Today, I want to give some emphasis to something that I added to yesterday’s post, and which played a role in a response that I gave to Atheist Observer to days ago.
Typically, somebody who writes about morality is anxious to assert that their theory can be the only true account of morality, and that no other use of the term ‘morality’ is legitimate. In contrast, I hold that language is an invention, what is true of things in the world does not depend on what we call them, so I do not care if somebody decides to use the term ‘morality’ in some way other than the way that I use it.
Let’s look at the propositions that provide the foundation for desire utilitarianism.
(1) Desires exist.
(2) Desires are the only reasons for action that exist.
(3) Desires are propositional attitudes.
(4) People seek to realize states of affairs in which the propositions that are the objects of their desires are true.
(5) People act to realize states of affairs in which the propositions that are the object of their desires are true, given their beliefs – meaning that false or incomplete beliefs may thwart their desires.
(6) Some desires are malleable.
(7) Desires can, to different degrees, tend to fulfill or thwart other desires. That is, they can contribute to realizing the propositions that are the objects of other desires true, or contribute to preventing the realization of those propositions.
(8) To the degree that a malleable desire tends to fulfill other desires, to that degree people generally have reason to promote or encourage the formation and strength of that desire. To the degree that a malleable desire tends to thwart other desires, to that degree people generally have reason to inhibit or discourage the formation and strength of that desire.
(9) The tools for promoting or inhibiting desires include praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment.
I have given these propositions without once using the term ‘morality’ or even the term ‘value’. Ultimately, it does not matter whether people actually do take this set of propositions, wrap them up in a package, and call them ‘morality’ or give them some other name. None of that affects the question of whether these propositions are true or false. It simply does not matter, ultimately, how a person wants to use the term ‘morality’ because it does not affect whether the things that I say above are true or false, or the implications of what follows from these propositions if they are true.
I would further assert that value-laden terms including moral terms carry with them assumptions about reasons for action. To say that a state of affairs is ‘good’ means that there exists some reason for action to realize such a state, and to call it ‘bad’ is to say that there are reasons for action for avoiding such a state.
People assert the existence of reasons for action other than desires – such as ‘God’s will’ or ‘intrinsic merit’. However, these ‘reasons for action’ do not exist. Because they do not exist, all statements that assert a reason for action grounded on God’s will or intrinsic value or some other form of desire-independent reason for action are false. They are not a matter of opinion.
Claims about desire-independent reasons for action are not ‘subjectively true’. Either these desire-independent reasons for action exist, or they do not. If they exist, then a theory that makes use of them should be able to do a better job of explaining and predicting intentional action. If a theory that makes use of them fails to do a better job of explaining and predicting intentional action, then by virtue of Occam’s Razor, we can eliminate them from our ontology.
It is true that a person can claim that some action X serves God’s will, and then act to realize X. However, we can adequately explain this type of behavior by asserting that the agent has a desire to serve God, and a belief that doing X serves God. However, in this case, the agent can never fulfill his desire, because he can never realize a state in which the proposition, “I am serving God” is true. He can only realize a state that he falsely believes is a state in which “I am serving God” is true. This means that such an agent cannot actually fulfill a desire – cannot actually realize something that has value. He can only falsely believe that he has realized a state that has value.
This account is still fully consistent with the claim that desires are the only reasons for action that actually exist. What motivates the agent’s action, in this case, is a desire to serve God and a false belief that doing X will serve God. The desire to serve God is a genuine reason for action that exists. However, it does not recommend any real-world action because no real-world action can actually realize a state where ‘I am serving God” is true.
If somebody wishes to assert that ‘morality’ attaches to something else, I will respond by asking, “In calling that moral, are you saying that there are reasons for action for realizing that which you call ‘moral’ or preventing the realization of that which ou call ‘immoral’? If you are, then I am going to ask you to demonstrate that the reasons for action that you are talking about actually do exist. If they do not exist, then your claim that there are reasons for action for realizing what you call ‘moral’ or for avoiding the realization of what you call ‘immoral’ is, quite simply, false. If they do exist . . . well, I would like to see an argument for the existence of reasons for action other than desires.
If you are claiming that in calling something ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’ you are not saying anything about what we should realize or prevent from being realized, then I am going to accuse you, at best, of inventing a new language and, at worse, of uttering nonsense. I could take you at your word – and say that because no ‘reasons for action exist’ for bringing about what you call ‘moral’ then the fact that something is ‘moral’ is unimportant. You cannot coherently insist that I bring about that where there exists no reason for me to bring about.
If, on the other hand, in calling something ‘moral’ you are saying that there are reasons for action for bringing it about, and in calling something ‘immoral’ you are saying that there are reasons for action to prevent its realization, I am going to ask you to demonstrate that those reasons for action are, themselves, real.
If you can’t meet this challenge and show that your reasons for action are real, then I am going to assert that your claim that there are reasons for action for bringing about that which you call ‘moral’ are false. If you can demonstrate that there are reasons for action that are real . . . well, I’m going to assert that you must be referring to desires, since desires are the only reasons for action that exist. If you are talking about malleable desires, then I get to ask questions about whether there are reasons for action for promoting or inhibiting those desires.
Desires that tend to fulfill other desires matter because reasons for action exist for promoting the occurrence and strength of desires that tend to fulfill other desires. Desires that tend to thwart other desires matter because reasons for action exist for inhibiting the occurrence and strength of desires that tend to thwart other desires. These ‘reasons for action’ are the desires fulfilled or thwarted. So, I do not face a problem at least in theory, when it comes to answering the challenge, “Do reasons for action exist for promoting that which you call ‘moral’ or inhibiting that which you call ‘immoral’?” I don’t need to use the word ‘moral’ for any of this.
Where those reasons for action exist, they exist whether we use the term ‘moral’ or not. Whether to attach the term ‘moral’ is not relevant to the whether the proposition is true or false. What matters is whether ‘reasons for action exist’ for realizing that which the speaker says should be realized, or for avoiding the realization of that which we are being told to avoid realizing. What doesn’t matter is what terms are used to refer to these facts.
4 comments:
morality should not "attach to something else": that's a nice way of putting it. However, i'm not so sure about the unimportance of the _term_ "morality". I'll grant u that people make words mean what they want, but that takes a long time and we usually all have to agree lest we stop understanding one another. Hence, i wouldn't want to let anyone use the word "morality" however they want. It would be better to simply not "attach something else" to it.
On another note, i think your point (6) is more important than you make it out to be and that that is where the morality (as commonly understood) kicks in: everything that you say is indeed a question of fact, including the sixth point that desires are malleable. Where things get difficult is when we try to decide which desires are desirable. Of course, you will probably introduce a "coherence theory of desires" to solve the problem; but you can only justify it by referring to a desire to be coherent. It might seem obvious that we _should_ desire that our desires be coherent, but that is nonetheless an obvious _moral_ truth and no longer a matter of fact. Let me know if i'm wrong.
eenauk
My claim about the unimportance of 'morality' actually has to do with the nature of value itself.
Of course, the term has a huge 'propaganda' significance. Nobody who wants to get their policies accepted by the general public will be able to do so by arguing that they are 'immoral'. Convincing others that they stand for 'justice' and 'virtue' are essential to getting public buy-in.
And, you are correct, a common language is essential to efficient communication. Ultimately, it does not matter what terms we use in that language. What matters is the degree to which different people call up the same concept when a term is used - so that we are all 'on the same page' as it were.
Concerning your second matter, the only way to answer the question, "Which desires are desirable" is to ask the question, "Which desires tend to fulfill other desires."
In other words, if desires are the only reasons-for-action that exist, then desires are the only reasons-for-action for deciding which desires to promote and which to inhibit. Anybody who tries to evaluate desires on any other critieron is making up 'reasons for action' that do not exist.
You are correct that this leads to a form of 'coherence of desires'.
I tend to use the phrase 'harmony of desires' because it is often the case that we can obtain the best fulfillment of desires when different people desire different things.
One example that I use is my preference for dark meat and my wife's preference for white meat - a harmonious set of desires when we have chicken for supper.
Another example that I use is that of an entity with a desire to gather stones, and another with a desire to scatter stones.
Note here that I am talking about desires for an activity, not desires for an end result. There is a difference between a desire to gather stones and a desire that stones be gathered. Two creatures with desires for two different end states - one to have all stones gathered, and the other to have all stones scattered - would NOT be in harmony.
But, yes, I cannot defend this claim by saying that harmony has some sort of mysterious 'intrinsic' worth.
Fortunately, I don't have to.
I will cover that argument in a couple of days.
Alonzo,
While I have no issue with the discussion of morality in this post, I will adopt the courtroom rule that if you bring something up in your presentation, then it is fair game for discussion. In this case I’d like to raise objections to two of the foundational propositions you list.
The first a technical issue with the statement that, “desires can…tend to fulfill or thwart other desires.” Since desires are propositions and reasons for action this means you are saying, “these reasons for action tend to thwart those reasons for action.” While you have written at some length on the differences between desires, desire fulfillment, and acts, in this case it is virtually always true that it is acts taken to fulfill desires that tend to fulfill or thwart the ability to commit acts to fulfill other desires. No matter what desires I have, if I never take any action based on those desires, they will never thwart or fulfill any other desires.
The second issue is empirical rather than technical, and deals with the issue of tools for promoting and inhibiting desires. The question of what tools are effective in increasing, decreasing, or changing desires is not a philosophical one, it is a factual one. If we find that desires have changed after the use of a tool or technique, then it is a valid tool in that instance for that desire.
If we want to develop tools for changing desires, then the logical way to go about it is to ask how we acquired our desires in the first place. Naturally the things that played a role in creating desires are likely to be important in modifying them as well. I propose three causal mechanisms for this process.
The first is an internal pleasure-pain system more or less hard-wired by evolution into our nervous system that is triggered by conditions in our environment or our bodies. These feeling are independent of rational thought and while they are probably more accurately described as feelings than desires, I assert that just as there are no reasons for actions other than desires, there are no reasons for desires other than these feelings. If anyone has a plausible alternative mechanism for the creation of desires I have yet to hear it.
(Mothers saying they want to protect their children rather than just feeling they protect them does not disprove this thesis unless you can provide a mechanism for acquiring such a desire that does not involve these feelings.)
Second, an adaptive learning mechanism by which these basic pleasure-pain experiences are unconsciously associated with other aspects of the environment. Much of this takes place during early childhood, but it also continues throughout life. There is no question that praise and condemnation can be effective tools in causing children to develop certain desires. A child can develop a desire to do something because it has been praised even when the one giving the praise is not present. However even in small children one cannot assume a simple cause and effect. One must also consider the situation in which a condemned child actually repeats the action as a response to the condemnation.
The third causal mechanism in generating desires is conceptual learning and experience. One’s beliefs play a fundamental role in the development in most desires. If desires are propositions about states of affairs, it makes little sense to claim that one’s beliefs about those states of affairs have nothing to do with the desires to bring them about. A desire to vacation in Hawaii would never come about if one never had any beliefs about Hawaii. It also logically follows that if a desire depends on certain beliefs, changes in those beliefs will result in changes in desires.
Where does all this lead as far as tools for promoting and inhibiting beliefs?
If our basic drives are genetic, we can look to genetic engineering for change, but that’s hardly a viable short term tool. Fortunately since these drives evolved to benefit our genes, they are generally, though not always, beneficial to our overall species survival as well.
If we look to second order desires, those acquired unconsciously, there are at least three powerful forces at work. The first is example and imitation. From language to mannerisms to emotional responses, we learn the most about human behavior by observing others. Next, we experience how others react to our actions. We’re naturally attuned to the many subtle clues that reveal what feelings our actions elicit in them. Finally, and arguably the least important, is overt verbal feedback in the form of praise and condemnation. Given this, our available tools to modify desires are, in order of effectiveness: setting good examples, interacting in society in ways that implicit convey approval of good desires, and giving direct praise and condemnation.
Finally, if the majority of our desires have a significant component of beliefs, then to the degree we can provide new information and compelling reasons why these beliefs may be wrong, then we can modify the desires that depend on them.
Neither of these objections undermine the core of desire utilitarianism, but I believe addressing them would make it a more comprehensive and defensible theory.
Atheist Observer
I agree, more or less, with much of what you have written. Mostly, your statement that The question of what tools are effective in increasing, decreasing, or changing desires is not a philosophical one, it is a factual one, is very true and very important.
I have some disagreement with you over what those facts are, but it remains a fact that we are talking about cause and effect - something that requires empirical verification or falsification.
The one point where I disagree with with your third claim about the relationship of beliefs to desires.
Now, the term 'desires' is ambiguous. It refers to 'desires-as-ends' (what we desire for its own sake), 'desires-as-means' (what we desire because we believe it will lead to something that we desire for its own sake), 'contributory value' (what we desire because it is a part of something larger that we desire for its own sake - like a section of a painting), and 'participatory value' (what we desire because we believe it participates in a set of things that we value for its own sake - like valuing a painting that the owner thinks was painted by Monet.
Beliefs play an important role in desires-as-means, contributory value, and participatory value, but not in desires-as-ends. Yet, none of the three types of value in which beliefs play a role has any value independent of desires-as-ends. Ultimately, it is desires-as-ends that is the root of all value, and it is belief-independent. The fact that the other three types of value are belief-dependent should not be taken to infer that desires-as-ends is also belief dependent.
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