A Clarification on the Argument from Moral Experience

The Argument from Moral Experience argues from the observation that we appear to experience morality as objective to the conclusion that we are justified in at least presuming that there is an objective morality. The burden of proof is on those who tell us that this observation is an illusion - a mistake.

In my discussion of this argument, I distinguished two types of moral objectivity.

(1) Objective intrinsic prescriptivity - the type of objective values that J.L. Mackie was talking about when he says that objective values do not exist.

(2) Objectively true or false moral statements. In my own case, I hold that moral claims are claims about the relationship between desires that can be molded through rewards (such as praise) and punishments (such as condemnation) on the one side, and the desires that give people reason to reward/praise or punish/condemn on the other. However, this is a version of this type of objectivity, and there are others.

And I hold that a great deal of unnecessary disagreement takes place because people do not distinguish the two. Because this failure, those who see the significant problems that exist with the first type of objectivity end up asserting that the second type of objectivity does not exist either. Those who see the ways that the second type of objectivity makes sense asserts that the first type of objectivity must exist as well.

I agree that the first type of objective value does not exist, but the second type of objective value does.

What I need to clarify is the fact that, though I believe that the second type of objective values exist, I do not defend these types of objective values using any type of Argument from Moral Experience.

That is to say, Don Loeb's objections to the Argument from Moral Experience are applicable to both types of objectivity. If one wants to defend the second type of objectivity, one must find arguments other than the Argument from Moral Experience.

That there are objectively true statements to be made about the relationships between desires that can be molded by reward and punishment and the reasons to reward and punish actually seems to be beyond dispute.

At the same time, there are objectively true statements to be made about the amount of blood a person can lose before dying and the population densities of the various countries on Earth. There are a great many objectively true statements that can be made that are not moral statements.

The real question is: Are there objectively true statements that deserve to be called moral statements and, if so, are those statements "relationships between desires that can be molded using reward and punishment and the reasons to reward and punish."

For this task, I use the claim that moral statements can be reduced to statements about these relationships and function the same way.

In other words, looking at these relationships, one can distinguish between the three categories of action (prohibition, obligation, and non-obligatory permission), supererogation, the concept of excuse, the use of reward and punishing - and praise and condemnation - in morality, mens rea, culpability, "ought" implies "can", the types of evidence people bring to moral arguments, and the like.

I include the fact that moral statements seem to be objectively true and false, and statements about the types of relationships being discussed here are objectively true or false.

However, this is not an argument from moral experience. If it were an argument from moral experience then, if somebody were to find inconsistencies between moral statements and statements about these relationships among desires, we would still have a presumption of moral objectivity but a side belief that these relationships do not describe that reality. As it is, however, if such inconsistencies came to light, there would be no grounds for a continued presumption in an objective morality.

So, in short, the fact that I distinguish between two types of objectivity has no implications for Don Loeb's argument. It works with equal effect against both types of objectivity, even though morality is not actually objective in the first sense and is fully objective in the second.