tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post5728207575194535066..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: A Harmony of DesiresAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-24855345250080715352010-07-23T05:06:29.153-06:002010-07-23T05:06:29.153-06:00If the only desires, in the hypothetical universe,...<i>If the only desires, in the hypothetical universe, are either to gather the stones or to scatter them, where would actions like encouraging others or discouraging others spring from?</i><br /><br />They would come from the desire to gather or scatter stones.<br /><br />Your question is like asking, "If the only desire is to gather stones, then where would actions like walking to the stone to be gathered come from? Where would the act of picking up the stone, or carrying the stone to the pile where they are gathered come from?<br /><br />The desire to gather stones would motivate the agent to eat, as long as he realized that the eating would be useful in maintaining the energy to gather stones. A desire-as-end to gather stones, and a belief that a starving person cannot gather stones, will generate a desire-as-means to eat.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-24525855137852109172010-07-23T00:11:34.918-06:002010-07-23T00:11:34.918-06:00If the only desires, in the hypothetical universe,...If the only desires, in the hypothetical universe, are either to gather the stones or to scatter them, where would actions like encouraging others or discouraging others spring from? Why would an individual in this universe prefer to discourage others from competition rather than do the opposite of what it desires when needed? What would cause it to prefer one type of 'work' over the other? It cannot possibly be minimising the time/effort spent in doing work, because such a desire does not even exist.Ganapatinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-36100000454140800652007-10-08T05:47:00.000-06:002007-10-08T05:47:00.000-06:00Alonzo -“Can there be a moral system among animals...Alonzo -<BR/><BR/>“Can there be a moral system among animals,” I answer that there can be. All it takes is a system of ‘rewarding’ those who fulfill the desires (with grooming, sex, the sharing of food, play) and the ‘condemning’ of those who thwart the desires of others (through snarls, hisses, a swipe across the nose, and other threats). Animals can very well ‘promote desires that tend to fulfill other desires, and inhibit desires that tend to thwart other desires’ in this way without having even a concept of good and evil.<BR/><BR/>I completely agree. I've always argued with people who claim that morality is a uniquely human (or divine) invention, and I try to point out the other animals have basic moral systems as well. As an animal trainer, I see this all the time. It's basically <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operant_conditioning" REL="nofollow">operant conditioning</A>, and it's how all animals - including humans - learn. <BR/><BR/>I like how you extrapolate up to the human level and show that an objective/intrinsic or divine foundation isn't needed.<BR/><BR/>Best,<BR/>JunoSteve Neumannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07711295082644210782noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-6282443890425888082007-10-07T12:10:00.000-06:002007-10-07T12:10:00.000-06:00ok, i think that does answer my objection: you can...ok, i think that does answer my objection: you can avoid having to justify your system from the outside by replacing the "we should seek harmonious desires" with an self-regulating system. This, however, does not allay my fundamental worry, which is precisely that your system is indeed complete.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps i can formulate it on an explicitly meta-ethical level. (To be clear: i am not trying to introduce a "mystical foundation" of morality; i am however uncomfortable with _reducing_ morality to facts alone: i am worried that putting "desires" at the foundation of ethics introduces unwanted metaphysical assumptions.) Here is a reformulated objection:<BR/><BR/>Why are desires so important? On one level they are important by definition: we do, after all desire them. But on another level, there are certainly other important things in our moral lives. Kant also came up with a "closed" ethical theory that was however based on "reason alone". Why are desires more important than reason? Why reduce homo moralis to desires alone?<BR/><BR/>What happens in Desire Utilitarianism Land when a saint appears who suppresses her own desires in order to further everyone else's desires? Will she not irreversibly prove by her actions that Desire Utilitarianism is now selfish? Morality can never be satisfied with itself. Of course, this saint can be said to have learnt to "desire to suppress her desires". However, this is a new type of desire that did not previously exist and that now requires a new moral theory.<BR/><BR/>Desire Utilitarianism will only be a _good_ moral theory when it includes a means of improving itself by doubting of its own goodness.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com