tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post6551255537679220590..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Moral "Should" StatementsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-10228893047405488262011-06-07T13:03:37.066-06:002011-06-07T13:03:37.066-06:00You wrote:
You may respond that this is not what ...You wrote:<br /><br /><i>You may respond that this is not what you mean by the word "should", or that you do not agree with the claim that this captures how the word is actually used. Neither of these counter-claims are actually worth a great deal of effort. Neither proves that the substantive claims of this theory are false. They are merely disagreements over the language used in expressing those substantive claims, not the substantive claims themselves.</i><br /><br />What I am arguing (or what I will argue in just a moment) is that the way you are using the term "ought" here is not consistent with our implicit understanding of what it means. I can define "justice" to mean "a state of affairs in which I win the lottery," but surely that is not consistent with our implicit understanding of what justice is!<br /><br />Perhaps if we wish to understand what "ought" in the moral sense means, we should look to how we use the term in the nonmoral sense. In the latter sense, we generally take "should" to mean "what you must do if you want to satisfy your desire for state of affairs S." "Ought," therefore, refers to what we must do if we wish to satisfy our desire for a given state of affairs. In light of this, it would not be implausible to suggest that the morally relevant sense of the term has something to do with satisfying desires as well.<br /><br />The moral sense of "ought" transcends all other oughts. No matter how badly someone might want to take an action that is unethical, she "ought" not to do it. If both senses of "ought" have something to do with desires, then it must be the case that the ethical sense of the concept would result in one's deepest and strongest desire going unsatisfied. <i>It should go without saying what what we desire the most is justice.</i><br /><br />"Ought" in the morally relevant sense therefore refers to what we must do if we are to satisfy our desire for justice. When we say "action X might benefit you, but you still ought not to do it," we are saying "X might benefit the part of you that does not desire justice, but you still should not take action X, because if you do, your desire for what is just and what is right will go unsatisfied." <br /><br />Determining what one "ought" to do therefore requires an understanding of what justice is. And if you've been paying attention, you will realize that, like "ought," "justice" is another one of those extremely difficult to define concepts. It seems to me that any theory of ethics which puts as great a deal of emphasis on satisfying desires as does yours, cannot possibly afford to be neglectful of justice.Austin Nedvedhttp://postpostmodernism.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-78846236503781885902011-06-07T13:03:08.549-06:002011-06-07T13:03:08.549-06:00When I say, "You should not lie" in this...<i>When I say, "You should not lie" in this sense - the moral sense - I am not saying that you HAVE reasons not to lie. I am saying that there exist a great many and strong reasons for people to cause you to have a reason not to lie. I am saying that they have many and strong reasons to offer rewards (such as praise) to those who are honest, and to offer punishments (such as condemnation) to those who lie.</i><br /><br />There seems to be a problem here. If I personally have no reasons not to lie, and doing so would overall benefit me, there can be no possible reason why I should not lie. (Suppose I am unbothered by the negative consequences that others would inflict on me for lying.) This results in an absurd situation in which it is "reasonable" for me to lie, while it is also reasonable for others to try to prevent me from lying. It is absurd to suggest that reason could ever demand that two agents pursue mutually exclusive goals, or that it would ever be "reasonable" for two different people to take actions that "clash" with each other in such a way.<br /><br />Fortunately, I think there is a solution to this problem, and this solution involves distinguishing between two different sorts of "oughts": "ought" in the nonmoral sense, and "ought" in the ethical sense. We are using the term nonmorally when we say something like "If you want your car to have a long life, you <b>ought</b> to change the oil frequently." "Ought" is being used in the ethical sense when we say something along the lines of "I understand that, while murdering that person might benefit you, you <b>ought</b> not to kill him."<br /><br />"Should" in the first sense refers to what you "should" do if you want to achieve a goal that has no real bearing on anything ethical. But what does "should" the second, morally relevant sense, refer to? This, unfortunately, is not immediately clear. Think of <a href="http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/heidegger6a.htm" rel="nofollow">what Heidegger said about our understanding of the meaning of the word "truth":</a><br /><br /><i>But in calling for the actual 'truth' we must already know what truth as such means. Or do we know this only by 'feeling' and in a general way”? But is not such vague 'knowing' and our indifference regarding it more desolate than sheer ignorance of the essence of truth?</i><br /><br />Something very similar is true with respect to our understanding of the moral meaning of the word "ought." Literally, all that we can say initially is that it is what one "should" do; and, as we can see, this does not help us understand its meaning at all. So how do we go about clarifying its meaning?<br /><br />The first step we should take here is to try to understand where the meaning of this term can be found. It seems that we contain <i>within ourselves</i> the clearer understanding of the term that we so desperately seek. But while we may contain this deeper understanding within ourselves, this comprehension does not exist within our conscious mind. So it seems that what we need to do is to bring it to consciousness. This must be done through language, through words.<br /><br />[Your blog will only let me leave comments that are under 4,096 characters, and my comment is much longer than that. See below for the other part(s) of it.]Austin Nedvedhttp://postpostmodernism.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-27391192931963953062011-06-04T10:30:28.648-06:002011-06-04T10:30:28.648-06:00I'm reading chapter 20 of "Desire Utilita...I'm reading chapter 20 of "Desire Utilitarianism" but your page is down: http://www.alonzofyfe.com/cgi-sys/suspendedpage.cgi<br /><br /><i>Visitors, we are sorry, however, this site is experiencing difficulties at this time. Please return later.</i>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com