The Good

What is it for something to be good?

Good = Is such as to fulfill the desires in question.

This is the start of it. If anybody says that something is good - a knife, a law, a person, an action, a system of government, a company, an apple, a painting, a book - then either they are saying that it is such as to fulfill the desires in question, or their statement is false. Of course, they could say that it is such as to fulfill the desires in question and still be false - if it does not actually fulfill those desires. But at least what they say has a chance of being true.

There are other options, but they mostly involve significantly redefining the meaning of the term "good" and using that new and bizarre definition. I am intending to use 'good' in the way we generally understand it. Most importantly, if something is good, it is something worth having, or worth being made a part of the world, to be made real. We can rule out those other definitions as not being about that which we have reasons to do or to bring about or to experience.

This leads to some questions: What is a desire? What are "the desires in question"? And what is it to "fulfill" a desire?

I can - and often have - given a technical definition of these terms. But let's see if I can explain these in terms without the jargon.


What is a desire?

You have an aversion to pain. I suspect you do. There are some who do not - and apparently this condition can be created by certain drugs - but they are rare. I am going to assume that you are not one of those, and that you have generally experienced pain and as something to avoid. This is your aversion to pain. We can also describe it as your "desire that I not be in pain".

A desire provides a motivating reason for making it the case that the thing that the person desires becomes true. My desire that I not be in pain is a motivating reason for me to avoid states in which I am in pain. It motivates me to make or keep the statement, "I am not in pain" true.

A desire to have sex is a motivating reason for making it true that "I am having sex".

A desire to go to a Jimmy Buffett concert is a motivating reason for making it true that "I am at a Jimmy Buffett concert."

Right now, as you read this, you are reading this because you have some desire, and (you believe that) reading this posting will make whatever you desire true in the real world. Perhaps you have a desire to know what is good . . . a desire "that I know what good is" . . . which is your motivating reason for making it the case that "I know what good is". I hope that I can fulfill that desire - that is my reason for writing this. I have had a desire that I know what good is since I was young. That is what motivated me into several years of studying the question. I think I have figured it out.

When I write this blog, I am acting to fulfill my own desires. They are my desires, but my desires are not all selfish. I have a desire to know what good is and, by writing this blog, I am making it possible for somebody to put something in the comment section that says, "You idiot. You have it all wrong," along with some proof and useful instructions. Furthermore, assuming I may have gotten something right, maybe (hopefully) it would be useful to let other people know what "good" is so that those people do not waste their lives chasing things that are not good.

So, a desire is something in the brain that motivates the agent to make that which is desired true in the world.

Now, I suppose I can go to that technical definition I warned you about at the start of this post.

A desire that P is a mental state that provides the agent with a motivating reason to make or keep the proposition 'P' true.

An aversion to pain . . . a desire that I am not in pain . . . is a mental state that motivates me to make or keep true the proposition 'I am not in pain' true.

My desire to understand 'good' . . . a desire that I understand what 'good' is . . . is a mental state that motivates me to make or keep true the proposition 'I understand what 'good' is'. I am still working on that one.


What is it for a desire to be fulfilled?

So, now that we know what a desire is, what is it to fulfill a desire?

Insofar as I have an aversion to pain, then I have a desire that I not be in pain. My desire that I not be in pain is fulfilled . . . or, I sometimes use the term 'realized' . . . whenever it is the case that 'I am not in pain' is true. If I want some pumpkin pie (if I desire that I am eating pumpkin pie), then this desire is fulfilled in any state of affairs where "I am eating pumpkin pie" is true.

If I want my child to be safe . . . if I desire that my child is safe . . . then this desire is fulfilled whenever "my child is safe" is true.

So, a desire that P is fulfilled in any state of affairs where 'P' is true.

Again, what is it for something to be good?

Let us go back to what it takes for something to be good . . . or for something to be bad. Sometimes bad is easier to understand than good.

Well, pain is bad. If I have a desire that I not be in pain, then any state of affairs where "I am not in pain" is false (that is to say, any state of affairs in which I am in pain) is bad. This is something I want to avoid. This is something I have a motivating reason to avoid.

If I want some pumpkin pie . . . if I desire that I am eating some pumpkin pie . . . then a state of affairs in which "I am eating pumpkin pie" is true is something I have a motivating reason to bring about. I see it as good.

If I desire that my child is safe, then any state of affairs in which "my child is safe" is true is good. I don't even have to know that my child is safe. If I had to choose between believing that my child is safe while he is being tortured, and believing that my child is being tortured while he is safe, I would choose the latter. This is because the latter is a situation where "my child is safe" is true - even though I do not know that he is safe - and what I want is for him to be safe. I want it to be the case that "my child is safe" is true.

As I said, all of my desires are my own desires, but they are not all selfish desires. "My child is safe" is such as to fulfill the desires in question - where the desire in question in this case is my desire that my child is safe.

Now, I also have a desire that I not experience the anguish that would come from believing that my child is being tortured. So, I also desire that I not believe that my child is being tortured. But, all things considered, my desire that I not believe that my child is being tortured is pretty weak compared to my desire that my child is safe. Consequently, I would choose "I believe that my child is being tortured, but my child is safe" to "I do not believe that my child is being tortured and my child is not safe." The first option is better than the second. It is better because it fulfills the most and strongest desires.


What are the desires in question?

This part is going to be difficult to understand. People who make a mistake understanding this position tend to make the mistake right here. They think things like, "So, you are saying that, if I desire that I torture a child, that any state of affairs in which I am torturing a child is good." Which, of course, is nonsense. So, that defeats the whole position right there.

But, really, when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing a child, are we REALLY talking about the desires of the person who wants to torture the child? Honestly, this is NOT the correct "desires in question" that we are referring to when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing the child. We are talking about the desires of the child, the child's parents, the whole of society.

People who raise this objection are correctly noticing that torturing a child . . . and having a desire to torture a child . . . are both things that tend to thwart the "desires in question" that we have in mind when we talk about the badness of torturing a child. It's a very bad thing . . . relative to the desires in question. In fact, it is difficult to think of things that are worse.

So, no, this doesn't say that torturing a child is good. It says that the person who desires to torture a child has a motivating reason to torture a child. That's true enough. But, as i have already said, when we talk about the goodness and badness of torturing a child, his desires are not the desire that we have in mind. The statement that "torturing the child is such as to fulfill the desires in question" - when we seriously and honestly identify the desires in question when we make this statement - is obviously false.

This really is the most common mistake. People take something like torturing a child and claim that this theory calls it "good" when it is obviously not good . . . because they choose the wrong "desires in question". The "desires in question" or those that make the most sense out of the evaluation. When it comes to evaluating the torturing of a child, the desires of the person wanting to torture the child does not make the most sense of our evaluation. So, the claim that I am calling this "good" is a mistake.

So, we pick up what "the desires in question" are from the context in which we make the statement. If I say, "That was a good supper," I am typically saying that the supper fulfilled my desires regarding what I like to taste. If I say, "that was a good movie" I am probably talking about the desires of people who like that kind of movie. If I say, "This is a good knife" I have in mind the desires that knives are typically built to fulfill - a desire to cut things or, for certain types of knives, cutting certain kinds of things (e.g., a bread knife, a butter knife).


Once again, what is good?

Whenever something is called "good" either it is "such as to fulfill the desires in question" or the statement is false. This applies to all types of goodness. Try it out. You can't have a conversation without somebody making an evaluation - saying that something is "good" or "right" or "better" or "bad" or "worse". See if you can pick out the "desires in question" and, if you can, see if the object of evaluation really is "such as to fulfill the desires in question".

Now, of course, you will come across people who use the term "good" or some similar evaluative term without referring to "the desires in question". Typically, they are claiming that something is intrinsically good - that it has good regardless of whether or not it is such as to fulfill the desires in question. This happens a lot. Those claims are false. If you want an evaluation to be true, then it has to be "such as to fulfill the desires in question". If it is not such as to fulfill the desires in question then the claim that it is good is false. Feel free to tell them they are mistaken.


Conclusion

This, then, is where it all starts. This is goodness.

Any questions? Feel free to ask.