A Non-Religious, Non-Evolutionary Account of "Ought"

I have spent a couple of weeks now arguing that the claim that evolution cannot account for (prescriptive) morality is no myth. I wish to conclude this series by offering an account of (prescriptive) morality that requires neither a god nor evolution.

It begins with a community of two or more creatures that act to realize ends or goals and that has at least one malleable end. They may have evolved. They may have been created. They may simply popped into existence. None of that matters.

Person A says to Person B, "You ought to do X."

Person B asks, "Why?"

The only legitimate answer to this question, “Why should I do X” is to provide a reason for intentional action that exists.

If A gives an answer that is not a reason for intentional action this - by definition - will not identify a reason for B to do anything. It is just an empty fact.

If A gives an answer that identifies a reason for action that does not exist (e.g., "because it is intrinsically bad,") then this fails to provide a real reason to perform a real action. B can answer, "That is not true. There is no god to displease."

People give a lot of reasons for intentional action that do not exist. They point to what they call divine commands, intrinsic values, categorical imperatives, the will of the impartial observer, the opinions of imaginary people behind an imaginary veil of ignorance. None of these are real. None of these provide a real-world reason to perform or refrain from a real-world action.

Desires provide the only reasons for action that exist.

Desires are propositional attitudes. That is to say, a "Desire that P" is a piece of programming in the brain that motivates an agent to act (that is to say, provides an agent with a reason to act) so as to realize any state of affairs in which P is true. The agent takes making or keeping P true as an end, consults his belief, and makes a plan for realizing P (or preventing the realization of not-P), if possible – assuming that more and stronger desires do not outweigh this particular interest.

So, let's go back to answering B's question, "Why?"

The answer must tie the recommended action to one or more desires (a reason for action that exists). It must take the form, "Because P is either true in X or some consequence of X" for some desire that P.

One distinction we must make is a distinction between the reasons for action that exist, and the reasons for action that a particular agent (in this case, Person B) actually has.

A significant difference between these two types of reasons is that B will only be (directly) motivated by any desire (reasons for action) that he has. In fact, any action motivated by a desire that is not B's desire is not his action. It belongs to the person whose desires motivated it.

If A relates X to a desire-that-P that B has, then B – as soon as he realizes the truth of A’s claim, has a motivating reason to do X. However, if A relates X to a desire that Q that C has, then B is open to answering with a shrug of the shoulders and, “So?”

This “desire that Q” that C has is not a direct motivating reason for B to act to realize Q. However, it is a motivating reason for C to take action to cause B to choose that which would bring about Q.

C can pay B – “If you act so as to realize Q, then I will act so as to realize P where you desire that P.”

C can threaten B – “if you do not act so as to realize Q, then I will act so as to realize not-P, and you don’t want that.”

These, then, provide two "reasons for action that exist" for B not to respond to “You ought to do X” (where C has a desire that Q that is either true of B doing X or some consequence of B doing X) with a shrug. This fact tells B that he is potentially in a position to obtain a reward for doing X or to suffer a cost for not doing X.

A third option is for C to alter B’s interests or desires so that B wants to do those things that would result in realizing Q – assuming that C has some method available to do this.

More specifically, where B has malleable desires, C has a motivating reason to change B’s desire-that-P into a desire-that-P’ where the desire that P’ (unlike the desire that P) will motivate B to act in ways that realize Q.

B can still answer the claim, "You ought to do X" with a shrug - up to the point where C is successful in modifying B's desire-that-P into a desire-that-P'. After that conversion takes place, B has a motivating reason to do what he ought.

Let us assume that B has a reward system, where a reward can cause in B a desire that P’, and a punishment can cause on B an aversion to not-P’. C has a motivating reasons to use reward and punishment to cause B to have a desire that P’ (or an aversion to not-P’).

Let us then add that praise works as a reward, and condemnation works as a punishment. Now, C has a motivating reason to use praise and condemnation as tools for promoting in B a desire that P’.

Finally, let us build praise and condemnation into the meaning of this specific sense of 'ought'. In this sense, “You ought to do X” means, in part, “Praise be to those who do X .” and “Those who would not do X are hereby condemned”.

Finally, we will add one more stipulation - that this "ought" refers not to C's desires alone, but to what people generally have reason to praise or condemn. In this sense, where A says to B, "You ought to do X", he plants a flag and says, "People, look here. Among you are many and strong reasons to praise those who would do X, and condemn those who would not do X." If this is not true, his claim would be false.

Now we have built a sense of “ought” – tied to praise and condemnation – where “you ought to do X” says nothing about what B has a reason to do, but instead refers to what people generally have reason to praise and condemn. B can still shrug his shoulders and say, “So?”. However, B cannot deny the fact that people generally have reason to praise those who do X and condemn those who do not. That is to say, he cannot deny, “I ought to do X” even though he may not care.

Furthermore, B does have a reason to be somebody that others have reason to reward praise and avoid being somebody that others have reason to condemn. More generally, he has reason to be somebody that others have reason to reward and to not be somebody that others have reason to punish. Consequently, a shrug of the shoulders and an answer of, “So?” to “You morally ought to do X” may be possible, but rare.

We can also add that, for many possible desires, there are those that even B has reason to promote (using reward and punishment) – such as an aversion to acts that cause pain, an aversion to lying, and a desire to keep one’s promises. In these cases, A and C can honestly assert, “People generally - even you - have motivating reasons to promote a desire to tell the truth and an aversion to lying."

Here, then, is a sense of “ought” that is not necessarily tied to what an agent does desire, but very often does have some links to an agent’s actual desires. Instead, it is tied to what an agent “should desire” – that is to say, what people generally (often including the agent herself) has many and strong reasons to cause people to desire using the social tools of reward (such as praise) and condemnation (such as punishment). Statements using these terms not only report these facts but, at the same time, attempt to mold those desires by building praise and condemnation into the very terms themselves. Thus, "You ought to do X" works directly on the reward system to promote that which is praised and inhibit that which is condemned.

How much of this does evolutionary psychology account for?

Actually, at its most basic level, evolution accounts for none of it.

Even in a universe in which no living creature exists, it would be true that IF there was a creature with a desire that Q, and a second creature with malleable desires, then the first creature has a motivating reason to cause the second creature to acquire a desire that P' where Q becomes true in realizing P'. No evolutionary history – no chain of evolutionary facts – would change this.

Of course, evolution has a great deal to say about the fact that there exists a creature with a desire that P, and a second creature with malleable desires, the specific strength and object of the desire that P, and the mechanisms through which other desires can be changed. Consequently, evolutionary psychology has a lot to say about desires people actually have the most and strongest reasons to promote or inhibit.

Think of the eye. How much is evolution responsible for he principle of optics that govern how light behaves as it passes through matter with different densities? Answer: none. How much is evolution responsible for the development of an organ that uses these principles - however imperfectly - to provide an entity with information about its surroundings? Answer: A great deal.

The proposition that evolution cannot account for morality is no myth; it is a fact. However, the proposition that evolution created beings capable of using morality is not a myth. It is a fact.