What are moral
judgments?
On one account, moral
judgments are truth-bearing propositions. The claim, "rape is wrong" reports
a fact about the world.
I think this is true.
On another account,
moral judgments express attitudes. The claim, “rape is wrong” is equivalent to
saying, “Booooo!” to rape. “Boooo!” has no truth value.
I think this is true
as well.
These are not
mutually exclusive options. A person can shout angrily, “You ran into me!” In
doing so, she can utter a statement that is objectively true and, at the same
time, express an attitude towards that situation (and towards the person who
brought it about).
In the case of moral condemnation, the agent is not only reporting the fact of the matter in the sense, "You lied" or "You ran over me." Insofar as it is moral condemnation, she is also saying that people generally have many and strong reasons to condemn such an act. Then, she adds to this, the condemnation that she says is warranted.
As I have been
discussing in recent posts, when I say that moral claims report facts about the
world, a lot of people misinterpret that. They interpret this as a claim that
states of affairs contain an intrinsic prescriptivity. Their first instinct is to
assert that I am making a claim that intrinsic prescriptivity exists when I
claim that moral statements are sometimes true.
However, that is not
my belief.
Intrinsic
prescriptivity does not exist. However, value claims often report relationships
between states of affairs and desires (not necessarily the desires of the
person making the claim). These relationships exist in the real world as a
matter of fact. To deny the existence of these relationships is to deny a
substantial aount of what explains the behavior of objects in the real world.
Most discussion in
moral philosophy stops here. However, I think they are leaving out an important
element.
There is a third
property to moral judgments.
Moral judgments are
meant to do work. They are meant to act on the limbic system to bring about
actual changes to the physical structure of the brain. Specifically, they are
meant to create and promote desires that tend to result in repeating what was
praised and in avoiding what was condemned.
They are not meant to
cause agents to do good deeds so that the agent can be praised, and to avoid
bad deeds so that the agent can avoid condemnation. These are useful
considerations. However, an agent who acts for the sake of praise or avoiding
condemnation is generally not considered moral. The moral agent does what is
right and avoids what is wrong for its own sake, not for the sake of rewards or
avoiding punishment.
If I had to identify
a moral philosopher who actively promoted this view, I would put John Stuart
Mill near the top of that list. He wrote that agents begin to do as a means to
happiness they eventually come to see as a part of happiness. In more modern
language, what agents do in order to fulfill their (other) desires becomes
something desired for its own sake, independent of its consequences. The role
of morality is to bring private interests into alignment with the public good
by promoting those interests that serve the public good and inhibiting those
interests that thwart the public good.
So, then, in
answering the question of what moral judgments are, I think they have three
elements.
(1) Value judgments
are often truth-bearing propositions that report relationships between states
of affairs and desires (not necessarily those of the agent), and moral
judgments are a species of value judgments. Specifically, they relate actions
to desires and aversions that people have reason to promote, and they evaluate malleable
desires and aversions by their tendency to fulfill or thwart other desires and
aversions.
(2) Moral judgments
express praise or condemnation.
(3) Moral judgments
are tools that are used to do work altering the sentiments of individuals,
promoting interests that serve the public good and inhibiting interests that
thwart the public good.
And these are all
related.
Praise and
condemnation act on the limbic system to promote desires and aversions, not
only in the brains of those praised and condemned, but in others who come to
experience or hear about the praise and condemnation. They aim to alter these
desires and aversions because of the relationships between those desires and
aversions and other desires and aversions – their tendency to fulfill or thwart
other desires.
This is what moral
judgments are.
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