Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value"

I have finished the first reading assignment for Phil 5110: Contemporary Moral Theory: Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value", Philosophical Studies (2006) 127:109- 166.

Since I claim to be a realist about value, one would think that I would have a problem with this argument. However, the way Street defines realism, that is not the case. The position that she is arguing against - that she thinks that evolutionary theory creates a problem for - is the thesis that "there are at least some evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes."

Desirism holds, of course, that all evaluative facts are facts about relationships between objects of evaluation and desires. Facts about relationships between objects of evaluation and desires are not independent of our evaluative attitudes. Consequently, desirism is not a realist theory, and is not subject to the Darwinian Dilemma.

I am going to have to object to the way that Street distinguishes between realism and realism. After all, evaluative attitudes are real, the states of affairs that are being evaluated are real, and so are the relationships between them. Still, it avoids the Darwinian Dilemma that Street describes.

Her Darwinian Dilemma that she uses against "value realism" actually has much in common with an argument that I use against the thesis that evolutionary psychologists have discovered an evolutionary foundation for morality. One objection that I raise is a type of "Euthyphro dilemma".

It is derived from the dilemma that Socrates presented to Euthyphro about the nature of goodness. When Euthyphro said that goodness is whatever is loved by the gods, Socrates as, "Is it good because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is good?"

If it is good because it is loved by the gods - then anything loved by the gods would be good. If the gods loved slavery and the torturing of young children for pleasure, then these would be good.

If, on the other hand, it is loved by the gods because it is good, then we still do not have an account of what makes them good.

As I use this argument against those who think that evolution can explain morality, I ask whether something is moral because we evolved a disposition to approve of it, or if its goodness is independent of our disposition of approve of it but we have evolved a disposition to approve of it nonetheless.

If it is good because we evolved a disposition to approve of, then anything we evolve a disposition to approve of would be good. If we evolved a disposition to enslave others, then slavery would be good. If we evolved a disposition to rape, then rape would be good. If we evolved a disposition to favor those who "look like us" (on the grounds that they likely have more of our genes), then racism would be good.

If, on the other hand, goodness consists in something other than our being evolved to approve of it, then we are still lacking an account of what goodness is. Furthermore, it would be a huge coincidence if that which we evolved a disposition to approve of - given that those dispositions are subject to evolutionary influences - would be precisely the same set of things that happen to be good.

Street uses a similar argument against value realism. She takes it to be a basic fact of evolutionary theory that evolution has disposed us to like things that promote our evolutionary success and dislike things that hinder our evolutionary success. Thus, we tend to like taking care of our own children, tend to prefer the well-being of family members to strangers, and are disposed to praise and reward those who benefit us.

The problem with value realism is that, if values are "out there" in the world, then we would have to postulate a huge coincidence between that which promote human evolutionary success and that which is really good. The value realist has to reject the option that something is good because we evolved a disposition to like it and, instead, assert that goodness exists in things independent of our disposition to like it. However, our disposition to like and dislike is still going to be molded by their evolutionary pressures. What are the odds that these evolutionary pressures are going to direct our perceptions of what is good and bad so that it hits this target?

Steel compares this to a situation where a person wishes to go to Bermuda - arriving at Bermuda is the goal - but is sailing in a craft left up to the winds and currents. Certainly there is a chance that the boat will end up at Bermuda, but could just as easily - and, in fact, far more likely - end up someplace else entirely.

She ends up defending what she calls anti-realism. When life first came into existence, there was no value. Value came into existence because life acquired a disposition to value. This disposition to value promoted evolutionary fitness, because it became a disposition to value that which promoted evolutionary fitness and to dislike things that hindered evolutionary fitness. Value does not exist as something independent of these evaluative attitudes.

Still, Street seems to be the victim of a false dichotomy that takes value either to be real properties completely independent of our evaluative attitudes and the evaluative attitudes that the assessor would have under certain circumstances. In other words, "X is good" either means "X has an intrinsic property of goodness" or "I like X - or I would like X if I looked at X under certain circumstances of perfect knowledge and sound reason." A third option that she does not consider is that "good" refers to relationships between objects of evaluation and desires that actually exist - that are real - and that do not in any way depend on the agent's own beliefs or desires ABOUT THEM. They are not at all independent of 'evaluative attitudes'. However, they are quite independent of the attitudes of the person who is talking about them. They are as real as anything that can be found in nature. It is because I take value to be about something as real as anything that can be found in nature that I consider myself to be a realist about value - though not in any sense that Street is arguing against.