I have been approached in two different ways recently by people asking if I have considered opposing views. I consider those two different approaches to be morally telling.
The first approach took the following form.
"With regard to your claim C, writer W says “Quote”. How do you respond to that position?"
The second approach took the following form:
"Have you read anything people who hold an opposing view such as W. If not, then you are condemned for even thinking that you are qualified to make claim C."
The main atheist writers of this decade have faced the second form of objection many times. It takes the form of raising the objections apply only to the unsophisticated claims commonly held within the religious community, but fail to address the sophisticated claims held by a small group of elite thinkers within that community.
This form of objection is often imbedded in a fallacy. Usually, the person raising the objection is claiming that, "Since you have not considered the sophisticated view of this extremely small elite minority, your objections against the unsophisticated view of the common majority must also be rejected."
That implication is wholly invalid. Regardless of the views held by any elite minority within community, the common and unsophisticated views of the majority shown to have significant flaws are still significantly flawed.
It is like inspecting a dam and discovering a significant number of cracks and design flaws that make the dam likely to collapse at any moment. The engineer then says, “Ah, but have you considered the construction of that dam over there. It is well put together. Since that dam over there is well constructed, we have good reason to dismiss your claim that this dam over here is about to collapse.”
In the moral realm, we have reason to judge people according to what they actually do, without regard to the possibility that somebody else might have had a good reason to do exactly the same thing.
Let us imagine a case in which two people, Jack and Jill, each aim a gun at a third person, Paul. Jack ends up firing a second before Jill and ends up killing Paul. Jack is small-time drug dealer. He has just discovered that one of his best customers has started getting her drugs from Paul at a reduced price. Angry at Paul for cutting into his business, he finds Paul and immediately shoots him.
Jill is an undercover detective. She has spent several months trying to collect evidence against Paul and the people Paul works worth. Paul had just discovered that Jill was a cop and had reached for a gun in order to kill Jill. Jill pulls her gun and prepares to defend herself.
Now, imagine Jack going into court on murder charges and claiming, "Hey, look, Jill had a perfectly legitimate reason to shoot and kill Paul. Because she had a good reason to kill Paul, I am innocent of murder."
In both the legal and the moral realm that defense has no merit. What matters in the moral realm are not the reasons that somebody might have had for performing an action, but the reasons that the agent actually had. Jack is still guilty of murder, regardless of the quality of whatever reasons Jill had for killing Paul.
So, the fact that there are people who give sophisticated arguments in defense of certain religious beliefs does not invalidate the claim that many of the common assertions that we hear people give every day are intellectually reckless (or deceptive) and morally bankrupt – and worthy of condemnation.
To draw out the relevance of these points, there are people out there who ground the belief that others may be subject to harm on groundless, evidence-free faith. The fact that there are others with more sophisticated view does not give us reason to dismiss the moral charges against those who base their call for doing harm to the life, health, and liberty of others on groundless faith.
Whether we are talking about outright dishonesty or intellectual recklessness, either way we are talking about a moral failing. We are talking about people whose values are such that they are disposed to act in ways that bring unjustified harm to others. Consequently, we are talking about people who deserve not only criticism for their actions, but moral condemnation. These are not virtuous people. A virtuous person has more concern than this over the possibility of bringing unjustified harm to others.
Now, I do have a couple of posts to write from some people who have brought me points to consider using the first method, I hope to get to them in the near future.
12 comments:
Since some form of this argument is bound to appear somewhere, especially following this post, and since I enjoy playing devil's advocate (absolutely love it), I figure I'll make it here;
We (as in, atheists, or rational thinkers, or whatever term you prefer to use) tend to, for the most part, criticse religion based on the most widely held beliefs about religion, and disregard the more "sophisticated" views held by the very few people who seriously think about their faith. Basically we criticise the ignorant and ignore the eloquent because their arguments are based on the same faulty premise (the courtier's reply from PZ Myers).
BUT
Whenever I read that argument, all I hear in my head is a creationist saying "what about evolution it's the same".
Whenever creationists attack evolution, they always do it by attacking the stupid strawmen beliefs about evolution held by the majority of the public who haven't been educated properly in science, such as "if we came from monkeys why are there still monkeys", "where's the crocoduck" and so on.
How can we, given our response to the courtier's reply, then essentially tell the creationists to do some "real research" on evolution by reading the works of the (relatively) few people who understand evolution properly?
Basically, when we get attacked for focussing mostly on the more widespread beliefs and ignoring the "better" arguments held by a few people, we say "the same criticism applies because it's the same argument, just worded more eloquently" (essentially).
However, we then go after creationists for the exact same thing; they attack the commonly held, wrong beliefs about evolution, and we say "you haven't read a proper explanation of it".
There obviously is a difference; evolution is an observable fact with actual evidence, whereas religion is essentially a series of quasi-philosophical justifications without any evidence to back them up. But I honestly don't think that creationists can see the difference.
How can we make it more clear?
Anonymous
One difference is the types of conclusions that one draws from criticizing the weaker versions of a particular set of ideas.
Evolutionary biologists are, themselves, constantly attacking weaker versions of evolutionary biology. From their attacks they do not draw the conclusion that evolution itself is a mistake. They limit their conclusions to what the argument actually demonstrates - "Your view of evolution is mistaken."
To the degree that creationists do the same thing, then they are welcome to do so. To the degree that they draw the conclusion that evolutionary theory itself is to be abandoned, their conclusions overreach their premises.
The same thing is true of atheists attacking religion. And, in fact, this is a fault with many atheist arguments that I am repeatedly pointing out. I identify it as the failure to make the distinction between objections to "a religion" and objections to "religion". Atheists should treat weaker versions of religion the same way that they treat weaker versions of evolutionary theory. "This defeats your specific view. We will leave open the option that this will not apply to more sophisticated views."
Another difference (or another aspect of the same difference) is that many who criticize atheists use the inference, "some sophisticated versions of religion exist; therefore, none may be criticized. Whereas evolutionary biologists will tend to view it as absurd to hold, "sophisticated versions of evolutionary theory exist; therefore, none may be criticized."
You wrote:
We (as in, atheists, or rational thinkers, or whatever term you prefer to use) tend to, for the most part, criticse religion based on the most widely held beliefs about religion , , ,
This is simply not legitimate. This is the fallacy of over-generalization.
If we are focusing our criticism on a widely held religious beliefs then our conclusions themselves have to be limited to the most widely held religious beliefs. They cannot be applied universally unless some law of nature claims drawin a link between the specific and the general.
Of course, when atheists quit committing the fallacy of over-generalization, then their condemnation of others for committing the fallacy of over-generalization should carry a little more weight.
You are very skilled at analogies, my friend.
Alonzo, are you on reddit? If so, I want to friend you. If not, sign up real quick and I will friend you. :)
Alonzo, you wrote,
"This form of objection is often imbedded in a fallacy. Usually, the person raising the objection is claiming that, "Since you have not considered the sophisticated view of this extremely small elite minority, your objections against the unsophisticated view of the common majority must also be rejected."
But earlier you had written regarding Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic "tracts" on the topic of homosexual rights (and this was the beginning of our conversation),
"The point that I am arguing for is to argue that the first three are inadmissible."
and,
The only arguments that are relevant – and that should be considered – in justifying a policy that deprives others of life, health, and liberty are the secular arguments.
Considering your background in moral philosophy, the error you have made here is a surprising one. Let me state it in the most charitable light. You have failed to be clear about whether you are speaking of (a) Christianity, Judaism, and secular philosophy as understood by its careful-thinking proponents, and (b) the three of them as practiced by individuals. A less charitable way to view it would be that you were applying (a) at the beginning, referring to published "tracts," and that for some reason you decided later on to talk about the unwashed masses of ignorant Christianity, without acknowledging the switch.
It seems to me that you are defending secularism as a system grounding ethical judgments, and on that basis you feel free to call upon "elite" (your term) thinkers to provide arguments in its favor. But when I pointed out the Christianity as a system is grounded in evidence and reason, you complained that my objections do not stand, because you have in mind the "unsophisticated view of the common majority."
(At the other location we have discussed this recently, I wrote about how stereotyped this view is. I hope you can see how that clearly here; it's pretty obvious. But that's parenthetical.)
I'd like you to clarify whether you're speaking of persons or of systems, and to that end I have three questions for you at the end of this post.
You go on in this blog entry to say,
"Regardless of the views held by any elite minority within community, the common and unsophisticated views of the majority shown to have significant flaws are still significantly flawed."
Now, I can agree that the following is possible:
So, the fact that there are people who give sophisticated arguments in defense of certain religious beliefs does not invalidate the claim that many of the common assertions that we hear people give every day are intellectually reckless (or deceptive) and morally bankrupt – and worthy of condemnation.
Any good or bad system of thought can be defended by the worst kind of arguments. For example, I've heard people say that homosexuality cannot be inborn because if it was, natural selection would have selected it out of the population. That's a really poor, fallacious argument, and if and when I hear it again I'll jump all over it myself, even if it's used in support of a conclusion I agree with. On the other hand, to say that homosexuality must be good (or morally neutral) just because for some persons it is inborn, is also a terribly weak argument. Not every inborn passion or tendency is good (or morally neutral.)
A poor argument in support of a good conclusion is a poor argument. "1*1 = 1 because any number multiplied by itself equals itself," for example. Good conclusion, bad way to get there. This is hardly just a theist's error to make, as I'm sure you know.
But as I said, it was at least unclear from the beginning whether you were speaking of Christianity as a system, or as represented by the least capable of its proponents.
So I have these questions to ask you:
1. Are you speaking of Christianity as a system or as represented by its least thoughtful adherents?
2. If the latter, why? I mean, what good would it do me to show what's wrong with the least capable atheists' arguments?
3. What would you say to a witness and/or jury (going back to a prior post of yours) composed of Christian thinkers who are able to represent the system of Christian thought, who bring evidence and reason with them, and who decide on that basis? Are they ruled out of court for having brought faith with them too, a faith that is supported with evidence and reason?
Hiya Tom. I hate to butt in, but I wanted to make a quick point. If a system of (for example) well-thought out Christianity has come to a conclusion about homosexuality, it has either done so because of evidence and reason, or based on their holy books.
If it has done so based on evidence and reason, then it has reached these conclusions by secular means. Evidence and reason don't have a religion.
If it has done so based on their holy books, these are religious reasons, and are inadmissable.
Since all evidence-based reasons would be in the secular tract, it's reasonable to assume the religious tracts just contained religion-based arguments and thus needn't be considered.
Eneasz's answer is substantially correct until the last paragraph.
A secular argument is one that, in virtue of that fact, speaks to all people regardless of their religion. A specifically religious tract only speaks to people within a particular religion.
Recall that my point in the referenced post was one in which the prosecuting attorney called a Christian witness only to convince Christian jurists and not to speak to everybody (regardless of religion).
It is not legitimate to have any tract that advocates policies harmful to others but that speak to only a portion of the population.
Any arguments in the specifically Christian tract that appealed to all individuals (insofar as it was grounded on evidence and reason) should also be in the secular tract already for that reason.
Hiya Tom. I hate to butt in, but I wanted to make a quick point. If a system of (for example) well-thought out Christianity has come to a conclusion about homosexuality, it has either done so because of evidence and reason, or based on their holy books.
The point I've been making all along, Eneasz, is that this is a false dichotomy. Evidence and reason support Christianity. Christianity's Holy Book, in particular, is supported in its authority and authenticity through evidence and reason. That's what I was checking on with Alonzo: whether he was up to speed on that, since he seemed to be indicating otherwise.
And Alonzo, I want to ask you specifically about this:
It is not legitimate to have any tract that advocates policies harmful to others but that speak to only a portion of the population.
Which policies are you referring to as "harmful to others," and on what basis do you decide what constitutes harm? I want to know whether what you are arguing is described according to the following form:
Ethical Issue (E) may be decided with outcome (E1) or (E2). Outcome (E1) produces harm, (E2) does not produce harm. Faith-based thinkers favor (E1), and because their preferred outcome produces harm and speaks to only a minority of the population, they should not be allowed to speak to the process.
Here's why the question matters. The statement "(E1) produces harm" cannot be introduced into the argument until it has been demonstrated. The same is true for the (possibly implicit), "(E2) does not produce harm."
Further, the demonstration of either statement is itself a matter of ethical decision-making. Take abortion, for example:
E1: Women should not be allowed to have abortions in most cases.
E2: Women should be free to have abortions in most cases.
Which of these produces harm? It depends on an ethical decision about the moral and personal status of the baby. So now we have to back up the ethical discussion at least one step, to:
D1: The baby is a real person at the moment of conception, and entitled to the rights and dignity of a real person.
D2: The baby is not a real person entitled to a real person's rights until some time after conception.
How will you introduce your harm-producing principle there? Is (D1) more harm-producing than (D2)? Can you show that without regressing to some (C1) and (C2), and then (B1), (B2)... ?
I must introduce two very important caveats here now. This is not a question at this point of which ethical decision is more moral, but about whether faith-based considerations may be injected into the discussion. You have said that when there is the possibility of producing harm, faith-based considerations must be excluded, and that is the question I am focusing on. It is not the usual question, and because the usual question comes so readily to mind at this point in debate, I feel I must emphasize that I am not talking about the usual question. I am talking about the one you have raised, which is whether faith-based considerations are allowed. (I have stated that rather redundantly, I know, but I know how quickly we run to the usual question in our minds, and I don't want this to be about that.)
Therefore, please note that the question here is about how to introduce the harm-producing principle into the ethical discussion; so at this point the question is not whether (D1) or (D2) is true. The question at this point is whether one or the other beliefs is harm-producing, and thus a decision from which faith-based approaches must be excluded, on your principles.
Note also that it would be illegitimate to argue that (D1) or (D2) is harm-producing on grounds of its implications (E1) or (E2). The status of the (E) statements depends on the (D) statements, so it would be circular to make the (D) statements depend on the (E) statements.
How will you introduce your harm-producing principle there? Is (D1) more harm-producing than (D2)? Can you show that without regressing to some (C1) and (C2), and then (B1), (B2)... ? And how will you utilize your harm-producing principle without answering questions of that nature? Do you maintain that there is demonstrable harm produced all the way back through that virtually infinite regress of ethical statements? Can you show it non-circularly?
Or do you really mean to say that faith-based decision-making should be excluded from all moral reasoning whatsoever? For I think that's the only way you could hold to your harm-production principle without contradicting yourself.
(This is one of the fatal flaws of utilitarian systems I've had opportunity to study. What constitutes real utility, and who defines it, and on what basis?)
I could have used any number of other current ethical issues instead of abortion, by the way: homosexual rights, embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, environmental issues, racism, gender equality, divorce, and on and on. I don't think you can define harm-producing in any of these issues without first defining what constitutes good and harm in each case; and that cannot be done apart from moral decision-making.
Hiya Tom. Two quick things.
Evidence and reason support Christianity. Christianity's Holy Book, in particular, is supported in its authority and authenticity through evidence and reason.
I'm going to come out and say flatly that you are wrong. If you wish to base any moral judgement on christianity it is your duty to first demonstrate that your holy book is, in fact, supported by evidence. I've never seen anyone do so successfully, and people (many of them great people) have been trying for about 2000 years.
I don't think you can define harm-producing in any of these issues without first defining what constitutes good and harm in each case; and that cannot be done apart from moral decision-making.
That is what this blog (and Desire-Utilitarianism) is all about. I realize you want answers now, every one does, even I did. Unfortunatly, it does take some time to assimilate the whole theory. A wonderful place to start is Luke's FAQ, linked near the top of the side-bar (YAY LUKE!).
"Regardless of the views held by any elite minority within community, the common and unsophisticated views of the majority shown to have significant flaws are still significantly flawed."
One can imagine this being used as a justification for some seriously non PC thinking.
Eneasz, you wrote,
"I'm going to come out and say flatly that you are wrong. If you wish to base any moral judgement on christianity it is your duty to first demonstrate that your holy book is, in fact, supported by evidence. I've never seen anyone do so successfully, and people (many of them great people) have been trying for about 2000 years."
I could say the same about secularism/naturalism/atheism; not that you have a "holy book," but that you cannot show that your basic assumptions rise above the level of an undemonstrable faith. Carl Sagan's opening statement in Cosmos, almost a creedal line regarding naturalism, is as striking a faith statement as I have ever heard. I say that by way of illustration; the same is true for any statement of atheism that I have run across.
But this is not the place to try to demonstrate the truth of our worldviews. You can read through my blog to see how I have carried out that defense. You won't be convinced by it, I'm sure; but I'm not convinced by yours, and this is not news to either of us.
"That is what this blog (and Desire-Utilitarianism) is all about."
I recognize that. I raised a very specific point in this last comment, not about desire-utilitarianism as a whole, but about the harm-producing theory Alonzo recently stated. It seems to me that this theory is one that cannot be applied in any ethical system whatsoever. It proposes that there are some ethical matters whose outcome may be harm-producing, and that when those matters are under consideration, certain people's theories should not be admitted into discussion. But as I have said, there is ethical decision making involved in deciding what is harm-producing. That decision itself is not value-free at all.
Therefore if Alonzo says to me, "On this matter (E) you cannot express your opinion, because (E) may lead to harm-producing decisions," I will answer, "who decided what constitutes harm in this case, and on the basis of what values? Was that not also an ethical decision?" And (as I wrote above) this will lead us into (practically speaking at least) an infinite regress, or at least a regression back to the point of our fundamental differences in our views of the world, so that in the end, Alonzo's position would come to this: "You cannot be involved in ethical decision-making at all, because you do not believe as I do, that the world is just matter and energy and its interactions."
My point then in summary is that Alonzo has tried to show that there are some decisions in which people of faith should not be involved, but his principles actually imply that people of faith must be excluded from virtually all judgments of value and ethics. I don't know if he intended to say that, but it certainly follows from what he said.
And that is rather an outrageous position to commit oneself to, isn't it? The effect it would have had, had it been applied only to Christians throughout history, would have been extreme. They would have had no standing to condemn the common practice of infanticide in Rome, as they did.
Dunant could not have founded the Red Cross. The Salvation Army and the YMCA would never have existed. There would have been no hospitals in Africa until many, many years after they were first brought there by Christians. The practice of suttee in India would have continued possibly until now. Chinese women might still be binding their feet. Martin Luther King would not have been allowed to speak to the problem of racism. Wilberforce would not have been able to carry out his fight against the slave trade.
Canadian and American Christians give more to charities and volunteer more in their communities than other North Americans do. Yet Alonzo considers us unqualified to speak to ethical issues.
And so on. I think Alonzo's thesis on this point proves considerably (and alarmingly) more than he intended it to prove.
Oh, and by the way, is there not harm produced by excluding whole large classes of persons from involvement in ethical decision-making?
I don't know about the rest of desire utilitarianism, but this harm-producing theory of ethical decision-making involvement is clearly and demonstrably wrong, prejudiced, and I think even bigoted. It is irretrievably flawed in its logic. If it had been applied throughout history its results would have been unspeakably tragic, and if it were applied now its immediate result would be to produce huge harm in the name of reducing harm. The whole thing collapses in a huge heap of toxic dust.
I only have a few minutes, so I'll try to be brief.
The atheists' "faith" (as you call it) in reality is the farthest thing from undemonstratable. It is proven daily, by everyone, and has never failed to be proven correct in all of human history.
Alonzo has never said that theists have no say in deciding what causes harm. In fact he says the exact opposite - that all desires are considered. You are correct that excluding a large portion of the population (or any portion, really) causes great harm, but this is not what Alonzo advocates. What he does say is that faith-based reasons are inadmissible when determining if harm can be done to someone, because (due to the fact that no gods exist) they are the equivalent of saying "You should be harmed simply because I want to cause you harm." This is a bad reason, and a morally-bad desire.
The practice of religions claiming responsibility for the moral and scientific progress of humanity is old and tired. And, frankly, laughable. People do good things because they have been instilled with good desires. This generally happens DESPITE religion, and not because of it. Or have you forgotten that the bible condones slavery, and the subjugation of women? I have no patience for such preposterous and BLATENTLY false claims. Please try again, with less fail.
I do not dispute that the religious give more to charity than the non-religious. That is a failing on our part. Alonzo has written of this before, here.
Please note however, that the millions given to depriving gay couples of the right to marry should be counted as anti-charity, as it is money used to do harm. There are several similar theistic "charitable" causes.
But, even so, I admit that the religious give more in charity. Please see Alonzo's post linked above.
Crap, now I'm late. :/
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