tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post8818794339841702996..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Torture - Part 2: Evaluating Acts vs Evaluating DesiresAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70595481087640621992012-05-13T20:17:17.440-06:002012-05-13T20:17:17.440-06:00thanks everyone this has been a really good discus...thanks everyone this has been a really good discussion of some things that had been rolling around in my head and you really helped to me focus my thinking.Kristopherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08544209777124068097noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-25930586361531249122012-05-12T12:41:23.267-06:002012-05-12T12:41:23.267-06:00I heard a good philosophy bites the other day that...I heard a good philosophy bites the other day that dealt with this very question. I thought it was a good solution.<br /><br />Because torturing a prisoner who may know the location of a bomb happens very, very, very rarely (outside of hollywood), it ought to be prohibited and illegal. This is because it would be easy to <i>believe</i> that the circumstances justify that you torture a prisoner, when that's simply not the case. There would be more torture involving, if not innocent, at least guilty people with no useful information.<br /><br />If you really do have somebody who has the information on the location of a bomb that's going to go off in a short period of time, then go ahead and torture them, understanding that what you're doing is wrong, and you'll face legal retribution. If you manage to avert a disaster by torturing the terrorist, then that can be brought up in your defense, at your trial.Justinnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-40429422890010325432012-05-11T16:08:30.031-06:002012-05-11T16:08:30.031-06:00You will need to define what you mean by "app...<i>You will need to define what you mean by "appropriate to the situation".</i><br /><br />That's a tall order. Tentatively, for an emotion to be appropriate to a situation means that it is consistent with the response of the agent's values to the situation. Maybe "consistent" is a better term to use, less likely to be misunderstood. If Alice supports same-sex marriage, and she hears about a state passing same-sex marriage into law, it is consistent for her to feel happy. If Bob opposes SSM, it is consistent for him to be disappointed when he hears the news.<br /><br />Whether Alice's or Bob's <i>values are right</i> is a different question from whether their <i>emotions are consistent with their values</i>. I would say that Alice's value judgment is right and Bob's is wrong. But if Alice's emotional response to the news is disappointment, then I would say it is inconsistent, because it doesn't match the relation between her values and beliefs, and if Bob's emotional reaction is disappointment, I would say that's consistent.<br /><br />Emotions are one of the most powerful motivating forces on humans, so we have reason to keep our emotional responses consistent with our values. A joy pill would be a fun recreational substance. I might even take it while torturing the child in your hypothetical, if I couldn't make myself go through with it without chemical assistance. But a pill that made joy my emotional reaction to torturing-- that, I would avoid like poison.<br /><br /><i>These other effects would exist even if the act in question is never performed. ... It would be hard to justify calling X a consequence of Y under conditions where X exists even when Y never happens. </i><br /><br />Thank you, Alonzo. This is exactly the type of explanation I was looking for. I don't entirely agree; there are are examples of X occurring as a consequence of Y, even if Y never happens. Bob the Bully might choose not to bully Assertive Alice if he believes she will fight back, even if the situation never actually arises. But act-consequentialism doesn't seem to offer a convincing account of acausal influence, so that doesn't save it from this argument.Jesse Reevenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-38418036598434039252012-05-11T12:02:38.552-06:002012-05-11T12:02:38.552-06:00Jesse Reeve
I prefer turmoil to joy if turmoil is...<b>Jesse Reeve</b><br /><br /><i>I prefer turmoil to joy if turmoil is appropriate to the situation-- such as the situation of having to choose between torturing a child and the end of the human race.</i><br /><br />You will need to define what you mean by "appropriate to the situation".<br /><br />Desirism, as described here, says that being so constituted to feel turmoil in torturing the child is better - morally better, more virtuious, a state that people have reason to want others to be in - than being so constituted so as to feel joy in torturing the child.<br /><br />So, I also prefer turmoil to joy in this context.<br /><br />However, in the case where the choice is between joy itself or turmoil itself - the red pill will give you a feeling of joy and the blue pill a feeling of turmoil, and you must take one or the other - joy would in.<br /><br /><i>[C]an't an act-consequentialist still treat the effect on those other human interactions as a consequence of her act?</i><br /><br />It would be a tortured use of language (please pardon the pun).<br /><br />These other effects would exist even if the act in question is never performed. They come from being the type of person who would experience joy at torturing the child, even if one never finds oneself in a position of being abducted by aliens and told to choose between torturing a child or bringing about the destruction of the world.<br /><br />It would be hard to justify calling X a consequence of Y under conditions where X exists even when Y never happens.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-37405284469465260212012-05-11T10:51:00.491-06:002012-05-11T10:51:00.491-06:00The only difference is that, in one case, the tort...<i>The only difference is that, in one case, the torturer experiences inner joy, while in the other he suffers inner turmoil. Joy is better than turmoil, so the former is a better state of affairs than the latter.</i><br />Does Harris say that joy is better than turmoil? Personally, I think that's like claiming that satiety is better than hunger. If my body needs food, I prefer to feel hungry, even if it hurts. I prefer turmoil to joy if turmoil is appropriate to the situation-- such as the situation of having to choose between torturing a child and the end of the human race.<br /><br /><i>A wide-spead social acceptance against torture requires lowering the overall aversion to cruelty. This lower aversion to cruelty is going to reveal itself in countless human interactions outside of the torture chamber.</i><br />I'm not convinced that feelings and acts belong in the same category. Partly for the reasons you describe-- that feelings come from desires that can't be changed nearly as easily as a decision can (at least in terms of cognitive effort required). But even if I stipulate that feelings are a subset of acts, can't an act-consequentialist still treat the effect on those other human interactions as a consequence of her act?<br /><br />Or is it that I'm being too generous to act-consequentialism? Does act-consequentialism focus on the immediate circumstances of an act only, and disregard their personal and social context?Jesse Reevenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-56159993028459258522012-05-11T10:24:53.867-06:002012-05-11T10:24:53.867-06:00Gingerbaker
Please note that in the sentence you ...<b>Gingerbaker</b><br /><br />Please note that in the sentence you cited I used the term "act-consequentialist", not "Harris".<br /><br />Harris' defense of torture in the ticking bomb case IS act-consequentialist. Harris may not be willing to follow act-consequentialism to its logical conclusions, but these are the logical conclusions of act-consequentialism nonetheless.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-59379486659856496932012-05-11T09:51:10.500-06:002012-05-11T09:51:10.500-06:00"The act-consequentialist would have to say,&..."The act-consequentialist would have to say,"Yes, we may torture children whenever (we believe) it would provide the best consequences."<br /><br />No, you just moved the goalposts off the field and into another stadium. Harris believes torture is justified by the ticking bomb scenario, and he does not go further.Gingerbakernoreply@blogger.com