Obligation, Prohibition, and Permission

This posts concerns what you morally ought to do, what you morally ought not to do, and what is morally permitted but not obligatory - and how to tell the difference.

The Basic Definitions

An act is morally obligatory when that act is what a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would have performed the action in those circumstances.

An act is morally prohibited when the act is one that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would not have performed the action in those circumstances.

An act is morally permitted, but not obligatory, when a person with good desires and lacking bad desires may or may not perform that action in those circumstances, depending on the agent's non-moral (personal) interests and concerns.

Not too long ago, in a posting called "Good Desires, Right Action", I explained what a good desire is. First, in a posting called The Good I explained that for something to be good it must be such as to fulfill the desires in question. Consequently, a good desire is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. Insofar as we are talking about moral goodness, a good desire tends to fulfill other desires regardless of whose they are. Because they tend to fulfill other desires, these are desires that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote universally, using their tools of reward (such as praise) and condemnation (such as punishment) to do so.

This means that if I am morally obligated to perform some action, yet I am not sufficiently strongly motivated to perform that action, then this must mean that I lack good desires or that I have a bad desire. This means that I am the kind of person that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn - and perhaps even to punish.

When we say that people generally have reason to condemn, and perhaps to punish, people of that type, this generally implies that I, too, have reasons to condemn, or perhaps to punish, those people. Condemnation and punishment (as well as rewards such as praise) are tools that have the power to alter the mental states of others - creating desires to do that which is praised and rewarded, and aversions to doing that which is condemned and punished.

Let's take lying as an example. People generally have many and strong reasons to promote a universal aversion to lying, fraud, and other forms of deception. Imagine that you are in a position where you could choose to live in one of two communities. In Community1, people habitually lie and deceive each other whenever they think they can gain an advantage or benefit. They have no aversion to lying, and refrain from lying only when they fear it will make their situation worse off. In the alternative community, people have an aversion to lying. Because of this, they will likely tell the truth even when they could get away with a lie. Having an aversion to lying is like having an aversion to eating broccoli or to holding one's hand over a hot flame. People do not do these things even when they would otherwise benefit because the motivation that the aversion provides outweighs these other incentives. I suspect most readers will see the reasons to prefer the honest community over the deceptive community.

In a sense, we face this choice - a choice concerning what type of community we are going to live in - daily. We often have opportunities to use our power to praise and reward honesty and to condemn and punish dishonesty, fraud, and deception. In doing so, we have the power to promote in others a desire to tell the truth for its own sake, and an aversion to performing acts that are basically dishonest, fraudulent, or deceptive. In this way, we get to decide whether we are going to create a community that is more or less honest, or more or less filled with deception and misrepresentation. If we choose the latter - if we choose to not only allow lies and deception to go unpunished - then we are partially responsible for creating a society in which people generally - including, in all probability, ourselves - is worse off than it would have otherwise been.

Somebody who lies shows that he does not have the requisite good desires and/or has a bad desires. Such a person is the type of person that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn. Even the followers of a President to habitually lies have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps to seek the punishment for, such a person whether they realize or admit this or not. Failure to do so will likely have the unfortunate effect of teaching the next generation that lying is a perfectly legitimate activity when it gets you what you want, meaning that the next generation is going to have to live in a society filled with habitual liars, and will suffer accordingly.

"In Those Circumstances"

These definitions all contained the phrase "in those circumstances". This phrase captures the fact that these obligations and prohibitions often come into conflict. Recall that in The Internalist Objection to Desirism, this aversion to lying would be one aversion among many. It will not prevent a good person from lying when more important values are at stake (e.g., protecting the Jews from the Nazi soldiers or the runaway slaves from the slave catchers, for example). In fact, in those circumstances, a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would lie and protect the innocent person. In those circumstances, one has an obligation to lie - though, again, there may be circumstances where lying could be much too costly even for the person with good desires and lacking bad desires.

However, this does not change the fact that in the vast majority of our everyday circumstances - those not involving Nazi soldiers, slave catchers, or ICE agents who are hunting people they have no moral permission to hunt - where a person with good desires and lacking bad desires will tell the truth. We have an obligation to tell the truth in those circumstances. People generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps to punish, those who do not tell the truth in those circumstances. These include cases such as, for example, if I am trying to sell something to you, or I am trying to convince you to do something (e.g., when I am seeking fully informed consent), or I am providing you with advice on the basis of which you will be making an important decision. These are the types of circumstances where a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would tell the truth, and where each of us has an obligation to tell the truth.

Non-Obligatory Permission

Sometimes, a person with good desires and lacking bad desires still does not have a sufficiently strong reason to choose one option over another. Within broad constraints, there is nothing about having good desires and lacking bad desires in the sense being discussed that dictates what to wear, what to eat, what to read, what profession to enter, where to live, who to marry, or where to shop, when to get out of bed, whether to try to steal second base, or who to invite to the party. This is the realm of non-obligatory permission.

Some moral theories do not allow for a category of non-obligatory permission. Maximizing utilitarian theories (always perform that action that will produce the most utility) and other maximizing consequentialist theories are the most common examples of this. Desirism allows that there are situations in which the motivation provided by good motives (and the lack of motivation provided by the absence of bad motives) provides such a weak motivation in favor of one option over another that other interests and desires can easily override them. It also allows there to be cases that are marginal, where even the person with good desires will struggle to resolve the question of whether he should do is important enough to outweigh what he wants to do instead.

In fact, in some cases, we have reason to want people to come up with different desires. A particularly obvious example is that of choosing a profession. Given a choice, we are far better off in a community where some people like teaching, others like engineering, some like construction, and some enjoy accounting - particularly when compared to a community where everybody wants to do exactly the same job and some are forced into occupations they do not like because they have to be done. We can avoid a great deal of conflict if we encourage diverse preferences for such things as where to live, who to marry, who to invite to the party, and what to study.

Even when some moral considerations are in play - such as the obligation to give to charity - there are reasons to prefer that different people be interested in different charitable activities than that everybody has one and the same concern. Some may be interested in researching cures to cancer or Parkinson's disease, others interested in providing clean water and sanitation, and others concerned with promoting education - because all of these things provide value. Though here, as in other areas (e.g., what profession to take up) morality provides some constraints on the available options. Charitable contributions to terrorists and taking up the occupation of hit-man provide a couple of examples.

Conclusion

This, then, is how desirism handles the moral categories of obligation, prohibition, and non-obligatory permission. They are all defined in terms of what a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would do in the circumstances. They identify the acts that identify the agent as somebody that people generally have many and strong reasons to praise and, perhaps, to reward. At the same time, when an agent acts in ways contrary to what a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would act, then people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps to punish, those people. Yet, there are large portions of our daily lives where we exist in a realm where we can choose from a variety of options. For example, one may decide to satisfy one's obligation to make the world a better place than it would have otherwise been by studying theories of value and presenting one's findings to those who may be interested.

Responding to Criticism: Michael Smith on The Moral Problem

In this post, I try to convince you that I was wrong.

I have been criticizing the view that "There is a reason for you to do X" implies "You have a desire that would be fulfilled by doing X."

I owe it to you, the reader, to give this position the best defense I can provide. There are reasons why so many people believe it - it's not just something they picked at random to have faith in. There is an argument for it. Consequently, I am obligated to explain what this argument is in such a way that it is possible for an intelligent and concerned person to be convinced that it is true. Then one can demonstrate the subtle but important mistake one makes in going from the available reasons to that particular conclusion.

Michael Smith in The Moral Problem provides a defense of the position I am criticizing. In Smith's argument, he has us begin with the assumption that you have convinced you that I have a moral obligation to give 10% of my income to famine relief. So, now, at the end of our discussion, I say, "You're right. I am obligated to give 10% of my income to famine relief." But, then, I also say, "But, I don't care. You've convinced me that I have this obligation, but I am entirely unmoved to do that which I agree that I am obligated to do." The oddness of this conjunction of statements is captured in the proposition, "If I am convinced that I am obligated to perform some action, then I am motivated to perform some action."

If we combine this with a Humean theory of motivation (a move that some consider controversial, but we do not need to get into that here), then this yields the conclusion, "If I am convinced that I am obligated to perform some action, then I have some desire that would be served by my performing that action."

There is a strong and a weak version of this thesis. The strong version says that if I believe that I have an obligation to do something than I am sufficiently strongly motivated to actually do it. If I do not actually perform the action, assuming that I am able to do so, this proves that I do not sincerely believe that I have the obligation. The weak version, in contrast, allows that I can be motivated to perform the action, but that this motive can be outweighed by other motives not to perform the action. We may be able to distinguish these two versions by categorizing the former as an "all things considered ought judgment" and the latter as a "prima facie ought judgment." Since both of these views are mistaken, we do not need to decide between them.

In contrast, Desirism says that convincing me that I have an obligation to donate 10% of my income to famine relief means convincing me that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would donate 10% of their income to famine relief. "Good desires," in turn, are those desires that people generally have reasons to promote universally, while bad desires are those that people generally have reason to inhibit universally.

Desirism allows me to say, "Okay, you have convinced me that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would have performed that action. However, since I do not have the relevant good desires, and do not lack the relevant bad desires, I happen to be unmoved by your argument. I am not the least bit motivated to do that which you have totally convinced me I have an obligation to do."

Consequently, desirism fails to account for the motivation that is intrinsic to being convinced that one has an obligation to do something. Because it cannot account for this observed fact, the theory itself fails and must be discarded.

Obviously, I do not believe this. I think that Smith's argument is flawed. To defend desirism, I either need to question Smith's observations about the relationship between believing one has an obligation and having motivation, or account for that relationship in a way compatible with desirism.

Allow me to take the second route.

Let us look at exactly what I am saying when I say, "You have convinced me that I have an obligation to give 10% of my income to famine relief."

As I already mentioned, this means that you have convinced me that a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would give 10% of his money to famine relief. If I were to then say that, even though I believe what you say, I am not in the least bit motivated to act, then I must be saying, "I either lack some good desires, or I have some bad desires" This, in turn, implies, "People generally have many and strong reasons to condemn - and perhaps even to punish - people like me." It turns out that I do have reasons to avoid condemnation and punishment. Consequently, I do have reasons to do that which I agree that I am obligated to do. However, I am not being moved by any desire to help those in need, or by any desire to do that which I believe is right. I am being moved, instead, by my aversion to condemnation and punishment that, I have agreed, people generally (people like you) have many and strong reasons to inflict on people like me.

These reasons are still not necessary. They are contingent. They depend on the fact that I have reasons to avoid condemnation and punishment. If I were a sufficiently powerful self-sufficient entity who had nothing to fear in terms of punishment and did not care about condemnation, then I would not, in fact, have a reason to do that which I said I had an obligation to do. The situations in which this is most likely to be the case are situations in which I can perform the act without getting caught (or without others even getting suspicious), in which case I can avoid all condemnation and punishment for my evil deeds. This contingent relationship (this denial of a necessary relationship) is something that people such as Smith would object to. After all, an action is wrong even if the agent can get away with it in secret.

Of course, desirism agrees that the action is wrong even when I can get away with it without the least bit of risk of condemnation and punishment. This is because, even though I can get away with the moral crime, it remains true that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps even to punish, people like me. Consequently, the objection that desirism cannot account for the fact that the actions that one can get away with are not wrong fails. Desirism does account for those facts.

Still, desirism states that, if I believe that I can get away with some action without getting caught (and thus avoid condemnation and punishment), I can still agree that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn and, perhaps, to punish people like me (in other words, that performing the action is wrong), and still perform the action without the least bit of hesitation. Yet. even this requires that I have no desire to be the type of person that people generally have reason to praise, and no aversion to being the kind of person that people generally have reason to condemn and punish. Note that if I perform the action without getting caught, I would still be the type of person that people generally have reason to condemn and punish, even if they do not know this fact. To be unmoved by the fact that the action is wrong is to be unmoved by the realization that I am the type of person that people generally have reason to condemn and, perhaps, to punish.

The type of person that can be unmoved by the belief that they have an obligation is turning out to be a very rare type of creature, indeed. Typically, the way people respond to the claim that their actions are wrong is through some sort of rationalization. They say - often to others, but at least to themselves - "The claim that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and to punish, people like me is mistaken. I have good reason for what I do. The only people who will suffer as a result of my theft are the insurance companies, and they are malevolent and exploitative institutions that deserve to suffer. Or, the person who will suffer from my violent assault (or rape) or my destruction of their property is somebody who, in virtue of their past actions, deserves to suffer. Or, "even though they do not realize it and I have not obtained their consent, they will value what I am doing and will, ultimately, be better off because of it." These are among the more common ways of denying the thesis that "people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps to punish, people like me." Or, they may say that, "even though this is a prima facie wrong, it serves a greater good."

In fact, I offer as a partial defense of desirism that it is capable of explaining and predicting the types of claims that wrong-doers will make in their own defense. All of the standard excuses that wrong doers offer are reasons that, if true, would argue against the proposition, "people generally have reasons to condemn or even to punish people like me." If this was not an accurate account of what people mean when they say that some action is wrong, then why is it that these are the arguments that people use when they want to support the thesis that the action actually is not wrong.

In summary, desirism can, in fact, handle the observation that when somebody has been convinced that something is wrong they tend to be motivated not to perform that action. This is because it is a very rare type of creature indeed who can be unmoved by the fact that "people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn, and perhaps to punish, people like me." It is such a rare occurrence that, in the real world, you can almost universally expect that convincing somebody that some action is wrong means motivating him to avoid performing that action.

"I have" vs "There is" a Reason to Do Something

In the previous post, "The Central Problem of Morality", I claimed that I could solve The Central Problem of Morality by employing a distinction between "I have a reason to do something" and "There is a reason for me to do something."

If I have a reason to do something, then I have a desire that would be fulfilled by my doing it. If, on the other hand, there exists a reason for me to do something, then there exists a desire that would be served by my doing it. The desire that exists need not be mine - I am not the only creature in the universe with desires. Consequently "there is a reason to do something" does not imply "I have a desire that would be served by my doing it."

The standard problem of morality as described in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is built on the premise that "there is a reason for me to do something" does imply "I have a desire that would be served by my doing it." It is from this false premise that we get "the central problem of morality". Replace the false premise with a true premise and the central problem of morality disappears.

What SEP calls "the central problem of morality" is found in trying to reconcile (1) If I tell you that something is wrong, it means that there are reasons for you not to do it, (2) to say that there are reasons not to do it is to say that you have a desire that would be served by not doing it, and (3) the wrongness of the act is independent of your desires. Fixing this inconsistent triad is called the "central problem of morality".

You can look at that previous posting for more details.

What I want to do here is to describe this distinction between "I have a reason to do something" and "there is a reason for me to do something" in a bit more detail and try to make its relationship to morality a bit more obvious and easier to understand.

So . . . let me begin with this.

Imagine that you are a creature with an aversion to pain. (I know . . . moral philosophers have this bad habit of using examples that have only the weakest relationship to reality. But, if you please, bear with me a moment, I think this will help.)

Imagine that you are a creature with an aversion to pain, and you are surrounded by creatures that have what we will call a "mesolimbic dopamine pathway" What this brain feature does is that it processes what are called "rewards" and "punishments". The way this system works is that it takes rewards (which we can loosely understand as "things that the agent likes") and punishments (which we can loosely understand as "things that the agent does not like") and processes them so as to generate rules of behavior that tend to increase the chances of "what is liked" happening and "what is not liked" not happening.

Now, there are several important facts and distinctions one has to keep in mind.

First, praise acts as a reward and condemnation acts as a punishment. That is to say, praise tends to generate dispositions to do those things that result in praise, and condemnation tends to generate dispositions to do things other than that which brings condemnation.

Second - and this is important . . .

Rewards and punishments work in two different ways.

The first way is as incentives and deterrence. If you promise to pay somebody to do something, you give him a reason to do it. If you threaten to punish someone if he does not do what you command, this gives him a reason to do what you command. The important thing to make note of is that this is NOT (emphasis, "NOT") what I am talking about when I talk about rewards and punishments (including praise and condemnation) generating reasons for behavior.

The second say is as the causes of new dispositions - desires and aversions. Praise a child for her honesty and she will be more likely to be honest - even under conditions where she cannot expect to receive any praise. She will come to value honesty for its own sake - as an end in itself. If a child is "punished" by, for example, eating a meal that has mushrooms in it that makes him violently ill (even if it has nothing to do with the mushrooms or even the food), the child may well acquire a strong aversion to eating mushrooms. Put such a meal in front of the child in the future and he will turn away. Similarly, condemnation and punishment will tend to form strong dispositions to avoid that which caused the condemnation and punishment. This is the effect that I am focusing on in this blog posting.

Now, a quick summary. You have an aversion to pain. You are surrounded by creatures with a "reward system" whereby, by praising and rewarding those who avoid actions that cause pain, and condemning and punishing those who perform actions that cause pain, you can potentially promote in others an aversion to performing actions that will cause you pain. You certainly have a reason (note the use of the phrase "have a reason") to praise and reward those who avoid causing pain to others, as well as to condemn and punish those who do not. Furthermore, you have a reason to promote this aversion to causing pain universally - in everybody else, without exception. The more people who have this aversion to causing pain, and the stronger that aversion is, the less likely it will be the case that you will experience pain. So . . . go ahead . . . use your powers of praise and condemnation, and reward and punishment (to the degree that you can safely do so) to promote, universally, in others an aversion to causing pain. It sounds like a good idea.

Now, I want to add one more stipulation - which is that you are not so different from the other creatures in your community. In other words, just like you, they have an aversion to their own pain just as you have an aversion to your own pain. Furthermore, your brain contains a reward system just as theirs does. Consequently, just as it is the case that you have reason to praise and reward those who avoid causing pain to others, and to condemn and punish those who cause pain to others, those others have reason to praise and reward you when you avoid causing pain to others, and to condemn and punish you if you should cause pain to others.

Under these conditions, we can say that it is true that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote, universally, an aversion to causing pain to others. So, how are we going to communicate this fact to others?

We share a common language.

I have an idea. We can say that it is "wrong" to cause pain to others. When we say this, we will mean, of course, that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote, universally, an aversion to causing pain to others. However, I think we can be a bit more efficient than that. We can include as a part of the meaning of the term "wrong" the act of condemnation itself. When we say that what somebody did was wrong we are not only reporting a fact about the desires that people generally have reason to promote universally, we are - at the same time and in the same breath - making a statement of condemnation. "What you did was wrong," not only tells a person, "You did something that people generally have reasons to promote an aversion to doing through condemnation and punishment." We are also saying, "We condemn you. We hold you in contempt. Behold our anger and indignation as your wrongdoing."

An interesting side note about punishment. We often intentionally harm others, but it is not always punishment. A doctor who gives a child a vaccine causes the child pain. But it is not a punishment. For something to count as punishment - in the social and legal sense - it must contain an element of condemnation. It must contain an element of condemnation to count as "punishment".

Anyway, my goal here is to elaborate on how the distinction between "Agent1 has a reason to do something" and "there is a reason for Agent1 to do something" solves the central problem of morality.

Notice that, in the above example, when we tell somebody "causing pain to others is wrong" we are NOT (emphasis "NOT") saying that he has a reason to avoid causing pain to others. We are saying that he SHOULD have a reason to avoid causing pain to others and, by that, we mean that there are reasons to condemn and, perhaps, punish those who cause pain to others as a way of giving them a reason to avoid causing pain to others. Note that, when we say, "we are going to give you a reason to avoid causing pain to others," we are generally talking about both methods described above. That is to say, we are promising not only to use condemnation and punishment as a deterrence, but we are also seeking to use condemnation and punishment to trigger the reward system to create a rule against (an aversion to) causing pain to others.

So, now we have a solution to the central problem of morality.

Recall that the central problem is trying to resolve an inconsistent triad.

(1) If I tell you that something is wrong, it means that there are reasons for you not to do it, (2) to say that there are reasons not to do it is to say that you have a desire that would be served by not doing it, and (3) the wrongness of the act is independent of your desires.

In this version of the problem, we are going to reject (2). To say that there are reasons not to do it is to say that there are reasons to cause you to have a desire that would be served by not doing it. You may not have such a desire - at least not yet, but we're working on changing that.

The Central Problem of Morality - Solved

In this post, I am going to solve The Central Problem in Morality.

That is actually what it is called, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) - as described in its entry, "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External"

The problem goes like this:

First, we accept the Revised Humean Theory of Reasons:

(1) The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons: If there is a reason for Agent1 to do something, then Agent1 must have some desire that would be thwarted by doing it, which is the source of Agent1's reason.

We combine this with moral rationalism:

(2) Moral Rationalism: An action is morally wrong for Agent1 only if there is a reason for not doing it.

Here, we must be careful to distinguish between "wrong all things considered" and "prima facie wrong". Proposition (2) describes a prima facie wrong in that it is possible that an agent can have a reason not to do something (a reason to keep a promise) that can, on occasions, be outweighed by more and stronger moral considerations (preventing nuclear war). This is just something to keep in mind as we proceed.

If we combine these, we get:

(1) + (2) An action is morally wrong for Agent1 only if Agent1 has some desire that would be thwarted by doing it, which is the source of her reason not to do it.

Let me explain using the example that the SEP provides:

The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons states that if there is a reason for Hitler not to order genocide, then Hitler must have a reason that would be served by not doing it, which is the source of Hitler's reason. Moral rationalism says that ordering genocide is morally wrong for Hitler only if there is a reason for not ordering genocide. From this, we get the conclusion that ordering genocide is morally wrong for Hitler only if Hitler has a desire that would be served by not ordering genocide.

Now, we take this, and we add a third principle: Moral Absolutism:

(3) Moral Absolutism: Some actions are morally wrong for any agent no matter what motivations and desires they have.

Or, on the case of our example, ordering genocide is morally wrong for Hitler no matter what motivations and desires Hitler has.

The Central Problem of Morality, then, yields a contradiction - there seems no way that (1), (2), and (3) can all be true at the same time. (1) and (2) combine say that the moral wrongness of genocide is linked to Hitler's desires, (3) states it is independent of Hitler's desires. Since wrongness cannot be both independent and independent of an agent's desires, we have to give up one of these claims.

As I argued in "The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons Further Revised (RHTRFR)" I would give up on (1). Which happens to correspond with a rather specific interpretation of (2).

Recall that the RHTRFR distinguishes between "there is a reason for Agent1 to do something" and "Agent1 has a reason to do something." It equates "there is a reason" to "there is a desire that would be served" and "Agent1 has a reason" with "Agent1 has a desire that would be served. More specifically:

(1') The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons Further Revised (RHTRFR): If there is a reason for someone to do something, then there must be some desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason. And if Agent1 has a reason to do something, then Agent1 must have some desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason.

Now, this requires a reinterpretation of (2). More specifically, we should split up 2 in the same way we split up (1). We can keep (2) as is:

(2) Moral Rationalism: An action is morally wrong for Agent1 only if there is a reason for not doing it.

Then add (2') just for reasons of clarity. We are not going to actually use (2') in solving The Central Problem of Morality, but it will be useful to have it roaming around in one's mind for proper context.

(2') Practical Rationalism: An action is practically wrong for Agent1 only if Agent1 has a a reason for not doing it.

Again, we are talking about a prima facie wrong, not an all-things-considered wrong.

So, now that we have this distinction, we can now combine (1') with (2) and get:

(1') + (2) An action is morally wrong for Agent1 only if there are desires that would be thwarted by Agent1 doing it which are the source of reasons not to do it.

Note that, in this retelling, the desires need not be Hitler's desires. Indeed, they can be the desires of the Jews and others that would be thwarted through genocide, which makes moral sense.

At this point, one may ask questions about how we balance the reasons of the Jews against Genocide with Hitler's reasons for genocide. These are important questions that ought not to be ignored. However, I do not have the space here to address them. Consequently, I will save that discussion for a future post. Very quickly: morality is not concerned with the desires that Agent1 has but, instead, with the desires that Agent1 should have - and the desires that Agent1 should have are the desires that people generally have reasons to cause everybody to have. People generally have reason to cause everybody universally to have an aversion to committing genocide. It is in virtue of this fact that Hitler's desires to commit genocide are identified as evil desires.

Setting that problem aside for a moment, we can see that we at least have an answer that is compatible with (3)

(3) Moral Absolutism: Some actions are morally wrong for any agent no matter what motivations and desires they have.

The wrongness of Hitler ordering genocide does not depend on Hitler's having a desire that would be thwarted by ordering genocide. It is grounded on the fact that people generally have reasons to cause Hitler to have an aversion to performing genocide. More specifically, it is grounded on the fact that people generally have reasons to condemn and to punish people like Hitler. And that is what makes his actions wrong.

The solution can be found, as I have argued previously, in simply recognizing the proper distinction that relates "There is a reason for Agent1 to do something" with "There is a desire that would be served by Agent1 doing something" and relates "Agent1 has a reason to do something" with "Agent1 has a desire that would be served by doing something."

"Should" and "Ought"

"What should I do?"

This question seems to dominate the day, from when I wake up in the morning (should I get up or should I try for another hour of sleep?) to its end (should I finish up some chore before going to bed?).

Plus, there seems to be this gap between what I should do and what I want to do. I would like to be playing my computer game. I should do dishes, but I don't want to - though I do want the dishes to be clean and doing the dishes may be a necessary means to that end. And I should publish a blog post today on the nature of "should" and it's cousin "ought".

"Should" and "ought" are intimately tied to reasons for action. If I were to tell you, "You should help to promote a correct understanding of 'should' and 'ought'" you may ask me "Why?"

There is only one legitimate response to that question. I need to provide you with a reason for action - and a good reason at that. This is the only type of claim that implies, in normal conversation, a 'should' or an 'ought'.

As I argued in those earlier posts . . . there are two types of good reasons for action, corresponding to the distinction between "I have a reason" and "There exists a reason."

If you have a good reason to do X, then doing X must serve some desire you have where that desire is of a type that tends to fulfill your other desires.

This then gives you a practical reason - since it concerns only the desires of the agent and nobody else. You have a good reason to exercise because exercise serves desires (for health) that tend to fulfill other desires. You do not have a good reason to smoke. Smoking serves a desire that tends to thwart other desires.

Good practical reasons answer the practical-ought question. You should quit smoking or, if you do not smoke, you should avoid acquiring the desire to smoke (which empirical research suggests is a desire you can avoid acquiring by not smoking).

If there is a good reason for you to do X, then doing X would serve a desire that tends to fulfill other desires, regardless of whose desires they are.

This type of reason for action answers the moral-ought question. You should keep your promises and repay your debts. It does not matter that you do not want to keep your promises or repay your debts. The desire to keep promises and repay debts is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. This fact, and the fact that reward and punishment (including praise and condemnation) tends to promote the strength of such desires in others, means that people generally have many and strong reasons to reward (including praise) those who keep promises and repay debts and punishment (condemn) those who do not. So, even if you do not have a desire to keep promises and repay debts, you should have a desire - which, in this case, means that people generally have many and strong reasons to cause you to have the desire, just as you have reasons to promote such a desire in others.

Here is a problem - it seems to be so often the case that what I should do - either practically or morally - goes contrary to what I want to do. I want to be playing that computer game I enjoy playing. Furthermore, I want to go to the refrigerator and find something that is both fattening and filling to eat. I should not do either of these things. The desire to play the computer game fulfills no other desires (and takes resources away from activities that do fulfill other desires), and the weight-gain from giving into the urge to eat something fattening will tend to thwart other desires as well.

But . . . desirism says that desires are the source of all value. If desires are the source of all value, then how can it be the case that what I should do is so often at odds with what I desire?

Answer: Because your current desires are not the only desires that exist. Only the desires you have right now are motivating your current actions. However, you will likely have future desires - desires that are not motivating your current action - such as the future desires that would be thwarted by poor health. Plus there are the desires of other people - desires that you do not have but which still exist because other people have them. Of course, other people also have future desires, and future people have future desires. For these reasons, "what I want to do" given my current desires and "what I practically ought to do" given my present and future desires sometimes pull apart. Furthermore, what I practically ought to do may pull apart from what I morally ought to do since the moral ought also include the present and future desires of other people.

However, for a person with good desires, this does not happen. If Agent1 has good desires (and no bad desires), then Agent1 has those desires that tend to fulfill other desires, and lacks those desires that tend to thwart other desires. Consequently, Agent1 wants to do what Agent1 should do, so Agent1 experiences no conflict. Ultimately, I am writing this blog post because I want to. It's not the only thing I want - and those desires to play that computer game and to get something filling and fattening to eat are still pulling at me. However, I am doing what I want and I think I can make a case for saying that I want to do in this case is what I should be doing - both practically and morally. Now. (I did spend a couple of hours in that computer game before I came here.)

You are always going to do what you want most to do. (This is not, strictly speaking, true. You will do what you want most to do so long as your relevant beliefs are true and complete and you are not suffering from some irrationality - but as a slogan, this statement is generally correct.) So, the trick is to want to do what you should be doing - to have those desires that tend to fulfill other desires. We will discuss how to cultivate those desires in future postings.

The List

I would like to illustrate the relationship between "should" and "ought" on the one hand and "reasons for action" on the other my modeling a particularly important and complex decision.

Assume that you are required to make a difficult decision. You are trying to decide whether you should quit your job, or to ask somebody out on a date, or to get a divorce, or to have children, or to start a new business, or to buy a new house or a new car. Let's make this one of those important decisions where there is a lot of stake.

One common piece of advice is to make a list. On one side of a piece of paper you put the reasons for. On the other side, you put the reasons against.

What are you doing?

Well, are writing down your reasons for action. If what I have been saying in this post is true, everything that appears on your list should relate, directly or indirectly, to some set of desires. Look over your list and if you see anything on the list that is not serving a desire then cross it off. Those reasons do not exist. They are the unicorns and ghosts of the realm of reasons. I would argue that these would include "serving God" and "realizing something that is intrinsically good". Since there is no god, I would argue that you cannot make the proposition, "I am serving God" true. Because you cannot make this proposition true you cannot fulfill a desire to serve God. If you believe you are serving God, you are mistaken. This does not imply that the action cannot be good for other reasons (that it cannot serve other desires). However, if it is actually good for other reasons, then those are the reasons that should appear on the list. I could be wrong on the "God" issue (though, in addition to believing that such a god exists, one also has to accurately determine what serves God, and that is a notoriously difficult question to answer itself).

"Should appear on the list". Well, here's an example of one of those "should" statements. In this case, the "should" concerns serving actual desires rather than non-existent goods.

In the "Reasons For" column you may put down, "I will have more free time." Free time is useful for fulfilling other desires. In the "Reasons Against" column, you may put down, "I will have less money." Money, like time, is also a useful resource for fulfilling other desires. These, then, are legitimate reasons.

Some of those reasons will concern serving your own future desires. Those are practical reasons. Good practical reasons may not be something you particularly want to do . . . but they do serve desires you do not have yet (and, thus, are not motivating your current decision). If you are deciding whether to go on a diet or start an exercise program, the reason to do this is to improve your health. The desire to improve your health is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. This is not only a practical reason to go on a diet or get more exercise, it is a good practical reason. This is, in fact, a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. And you should be concerned about your health.

Plus, there are moral reasons. Moral reasons fulfill desires that tend to fulfill other desires regardless of whose they are. On the "Reasons For" side of the equation, you may want to add that the action is a charitable action that will aid those who are in desperate need. On the "Reasons Against" side you may need to add the moral reason, "Because I would have to break a promise." The desire to help those in desperate need and the aversion to breaking promises are desires that, to the degree that they are universal, to that degree they tend to fulfill more and stronger desires that would not otherwise be fulfilled. That is to say, these are desires that people generally have reason to promote universally. We could call them "virtues" and promote them in our society - making them stronger and more common - by rewarding (praising) those who exhibit them and punishing (condemning) those who do not. We will discuss these features of morally good reasons in future posts. For the moment, it is enough to note that these reasons, when they show up on your list, are the moral reasons for taking or not taking some action.

Here is some technical language.

Each specific reason that appears on your list on either side of the equation is a "prima facie reason". A prima facie reason is a genuine reason to do something. However, the fact that it is a reason does not imply that it is a good enough reason in these circumstances. It may be outweighed by even more and stronger reasons piled up against it. The fact that I have a reason to go get another slice of chocolate cake (because it would serve my desire to eat a delicious chocolate cake) is a prima facie reason to go get some chocolate cake. However, when I weigh this against the prima facie reasons of concern for my health and the fact that I promised my wife that I would leave her the last slice of chocolate cake (and there is only one slice left), my prima facie reason is not a good enough reason to get some chocolate cake.

All of these prima facie reasons come together to yield an all-things-considered judgment about what I ought or should do.

"Prima facie ought to do X" means "There is a reason for you to do X."

"All-things-considered ought to do X" means "The total weight of all of the reasons for and against doing X are in favor of doing X."

This, then, is the relationship between reasons for action and "Ought" or "Should". If you really want to know what you ought to do or should do, this should get you started on figuring it out.

Conclusion

Now that I am done with this posting, I should get back to my game. After all, I promised some friends that I would meet them there.

Good Reasons

A Good Reason

In my previous post I explained what it is you have when you have a reason to do something, and what it is that exists when a reason exists to do something.

The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons Further Revised (RHTRFR): If there is a reason for someone to do something, then there must be some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of that reason, and if Agent1 has a reason to do something, then Agent1 must have some desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of her reason.

A few posts ago I explained what it is for something to be good.

"Good" = "Is such as to fulfill the desires in question"

So, now, I should be able to tell you what a good reason is - and a bad reason - and about reasons that are neither good nor bad.

A Good Reason

If there is a good reason for someone to do something, then there must be some desire that tends to fulfill other desires that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason.

Furthermore, if Agent1 has a good reason to do something, then Agent1 must have some desire that tends to fulfill other desires that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason.

Serving a Desire

Please note that I said that to have a (good) reason is to have a (good) desire that would be served. I did not say anything about what Agent1 believes to be the case.

For example, a parent may believe that she has a good reason to refuse to get her child vaccinated. She may be motivated to do so because of a concern for her child's health. A concern for the health of another - and, in particular, a parent's concern for the health of her child - is a good desire so would count as a good reason to perform some action. However, this parent does not actually have a good reason to refuse to get her child vaccinated. This is because refusing vaccination does not actually serve the desire that one's child be healthy.

So, a person can think that they have a good reason to do something, and be wrong. In fact, a whole culture can believe that they have a good reason to engage in some practice - e.g., that they have good reasons to sacrifice a virgin to the volcano god so as to appease him and prevent him from destroying the village - and be wrong. There is a fact of the matter as to whether an act, institution, practice, or norm is "such as to fulfill the desires in question" - and the fact of the matter may be contrary to what any person, or what all people, believe or even feel to be the case.

The Desires in Question

We are going to have to deal with an ambiguity here because, as it turns out, there are several different kinds of "reason" - each corresponding to a different "desires in question."

The "desires in question" might be Agent1's own desires. If this is the case, then we are talking about practical reasons. In other words, a practical reason is a reason that tends to fulfill the other desires of the agent performing the action. An agent has a practical reason to invest for retirement, to eat healthy foods, to exercise, to obtain useful training and education, and the like. At the same time, if Agent1 wants to rob a convenience store, then Agent1 has a practical reason to wear a ski mask so as to avoid being recognized on the security video.

If, instead, the "desires in question" are other desires regardless of whose they are, then the reason is a moral reason. Note the distinction here between a moral reason and a practical reason. A moral reason tends to fulfill other desires regardless of whose they are. A practical reason tends to fulfill the agent's own current and future desires.

Notice that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between "there is a reason" and "has a reason" that I mentioned above and in the previous post on what a reason is. "There is a reason" for an agent to do the morally right thing - since moral reasons refer to desires that exist regardless of whose they are. At the same time, the agent "has a reason" to do the practical thing, since practical reasons are reasons that fulfill desires the agent has (or will have).

Good Reasons Revisited

So, we have two types of good reasons.

We have reasons grounded on desires that tend to fulfill the desires that the agent has or will have - practical reasons.

We have reasons grounded on desires that tend to fulfill the desires of people regardless of who they are - moral reasons.

Of course, when we talk about reasons for action, we are also talking about what people ought to do. I will be getting to that next.

What Should I Do?

Why should I do what you tell me I should do?

Give me a reason.

What is a "reason" anyway? And how can we tell the difference between a good reason and a bad reason?

These questions are going to take a few posts. However, I will start here with the question, "What is a 'reason'?"

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) has an article on this subject: Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External. However, it contains a serious error - or at least a serious source of confusion that leads to a lot of error.

I know . . . for me to say that the SEP contains a serious error is a bold claim. However, I will back it up below and you can decide for yourself.

This entry in the SEP entry presents what it calls, “the revised Humean theory of reasons” (RHTR). The term “Humean” refers to the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). If anybody wants to know which famous historic philosopher comes closest to the desirism, that would be David Hume.

The SEP presents the RHTR as follows.

Revised Human Theory of Reasons (RHTR): If there is a reason for someone to do something, then she must have some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of her reason.

In other words, it says that if there is a reason for you to read this blog posting, then you must have a desire that would be served by reading this blog posting. I am going to reject this claim in what follows. But, to understand its initial plausibility, we can imagine that you want to know something about the nature of what it is to have a reason to do something. In that case, reading this posting will (hopefully) serve that desire, so you have a reason read this posting. What the SEP calls "serving" a desire I call "fulfilling" a desire. That is to say, if we express a desire as a "desire that P" and then fulfilling a desire is acting to make or keep "P" true.

It is obvious what this has to do with desirism. It reduces reasons to desires. This entry appears in the SEP because a lot of philosophers think that anybody who wants to hold a theory that reduces everything to desires has to believe something like this RHTR. Unfortunately, RHTR as stated is problematic. Consequently, many philosophers conclude that a desire-based theory of morality like the one you see here is problematic.

But . . . RHTR is . . . well . . . not the way I would put it.

The problem is that it relates "there is a reason" (seen at the start of the description) to "she must have some desire" found in the second half of this association. There is no justification for this. In fact, it is clearly false - and can be shown to be false with some very obvious counter-examples.

The whole problem rests on the distinction between "There is an X" and "Agent1 has an X". Clearly, it is possible for it to be the case that "There is an X" to be true and "Agent1 has an X" to be false. Think about a $5 bill. It is possible for it to be true that "There is a $5 bill on the table" to be true and "Agent1 has a $5 bill on the table" to be false. This happens whenever it is the case that the $5 bill belongs to somebody else, or belongs to nobody at all.

The same is true with reasons and desires. The first part of the statement says that "there is a reason". It is perhaps clearer to understand this as "there exists a reason" or "a reason exists." Let's grant that. Assume that Agent2 has a desire to live in an orbiting space station. This means that Agent2 has a reason to live in an orbiting space station. Because Agent2 has a reason to live in an orbiting space station, there exists a reason for Agent2 to live in an orbiting space station. Because there exists a reason for Agent2 to live in an orbiting space station, there exists a reason for Agent1 to help Agent2 live in an orbiting space station.

Whoa! you say. That last sentence doesn't follow form the earlier statements. For the moment, I am simply going to stipulate that it does. But it clearly seems to have a second meaning as well - a meaning that is a source of all of the confusion. I will get to that second meaning shortly. At this point, all of the statements in the previous paragraph, as I am using the terms, refer to the same desire - Agent2's desire to live in an orbiting habitat.

This is the statement that I want to disambiguate. I want to separate the sense that is consistent with the rest of the paragraph from the sense that is not and end the equivocation between these two senses that is causing so many problems. The sense that is consistent with the rest of the paragraph does not imply that Agent1 has a reason to help Agent2 live in an orbiting space station. In fact, in this example, Agent1 does not have a reason. "There is a reason" is true, but "Agent1 has a reason" is false. Thus, the RHTR is false in this sense. We have to reject it.

On the other meaning, RHTR is true, but it is trivially true. On this second meaning, "there is a reason for Agent1 to do something" is just another way of saying, "Agent1 has a reason to do something." If Agent1 has a reason to do something" is true in this sense, then "Agent1 has a desire that would be served by doing it" is also true. But this sense makes the false assumption that "there is a reason" implies "Agent1 has a reason" - and this is true only if all of the reasons that exist are those that Agent1 has.

Here, I would advise the critic to adopt a clearer, more precise language. When "there is a reason for Agent1 to do something" means "Agent1 has a reason", then say so, and quit using the phrase "there is a reason".

In my next post, I will be showing that what the SEP calls "the central problem" in moral philosophy rests on a failure to be clear on this matter, allowing people to equivocate between two different meanings of "there is a reason for Agent1 to do something" - the "there is a desire that would be served" meaning and "Agent1 has a desire that would be served" meaning.

And that is why contemporary moral philosophy is all messed up.

More specifically, I will be using the Revised Humean Theory of Reasons Further Revised:

The Revised Humean Theory of Reasons Further Revised (RHTRFR): If there is a reason for someone to do something, then there must be some desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason. And if Agent1 has a reason to do something, then Agent1 must have some desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason.

This is the theory that Desirism uses.

Note that this version relates "there is a reason" to "there is a desire that would be served" (without specifying whose reason/desire it is) and it relates "Agent1 has a reason" to "Agent1 has a desire that would be served."

This is going to clear up a lot of problems.

Terms of Evaluation

General Account

Our language has a huge set of evaluative terms. Good. Bad. Right. Wrong. Obligatory. Prohibited. Permissible. Virtue. Vice. Evil. Beautiful. Ugly. Ought. Ought not. Should. Should not. Health. Illness. Injury. Useful. Pleasant. Benefit. Harm. Generous. Helpful. Dangerous. Warning. Obnoxious. Rude. Welcome.

We could really use a system that explains what all of these terms have in common, and what makes one different from another.

All of them - at least when they are used in a true statement - relate an object of evaluation to a set of desires in question.

How they differ depends on the specific relationships they describe.

There are four major questions to ask regarding any evaluative Term.

(1) What kinds of things does the term typically evaluate?

(2) What are the relevant desires is that the term refers to?

(3) Does the object of evaluation fulfill or thwart those desires?

(4) Does the object of evaluation fulfill or thwart those desires directly or indirectly?

The Meanings of Evaluative Terms

Before I get to some examples, I want to say a few words about the meanings of moral terms.

When I offer these definitions, I am not saying that this is the meaning that we have adopted in our every-day language. In our everyday language, "good" = "there is a reason to bring about or preserve". But it doesn't say anything about what those reasons are. They could be intrinsic values. They could be divine commands. They are simply "reasons". In this theory, I take this definition and I add the empirical fact that desires are the only reasons that exist. As a consequence, either the sentence containing an evaluative term relates an object of evaluation to a set of desires, or it is false.

Below, I will give some examples of evaluative terms and how they relate states of affairs and desires. A reader may be able to think of examples where we do not use the term in the way described. However, those will be cases where we use the term under an assumption that there exists a type of reason for action that does not come from desire. That assumption is false. The use of the term in that way still makes sense - since the term actually refers to reasons and not just desires. It is just false.

In other words, these examples slightly reform our use of evaluative terms and make them more precise. The same is true of the terms I have already defined such as "good" and "right". It is an account of how the terms must be used when they are used in true statements.

So, let us look at some examples.

Useful

(1) This term can potentially be used to refer to anything - battles, potato peelers, people, parsnips. You need to look at the context in which the term is used to determine what is being evaluated. Usually, it is the subject of the sentence such as, “I think this old box could still be useful.”

(2) The desires in question is also determined by context. A ski mask is useful if one wants to rob a convenience store without being recognized. A military drone is useful for assassinating suspected terrorists.

(3) A useful thing fulfills the desires in question. If it does not fulfill the desires in question, then it is useless.

(4) Insofar as it is useful, it only fills the desires in question indirectly. This does not mean that it cannot fulfill desires directly. It is just that, insofar as we are talking about it’s usefulness, we are talking about it’s ability to fulfill desires indirectly.

Injury/Illness

This is a fun one.

(1) The objects of evaluation are changes in mental and physical functioning or deviation from the norm. The fun part is the distinction been injury and illness. An injury has a cause that somebody living a few centuries could detect - being trampled by a horse, falling off a roof, being stabbed or shot. An illness is something that, to a pre-scientific mind, had a mysterious cause - a virus, cancer, poison, diabetes.

(2) The desires in question are those of the patient.

(3) Injuries and illnesses thwart the desires in question. There are reasons to get rid of them or avoid them.

(4) They can thwart the desires in question directly (pain, discomfort) or indirectly (disability).

Beauty

(1) I do not know why, but we decided to use the term “beautiful” only to things heard or seen.

(2) With respect to the desires in question, the term is ambiguous. There is one understanding of the term that finds beauty in the eye/ear of the beholder. Another finds it in the eyes and ears of the aristocracy - the people of “refined taste”. I think that the second definition is grounded on a mistake - the false assertion that the aristocracy has a capacity to perceive true value. In fact, this is the aristocracy saying, “We are superior to the common folk and what we like has true value, while they are too crass and base to understand such things.” So, I go with the first option.

(3) Beauty, of course, fulfills desires.

(4) Beauty fulfills those desires directly. The beauty is found immediately in the direct perception of the object of evaluation.

A Good Knife

We are all interested in a good knife, a good movie, a good job, a good place to live, a good school for one's children. This account applies to all versions of "a good X" - even a good person or a good desire.

(1) The object of evaluation is whatever object one is evaluating; a knife, a movie, a job, a place to live, a school.

(2) The desires in question are those desires that the object is generally built to fulfill. Note that we are not evaluating the knife relative to the desires of the agent. That agent may have a great many desires that are not even relevant to the object of evaluation being a knife. The term "knife" is a term in the common language. To speak about a good knife is to examine those qualities that have made the object a "knife" in common speech. These qualities are meant to perform a particular function - to cut things. A good knife is something that cuts things particularly well - and something that cuts things well is something that cuts things that tend to fulfill the desires of people who want things cut.

(3) A good knife, of course, is something that is such as to fulfill the desires in question. If the good knife did not tend to fulfill those desires that are relevant to calling something a knife, than it is not a good knife.

(4) A good X can fulfill those desires either directly or indirectly. If we are talking about a good tool, then we are talking about something that tends to fulfill desires indirectly - by pounding in a nail or getting the dishes clean. If we are talking about, for example, a good painting or a good movie, then we are talking about something that tends to fulfill its characteristic desires directly. Now, if you are looking for a good X, you can determine more precisely what it is you are looking for. You need to find out which desires X typically serves - the desires in virtue of which it is called an X, and see if the object of evaluation fulfills those desires well, whether directly or indirectly as appropriate.

Conclusion

If this is correct, then all evaluative terms should be reducible in this sense. If something is dangerous than it is something that has the potential to thwart the desires of question unless agents are careful with it. If something is harmful, then it tends to bring about the thwarting of desires, whereas if a person has been harmed than that person has had a particularly strong and stable damage thwarted. An act is wrong if it tends to thwart good desires or fulfill bad desires overall and a person is a bad person if he is the type of person who tends to thwart other peoples' desires in virtue of his own character traits - those actions that spring from his own desires. All evaluative language should be reducible in this sense.

If any of it isn't, please let me know.

Good Desires, Good People, and Right Action

There are good and bad desires.

In my last post I discussed what it takes for something to be good.

Specifically:

X is good = X is such as to fulfill the desires in question.

But what about desires themselves? Doesn't this mean that anything can be good or bad so long as it is desired? If somebody desires to torture a child, and "good" = "is such as to fulfill the desires in question", then it is good to torture a child.

I answered this in part in that previous post. The person's desire to torture a child is not the "desires in question" we refer to in making these types of evaluations. But there is more that can be said.

Desires themselves can be good or bad.

To see this, all you need to do is fit a desire into the original formula.

A desire is good if and only if it is such as to fulfill the desires in question.

So, take this "desire to torture children" and plug it into the formula. Clearly, this desire is a desire that tends to thwart other desires. That would make it a bad desire. More to the point, people generally have many and strong reasons to weaken or prevent the realization of this desire. To whatever this degree this desire exists, to that degree the interests of other people are put at risk. That gives them reason to call this a "bad desire" and to condemn instances in which this desire appears.

Let's say you could press a button and, from that moment on, a desire to torture children (a "desire that I am torturing a child") no longer exists. Can anybody give me a reason not to press the button? Even somebody with a desire to torture children would almost certainly have more reason to press the button than not to. The effect of the button means that the person himself would no longer have a desire to torture children, so he would no longer be tormented by an unfulfilled desire. He would be more like the rest of us - enjoying the types of lives the rest of us can enjoy who have no desire to torture children.

The desire to torture children is a bad desire.

Compare this to the desire to keep promises. Let's say we could press a button and wipe out the desire to keep promises. People could no longer be relied upon to keep promises. That would make the promises themselves worthless. The institution of promise keeping is a very useful institution, allowing us to better predict the behavior of others, make better plans, agree to deals where we carry out our part at one time with the expectation that the other person will carry out their part at a later time (even after they already get what they want). All of this would be lost. So, the desire to keep promises is a desire we have reason to encourage in others.

The desire to keep promises is a good desire.

A desire to keep promises is a desire people generally have reasons to want everybody to have. It is one of several desires of this type. We have reason to want to live in a community filled with people who have a desire to tell the truth, to repay debts, to leave other people's property alone unless one has the owner's consent. These, too, are good desires. In fact, there is a close relationship between the types of desires that people generally have to promote universally and the rules of morality. This is not a coincidence.

There are good desires, and there are bad desires.

Remember, "good" = "is such as to fulfill the desires in question". Since there are good and bad desires, there are cases in which the "desires in question" can be "good desires and the absence of bad desires."

A person tells a lie. We can ask: "Would a person with good desires and lacking bad desires have told a lie in those circumstances?"

Maybe he would. Perhaps he is hiding Jews in his attic and the Nazi soldiers come to his door asking about the Jews who used to live next door. Or perhaps he is hiding runaway slaves in a secret room in his basement. In this case, a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would probably lie. In fact, to lie in this type of case might be considered an obligation. It is what a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would have done.

Mind you, the person with good desires and lacking bad desires would still have an aversion to lying. It would simply be outweighed by other considerations. A desire to protect innocent people from harm. An aversion to being a party to an injustice. These are the desires that would motivate the person in this case to lie.

Though, actually, these types of cases are rare. For the most part, people generally have reason to promote universally an aversion to lying. A person with good desires and lacking bad desires would tell the truth in most circumstances. There are many and strong reasons to condemn - even to punish (Perjury) - those who lie in these every-day circumstances.

The same thing goes to taking the property of others without their consent. We have reason for people generally to have an aversion to doing this type of thing. We call it theft (or robbery) and, for good reason, condemn and punish those within whom this aversion to taking property without consent seems to be lacking. However, this aversion can be outweighed by other circumstances. One of those likely circumstances is when people generally can come to an agreement (in a democratic society) that taking the wealth from those who have a great deal and use it to alleviate the suffering of the very poor. There are few reasons to condemn this type of action - and many reasons to praise it (to consider the act obligatory such that one is condemned for NOT supporting these types of institutions).

So . . . there are good and bad desires . . . and it makes sense to evaluate actions, institutions, laws, governments, and the like according to whether they are things that "a person with good desires and lacking bad desires would have done in the circumstances". We can use these judgments to direct praise or condemnation, thus promoting the desires that people generally have reason to promote, and inhibiting desires that people generally have reason to inhibit.

The Good

What is it for something to be good?

Good = Is such as to fulfill the desires in question.

This is the start of it. If anybody says that something is good - a knife, a law, a person, an action, a system of government, a company, an apple, a painting, a book - then either they are saying that it is such as to fulfill the desires in question, or their statement is false. Of course, they could say that it is such as to fulfill the desires in question and still be false - if it does not actually fulfill those desires. But at least what they say has a chance of being true.

There are other options, but they mostly involve significantly redefining the meaning of the term "good" and using that new and bizarre definition. I am intending to use 'good' in the way we generally understand it. Most importantly, if something is good, it is something worth having, or worth being made a part of the world, to be made real. We can rule out those other definitions as not being about that which we have reasons to do or to bring about or to experience.

This leads to some questions: What is a desire? What are "the desires in question"? And what is it to "fulfill" a desire?

I can - and often have - given a technical definition of these terms. But let's see if I can explain these in terms without the jargon.


What is a desire?

You have an aversion to pain. I suspect you do. There are some who do not - and apparently this condition can be created by certain drugs - but they are rare. I am going to assume that you are not one of those, and that you have generally experienced pain and as something to avoid. This is your aversion to pain. We can also describe it as your "desire that I not be in pain".

A desire provides a motivating reason for making it the case that the thing that the person desires becomes true. My desire that I not be in pain is a motivating reason for me to avoid states in which I am in pain. It motivates me to make or keep the statement, "I am not in pain" true.

A desire to have sex is a motivating reason for making it true that "I am having sex".

A desire to go to a Jimmy Buffett concert is a motivating reason for making it true that "I am at a Jimmy Buffett concert."

Right now, as you read this, you are reading this because you have some desire, and (you believe that) reading this posting will make whatever you desire true in the real world. Perhaps you have a desire to know what is good . . . a desire "that I know what good is" . . . which is your motivating reason for making it the case that "I know what good is". I hope that I can fulfill that desire - that is my reason for writing this. I have had a desire that I know what good is since I was young. That is what motivated me into several years of studying the question. I think I have figured it out.

When I write this blog, I am acting to fulfill my own desires. They are my desires, but my desires are not all selfish. I have a desire to know what good is and, by writing this blog, I am making it possible for somebody to put something in the comment section that says, "You idiot. You have it all wrong," along with some proof and useful instructions. Furthermore, assuming I may have gotten something right, maybe (hopefully) it would be useful to let other people know what "good" is so that those people do not waste their lives chasing things that are not good.

So, a desire is something in the brain that motivates the agent to make that which is desired true in the world.

Now, I suppose I can go to that technical definition I warned you about at the start of this post.

A desire that P is a mental state that provides the agent with a motivating reason to make or keep the proposition 'P' true.

An aversion to pain . . . a desire that I am not in pain . . . is a mental state that motivates me to make or keep true the proposition 'I am not in pain' true.

My desire to understand 'good' . . . a desire that I understand what 'good' is . . . is a mental state that motivates me to make or keep true the proposition 'I understand what 'good' is'. I am still working on that one.


What is it for a desire to be fulfilled?

So, now that we know what a desire is, what is it to fulfill a desire?

Insofar as I have an aversion to pain, then I have a desire that I not be in pain. My desire that I not be in pain is fulfilled . . . or, I sometimes use the term 'realized' . . . whenever it is the case that 'I am not in pain' is true. If I want some pumpkin pie (if I desire that I am eating pumpkin pie), then this desire is fulfilled in any state of affairs where "I am eating pumpkin pie" is true.

If I want my child to be safe . . . if I desire that my child is safe . . . then this desire is fulfilled whenever "my child is safe" is true.

So, a desire that P is fulfilled in any state of affairs where 'P' is true.

Again, what is it for something to be good?

Let us go back to what it takes for something to be good . . . or for something to be bad. Sometimes bad is easier to understand than good.

Well, pain is bad. If I have a desire that I not be in pain, then any state of affairs where "I am not in pain" is false (that is to say, any state of affairs in which I am in pain) is bad. This is something I want to avoid. This is something I have a motivating reason to avoid.

If I want some pumpkin pie . . . if I desire that I am eating some pumpkin pie . . . then a state of affairs in which "I am eating pumpkin pie" is true is something I have a motivating reason to bring about. I see it as good.

If I desire that my child is safe, then any state of affairs in which "my child is safe" is true is good. I don't even have to know that my child is safe. If I had to choose between believing that my child is safe while he is being tortured, and believing that my child is being tortured while he is safe, I would choose the latter. This is because the latter is a situation where "my child is safe" is true - even though I do not know that he is safe - and what I want is for him to be safe. I want it to be the case that "my child is safe" is true.

As I said, all of my desires are my own desires, but they are not all selfish desires. "My child is safe" is such as to fulfill the desires in question - where the desire in question in this case is my desire that my child is safe.

Now, I also have a desire that I not experience the anguish that would come from believing that my child is being tortured. So, I also desire that I not believe that my child is being tortured. But, all things considered, my desire that I not believe that my child is being tortured is pretty weak compared to my desire that my child is safe. Consequently, I would choose "I believe that my child is being tortured, but my child is safe" to "I do not believe that my child is being tortured and my child is not safe." The first option is better than the second. It is better because it fulfills the most and strongest desires.


What are the desires in question?

This part is going to be difficult to understand. People who make a mistake understanding this position tend to make the mistake right here. They think things like, "So, you are saying that, if I desire that I torture a child, that any state of affairs in which I am torturing a child is good." Which, of course, is nonsense. So, that defeats the whole position right there.

But, really, when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing a child, are we REALLY talking about the desires of the person who wants to torture the child? Honestly, this is NOT the correct "desires in question" that we are referring to when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing the child. We are talking about the desires of the child, the child's parents, the whole of society.

People who raise this objection are correctly noticing that torturing a child . . . and having a desire to torture a child . . . are both things that tend to thwart the "desires in question" that we have in mind when we talk about the badness of torturing a child. It's a very bad thing . . . relative to the desires in question. In fact, it is difficult to think of things that are worse.

So, no, this doesn't say that torturing a child is good. It says that the person who desires to torture a child has a motivating reason to torture a child. That's true enough. But, as i have already said, when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing a child, his desires are not the desire that we have in mind. The statement that "torturing the child is such as to fulfill the desires in question" - when we seriously and honestly identify the desires in question when we make this statement - is obviously false.

This really is the most common mistake. People take something like torturing a child and claim that this theory calls it "good" when it is obviously not good . . . because they choose the wrong "desires in question". The "desires in question" or those that make the most sense out of the evaluation. When it comes to evaluating the torturing of a child, the desires of the person wanting to torture the child does not make the most sense of our evaluation. So, the claim that I am calling this "good" is a mistake.

So, we pick up what "the desires in question" are from the context in which we make the statement. If I say, "That was a good supper," I am typically saying that the supper fulfilled my desires regarding what I like to taste. If I say, "that was a good movie" I am probably talking about the desires of people who like that kind of movie. If I say, "This is a good knife" I have in mind the desires that knives are typically built to fulfill - a desire to cut things or, for certain types of knives, cutting certain kinds of things (e.g., a bread knife, a butter knife).


Once again, what is good?

Whenever something is called "good" either it is "such as to fulfill the desires in question" or the statement is false. This applies to all types of goodness. Try it out. You can't have a conversation without somebody making an evaluation - saying that something is "good" or "right" or "better" or "bad" or "worse". See if you can pick out the "desires in question" and, if you can, see if the object of evaluation really is "such as to fulfill the desires in question".

Now, of course, you will come across people who use the term "good" or some similar evaluative term without referring to "the desires in question". Typically, they are claiming that something is intrinsically good - that it has good regardless of whether or not it is such as to fulfill the desires in question. This happens a lot. Those claims are false. If you want an evaluation to be true, then it has to be "such as to fulfill the desires in question". If it is not such as to fulfill the desires in question then the claim that it is good is false. Feel free to tell them they are mistaken.


Conclusion

This, then, is where it all starts. This is goodness.

Any questions? Feel free to ask.

Semester Over

I am back. The fall semester is over.

It's not OVER over . . . I still have a final exam and a paper to work on over the break. But, I feel the pressure slipping away. I got worried about grades and keeping up with the work at around the first of November and hunkered down some.

My professors this semester made me work. I turned in multiple drafts of papers with edits and criticism that I then had to respond to with more drafts. One of the criticisms was that my writing was too casual and it read too much like a journalism article than like a philosophy paper. Well, what do you expect? I've been writing philosophy in the form of blog posts for 10 years. Well, that was one of the reasons I set aside the blog for a while - I wanted to focus on writing the types of papers that philosophy professors think is appropriate.

You may notice that there will be some change in my writing style. Arguments are going to be a bit more explicit and a bit more structured than they have been. I think that is for the best.

Oh . . . and I am done with my core requirements now. Logic class . . . check. Classes in metaphysics/epistemology . . . check. History of philosophy class . . . check. Well, that's the one that I am needing to finish up during the break.

2019 is going to be the year of doing what I want to do.

I have two courses next semester.

Course 1: The British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing. (About 1880 - 1950.) For anybody familiar with philosophical ethics, the class covers the likes of Henry Sidgwick, W.D. Ross, G.E. Moore, C.D. Broad. I don't know why Sidgwick gets a real first name . . . he just does. Anyway, these were the influential thinkers until the emotivists took over. These were meta-ethicists, so covering these theorists means covering such topics as the definition of "good", intrinsic value, and intuitions. Right up my alley.

Course 2: Metaethics: Internalism vs. Externalism about Moral Motivations. I am an externalist. "Internal" motivation requires that the agent have a desire. Morality is about the desires that exist. Many of the desires that exist are external to the desires that the agent has. Thus, many of the reasons that something is morally right or wrong have to do with reasons that are external to the motivational states (desires) of the agent himself. Well . . . this is actually going to be the first class I have taken where I get to be a full-blown unapologetic true-to-life desirist. I am looking forward to it.

I have already started studying for the semester, and I am going to be posting my notes here.

Oh . . . and these courses will be the foundation for my masters' thesis. So . . . there's that to look forward to as well.

It's good to be back.

Be talking to you again shortly.