Morality and Free Will

I am sorry for the length of this post. However, I get into some fundamental moral concepts in this post, and felt that the detail was necessary. This post concerns questions of what morality is and how it works in general, which provides the basis of many of the specific judgements I make in other posts.

The folks over at the Secular Outpost put its readers in contact with "an open letter to the atheist community" entitled "Denying Big God and Little God: The Next Step for Atheists."

The "little god" in this case is contra-causal free will, the special type of ability to change the world on which, some think, all of morality depends.

I gave up on this type of free will when I was an undergraduate philosophy student. I describe my reasoning in Chapter 8 of "Desire Utilitarianism: An Atheist's Quest for Moral Truth".

It was a very difficult subject for me to work through -- something I think is comparable to what others must suffer upon realizing that their favorite God does not exist. That is, until I actually sat down and worked out the implications.

Tom Clark, the author of "Denying Big God and Little God," made some important errors about what those implications are.

In particular, I want to raise an objection to this statement:

...since we see others as fully caused – for instance substance abusers, criminal offenders, the destitute and homeless – we become less blaming, less punitive and more empathetic and understanding.

My answer: “Not necessarily.”

What Is Contra-Causal Free Will?

I agree with Mr. Clark on the absence of contra-causal free will. I work from a model in which morality is not only compatible with the absence of this power, it requires the absence of such a power. Contra-causal free will simply introduces way too many problems and does not offer the slightest bit of help.

I want to be specific about what it is I am rejecting here. I am rejecting the existence of a special force that allows us to cause even the smallest atom to alter its course through space, to change direction or speed or mass or any other property, contrary to the movement bestowed upon it by the laws of physics. If we cannot alter the movement of an atom in this way, we also lack the ability to alter the movement of something as massive as a hand or an arm or any of the other components of human action.

We still have the capacity to make choices. The words that show up in this posting are the words that I choose to put into it. If I had wanted to use different words -- or if I wanted to write on a different subject -- then I would have done so. The subject matter and content of this posting comes from my desires and, as such, they are my words. I am responsible for its content.

This set of beliefs and desires that are mine -- that define me -- and that determine the subject matter and content of my postings, do not sit outside of the physical universe, mysteriously reaching in to alter the flow of matter in ways outside of the rules of physics. They exist within the physical universe, and by their presence I change the universe around me. The type of person I am, my moral character, determines whether I change the universe for better or for worse.

I am aiming for "better."

Free Will and Morality

The model of morality that I have been using can be roughly described as one that views morality as the science of using praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment to make the world better.

As I said, the model requires determinism because it looks substantially at the effects that these four tools have on molding the character of people in a society. Morality aims at using these tools to promote good desires (desires that tend to fulfill other desires) and inhibit bad desires (desires that tend to thwart the desires of others).

Allow me to explain what I mean with an example; the moral crime of drunk driving. To a certain degree, by the use of condemnation and (threats of) punishment, we can cause individuals to have a stronger aversion to driving while drunk than they would otherwise have. To the degree that we can promote such an aversion, to that degree we have fewer drunk drivers on the road. Fewer drunk drivers means that we, and those we care about (our significant others, children, family, friends, their children) are safer.

Threats of punishment (laws) have some effect. A law is a threat to thwart other people's desires if we catch them driving under the influence. However, this system has a loophole – it’s effectiveness in reducing the number of drunk drivers depends on people’s beliefs about their chances of getting caught. It has no effect on those who think they can get away with it.

So, how do we cause somebody to refuse to drive drunk even when they think they can get away with it?

Well, let us note that a person who has an opportunity to put his hand in a hot fire – nobody is looking, and nobody will have any opportunity to punish him – still will not put his hand in a hot fire. He will refuse to do so, even though he will not get caught, because he does not want to.

Similarly, if a person hates the taste of liver and onions, you can put him in a room with a serving of liver and onions and trust that, even when nobody is looking, he is not going to sneak a taste. Again, the fact that he has an aversion to the taste of liver and onions keeps him from taking any, even when he can get away with doing so.

If we can cause a person to have an aversion to driving while drunk which is similar to his aversion to putting his hand in a hot fire or to eating liver and onions, then we have a way to prevent a person from driving while drunk even when he thinks he can get away with it. The aversion will keep him from driving while drunk, even where the chance of punishment does not exist.

How do we create that aversion?

To do this, we use the tools of praise and condemnation. We praise those who have the aversion, and condemn those who do not, in the hopes that this will influence the attitudes that people have towards driving while drunk.

In the same way, we use this to create an aversion to taking money out of a co-worker's purse even when one can get away with it. Of course, he also wants the money (or, more precisely, the money will help him to get other things that he wants). However, if his aversion to taking things from others is strong enough it will override these other interests.

A Question of Cause and Effect

So now the question of how much we blame or condemn others becomes a question of the effect of these types of actions.

What if the effect of blaming people less is that they have a weaker aversion to drunk driving than they would have otherwise had? This means that there will be more drunk drivers (and those who drive drunk will do so more often). This means that our own lives, health, and property – as well as those of the people we care about – are more at risk. In addition, we have reason to be concerned with the possibility of those same family and friends driving while drunk. Doing so not only makes them a danger to others, but it makes them a danger to themselves. To the degree that we care about them, we have reason to use the tools we have available to cultivate in them an aversion to drunk driving, and an aversion to riding in a car in which the driver has been drinking.

If blaming promote this aversion, we have reason to blame.

These tools seem to have their strongest effect on children. A concerned parent clearly has reason to raise a child who will not drive while drunk, and who will not get in a car with a driver who is drunk. To the degree that an attitude of condemnation and contempt causes the child to grow up with such an aversion, to that degree the parent has a reason to express an attitude of condemnation and contempt to express such an attitude.

Because the child who grows up without an aversion to driving while drunk is a threat to me and those I care about, I have reason to condemn parents who do not raise their children to acquire an aversion to drunk driving.

Responsibility

One might want to object that this defense of condemnation involves condemnation without responsibility. The condemnation is justified by its effects, but those being condemned are not actually “guilty” of anything.

Yet, they are guilty. Those being condemned lack the aversion to driving while drunk that they should have – the aversion that would prevent them from being a risk to others. They become the targets of condemnation precisely because of a flaw – or a fault – in their moral character. That is to say, the condemnation is due to something that is the fault (or a fault – a flaw) of the person being condemned.

Implications

This is a part of the moral theory upon which this blog is built.

I fill this blog with an attitude of blame and calls for punitive action.

I look for characteristics that make people a threat to others – such as the Bush Administration’s lack of an aversion to torture that makes them a threat to others. I also look at their willingness to pick people off the street and imprison them without a trial, and their tendency towards backward thinking -- where they first draw a conclusion (e.g., Iraq is a threat) and then accept or reject evidence on whether it supports or conflicts with their desired conclusion. I look at their willingness to create a presidency with no limits on its power, because such a presidency is clearly a threat to others. I then direct blame and contempt at those who have these characteristics, as a way of making the world safer than it would otherwise be. I also look for attitudes which, if more common, would make people less of a threat to others. In this post, I have argued for a stronger aversion to drunk driving, and seek to direct condemnation against those who would do such a thing. In addition, I look at whether others are directing blame and contempt at people who are not, in fact, a threat to others. Misplaced blame and contempt – particularly when accompanied by demands that his targets suffer punishment and other harms – makes the person placing blame and contempt a threat to others. As a character trait, homosexuality is not a threat to anybody. It is nothing like lacking a desire to torture, drive while drunk, and create a presidency of unlimited power. It is those who cast blame and contempt at the homosexual who is the threat to others, not the homosexual.

Summary

Tom Hunter also wrote in his essay, …by seeing just how we are caused, by our genetic endowment, upbringing, and social environments, a naturalistic understanding of ourselves dramatically enhances our powers of prediction and control, both in our personal lives and in the larger social arena..

This is true.

However, seeing how we are caused includes a seeing the role that praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment work within that causal chain, and its effects on the type of people we become.

The absence of contra-causal free will does not imply that we should be less blaming or punitive, or that we should reduce our levels of praise and reward. Rather, it requires that we look at the rational application of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment in virtue of its effects. To the degree that these are useful tools, we have good reason to continue use them, perhaps using them even more than we do now, to make ourselves and those we care about safer than they would otherwise be.

I could be wrong about the effects of these particular tools, and I can easily make mistakes as to their rational use. Perhaps they have no effect, or a much lower effect, than I sometimes claim. Then again, perhaps their effect is greater than I sometimes claim. Whichever is right, this is not something that we can infer directly from the premise, “There is no contra-causal free will.”