tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post9142810822656814855..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Foundational Oughts versus Virtuous CirclesAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-36182901500370983252011-04-28T06:01:02.452-06:002011-04-28T06:01:02.452-06:00George W.
Your "question" does not foll...<b>George W.</b><br /><br />Your "question" does not follow the pattern of a Euthyphro dilemma.<br /><br />The Euthyphro dilemma follows this pattern.<br /><br />What is good?<br /><br />Answer: Good is X.<br /><br />Response: X is ambiguious. It could mean X1 or X2.<br /><br />X1 leads to absurd conclusions, so we must reject X1.<br /><br />X2 does not answer the question.<br /><br />Both options for X can be rejected. Therefore, we can reject X.<br /><br />As in:<br /><br />Answer: "What is good is that which is loved by the gods."<br /><br />Response: Are you saying that it is good because it is loved by the gods, or that it is loved by the gods because it is good?<br /><br />If the former, then anything that is loved by the gods would be good. If the gods loved the torture of young children, it would be good. Because of these absurd implications, we can reject this option.<br /><br />If the latter, then you haven't told me what good is. You have told me that good things are loved by the gods, but you haven't said what it is for something to be good.<br /><br />Both options can be rejected, so we can reject your answer that what is good is that which is loved by the gods.<br /><br />I argue that you can do the same with the claim that what is good is that which is loved by our genes (or what evolution has disposed us to like).<br /><br />If it is good because we have evolved a disposition to like them, then anything we evolved a disposition to like - the painful torture of young children, if that were to happen - would be good.<br /><br />If we have evolved to like them because they are good, then this does not answer the question of what makes them good.<br /><br />So, we can reject the gene-command theory just as we reject divine command theory.<br /><br />But your question, "Do we value social behaviors because we are a social species, or are we a social species because we value social behaviors," does not fit this pattern.<br /><br />Can you show me how one option must be rejected because it leads to absurd conclusions, and the other fails to answer an important question?<br /><br />Another serious problem is that it doesn't address the answer that I give to what is good.<br /><br />What is good, in the moral sense, is that which a person with desires that people generally have the most and strongest reasons to promote through the application of social forces such as praise and condemnation - and that lacks those desires people generally have reason to inhibit - would pursue.<br /><br />The suggestion that this can lead to absurd conclusions - such as the conclusion that the torture of young children can be good - is blocked. Any horrendous conclusion that you can come up with is a conclusion that thwarts desires - otherwise it would not be horrendous. But if it thwarts desires, then it is something that people generally have reason to bring their social forces against. And it would not count as "good" on this model.<br /><br />As such it escapes the Euthyphro problem through the X1 gate - a gate which divine command and evolutionary ethics theories cannot pass through.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-49352075913449061742011-04-28T00:05:55.176-06:002011-04-28T00:05:55.176-06:00It does not seem to me that Mr. Fyfe had such an o...It does not seem to me that Mr. Fyfe had such an obligation to duck. Although my case too will require patience - I am only a philosophy minor :P<br /><br />What I meant was that, to Desirism, all Desires can (and indeed, must) be considered if we hope to discern the moral truths of a situation. Each citizen must maximize their own desires. By extension, each society must maximize its citizens' desires. Instincts, on the other hand, have no equivalently objective, and frankly delightful way of relating and extending - not without appealing to these other systems. Social instincts, to Desirism, are "morally good", but it deems them so because they further other desires, not because they are instincts.<br /><br />In a similar tune, perhaps I can answer your last question: for it is the case that many of us value social behaviours, and also that we are a social species, because of our brains! Facts about brains are what matter to morality. Not just facts about what people think is worthy of the word (although that is interesting) - but Desirism says "Hey, I'm a system that cares about facts regarding what brains value, and how conflicting values can be reconciled, be they across your inner "community" of past and future selves, or actual community of different individuals."<br /><br />To the extent that that is Desirism, I like it. Mostly because I am sold on Sam Harris' science of morality.Jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15283678096642021038noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-30901706418142297642011-04-27T20:55:29.356-06:002011-04-27T20:55:29.356-06:00Hello again. I'm curious about the distinction...Hello again. I'm curious about the distinction you make between virtuous and vicious circles. I can't quite grasp what exactly the difference is between the two and why one is okay while the other isn't. It seems kind of arbitrary to me because I can't see what exactly the important distinction between the two is. At the same time, I recognize recursive functions are circular in a sense and yet I wouldn't be willing to say they're therefore illegitimate. Would you mind helping me out with this problem in my understanding of circularity?SS400https://www.blogger.com/profile/17307796666410840170noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-69392895418502952842011-04-27T20:42:42.082-06:002011-04-27T20:42:42.082-06:00Alonzo — I like how you compare epistemology w/ e...Alonzo — I like how you compare epistemology w/ ethics, here. I was wondering… would a "non-malleable" desire be comparable to a "foundational belief"? If so, then would morality would be comparable to a sort of "foundherentism" epistemology?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-74042474012153268242011-04-27T09:59:40.562-06:002011-04-27T09:59:40.562-06:00I am really enjoying this dialogue, though my expo...I am really enjoying this dialogue, though my exposure to philosophy is self taught and not institutional.<br />Forgive me if I misstep.<br /><br />I agree that your position of looking at desires is an improvement on Ken's instinctually grounded morality. To me though, it seems to be better by virtue of generalizing motives, and only seems to add a teaspoon of reason to his concoction of instinct, intuition, and social construct.<br /><br />To me, morality is an expression of the triumph of our social instincts over our selfish ones; by forcing Ken to include all our instincts under the umbrella of morality, you seem to create a dilemma where none exists. I took issue with you ducking your obligation to deal with a similar extension in your own argument.<br /><br />I don't have a problem with the Euthyphro dilemma if it is expressed in light of the subject at hand: Do we value social behaviors because we are a social species, or are we a social species because we value social behaviors.<br /><br />I must be missing something.....George W.https://www.blogger.com/profile/14508653029767613480noreply@blogger.com