Revisiting Reasons

In a separate communication, I have had an opportunity to restate my position regarding the Humean Theory of Reasons.

My position is that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy misstates the Humean Theory of Reasons. What SEP calls the Humean Theory of Reasons is false. But saying this does not imply rejecting the Humean Theory of Reasons. It is false because it misstates the Humean Theory of Reasons.

Reasons There Are

In addition to the distinction between internal vs external reasons, and objective vs subjective reasons, there's a third distinction being overlooked: a distinction between the reasons an agent has and the reasons there are.

To illustrate this distinction, please imagine an agent, Sara, with an aversion to being in pain. Sara, then, has a reason to avoid her own pain, on the Humean account. It is also consistent with the Humean account to imagine that the world also contains Jim, and Jim has a separate aversion to being in pain. Consequently, Jim also has a reason to avoid being in pain.

In this world, there are two reasons. There is Sara's reason to avoid being in pain, and there is Jim's reason to avoid being in pain. Of these, Sara has one reason. Jim has the other reason.

With this distinction in mind, please take a look at the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR) as described in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, "Reasons for Action: Internal vs External"

HTR (revised): If there is a reason for someone to do something, then she must have some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of her reason.

When we take into consideration the distinction above, this is false. In this illustrative example above, consider Sara having the option of doing something that save Jim from experiencing pain. There is a reason for Sara to do this thing. This reason is Jim's reason to avoid being in pain. However, it is false that Sara must have some desire that would be served by her doing it. Unless we assume that Sara also will experience pain if she does not act, she has no reason to act. There is a reason for her to act, but it is not a reason Sara has. It is a reason that Jim has.

With a true antecedent and a false consequent, which makes this a false implication, even within a Humean account of reasons.

To express HTR accurately, it must say the following:

If there is a reason for someone to do something, then there must be some desire that would be served by her doing it, which is the source of that reason; and if she has a reason to do something, then she must have a desire that would be served by doing it, which is the source of that reason.

This conjunction matches "there are reasons" to "there are desires" and "she has a reason" to "she has a desire."

Now, the SEP says that the HTR leads to what they call "The Standard Problem". They describe the problem as follows:

If (as Moral Rationalism claims) an action (like ordering genocide) is morally wrong for an agent (like Hitler) only if there is a reason for him not to do it, and if (as [the Humean Theory of Reasons] claims) there is a reason for him not to do it only if he has some desire that would be served by his not doing it, then it follows that whether an action is morally wrong for an agent depends upon what he or she desires. But that seems incompatible with Moral Absolutism [some actions are morally wrong for any agent no matter what motivations and desires they have]. So it seems we must reject at least one of HTR, Moral Rationalism, and Moral Absolutism.

However, this expression of the "standard problem" includes the false inference from "there is a reason" to "he has some desire". Instead, the inference should be from "there is a reason" to "there is some desire".

If we correct the HTR so that "reasons there are" relates to "desires there are", and "reasons Hitler has" relates to "desires Hitler has" we get:

Moral Rationalism: "an action (like ordering genocide) is morally wrong for an agent (like Hitler) only if there is a reason for him not to do it."

I am simply going to accept this as written for the sake of the demonstration. In fact, I would raise some arguments against it. Correcting it would require other corrections throughout this description of the problem. However, that is not what I am trying to talk about here.

HTR: There is a reason for him not to do it only if there are some desires that would be served by his not doing it.

Here, I am using the "there are reasons" to "there are desires" conjunct. And, in fact, in the case of Hitler ordering genocide, "there are some desires that would be served by his not doing it" is true. These importantly include the desires that the Jews had.

Then we get:

Moral Absolutism: Some actions are morally wrong for any agent no matter what motivations and desires they have.

Once we correct HTR, this is consistent with the other two principles. The "reasons there are" for Hitler not to perform the action are not reasons Hitler has. They are reasons that other agents (the Jews) have. Those reasons still "are" - they exist. And for every reason that exists there is a desire that exists, and the person who has the reason also has the relevant desire.

Hume's Evaluation of Sentiments

In his Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume provided four criteria for the evaluation of a character traits. A character trait is good to the degree to which it is pleasing to self, useful to self, pleasing to others, and useful to others.

Here, let us look again at the distinction between "reasons he has" and "reasons there are".

"Reasons he has" are associated only with "pleasing to self" and "useful to self".

"Reasons there are," on the other hand, also includes "pleasing to others" and "useful to others". These criteria look not only at the reasons the agent has, but the reasons that others have.

The set of "reasons there are" is much larger than the set "reasons he has". In fact, each agent has only a small fraction of the reasons there are.

Referring back to the original illustrative example in which Sara and Jim each had an aversion to their own pain. For Sara's action, "reasons she has" refers to "pleasing to self" and "useful to self". "Reasons there are" includes "pleasing to others" and "useful to others." This means that "reasons there are" includes Jim's desires - Jim's reasons for being pleased or finding the object of evaluation useful. When we include the full set of reasons there are, then it is no longer the case that "there is a reason" implies "Sara has a desire." It may be the case that "there is a reason" implies "Jim has a desire".

NOTE: I think it is important to note that Hume was evaluating sentiments, not actions. That will become relevant in developing this argument further, but it is not relevant at this point.


Conclusion

That, then, is the position that I would like to defend in at least a part of the thesis. That the Humean Theory is not "there are reasons" implies "she has a desire". Instead, "there is a reason" implies "somebody has a desire" and whoever has the reason also must have a desire that would be served.

Do you think this has merit?