The Science of Morality

It seems as if the subject of the science of morality is picking up again.

Unfortunately, nothing has changed. These so-called "moral-scientists" are still barking up the wrong data tree and, as a result, generating a set of conclusions that are incoherent, inconsistent, and far removed from morality.

This specific post was inspired in the blog posting, Answering Questions on Morality in the blog Open Parachute.

Ken writes:

[The model if human morality I suggest] sees our morality as built on human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals.

Is it wrong to round up all the Jews and put most of them in concentration camps where we work them to death while killing others outright?

Well, it seems that if those instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, cultural, and social animals say to kill the Jews, we should kill the Jews. The science of the morality of rounding up and killing the Jews is the science of these instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals.

All I am doing here is using the same Euthyphro argument that many atheists hold up as proof against a divine command theory of ethics.

Is X wrong because it displeases the gods?

Well, if it were true that X is wrong because it displeases the gods, then anything we think of that displeases the gods would be wrong. If it displeases the gods to suffer a Jew to live, or to spend a Sunday without the pleasure of a full day torturing a young child, then it is wrong to suffer a Jew to live or to refrain from torturing a child on Sunday.

Of course, it there were such a God then this would not prove that such things were good, it would prove that the God in question were evil. This is taken as proof that there is a standard of morality independent of God and we must look there to find the real difference between right and wrong.

This widely recognized problem with divine command theories of morality are just as much a problem for genetic command theories of morality or, more relevant to this post, to a "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals" command theory of morality. That is to say, whatever genetics or "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals" says we should do – that is what we should do.

Is X wrong because it displeases our genes (or displeases our "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals")?

Well, if it were true that X is wrong because it displeases our genes (or displeases our "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals"), then anything we think of that displeases our genes would be wrong. If it displeases the gods to suffer a Jew to live, or to spend a Sunday without the pleasure of a full day torturing a young child, then it is wrong to suffer a Jew to live or to refrain from torturing a child on Sunday.

At this point, the "science of morality" crowd proves that they are just as adept at hand-waving and ignoring arguments that they do not like as any theist.

Don't get me wrong. I believe that there is (or can be) a science of morality. I am a moral realist. I hold that there are moral facts. Furthermore, these moral facts are natural facts, subject to scientific scrutiny and discovery.

I am not denying the possibility of natural moral facts. I am denying that these types of theories of what those moral facts are makes any sense. The theories are flawed. These people need to look someplace else for their scientific theory of morality.

People who look for morality "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals" are wasting their time.

The Euthyphro argument shows this.

The answer to the Euthyphro argument in both cases is to argue that morality is to be found somewhere outside of God, or outside of "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals". If God, or our genetic behavioral dispositions, or our "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, social and cultural evolution as social animals, are moral or immoral – good or evil – depends on whether they conform to this external standard, or deviate from it.

A scientific study of these instincts and intuitions will do a lot to tell us what they are, but it will tell us nothing about what they should be. What they should be is determined by their conformity to this external standard.

A scientific model of human morality can easily explain why we have strong intuitions of right and wrong and we unconsciously respond to specific situation by classifying them as right or wrong ("auto mode").

I am quite certain – beyond all reasonable doubt - that if we had strong intuitions regarding the permissibility of working Jews to death and killing some outright, and responded to these situations by judging them right, that there would be a scientific explanation for that fact.

Scientists doing research on the human brain would be able to come up with all sorts of theories explaining how these intuitions and dispositions worked.

And this all might be good and interesting science.

But none of it will be relevant to the question of whether we should be disposed to working most Jews to death and killing some of them outright.

I am just as certain that science can tell us a great deal about what disposes a person to commit rape, about racial prejudice, about tribal hostilities that often lead to war. In fact, I am certain that we can give a scientific account of every form of behavior – both good and evil – including our disposition to judge actions as good or evil.

But this is a far cry from providing a scientific account of good or evil itself – of what it takes for behavior to actually be (as opposed to being judged to be) good or evil.

"When we go through the intellectual exercise of considering novel and theoretical situations . . . we accept our emphatic nature as a criteria?"

But SHOULD we?

Yes, we do this – I cannot deny that. However, at the same time, I think that this is something we should not be doing?

What type of argument are we being given here? We are disposed to do P therefore we are justified in doing P? I will grant that we are disposed to take our own emphatic nature as a criteria in moral arguments. Yet, I hold that this basically reduces to, "I believe that P; therefore, P". Our sentiments tell us what we believe – they do not tell us what is true. And there is simply no valid leap to be made from believing something (or having a sentiment that it is wrong) and its actually being wrong as a matter of fact. It is as far of a leap as going from the sincere conviction that there is a God to the conclusion that God exists as a matter of fact.

A great deal of evil comes from this practice of using our emphatic nature as a criteria for moral truth. This is really nothing but an excuse for taking our own likes and dislikes – our learned and natural pleasures and displeasures – and turning them into excuses for using violence against others. You can’t get from, "I like P; therefore, I am justified in using violence against others to acquire P", so we invent a middle step. "I like P. My liking P represents some sort of intrinsic value – is a reliable indication of what I ought to have and what others ought to provide me with . Therefore, I am justified in using violence against others in acquiring P."

However, that middle step is entirely unwarranted. It is true that this is a very common practice. However, it is also the case that you cannot go from, "X is a common practice" to "X is a wholly justified practice."

Something more has to be said.

My next question is: What are these "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, cultural, and social animals"?

I have my instincts and intuitions. You have yours. Which ones are we going to select as "human instincts and intuitions"?

Do they have to be universally shared?

That set does not exist. The brain-damaged human – the comatose human on life support – is still human, and may share very few instincts and intuitions with the rest of us.

Even trying to take a set of instincts and intuitions and define them as those of the PROPER human being will turn out to be no different than taking any (other) set of physical characteristics – blonde hair, blue eyes, light skin – and defining THEM as the proper human.

What are we going to say of the humans that lack these qualities? That they are not human?

That they are SUB-human?

If I am disposed to being disgusted and repulsed by the mere existence of homosexual or interracial relationships, or I am disposed to kidnap school children and hack them into little pieces without a quiver of conscience, how would these dispositions fit into the category of "human instincts and intuitions"?

Which raises the question, What are our obligations to non-humans?

I am not talking about our obligations to animals here, but our obligations to thinking beings who happen not to be human.

The problems that arise in constructing a morality between humans and some imagined race of star travelers is not a different KIND of problem from that of creating a morality among different human being. The differences between us and this hypothetical race and the differences between us and other human beings is not a difference in KIND. It is merely a difference in DEGREE.

But what do we look to in creating a moral system? Is it somehow written in nature that the proper way to treat these aliens is determined by "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, cultural, and social animals"? What about alien "instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, cultural, and social animals"? How do they fit in?

I want to repeat, these are NOT arguments against the possibility of the science of morality.

All too often, people read these arguments and answer, "Alonzo has provided a number of arguments against the possibility of a science of morality." They then show why none of these objections argue against the possibility of the science of morality and declare that I have been defeated.

So, I repeat, these arguments no only fail to disprove the possibility of a science of morality, I think that a science of morality is possible. I think this specific theory of morality utterly fails to address the subject matter. But that is not the same as thing that all theories of morality must utterly fail to address the subject matter. The latter implication is not only unjustified, I think it is false.

So, do not interpret this as a post objecting to the possibility of the science of morality.

Interpret this as a post that any theory that attempts to reduce morality to anything like "human instincts and intuitions which have developed during our biological, cultural, and social animals" is fundamentally flawed and must be rejected. Those people wanting an actual science of morality are going to have to look for a different kind of theory.