Saturday, April 16, 2016

What Is An Obligation?

What does it mean to say that a person has an obligation to do something?

Alph has borrowed $50 from a co-worker. Alph has promised to pay her back the next day. Alph has an obligation to go to work the next day with $50 that he will hand over to his co-worker, as promised.

What is this obligation?

Desirism recognizes three main categories for intentional action.

An obligatory act - a morally required act - is that act that a person with good desires (and lacking bad desires) would perform.

A prohibited act is that act that a person with good desires (and lacking bad desires) would not perform.

A non-obligatory permission is an act that a person with good desires (and lacking bad desires) might or might not perform based on the agent's non-moral interests. If the agent prefers coffee to tea then the agent has a non-obligatory permission to drink tea, instead of coffee.

Now, Alph asks, "What is this to me? You have this imaginary person with good desires and lacking bad desires who, if he were in my position, would be motivated to take $50 to work and give it to my co-worker. Fine. So what?"

Well, good desires are those desires that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote using social tools such as praise and reward (e.g., for those who repay debts) and condemnation and punishment (e.g., for those who fail to repay debts). Bad desires are desires that people generally have reason to inhibit or suppress using those same tools.

The reason why people may have reason to praise some actions is that the praise acts on the brain to strengthen desires that bring about that which is praised. At the same time, condemning an action promotes in people generally an aversion to performing that action. Some desires are malleable, and this represents how they are molded.

So, if Alph is the type of person who would take $50 to work the next day and give it to his co-worker, then Alph is the type of person that people generally have reason to praise and, even, to reward. However, if Alph is the type of person who neglects to repay the money, then Alph is the type of person that others have reason to condemn and even to punish.

Alph does have reasons to acquire rewards. In fact, nothing counts as an actual reward if it is not something that people generally have reason to acquire. And Alph has some reason to avoid condemnation and punishment. However, insofar as rewards and punishments are acting to motivate Alph directly, we still do not have anything that would justify saying that Alph has an obligation to pay his co-worker $50.

After all, an individual might purchase a Picasso painting in the hopes that he can sell it the next year for twice as much money. The prospect of doubling his money provides the reason to purchase the painting. However, the prospect of earning a profit - of collecting a reward - does not generate an obligation to purchase the painting. In order for there to be an obligation, something more has to be going on.

What we are saying in this case is that people generally have reason to promote in others a desire to repay debts - or an aversion to failing to repay a debt. This describes a different motive for repaying the debt. Alph may repay the debt because social praise and condemnation has caused in him a desire to repay the debt or an aversion with failing to do so. In other words, Alph repays the debt, not for the sake of obtaining praise and avoiding condemnation, but because he wants to. He desires to repay the debt - or, at least, an aversion to not paying the debt motivates him to do so.

Please note that the initial statement - the obligatory act is the act that a person with good desires would do - does not distinguish between repaying the debt to collect a reward from repaying the debt because one wants to. The obligatory act is to repay the debt, not to do so for a particular reason. The right action is simply the action of repaying the debt - because that is what a person with good desires would do.

Let's look again at the fact that society has reason to use the tools of praise and condemnation to promote a desire to repay debts and an aversion to failing to do so.

In part, I want to say that this is a part of what the claim that Alph has an obligation to repay the $50 means. It not only reports that people generally have reason to praise those who repay debts and condemn or punish those who do not. It is, at the same time, a statement of praise for those who repay debts and a statement of condemnation of those who fail.

So, to say that Alph has an obligation to repay the $50 is to say that people generally have reason to praise those who pay back the money and condemn those who do not. It also contains the praise and/or condemnation that the truth-bearing component of the sentence says is justified. It is praising Alph, should Alph be the type of person who pays back the money. Similarly, it is condemning Alph should Alph be the type of person who refuses to repay the loan.

Alph has an obligation to repay the $50. This is a claim that says that people generally have many and strong reasons to praise those would repay the money and condemn those who do not. At the same time, it is a statement that praises those who repay their debts and condemns those who fail to do so. That is to say, it does what the truth-bearing component says that people generally has reason to do.

Finally, this brings up a third way in which Alph might repay the money owed. I mentioned that he may do so in order to collect a reward or obtain praise, or to avoid punishment and condemnation. I also mentioned that he may repay the money because he wants to - because praise and condemnation has formed within him a desire to repay debts and an aversion to failing to do so.

This third motive for repaying the debt is "because it is the right thing to do". That is to say, the agent might have a desire to do the right thing, a belief that the right act is the act that a person with good desires would perform, and a further belief that the person with good desires would repay their debts. In desiring to do the right thing, and believing that repaying the debt is the right thing, Alph may be motivated to repay the debt.

In fact, when it comes to morality, we see all three of these types of motives in play. We also see people arguing as to which motive is the correct motive. I can say more on that issue, but this is not the place. It is enough for now simply to note that this theory provides an account of the three ways in which a person may be motivated to do the right thing.

My original question asked, "What is an obligation?" A person has an obligation to do that which a person with good desires would do. This means that people generally have reason to praise those who perform the action and condemn those who fail to do so. They have reason to praise or condemn based on the effects that praise and condemnation have on molding desires, thus creating people with good desires and eliminating those who do not.

3 comments:

Josh said...

this seems to be missing a very important part of what an obligation is. Doesn't seem that an obligation starts to become part of the picture when there is an impact to another person or society at large, basically some third party?

Josh said...

To provide more context with an example, if one promises themselves do to something (" I will run a mile after work today so that I can eat this chocolate bar") it's not an obligation in my view, because the term 'obligation' implies a social contract between multiple parties and not just oneself. This is different than paying back the $50 you owe a co-worker, because there is a second party involved who will be wronged if you fail to do what was agreed upon. A more closely aligned example and comparison:

Obligation: Paying back a co-worker $50 you borrowed at the agreed-upon time.

Not an obligation: Paying back yourself $50 you borrowed from your own savings account with the intention of replacing it with savings from your next paycheck.

Interested to hear your thoughts on this distinction.

Alonzo Fyfe said...

The impact on other people is captured by other people having a reason to praise or condemn. Their reason to praise or condemn is grounded on their seeking to obtain a positive impact or avoid a negative impact.

However, the impact is clearly not sufficient. Firing an employee has a negative impact - but firing an employee is not morally prohibited. Opening up a competing store has a negative impact on a store owner, but nobody has an obligation to refrain from doing so.

When we try to sort out legitimate from illegitimate negative impacts, it is here here we look at what people have reason to praise or condemn. There are reasons to condemn those who fire their employees, but they pale in significance to the reasons for allowing the hiring and firing of employees generally. There are reasons to condemn refusal to pay back debts, but there are no reasons for allowing people to refuse to pay debts generally.