The “Death of Desire” principle notes that a desire, once fulfilled, ceases to exist. Another way in which it is phrased is to say that a person cannot desire that which they know to be the case.
Here, I must admit, this simply seems wrong. It is easiest to see with respect to aversions. My desire that I not be in pain does not cease to be exist simply because I am currently in a state in which I am not in pain. My fear of deep water does not vanish when I am not in deep water. In fact, the persistence of these “desires that not-P” even when not-P is true provides the motivation to make sure that not-P does not become true. It is my aversion to pain when I am not in pain that causes me to make sure that I avoid future pain. It is my fear of deep water even when I am not in deep water that keeps me out of deep water.
In the case of positive desires – desires to realize a state rather than to prevent the realization of a state, it makes sense that evolution would equip us with desires that fade when they are realize. After all, desires command action. It makes sense that evolution would equip us with desires that fade when they are fulfilled so that we can move on to the next project. We eat until we have obtained the nourishment we need, then we go on to do something else. We are thirsty until that point at which we have consumed enough water to restore a healthy balance. We desire sex until we have reached an end that makes reproduction possible (at least males do), and we explore until we have discovered whatever it is we were exploring to discover.
This provides some understanding of where the idea that a desire ends when that which is desired has been realized. However, it is a mistake to attribute this to all desire.
Even in the case of some desires persist. The desire that one’s offspring is healthy and happy persists even when one knows that one’s offspring are healthy and happy. One’s desire to be a novelist persists through the writing of several novels.
Oddie brings up as an example Hillary Clinton’s desire to become president. Then (in his hypothetical alternative universe) Hillary does become the first female president of the United States. She can no longer become the first female president of the United States because she is the first female president of the United States. The desire disappears. However, being the first female president of the United States still appears good to her. This argument creates an objection to Oddie’s thesis, since this is an example where an agent can no longer desire that P (to become the first female president of the United States), but this still appears good to her. If a desire is an appearance of something as good, then there can be no appearance of good if the desire is dead.
Oddie answers this objection by stating that there is a thin desire that persists through the election, but we give different names to the different parts. At the start, Clinton has a perspective desire (a desire for a perspective state) of being the first female president of the United States. Then, she wins the election, and the perspective desire becomes a satisfied desire that she is president of the United States. Indeed, if the desire did not continue to exist, then she could not be experiencing the satisfaction of the desire the day after the election – not if the desire no longer existed to be satisfied.
The fact that Clinton can be satisfied with winning (if she wins) and disappointed with losing (if she loses) suggests that something of the desire survives the election. It does not, in fact, die. It simply changes its name.
The assigned value theory of desire would have the same response. The brain assigns a particular value to being the first President of the United States. This motivates the agent to make or keep the proposition true. When Hillary wins the election, the desire changed from making the proposition true to keeping it true. The desire did not die. It simply shifted to a new, appropriate object.
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