world was made of ‘atoms’. But what is an atom? To the Greeks, it had to be a substance without parts. Indeed, the term ‘atom’ means ‘without parts’.

Another example is the term ‘malaria’, meaning ‘bad air’, invented under the assumption that the disease was caused by bad air.

‘Intrinsic value’, used to refer to the case in which something is valued for its own sake, is another mistaken assumption. Yet, as in the other two examples, it is useful to continue using the term, even where we must clarify how we are using it.

Anyway, so, ancient value theorists distinguished between instrumental value and ‘intrinsic value’. Mill, however, wanted to make use of another type of value – one that can be called ‘inclusive value’.

Mill starts Chapter 4 with the classical relationship between these, that there are ‘means’ and ‘ends’, that happiness is the sole ‘end’, and that everything else has value as a means toward that end.

Questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required of this doctrine- what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil- to make good its claim to be believed?

Yet, just a few paragraphs later, Mill allows that many people value virtue, and that they do so not as a means, but as something valued as ‘a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it’.

Okay, Mill. Virtue is not the same as happiness. Either virtue has value only as a means to happiness, or there is something other than happiness that can have value as an end. How do you resolve this?

Ultimately, as follows:

The person who desires virtue as an end desires it as a part of happiness. Think of a painting that you like, or a song that you find particularly beautiful. Then, think of an individual note within that song. That note does not have value as a means to the value of the song. Nor does it have value independent of its position in the song. It has value as a part of the song. Similarly, virtue has value as a part of a happy life.

The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, is to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end.

This is ‘inclusive value’ coming to the rescue.

However, one of the things we can ask about ‘inclusive value’ is whether it is really necessary. For example, in physics, the sum of the forces acting on an object produce a result that is the vector sum of all of the other forces. Each force has a type of ‘inclusive value’ that affects the final result. However, we do not need to postulate any new force, a ‘final end’ force, that is the vector sum of its component parts. All we need is the component parts.

The real problem with happiness theory as a final end is that it fails the experience machine test. ‘Happiness’ does not mean ‘the vector some of the value-forces (desires) influencing individual action’. It refers to something specific. Most importantly, it refers to something that a person can acquire from an experience machine. However, many people express an absolute aversion to entering an experience machine, which shows that happiness is one end among many, and one that can be outweighed by other concerns.

Recognizing this fact, we can then defend Mill’s claim, which I wrote about last week, that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. It is better to be unhappy outside of an experience machine than happy within an experience machine – precisely because (and this is a solution Mill dismisses) that happiness is one end among many.

In describing the idea that what we desire ‘for its own sake’ is a part of happiness, Mill describes how we acquire new desires.

Referring to money as an example:

There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it . . .

In fact, few things work better as a proof of the fact that desires are malleable than the example of money, which simply does not exist in a state of nature, and cannot come to be naturally valued for its own sake the way that sex and freedom from pain are naturally desired for their own sake. This desire is learned. Because money is useful in the fulfillment of other desires, it begins as something desired as a means. However, for some people, it clearly becomes something desired for its own sake – valued beyond its usefulness.

Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. There was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of virtue. And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness.

Here we have the heart of desire utilitarianism, where a desire that is useful because of its tendency to fulfill other desires, gives people a reason to cultivate this desire in others and in themselves. The method by which they cultivate this desire is by associating it with the fulfillment of other desires – with a system of reward and punishment, and praise and condemnation, all engineered to make more common those desires that tend to make an individual ‘a blessing to [members of society’.

Everything that Mill says about the love of virtue applies to other desires as well. Mill wrote about the love of money, power, and fame, which makes an individual ‘noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs’, which then become desires that people have reason to discourage. However, they are hard to discourage, since they inherently fulfill the desires of the individual.

Any other desire that renders an individual ‘noxious to to the other members of the society to which he belongs’ is a desire those others have reason to inhibit, while any other desire that renders an individual ‘a blessing to them’ is a desire that people generally have reason to cultivate. When cultivated, these desires define objects that are valued for their own sake, and not simply because of their usefulness.

The only real change that one has to make to Mill’s theory at this point is to give up the idea of desires as being ‘a part of happiness’ and to simply acknowledge that happiness is one of the things desired for its own sake. In terms of how the theory works, this change is quite benign.

Camp Quest and Religious Bigotry

I came across an online article in The Hook concerning teachers who are refusing to hand out literature on Camp Quest for children to take home.

“Atheist camp: Teachers buck School Board policy.”

The story behind this article is that a Christian parent protested the fact that the school would not allow her to distribute a flier for a Bible school.

after a local parent was refused permission to send home a flier for vacation Bible school, the parent contacted the Christian Liberty Counsel, which reminded the Albemarle school district that the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that if a school permits fliers about after-school events, it can't discriminate against religious fliers.

Then, Camp Quest decided to hand out fliers. Camp Quest is an organization that runs summer camps with a secular, atheist, agnostic theme. Some teachers were refusing to hand out this material. The same lawyers informed them that the same rules prohibiting discrimination in what the school handed out based on religion required them to hand out the fliers for Camp Quest.

Now, the school is revisiting the policy. They want to exclude any further use of the school backpack mail program to advertise Camp Quest by limiting the distribution to “local events.”

The intention of the law is quite clear. Some teachers and parents want to discriminate against atheist groups. However, the law does not permit them to do so. Therefore, they want to Gerrymander a set of rules that use non-religious criteria that will, nonetheless, serve the same political purpose – to institute a policy of discrimination against atheists.

For example, if the school were to adopt a rule prohibiting fliers for any organization with the word “Camp Quest” in the title, this would be a non-religious distinction that would serve the purpose of discriminating against Camp Quest, while leaving religious organizations free to use the backpack mail program.

However, this rule would appear arbitrary. Its discriminatory nature will be so blatant and obvious that the Courts could not help but recognize it for what it is, and disallow it. What the school needs is to gerrymander a boundary between what is permitted and what is not that could possibly get past the courts because it seems like a legitimate rule. It’s possible for a community to be overcome by tribalism and decide to exclude all non-local vendors. Who is the Court to say that this is not the case?

The fact of the matter is, this is not the case. The rules did not come up for review because an “outside organization” decided to advertise using the backpack mail program. If a religious camp had decided to advertise in this way, there is little doubt that the school would have accepted the advertisements without a second thought. No, the real reason why these people are revisiting the rules is because an atheist organization decided to use it – and the school wants to ban atheists.

One question that this issue brings up is an issue of what the law will and will not allow. Is the law set up to defend bigotry, or to defend the victims of bigotry. As I have said several times, this is not a “law” blog, this is an “ethics” blog. I am not concerned with what the law does or does not say, I am concerned with what people should and should not do.

Regardless of what the law says, these people have already exhibited a moral failing that they cannot hide. The courts cannot change the fact that these people are motivated by unreasoned hatred and bigotry to commit an act of injustice against their neighbors. This is now an established and unavoidable fact.

A preacher might stand before these people and say, “You might be able to fool your neighbor into thinking that you are motivated by love and kindness to your neighbor. You might be able to fool the courts into thinking that you are motivated by love and kindness to your neighbor. But you cannot fool God. God knows what is in your hearts, and he knows that it is not love. He knows that it is not kindness. He knows that he sees hate. He knows that he sees injustice. You can try to hide your shame behind a fig leaf of rhetoric, but He knows.”

Of course, in secular terms, this is simply another way of saying that the terms ‘hate’ and ‘injustice’ capture the truth of the matter, and anybody who says otherwise is lying. But, if a person is already stepped into the quagmire of immorality up to the point of hate and injustice, why not add some good old-fashioned lying to top it off.

We constantly hear about how God gives these people an inside track on ‘the right thing to do’. We constantly hear that it is because they cannot hide from God, and they cannot escape judgment in the afterlife, that they are more highly driven to do good than their secular/atheist neighbors – people such as myself.

Yet, the physical evidence seems to suggest otherwise. The evidence suggests that they know that there is no afterlife, that there is no final judgment. All of these claims come with a wink and a nudge among the knowing, that this is just a story that they made up so that they could get away acting immorally, and then blaming it all on God. “I’m not the one who made up these rules. I’m just obeying God. Can I help it if GOD wants you to hate these people and treat them unjustly? I’m just the messenger.”

No, he is not just a messenger. He is a hate-mongering bigot who needs to say something other than, “Because I don’t like it,” to get others to adopt the hatred and bigotry he preaches.

A good person really doesn’t need a God to get him to do the right thing. He does the right thing because he wants to. He does not need to be told, “God can see into your heart and he knows what you are truly after.” This is because he can see into his own heart. He knows what he is after.

If he is after justice, then it is simply going to leave a taste in his mouth too foul for him to swallow if he should treat others unjustly. He will so hate the taste that this is simply something he will not do. If he does treat others unjustly, this can mean nothing other than the fact that it has not left much of a foul taste in his mouth after all.

This is how secular morality works. Or, at least, it is how desire utilitarianism works. Desire utilitarianism seeks to use social institutions to make it the case that people so dislike injustice that they will avoid it, even when they can get away with it. Unlike certain religious people in Albermarle, the very idea of manipulating the legal system to execute a campaign of hatred and bigotry does not appeal to them. This is not because they don’t think they can get away with it. It is not because God can see what is truly in their hearts even if the Judge cannot. It is because, in being raised to be good, moral individuals, they simply do not like to treat others unjustly.

It is said that, without God – without religion – people can do whatever they please. In fact, everybody always does whatever they please. Even the religious person does not serve God unless it pleases him to do so, and does not treat others justly unless it pleases him to do so. The difference between good and evil is not a difference between doing what one pleases or not. The difference lies in being pleased by an opportunity to act fairly and justly towards others, versus being pleased by an opportunity to treat others to unjustly.

Religion clearly has done nothing to give certain people in Albemarle a distaste for injustice. Indeed, we are invited to wonder whether their religion has helped them learn to treat others unjustly – actually causing them to adopt the immoral attitudes we see witnessed in this particular campaign. Injustice – particularly the unjust treatment of those who do not share their beliefs – is a recommended dish in most moral menus based on scripture. Injustice is a dish that too many people are trying too hard to serve up as often as they can, and to force down the throats of others.

In the name of God.

Amen.

Religion, Education, and Harry Potter

Michael, at Atheist Perspective, writes a series of rhetorical questions in condemnation of a teacher who was disciplined for refusing to listen to a student read Harry Potter. The teaching assistant believed that the books promoted witchcraft and objected to the book on religious grounds.

The teacher later resigned and is suing the school on the basis of religious discrimination.

Against this, Michael asked:

Isn’t teaching about what’s best for the child and not what’s best for the teacher? What right does a teacher have to supersede the wishes of the parent in what they wish for their child to believe? If your faith is such that you believe Harry Potter to be the work of the devil then you have no place in education. A teacher’s beliefs are secondary to a child’s development. As a teacher your job is to educate the child as the school wishes.

There is every reason to believe that this teacher thinks that these actions are in the best interests of the student, and that resigning is an act of self-sacrifice of a person who puts the (alleged) welfare of the student first. So, these accusations are out of line.

Furthermore, the counter-claim to this is that the state is forcing the teacher to do that which the teacher holds to be immoral. Would a Jewish teach be required to listen to a student read Mein Kampf? What about a black teacher listening while a kid reads some fiction that his racist father gives him where the "hero" of the story is out to rid society of "niggers"?

It is perfectly acceptable for a teacher to declare that these attitudes are wrong. Any offense given to Nazi or White Supremacist parents by a teacher's refusal to present this material in class is irrelevant.

We can't get by with saying that a teacher must listen and promote in class every viewpoint that some parent or other might embrace. Some picking and choosing is necessary.

Clearly, I do not hold that Harry Potter is in the same category as Mein Kampf and white supremacist literature. However, this teaching assistant did believe this - and believed it because her religion told her so.

The Essentials of Education

Speaking bluntly, the purpose of an education system is to fill a child’s brain with true beliefs and good moral values (to build good moral character).

For any who claim that values should not be a part of education – that values should be left up to the parents – I would like to mention the values. Don’t cheat; Don’t lie; Wait your turn; No fighting; Don’t interrupt; Be to class on time; Don’t disrupt the class; Don’t rape your classmates; Don’t destroy school property; Don’t take that which belongs to the school or to other students.

A school that did not teach virtue along with truth would not be a school anybody would choose to go to. In fact, it is logically impossible for a school not to teach values, because even a school that says “it is wrong to teach values in public schools” involves teaching the children a particular attitude towards the teaching of values in public schools.

There is simply no getting around the fact that the public school system is to devote the bulk of its efforts to teaching children which propositions are true, which propositions are false, which desires are virtuous, an which are vicious.

Inevitably, we are going to disagree over which propositions are true or false, and which desires are virtues and vices. In order to live in peace, we must consent to a set of institutions which we will use to resolve these differences – those institutions involving legislatures, courts, school boards, and teachers. We agree to go along peacefully with whatever these institutions decide, while at the same time struggling to make those institutions better.

History tells us that religious disagreements are all too likely to promote bloodshed and civil war. In order to get the people to peacefully agree to what will be taught in public schools, we have reason to support a set of institutions whereby the most important religious propositions are simply going to be ignored. We are only going to teach those propositions where there is a sufficiently broad agreement, and leave violently divisive propositions off of the curriculum.

This is not only true when it comes to teaching the truth or falsity of the propositions within a religion, but also a religion’s most important values – teaching children what to desire.

In order to keep the peace, we must mutually agree to respond to decisions made over what is to be taught, in terms of propositions believed or desired, with campaigns to change the system, rather than through force of arms.

Final Analysis

Given these propositions, I would need to know some additional information before knowing how to react to the case of this particular teacher. The most important part of this case as I see it is the teacher’s claim that, “I cannot listen to the expression of views that I do not agree with.”

We are not talking about a case in which a teacher was being required to engage in a religious ritual or practice that she disagreed with. Nobody was drawing pentagrams on the floor and asking the teacher to repeat the words in some ritual or other. All she was being required to do is to listen to and evaluate the report of some student.

“Exposing me to points of view other than my own while at work is religious discrimination and shall not be permitted.” This is the principle that this teacher’s assistant wants to introduce into our system. However, if we were to adopt this principle, then our school system itself will come to a dead stop. The same rule that demands that she not be exposed to the views of others also requires that others not be exposed to her views – which effectively implies that no person shall be permitted to say anything.

A civilized society requires that each individual at least be able to be exposed to views that are not their own. There are simply some principles that a civilized society needs that transcend ‘freedom of religion’. A prohibition on killing others simply because they do not believe the same religion is one. An willingness to be exposed to others who do not share the same beliefs is another.

An atheist teacher who requires that students talk about their favorite book must be ready to sit and listen to the student who talks about the Bible. Similarly, Christian students in the class would be obligated to sit and listen while somebody brings in the Koran.

In fact, it should be a part of the mission of any school to give children an opportunity to learn about other people with whom they are going to have to live. A huge number of possible professions that the child might want to enter as an adult will require knowing something about systems of belief other than his or her own. If he wants to be a police officer or a physician, he will need to understand how others live. If she wants to be a legislator, she will need to understand the various ways in which the people she represents live. Writers, speakers, advocates, lawyers, even good neighbors need to understand different ways of life.

Those who prevent a school from doing this, prevent the school from giving a child a quality education.

Considerations on Condemnation

In comments to yesterday’s blog, one commenter, ADHR, gave a particularly sophisticated set of responses to my position. I want to take advantage of this opportunity to address these concerns.

Yesterday, ADHR pointed out that a statement that I made, When people act so as to make the lives of others worse off than they would have otherwise been, and uses poor reasoning to defend their action, it is perfectly legitimate to condemn them for it. could not be taken as literally true. There are countless cases, rising from ignorance to a lack of options, where people act in ways that make the lives of others worse off without doing anything worthy of condemnation.

I made this statement in the context of a discussion as to whether somebody who owns a pharmacy should be permitted to refuse to sell birth control for religious reasons. I argued that such a decision deserves private condemnation but not violence (whether in the form of private violence or criminal penalties).

The objection is entirely accurate. As written, my statement above fit into a theory of morality that evaluated actions according to their intrinsic merit – that making another worse off is not only intrinsically wrong but deserving of condemnation. It is not a theory that I hold to.

I wrote too quickly.

It would have been more precise for me to say that the desires of others (the desire to have more ready access to prescription drugs they want) gives them reason to evaluate the attitudes of those who could easily fulfill those desires, but who refuse to do so. These thwarted (legitimate) desires gives them reasons-for-action for condemning, so as to inhibit, the owners.

This justification for condemnation comes from the fact that a person of good moral character would have presumed in favor of providing his or her neighbors with what they want, and would have accepted the need to thwart those desires only after receiving proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the owners are using religious arguments, no proof beyond a reasonable doubt is being offered.

When it comes to doing harm to others, “Because I have faith that my God would be pleased by the harm that I do to you,” does not qualify as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the harm is necessary.

However, I argue that these reasons-for-action for condemning this owners’ attitude do not justify physical violence in the form of criminal penalties. I argue that, for the sake of keeping the peace, there should be a strong presumption in favor of liberty that is only outweighed by evidence beyond reasonable doubt of significant harm to others.

ADHR’s first example does demonstrate that the original expression, taken literally, does fail. Indeed, all moral theories that base morality on the intrinsic value of actions will fail, because intrinsic value does not exist, and actions are caused by desire.

ADHR goes on to raise objections against introducing desires to solve this problem. And, I have to see if I get this right, because it is a sophisticated set of objections.

If a good desire is defined in terms of fulfilling the desires of others, what is it that defines the desires others have?

I cannot tell if ADHR is familiar with other posts that I have written that addressed this question. I regret that, as this post gets longer, I tend to write as if my readers are familiar with everything else that I have written, which is certainly a false assumption.

Either way, a ‘desire that P’ is a propositional attitude such that the agent with the desire is moved to make or keep P true to a degree determined by the strength of the desire. We explain and predict intentional action by postulating a set of beliefs (attitudes that a particular proposition is true or false) and desires (attitudes that a particular proposition is to be made or kept true or false) assigning different strengths to desires until we have the best explanation and can make the best predictions about an agent’s intentional actions.

Desires are the only reasons for intentional action that exist.

Desires are the only reasons that exist for or against condemning a particular (type of) person. Condemnation makes sense as a tool for inhibiting desire-thwarting desires.

An agent acts to fulfill the more and stronger of his desires, given his beliefs – and seeks to act so as to fulfill the more and stronger of his desires.

Since the bad desire only causes actions that generally prevent the fulfillment of the desires of others, and the good desire only causes actions that generally fulfill the desires of others, it follows that the good desire can cause an action that, in a particular case, prevents the fulfillment of the desires of others (and vice versa for a bad desire causing a beneficial action).

Yes, it is true that on this theory a person will sometimes act in ways that thwart the desires of others. This happens when the desires that will cause an agent to behave differently in the current situation would tend to cause agents to fulfill more and stronger desires in other actual situations. If it is the case that condemnation followed actually acting so as to make the lives of others worse off, then under these conditions condemnation would be appropriate.

Yes, I know that this is what I said in the quote above.

I miswrote. I was trying to come up with a statement that was close enough to the truth to work in a post without getting too technical.

So, ultimately, we are looking for what people generally have the more and the stronger reason to condemn. They have the more and the stronger reason to condemn where condemnation will inhibit attitudes (desires) that tend to thwart the desires of others. In the case of the pharmacy owners who choose not to fulfill prescriptions to birth control, this clearly thwarts the desires of others. This gives others a reason to condemn the attitudes responsible for this choice, so as to reduce the incidence of these desire-thwarting attitudes.

Note that in desire utilitarianism a desire is fulfilled if the proposition that is the object of a desire is made or kept true, and thwarted if the proposition that is the object of a desire is made or kept false. Desires that have as their object a proposition that cannot be true (e.g., “I serve God’s will) cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, nothing in the real world can be judged negatively by saying that they interfere with the fulfillment of such a desire. If the owners of the pharmacy are desiring to fulfill God’s will, nobody can interfere with that result, because no person can, in fact, ever fulfill the will of a God that does not exist.

Anyway, condemnation may inhibit attitudes that thwart the desires of others even where those attitudes, in some rare circumstance, actually fulfill desires.

Birth Control and Business Choices

Where I am spending some time visiting my mother, there is a controversy about a nearby drug store which is refusing to fill prescriptions having to do with birth control. The store in question is the nearest store to where my mother lives, and the only pharmacy in the neighborhood. It has recently been purchased by a couple who are Catholic and who announced that they would use this policy in their store. The local newspaper picked up the announcement and the story has generated a fair amount of debate.

The debate concerns a conflict between the rights of a store owner to sell what they please, versus the rights of individuals to obtain whatever legal medical care is available without being required to pass a religious test.

On the side of store owners being able to sell what they please, we must consider the case of a grocery store that makes a choice not to sell meat. Most people would not get too upset about the option. We do not require a grocery store to sell every type of legal food available. Indeed, we permit some grocery stores to sell only a limited set of foods. We do not call this an act of discrimination or bigotry against customers who do not like the food that the store serves. We simply say something like, “This is a vegetarian grocery store,” and we move on.

Similarly, we do not hold that a Catholic church is guilty of discrimination for holding only Catholic religious ceremonies. They are not engaging in discrimination against Jews and Muslims because they do not host religious ceremonies outside of their own tradition.

An example that is more directly relevant to this is the case of medical care. A hospital is not required to make all possible forms of medical care available to its patients. It can decide not to purchase particularly expensive equipment or to have particular types of skills represented among its doctors. This is its right.

Yet, there is an important difference in the case of people seeking birth control and other forms of medication when compared to people seeking a good steak or a place to pray. In the case of buying meat and prayer, the inconveniences are small, and we have less reason to condemn private beliefs for these costs. In the case of birth control and similar medical options, the price is significantly larger. In other words, this is a case in which the world would have been a better place if people did not have attitudes such as these, so people have much stronger reason to condemn those who have these attitudes.

Religion, Harm, and Causation

I would like to use this opportunity to briefly discuss the relationship between religion and harm. A few days ago I criticized Christopher Hitchens for making claims about similar situations that the only reason these wrongs get done is because of religion. In spite of my protests to the contrary, I worry about some people taking my argument to mean that I think that religion is impotent, and that we can ignore religion as a cause of harm.

I would like to use a quick analogy to explain my position.

Imagine that somebody in Colorado hops into a 1967 pickup and heads off to San Francisco. In a case like this, we would have to acknowledge that the 1967 pickup is not impotent – it has the ability to take a person from Colorado to San Francisco. However, the fact that it is not impotent does not imply that it is uniquely potent.

If we rid the world of 1967 pickups, we can rest assured that nobody will ever go from Colorado to San Francisco in a 1967 pickup. However, it is still the case that there are substitutes – that people in Colorado can still travel to San Francisco in something other than a 1967 Pickup.

My view on the relationship between religion and harm follows this model. Clearly, religion is not impotent – it can and is used to get people to adopt attitudes that adversely affect the well-being of others, as in the case of the couple that purchased the nearby pharmacy.

However, acknowledging that religion has the power to cause people to adopt attitudes that diminish the well-being of others does not imply that religion is the only entity with this power. Acknowledging that a 1967 pickup can get a person from Colorado to San Francisco is not the same as acknowledging that it is the only vehicle one can use to get to San Francisco from Colorado.

Consequently, I can condemn a particular set of religious beliefs, in this case, for creating a situation that will make the lives of some of my wife’s neighbors worse off than they otherwise would have been. I can say that they are being made worse off for no good reason. In saying this, I am not saying that non-religious options cannot generate the same (or worse) results. This can still be true, even if this time religion, and not some other entity, fills this role.

Condemnation

When people act so as to make the lives of others worse off than they would have otherwise been, and uses poor reasoning to defend their action, it is perfectly legitimate to condemn them for it. Condemning a person for saying or doing something contemptible is not the same as violating their rights.

This couple can quite honestly say that they have the right to choose what to sell in their store. However, I have argued that a ‘right’ to do something only means that a person should be free to do that thing without somebody responding directly with violence and harm. The right of the American Nazi Party to hold a march through some Jewish neighborhood means that they have a right against violent interference with their actions. It is not a right to be free from condemnation. Nor is it a right to be free from whatever private actions (e.g., boycotts) in response to their adopting this policy.

It is a matter of empirical fact that these people will be making the lives of many of those in the neighborhood worse than those lives would otherwise have been. I also assert that they have no good reason to do so. The desire on the part of others that this attitude is thwarting gives them reason to inhibit this attitude through condemnation and private actions. An interest in preserving the peace denies others the right to inhibit this attitude through formal sanctions or violence.

In fact, I would argue that it is a bit counter-productive to focus on the question of whether the state should require these owners to sell a product they do not wish to sell. Instead, I would propose using this as an example of people who are acting in ways that lower the quality of life of others. Claiming that people have a right to practice their religion seems quite benign, until one points out that what their religion commands them to act in ways that are harmful to others.

Summary

This is also a case in which people are using religious arguments to defend actions that make the quality of life worse for others. Those arguments are highly questionable. Those who are to be made worse off by the actions of others have a right to condemn others who use such poor reasons for doing harm.

All of this is quite consistent with the claim that religion is not the only medium one can use to ‘justify’ doing harm to others, and that where no religion exists we can still expect people to form ‘tribes’ that treat outsiders unjustly an even brutally. Animals – particularly primates – form groups like this without any belief in a God to guide them.

It is the medium being used in this case, and those who do so are deserving of some measure of condemnation for it.

Colin Powell: Defending the Iraq Invasion

Tim Russert interviewed former Secretary of State Colin Powell on Meet the Press today, where Powell said something that I find particularly interesting.

I cannot tell you why in the intelligence community, the people who put out burn notices – meaning, “Don’t trust this source,” – those burn notices never rose to the right level. One of the things that I am most irate about is that I have reason to believe that in the CIA on the nights we were out there until midnight every night putting this presentation together and trying to make it air tight there were people in the room who knew that burn notices had gone out on some of these sources and that was not raised to me or to [former CIA director] Mr. Tenet.

Let’s be clear about this. Colin Powell was preparing for a key speech to justify an American act of aggression against Iraq. Powell was giving this speech because, unlike Bush, Cheney, and others in the Administration, people trusted that Powell would not say anything he did not believe to be true. If Powell was sitting before the United Nations saying that we had reliable intelligence that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, then we can rest assured that the United States had reliable information.

True to his role in this (at least, according to Powell’s own testimony) he went over the information carefully and picked only conclusions that had multiple reliable sources. He said, for example, regarding the testimony that Iraq had mobile chemical weapons laboratories, that he had been assured that there were four independent sources confirming this conclusion.

The reason Powell was able to sit before the United Nations and give this false data is because people in the room decided – on their own or under orders from a higher source – not to tell Powell and Tenet that “burn orders” (warnings of a lack of reliability) had gone out on some of these sources.

When Russert asked Powell why he thought that this was the case, Powell answered:

I can’t answer that question. This is for others . . . I am not the investigator of the intelligence community. But if I was, we would be having very long meetings about this.

Indeed, this appears to be something about which there should be very long meetings.

There has been some sense of outrage over the fact that faulty intelligence made its way into the State of the Union speech. Bush said that there was intelligence indicating that Iraq was trying to buy raw material for nuclear weapons from Niger when intelligence experts had determined that the documents providing this evidence were forged. Even here, some people have asked why the Bush Administration does not seem to be at all embarrassed by this revelation. They certainly are not doing anything to ferret out who was responsible for putting bad data into the State of the Union speech. It is as if the Bush Administration does not see anything wrong with allowing the President to build the case for war based on faulty intelligence.

Indeed, Bush Administration members are behaving very much as if they have no antipathy at all to the idea of faulty information appearing in the President’s State of the Union Message. A person who misses an appointment, even if done for good reason, recognizes that at least a prima facie wrong had been done. He uses the words, “I’m sorry,” to show that he was aware of his expectations and intended to meet those expectations. Failure to use these words on the part of the Bush Administration suggests that they do not, in fact, sense any type of moral requirement to be honest to the American people and to refrain from ‘intelligence’ that is known to be faulty.

The case of getting false data into Colin Powell’s speech before the United Nations – an instance of the same type of moral crime – a crime of omission when it came to mentioning that certain sources of information were not reliable – is just as worthy of our concern.

Again, we see no concern coming from President Bush, Vice President Cheney, or other members of the Bush Administration. Again, this type of behavior indicates that they have no aversion (no sense of shame or embarrassment) in putting out false information before the public If they were the slightest bit embarrassed by what happened, they would seek to find out who was responsible for this embarrassment, and make sure that the culprit got the punishment he deserved.

Powell’s reaction demonstrates that he has a proper appreciation for the moral weight of this situation. The reaction from the rest of the Bush Administration shows that, at the very least, they suffer from a certain moral blindness that prevents them from seeing that a serious moral crime has been committed. They refuse to be embarrassed about something for which any morally decent human being would be greatly embarrassed.

The fault here rests as well with the American people. The best way to promote embarrassment, where embarrassment is appropriate, is to condemn those who would cause this embarrassment, and condemn those who let the culprits get away with this moral crime. If the Bush Administration is not guilty of committing the moral crime itself, it is at least guilty of giving the culprits a free pass, thus encouraging more of the same type of behavior in future generations.

This latter point ties in with another claim that Powell made during this interview. Powell said that if he were in charge he would close down Guantanamo Bay immediately, bring its prisoners into the United States, and put them into the Federal judicial system.

[I]f it was up to me, I would close Guantanamo, not tomorrow, this afternoon. I’d close it. And I’d not let any of those people go. I would simply move them to the United States and put them into our federal legal system. The concern was well, then they’ll have access to lawyers, then they’ll have access to writs of habeas corpus. . . America, unfortunately, has too million people in jail, all of whom had lawyers and access to writs of habeas corpus. And so we can handle bad people in our system . . . because every morning I pick up a paper and some authoritarian figure, some person somewhere, is using Guantanamo to hide their own misdeeds.

I have argued before that the Bush Administration suffers from a fundamental moral blindness – an inability to reason through whether it is a morally good idea to follow a particular policy. Every action that the Bush Administration performs, it tells the world – including the dictators, warlords, and other tyrants of the world, that this is a permissible thing to do. When Bush imprisons people indefinitely, it tells the world that indefinite imprisonment is a permissible option. When Bush has prisoners tortured it tells the world that the torture of prisoners is permissible.

When the Bush Administration allows faulty data to get into the State of the Union Speech and Powell’s speech before the United Nations, without showing any embarrassment over the fact or any attempt to ferret out those responsible for this situation, they tell the world that this type of behavior is permissible, and that we ought to see more of it.

This is one way that a morally astute person can judge the morality of his actions. He can ask whether he has reasons to promote a society in which everybody had those desires that would motivate people to perform the types of actions that he endorses. Do we have reason to want to live in a society where people do not care whether the vital statements of key state leaders knowingly contain false and misleading information?

I suggest that we do not. Instead, we have reason to promote a strong sense of embarrassment among those who are caught making false statements to the public, and for this acute sense of embarrassment to motivate them to take steps to prevent anything like this happening again. Leaders who do not take these steps are blind to the low moral quality of these types of actions.

J.S. Mill: Socrates Dissatisfied vs. Pig Satisfied

Introduction

With the Beyond Belief 2006 series having come to a close, I am in need of something new to write about on the weekends. I have decided in favor of a series of posts describing the philosophical roots of desire utilitarianism. The first historical philosopher that I want to discuss in this context is John Stuart Mill.

In his book, Utilitarianism, J.S. Mill gives a length defense of the idea that:

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

This has long been taken to be a problem with Mill's philosophy because it seems to directly contradict utilitarianism. If somebody holds that pleasure is the only good, and pain is the only evil, then in what sense can Socrates dissatisfied be better than a pig satisfied? The latter seems to clearly have more pleasure than the former. Claiming that the former has more value requires the assumption that value can be found in something other than pleasure. Yet, if value can be found in something other than pleasure, than there must be value in something other than utility, and utilitarianism itself is contradicted.

Directly Evaluating Desires

If we look at Mill's claim, we can find that a part of his defense rests with claims that a desire utilitarian would certainly want to make.

Specifically, when Mill talks about the difference between a Socrates satisfied and a pig dissatisfied, he asks us to consider both types of pleasure, and then asks us to consider which is the most desirable. As mentioned above, one is to consider one value beside the other and to judge which of the two options the evaluator wishes more.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.

Mill states that it is an "unquestionable fact" that anybody acquainted with the two "pleasures" would prefer one over the other. His argument appears to suggest that this universal agreement proves that there is quality of value that is higher in the pleasure of the former over the pleasure of the latter. Mill can be questioned on both of these grounds; that not everybody would give the assent he claims, and even if they did this would only prove an inter-subjective preference not a difference in intrinsic worth.

Still, Mill gives us a way of evaluating different desires – such as the desires of the pig versus the desires of Socrates. We can evaluate desires by determining whether the desires themselves are the objects of second order desires - desires to have (or to not have) particular desries. In a desire-utilitarian system, desires themselves have value according to how well they fulfill other desires. This applies not only to the value that a desire has as a means to fulfilling other desires (as a tool, or an instrument, useful in fulfilling other desires), but the degree to which desires themselves (or states of affairs in which one has particular desires) are desired.

Not withstanding that some do not have a preference to be Socrates dissatisfied over a pig satisfied, and that even if they did this would only prove that people have a common preference, insofar as people do have a preference for Socrates dissatisfied over a pig satisfied, they have reason-for-action for bringing about a state of Socrates dissatisfied rather than a state of pig satisfied (if they must choose).

Indirectly Evaluating Desires

Another way of evaluating a desire (in addition to whether or not it is desired) is by whether or not it tends to lead indirectly to the fulfillment of other desires. In other words, we can recommend certain desires and aversions because of their usefulness.

I want to start looking at this option by noting that Mill does not require that people always and only act from a principle of utility. Other motives can direct a person’s actions.

The great majority of good actions are intended not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of any one else.

An agent can act simply to realize something that he desires (other than general utility). Yet, we can still evaluate that desire by its usefulness - by its tendency to fulfill other desires.

In the case of abstinences indeed - of things which people forbear to do from moral considerations, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial - it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practised generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.

If Mill thought that we are to promote utility in all instances, then the above passage of foregoing instances that maximize utility would be frowned upon. Yet, Mill clearly states that a person should forego an instance of maximizing utility if the general practice "would be generally injurious". This would apply in cases where the desire for something is a desire that tends to thwart other desires.

Promoting Good Desires; Inhibiting Bad Desires

Finally, it is the purpose of law and social institutions to promote interests (desires) that are in harmony with the desires of others.

laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole . . . so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.

Mill's arguments for this position are the source of later interpretations that Mill was a rule utilitarian

It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another.

These landmarks or guideposts, according to Mill, are necessary because we cannot be expected to calculate utility entirely from scratch at the moment of every action. Indeed, it would be irrational for us to do so.

Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy, because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with it ready calculated . . .

And so it is with morality, that we enter into our moral universe with certain guideposts and landmarks already calculated. The rational person does not refer to the principle of utility itself in deciding each individual question, but refers instead to guideposts that have been calculated, debated, and promoted through thousands of years of civilization. He uses rules that, as a matter of experience, tend to produce far better results than the time-consuming task of evaluating every option from scratch

Desire utilitarianism makes the further claim that these rules are written into the brain in the form of culturally acquired 'sense' of right and wrong – in fact, a culturally acquired desire for or aversion to particular actions. The person who appeals to his or her 'conscience' in making decisions appeals to these desires and aversions as guideposts and landmarks.

However – and this is important – those guideposts are capable of being flawed, miscalculated. A person who appeals to his conscience can still perform wrong actions. More specifically, actions are not right or wrong in virtue of the testimony of conscience, and anybody who appeals to conscience as the final resting place of moral argument are mistaken. The 'guideposts' of conscience themselves need to be justified – shown good or bad – by their tendency to promote or inhibit overall utility.

Conclusion

Once again; under Mill's rule utilitarianism, a person can and should appeal to their conscience in making moral decisions. However, conscience is not the end of moral argument. We can also ask whether a state in which people generally have a particular conscience would tend to promote or inhibit the universal good.

The traditional interpretation of Mill is that these guideposts take the form of rules.

This interpretation leads Mill to a problem. Why should we follow the rule even when we know that it will not maximize utility? This would be as absurd as saying that the navigator has an obligation to continue to follow his rules of thumb even after he has determined that they are pointing him in the wrong direction. This would be madness.

However, another possible interpretation is that these guideposts take the form of learned sentiments of approval or disapproval – desires for and aversions to – certain types of actions. If these guideposts are desires, rather than rules, then the problem disappears. As desires, the 'landmarks' themselves become not only a means for getting to some final destination, but a destination in their own rights. If your goal is to get to New York from Kansas, then you have no reason to take a side street in Ohio that you know takes you out of your way. However, if you have a desire to get to New York from Kansas by going through Ohio, then the side trip to Ohio is no longer a distraction.

As described, Mill makes it much of the way to desire utilitarianism. He has rules functioning as landmarks for maximizing utility. These landmarks are to be taken to be the guideposts of utility. These landmarks are, among other things, the dictates of conscience. However, conscience is not the end of moral questioning. We must still ask whether it is conducive to utility to have individuals generally with a particular conscience. These sentiments, including the moral sentiments, are not only to be evaluated according to their usefulness. They are also to be evaluated according to whether they fulfill desires more directly – such as the stronger desire to be Socrates unsatisfied than a pig satisfied.

We only need to add a few drops of desire utilitarianism to Mill's theory of utilitarianism to create a theory that can handle many of the objections raised against it.

Christopher Hitchens on the Evils of Religion

I think that I am getting too many readers, so it is time for me to get rid of a few. It is quite predictable that when I write against some atheist hero, a fair number of readers decide that my blog is no longer worth reading. Today, I will accomplish this pruning by criticizing the arguments of Christopher Hitchens.

Hitchens does not speak for me. He makes narrow-minded, bigoted statements that 10 minutes of rational consideration can refute. Yet, he makes them, because they are easy to make. Also, I suspect that it weighs on his mind, subconsciously if not consciously, that a more careful and accurate description of the matter would not draw nearly as large an audience.

For example, Townhall.com contains a transcript of a debate involving Christopher Hitchens and Mark Robins, moderated by Hugh Hewitt. In it, Hitchens says,

There’s a great deal of wickedness that’s attributable purely to religious belief. Morally normal people wouldn’t do these things if they didn’t think God was desiring them to do so.

The claim that we can attribute so much wrongdoing to religious belief is simply false. Furthermore, the argument against Hitchens can be drawn from claims that Hitchen himself makes and defends.

Atheism and Evil

When discussing the good that religion does, Hitchens offers the following challenge:

You have to name a moral action taken, or a moral statement uttered by a person of faith that could not be taken or uttered by a non-believer.

This is a legitimate challenge, which I gave in an earlier post on, “The Good that Atheists Would Not Do.” Here, I disagree with Hitchens on another small matter. Hitchens says that the assumption built into the claim that religion does good – the assumption that this is a good that atheists would not do – is “a slightly insulting one”. In fact, it is deeply insulting and should be considered one of the worst forms of bigotry.

However, this touches on my objection to Hitchens. Because, just as claims that religion does good in the world are claims that these are goods that no atheist would perform, the claim that religion does evil in the world are claims that these are evils that no atheist would perform.

I can repeat Hitchens’ objection. Hitchens has to name an immoral action taken, or an immoral statement uttered by a person of faith that could not be taken or uttered by a non-believer.

The immediate comeback would likely to be to name some evil and to claim that it was done in the name of God. It is certainly true that no non-believer can honestly claim to be doing evil in the name of God. However, this is not a relevant difference. The same can be said on behalf of the good that people do. No atheist can honestly claim to be doing good in the name of God. However, he can honestly claim to be doing the same good. Similarly, no atheist can honestly claim to be doing evil in the name of God. However, he can still do the same evil.

Is there any evil that a theist could do that an atheist could not do (for some reason other than belief in God)?

There is none.

Consequently, just as claims asserting the good that religion does contain the bigoted assumption that these are goods that no atheist would do, asserting the evil that religion does contains a bigoted assumption that these are evils that no atheist would do.

Just as this is no slight insult against atheists to claim that these are goods that atheists would not do, it is no slight insult against theists to claim that these are evils that no atheist would do.

Cherry Picking

Another example of this bigotry at work starts with the well-observed fact that theists ‘cherry pick’ their religious beliefs. When some atheists, such as Hitchens, attempt to explain why certain evils are done in the world, they say “because of scripture.” When they make this claim they are offering what is, in fact, a scientific explanation for a set of observations. The observations are certain evils allegedly done in the name of some God. The explanation is, “because of scripture.”

As a rational explanation for this set of observations, it utterly fails.

Imagine watching a group of workers as they pick cherries. You seek an explanation for what they are doing. As a worker plucks a cherry from the tree, you ask, “Why did you do that?” He answers, “Because it is a cherry.”

Immediately, you know that this is not inadequate. The hypothesis that the reason for his action is to pick cherries is falsified by the fact that there are a lot of cherries on the tree that he will not pick. He will only pick a certain subset of all the cherries. This tells you that, “Because it is a cherry,” is, at best, an incomplete answer.

The same is true of those who cherry-pick scripture for their moral system. Somebody comes along and asks, “Why did you pick that particular moral prescription?” The answer comes back, “Because it is scripture.” However, a great deal of scripture is ignored. This is enough to prove that the answer, “Because it is scripture,” is, at best, inadequate.

Somewhere there must be a standard that they are using to determine which scripture they pick and which they leave behind. Where does this standard come from? This standard that they use to determine which scripture to pick and which to leave is the true source of morality. Whatever this source is, it is NOT scripture.

This problem is compounded by the fact that our cherry pickers are not picking cherries. In the case of religious ethics, religious people do not only pick scripture that fits their ethics (leaving the rest behind), they pick moral principles that are not to be found in scripture. They accept the abolition of slavery and certain principles fundamental to democracy even where there is nothing in scripture that advocates a democratic form of government.

Where do theists get these principles?

“Scripture” utterly fails to explain the phenomena in question. Yet “scripture” is what certain atheists such as Hitchens say is the source of great evil. That evil does not come from scripture, it comes from whatever source people use to determine which parts of scripture to accept, which to reject, and which to add to scripture.

History

There is one last problem with the idea that evil comes from scripture. This is the historical fact that, whatever made it into scripture is something that people thought of and accepted well before they wrote it into scripture.

Scriptures were not handed down by God. It seems strange to have to say this to an audience that is made up substantially of atheists. However, the proposition, “Scripture is responsible for this evil,” can come only if we forget, momentarily, where scripture itself came from. It came from a set of ideas that humans adopted without any divine intervention at all – ideas that a pre-scripture people still came to think of as good ideas.

This directly contradicts Hitchens’ claim that, “Morally normal people wouldn’t do these things if they didn’t think God was desiring them to do so.” Morally normal people were the ones who decided (and are still deciding) that a God wants them to do these things. The reason they claim that God desires these things is because they want God to desire these things, and they want God to desire these things because they want these things. Or, at least, they wanted these things at the time they were inventing and defining God.

Everything in scripture is evidence of what humans are capable of dreaming up and finding acceptable in the absence of scripture, because this was where scripture came from.

Conclusion

Every evil that has found its way into scripture is an evil that humans are capable of accepting in the absence of scripture. If this were not true, then these evils would not have found their way into scripture to begin with.

Every evil that people cherry-pick out of scripture is an evil that humans are capable of accepting in the absence of scripture. If this were not true, then people would not see these evils as ripe for the picking. They would ignore these evils, as they ignore all passages that report things that they reject.

Religion is not the source of these evils.

One of the sources of evil is a human tendency to divide the world up into groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’ – and to embrace easily refutable claims that ‘us’ – the master race, the chosen people – are immune to the evils that afflict ‘them’ – the lesser beings. It is found in the ease with which people embrace and cheer those who say, “If we can only rid the world of ‘them’, the world would be a better place.”

The idea that religion is the root of all evil is one of those easily refutable claims. It takes only a few minutes of reflection to hold that the evils that we find in religion are evils that have a source outside of religion, and that atheists have no magical immunity from the true source of evil.

It is an issue of which theory best explains and predicts a set of observations. Either religion is the root of all evil (in which case we are left wondering how that evil got into scripture in the first place), or people have an inherent affinity for philosophies that divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ that tend to blind them to poor arguments used in defense of these divisions. This explains both the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ of scripture, and why many atheist fail to see the flaws in their own ‘us’ versus ‘them’ philosophies.

This alternative hypothesis predicts that if religions were to disappear, and atheists ruled the world, that atheists would find other (equally unreasonable) reasons to divide the world into groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the violence would not diminish. We cannot end the violence by ending religion. We can only end the violence by fighting the root causes of evil that afflict the religious and non-religious alike.

As long as atheists divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ on religious grounds, they leave themselves vulnerable to the causes of evil that can be found in our nature. If religion is the root of all evil, we can ignore the tendency to embrace unreasonable claims that ‘we’ are inherently superior to ‘them’ and must rid the world of ‘them’ if we are to know peace. We can simply refuse to ask, “Is this claim that ‘they’ are responsible for all evil – and it is not to be found elsewhere – truly reasonable?”

I know, in order to boost readership I am supposed to join those defend this claim. Humans have a basic affinity for these types of assertions and to embrace those who make them. However, having a fundamental desire to accept certain types of beliefs does not make them true, or make the willingness to embrace them moral. In fact, reason suggests that the opposite is true. So this is what I write, instead.

Pardoning Libby

Announcement:

In my new efforts to add a bit more work rather than just writing these long essays, I have created a second blog called Atheist Ethicist Journal to deal with a number of smaller projects. My introductory message mentions Wikipedia and Borofkin’s decision to create a mini wiki on desire utilitarianism, and some effort that those who have wanted to volunteer could contribute.

The second blog will allow me to make minor follow-up comments on the news of the day relevant to my longer essays here, illustrate progress in my various tasks, and communicate in a less rigid and formal way with those who have expressed some interest in my work.

Essay: Pardoning Libby

This post is on the prospects of pardoning I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby. However, it is not an argument for why it should not be done. It is written in condemnation of some of the arguments given for saying it should be done.

It also raises concerns about those who would use a particular argument against a pardon.

According to the Washington Post,

. . . aides worry about the political consequences of stepping into a case that stems from the origins of the Iraq war and renewing questions about the truthfulness of the Bush administration.

This would be like a staff member for some congressman saying that he is concerned about the congressman having sex with underage pages because of the "political consequences" of such an act.

"Political consequences" is a second line of defense - one that is only used when the first line of defense, "because it is wrong," has already been breached.

When both psychological barriers against wrongdoing have been breached - the ‘because it is wrong’ barrier and ‘because of the political consequences’ barrier – we get Vice President Cheney, and others who actually favor a pardon.

Libby was convicted of interfering with an investigation into who was responsible for outing an undercover CIA operative. We have a conviction here, so the “presumption of innocence” that I argued for in earlier postings on the subject no longer apply. We are now free to presume guilt.

We are now free to presume that Libby intentionally misdirected investigators who were seeking to determine if somebody compromised our national security and, if so, to identify and punish that person (or those persons).

What should we do with people who intentionally interfere with attempts to discover those who compromise national security? We are not talking about somebody who exercises known Constitutional rights, like appealing to the 5th Amendment. We are talking about somebody who performed acts that are illegal and that have no Constitutional protections.

Assume that your child is missing. The police are interrogating people trying to discover where your child is at. One person intentionally lies to investigators and conceals information that the investigators have a legal right to acquire. Your child is still missing, and we know that this person intentionally misdirected or obstructed legitimate Police attempts to find her. He has been tried and found guilty in a court of law, so this is not mere idle speculation.

Would you argue that this person should be pardoned?

We have as much or more reason to react to somebody who obstructs an investigation into a potential breech of national security as we would react to somebody who obstructed an investigation into your child’s disappearance.

Now, imagine how you would react to people who said that this person who obstructed an investigation into your child’s disappearance should be pardoned because the police (obstructed, as they were, in their investigation by this person) never found out what happened to your child.

The National Review

According to the Washington Post:

[The conservative National Review] magazine contended that Libby had been "found guilty of process crimes," even though the special prosecutor never brought charges relating to the leak of CIA officer Valerie Plame's name: "He is a dedicated public servant caught in a crazy political fight that should have never happened, convicted of lying about a crime that the prosecutor can't even prove was committed.

We can see the moral principles that the editors of the National Review want us to live under by applying their morality to the case of your child’s disappearance.

Anybody who successfully obstructs an investigation into a child’s disappearance, where the police fail to discover what happened, shall be considered innocent of all wrong doing and, if convicted of a crime, shall be pardoned. The reason they shall be pardoned is precisely because the police failed to discover what happened to the child.

This is in spite of the fact that this individual has been convicted of deliberately misleading the investigation, making it harder for the police to actually discover what happened to your child. This conviction, according to the moral principles endorsed by the editors of the National Review, counts for nothing if your child remains lost.

The Weekly Standard

The Washington Post reports that:

The Weekly Standard followed with a cutting article accusing Bush of abandoning Libby: "So much for loyalty, or decency, or courage. For President Bush, loyalty is apparently a one-way street; decency is something he's for as long as he doesn't have to ake any risks on its behalf; and courage - well, that's nowhere to be seen. Many of us used to respect President Bush. Can one respect him still?"

Frankly, what passes for morality in the Weekly Standard is the type of behavior we would expect from an organized crime family. Whether an act is legal or illegal is does not matter. All that matters is whether the accused is a member of the family. Members of the family can violate laws and harm others with impunity. Only those who are not members of the family need to worry about consequences.

This is nothing but an invitation to lawlessness and obstruction in the Executive branch. The Weekly Standard is effectively saying that, “All key advisors who materially contribute to a failed investigation into matters that might embarrass the Administration should be rewarded for their efforts with a Presidential pardon.”

According to the Washington Post:

Former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney said that they would seriously consider pardoning Libby. . . . Sen. Sam Brownback (Kan.) and Rep. Tom Tancredo (Colo.) said flatly that they would pardon Libby. . . . Former Tennessee senator Fred D. Thompson, a presumed candidate who did not take part in the debate, is a member of Libby's legal defense fund and has called for a pardon.

Giuliani, Romney, Brownback, Tancredo, and Fred Thompson, all need to face a follow-up question. “Are you not saying that a member of your staff who is convicted of perjury an obstructing an investigation that may prove embarrassing to your administration can expect a Presidential pardon as a reward for his efforts?”

The Post reports that Giuliani added, “What the judge did today argues more in favor of a pardon because this is excessive punishment."

If Giuliani wants to set up a commission to investigate all sentences and offer pardons to anybody who his commission judges to have been given excessive punishment, this would be an option. However, for him to single out a member of the Administration for special treatment, while all others who suffer from excessive punishment languish in prison, is unfair favoritism. In effect, this states that the President should feel free to interfere with the criminal courts whenever his or her friends are involved.

The same response applies to Romney’s claim that, “[T]he prosecutor ‘clearly abused prosecutorial discretion.’” The courts have a built-in appeal process for dealing with these types of issues. If they do not determine that such an abuse took place, there is no justification for a pardon. If they determine that such an abuse did take place, then there will be no need for a pardon. Either way, the President has no moral justification for getting involved.

Five Republican candidates for President, including the front-runners, have announced that their staff should feel entitled to Presidential interference in criminal processes on their behalf. If they are caught and convicted of interfering with an investigation that may prove embarrassing to the President, then they should expect to be rewarded for their efforts with a Presidential pardon.

Giuliani might limit his interference to cases of “excessive punishment”, and Romney might limit his to “clearly abused procedural discretion,” but we have reason to wonder what would count as “excessive punishment” or “abused discretion” in these cases. We have reason to wonder how worried their staff members will be when it comes to interfering with investigations of their administrations.

Collaborators

In this political season, I would like to have the term ‘collaborator’ restored to widespread use, and for people seeking a career in politics to loathe the idea of suffering this particular brand.

A collaborator in this context is a person who assists any political faction who evidences a serious intent to destroy the principles of government written into the Constitution, other than through the accepted method of Constitutional amendment.

Two recent events bring this thought to the surface of my mind. The first comes from the recent Democratic and Republican political debates – both of them. The topic of discussion seems to be whether Bush is a competent commander in chief – whether he obtained his desired objectives skillfully. There is far too little discussion of what it is that he seemed to want to accomplish. With respect to some of the goals in the Bush Administration, really, one thing we do not need is a President and an administration that could accomplish those goals competently.

The goals that I am referring to are his attempts to dismantle the Constitution. The Bush Administration has worked systematically to create a form of government where the Constitution is nothing but a figurehead. Its role in American politics would be reduced to something comparable to that of the Queen of England. Its only purpose is ceremonial. People bring it out every now and then so that the public can cheer in its general direction, while he government largely continues in total disregard to what is written there.

In these debates, I have heard almost nothing said about such things as signing statements, warrantless searches and seizures, indefinite arbitrary imprisonment, cruel and unusual treatment of prisoners (I would call it ‘punishment’ – but punishment assumes at least a conviction of wrongdoing, which does not exist in the vast majority of these cases), the duty of the government to provide evidence that a person is guilty and deserving of harm as a condition of depriving somebody of life, liberty, or property.

I have not heard anything on whether any candidate believes that the President has the right to circumvent the legislative and judiciary branches, making these institutions as well the quaint relics of a bygone era – a type of “Colonial Williamsburg” where people dress up and pretend to fill roles once filled by real people with important jobs to do.

The second impetus to this request concerns a question of what we are going to teach our children about government and civic responsibility. Most children who were 12 years old on September 11, 2001 will be graduating from high school this year. They have spent the bulk of their formative years watching us, learning our values, learning what we can reasonably expect from a citizen of this great country.

What have we taught them?

Mostly, they have learned that, if any political faction should work to remove the Constitutional protections that I described above, the most important thing that they are to do with their lives is to wonder about the significance of things like Tom Cruise dancing on Oprah Winfrey’s couch exclaiming his love of Katie Holmes, or the identity of the father of Anne Nichole Smith’s baby. This is what a good citizen does with his day.

Having absorbed these lessons, we can only wonder what this generation will do when, 30 or 40 years from now, some would-be tyrant decides that he wants to be dictator of the United States. When that leader comes to power, what will that generation do to protect those same Constitutional freedoms. (Will there be any Constitutional freedoms for them to protect?)

There is a second, more important concern. How many of them are going to look back on the Bush Administration and the public reaction to their behavior and say, “How hard will it be to establish a more dictatorial government with us in control of everything? Look at the Bush Administration and how far he actually went dismantling the Constitution. And Bush was an idiot. If we avoid his mistakes, we might actually be able to succeed where he failed.”

We are, in effect, making it far more likely that our children or grand children will lose their freedom, because we have created a culture that is indifferent to the losses of those freedoms, while encouraging people to take seriously the possibilities that Bush has opened up for future presidents.

The Bush Administration has made the job much easier for some future tyrant in another way. They will be able to use Bush’s actions as President. Any action that Bush performed, that was not officially rejected by the American people, is an action that is open to some future President. From this moment on, all future Presidents can argue, “The people, Congress, and Courts did nothing to stop Bush from warrantless wiretaps; why are you getting all upset about it now?”

If anybody should answer, “But in 2006, we were at war,” the next President will be able to answer, “That can be arranged.” Because, another one of the powers that Bush has argued for that has not yet been challenged, is the right to attack any country he wants any time he wants by simply uttering the words, ‘national interests’.

The remedy against these possibilities is to teach a children a new and different moral lesson, that those who collaborate in the dismantling of these important freedoms are regarded – as they ought to be rewarded – as the scum of the earth. They are the type of people who deserve nothing better than to be verbally spat upon for the wrongs that they have done, and the wrongs that they have encouraged others to do.

Now, I want to make it clear that I am not talking about forcing a Democrat vs. Republican schism here.

First, the leaders in the Democratic Party have given these issues as little attention as the Republicans. Democrats in control of the House and Senate have taken no action to challenge and dismantle these abuses. I suspect that the front-runners in the Democratic Party, and those who fund them (particularly those who fund them), are looking forward to what they can accomplish with warrantless searches and seizures, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and signing statements.

Second, the Republican Party itself has had a long tradition of supporting Constitutional principles, particularly the value of a limited government and maximum freedom. I do not know where those Republicans have been hiding for the past six years, but it is time for them to come out and assert themselves

The Election Primaries is an excellent opportunity for each party to remove the collaborators from power, and to replace them with people who are more strongly devoted to Constitutional provisions of checks and balances. Party members are not compelled to choose leaders who are opposed to the Constitution. It is a choice – and a choice they must be held responsible for.

When the younger generation sees that collaboration comes with a cost in terms of contempt and political capital, they will have reason to think twice before they endorse similar methods in some future administration. If they see the futility of rendering the Constitution a powerless figurehead of a tyrannical state, they will not be tempted to pursue that option themselves.

For these reasons I argue that it is time to make the term ‘collaborator’ a part of our political vocabulary once again, and to make every politician afraid to wear that label. It is time to teach our children what it is like to stand up and defend those principles, so that they will have had some experience with such things, in case it will become required again in their lifetime.