Thursday, July 05, 2018

Now, About That Book . . .

Am I ready to start that book?

The right act is the act that a person with good malleable desires and lacking bad desires would have done in those circumstances.

This is the thesis that I want to defend.

I suspect there is a reader who will take one look at this thesis and immediately toss the project aside as a waste of time. With "right act" on one side of the equation, and "good malleable desire" on the other side, this project clearly begs the question as it smuggles in all of the answers to "the right" in a question-begging and equally problematic account of "the good".

It is a legitimate concern.

This account is going to need an account of "good malleable desires" that does not end up being question-begging. This means that I am going to need such an account of "good", "malleable", and "desire".

Specifically, it seems that I must begin with a theory of desire. From there, I can go on to a theory of "good". I would also through in a theory of "ought" and of "normative reasons" to boot.

As is the way of philosophy, a philosopher is supposed to spoil the ending by giving away the plot in advance.

In this light, I might as well say:

A desire is a propositional attitude - a mental state that that can be expressed in the form 'Agent desires that P', where 'P' is a proposition capable of being true or false, which assigns a value V(D) to a proposition P representing the importance to Agent of P being made or kept true.

NOTE: I have toyed with the idea that both beliefs and desires assign a value to a proposition being true. The value that it assigns to a proposition that is the object of a belief - V(B) - represents the credence of that belief - the likelihood given whatever else the agent knows that the proposition is, in fact true. Whereas, as I said, the value it assigns to a proposition that is the object of a desires - V(D) - represents the importance of that belief being made or kept true to the agent. However, I have not given the issue of belief in this regard a lot of thought. I toss that out here simply as something to think about.

From here, we can go on and develop theories of "good", "ought" and "normative reasons".

X is good if and only if X is such as to fulfill the desires in question.

Before going too far, I want to make sure to point out that this is not an account of the meaning of the term "good". If we were to look at the meaning of this term, it would say something like, "X is good if and only if and to the extent that there exists a reason to realize or preserve X". There could be all sorts of reasons - divine commands, intrinsic values, categorical imperatives. However, there is only one type of reason for intentional action that exists, and that is to fulfill a desire. All of the other types of reasons are consistent with the meaning of the term "good". They just don't exist.

The critic then asks, "Well, then, what is to 'fulfill' a desire and which are the 'desires in question'?"

A "desire that P" is fulfilled in any state of affairs S where P is made or kept true.

As to the "desires in question," this reflects the fact that the term 'good' is ambiguous. It has many meanings, each meaning relating the object of evaluation to different desires in question. We pick out the desires in question by looking at the context within which the term 'good' was being used.

Some of the more common options are:

(1) A given desire. Example: "If you do not want to be identified on the video when you rob the convenience store, then it would be a good idea for you to wear a mask."

(2) The agent's current desires. Example: "While you are at the store, it would be a good opportunity to pick up a carton of cigarettes."

(3) The agent's current and future desires. Example: "Smoking is no good for you. You should quit."

(4) The desires of those involved in the decision. Example: "What toppings do we want on our pizza?" and "Where would be a good place for us to go on vacation?"

(5) The desires typically fulfilled by the type of object being evaluated. Examples: A good knife. A good game.

This theory of "good" relates to a theory of "ought" as well as to a theory of "normative reason".

Agent ought to do A means that there is a reason for Agent to do A.

Here, I want to draw a distinction between this account of normative reasons and the account that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy identifies as the "Humean Theory of Reasons (revised)."

SEP offers the following hypothesis:

If there is a reason for someone to do something, then she must have some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of her reason. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External", https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/, accessed July 5, 2018.

This is a mistake. An accurate account of reasons says:

If there is a reason for someone to do something, then someone must have some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of her reason. Whereas, if she has a reason to do something, then she must have some desire that would be served by doing it.

This account properly separates the account of "there is a reason" from "she has a reason" which the original version does not do.

With a theory of "good" and "reasons for action" under our belt, we can look at the term "ought".

"Agent ought to do X" means that "Doing X will fulfill the desires in question."

Look to the above discussion about "good" for an understanding of the phrase "desires in question". The term "ought" is ambiguous. It has countless meanings, each meaning relating to a different set of "desires in question". All of these different meanings are perfectly legitimate. Yet, it is extremely easy to equivocate, to begin an argument using one understanding of 'ought' that refers to one set of 'desires in question', and then shifting the 'desires in question' (and, thus, the sense of the word 'ought') in mid argument.

In the case of morality, I would argue that the desires in question are all fixed desires plus those malleable desires that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote universally. That is a rather long and complex formula, so I will work it out in detail later.

For now, we have an idea of a desire, and we have an idea of "good", so a "good malleable desire" is a malleable desire that tends to fulfill the (other) desires in question. In the case of moral value, it is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires generally, regardless of whose they are.

I need to say something about the sense in which a desire is "malleable". In the case of morality, we are looking at desires that people can mold in others using the tools of reward and punishment, including praise and condemnation. We are familiar with the practice of using reward as an incentive and punishment as a deterrence. However, incentives and deterrence work on existing desires. A reward is a promise to fulfill, and a deterrence is a threat to thwart, an existing desire. However, what I am interested in here is the capacity of rewards and punishment, including praise and condemnation, to actually bring about changes in desires. I am interested in these tools having the power to create an aversion to lying or to taking the property of others without consent, a desire to help those in desperate need, or a desire to repay a debt.

So:

A good malleable desire is a desire that can be modified using the social tools of reward and punishment, including praise and condemnation, that people generally have reason to promote universally because of the desire's tendency to fulfill other desires.

This brings us back to the hypothesis that a right act is an act that tends to fulfill those malleable desires that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote universally using the social tools of reward and punishment, including praise and condemnation.

That's the big picture. However, the big picture is made up of a lot of little details. The first detail that I would like to look at is: What is a desire?

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