tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post397637419873298845..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Moral Instinct: A Case StudyAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-36397210243621092322008-01-17T14:08:00.000-07:002008-01-17T14:08:00.000-07:00After some consideration I would like to add my vo...After some consideration I would like to add my voice to the request to drastically reduce the Experience Machine metaphores. I think it is a great case example that demonstrates that most people value truth over happiness (ie: almost everyone would take the Red Pill if they were Neo, even if they knew what life is like outside the Matrix), but it has too many downsides as an argument to be over relied on.<BR/><BR/>The primary downside being that it is again one of those outlandish hypotheticals with no bearing on the real world. I occasionally field questions like "If you could end all human suffering forever by torturing one child do death, would you do it?" or "If a race of beings had a strong desire to be enslaved, and a different race had a strong desire to enslave others, wouldn't this make slavery moral?" The fact that they are outlandish hypotheticals with no bearing on reality often takes quite a bit of explaining. The Experience Machine is too close to these.<BR/><BR/>Also, with certain caveats (such as: no one else would be hurt, and I can bring the people I care about with me into it) a lot of people would seriously consider entering the experience machine (I know I might).<BR/><BR/>Finally, it's not the best explanation available for countering (for example) happiness theory, or demonstrating desire for truth over desire for happiness. When I am confronted with happiness theories, I simply point out that it does a poor job of explaining why I smoke, whereas DU can explain that quite easily. The "not knowing your child has been murdered keeps you happier than finding out s/he has been" is an ample and strong demonstration of how people value truth over happiness. Etc.<BR/><BR/>So in summary, I think the Experience Machine is unnecessary, and introduces more problems than it solves.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-27173265633344260612008-01-16T07:12:00.000-07:002008-01-16T07:12:00.000-07:00You have in the past made a critique of these type...You have in the past made a critique of these type of experiments as being artificial and not really related to day to day issues that morality deals with. Hauser answers that challenge in the first chapter of this book, adequately I might say.<BR/><BR/>Now here this is a peculiar experiment and I do agree with your analysis. Some key points<BR/><BR/>1) Hauser and by implication Pinker would be arguing for a Rawlsian intuitionist where the inability to verbalize one's views is evidence for this. I agree with you this is insufficient, much of our reasoning is not conscious period. Still their goal is not to derive prescriptions but descriptively understand how moral reasoning works. We might agree that they are mistaken here but I would say that this does not alter the fact that this is a useful empirical approach to take. New and better experiments need to be designed and maybe you could propose some?<BR/><BR/>2) You often use Nozick's Experience Machine in your arguments against Happiness based morality. What Hauser et al have done is taken these type of philosophical mind experiments and turned it into psychology experiments. Given your use of the experience machine, you surely cannot be against doing that in principle?<BR/><BR/>3) This particular experiment - harmless incestuous sex study - I agree is problematical and I agree with your analysis. Nonetheless we would hold that a universal aversion to incest is good and one to homosexuality or other races is bad. Granted you do not claim to be a psychologist, still how can one design an experiment to make this distinction or should or can that be done and if not, why not?Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-36622095761465821472008-01-15T22:56:00.000-07:002008-01-15T22:56:00.000-07:00Doug S.The short answer to your question is yes.A ...<B>Doug S.</B><BR/><BR/>The short answer to your question is yes.<BR/><BR/>A person can have an aversion to having sex with her brother, and a desire to have sex with a male having a particular set of physical characteristics. It may be the case that her brother has that specific case of characteristics.<BR/><BR/>This is 'ambivalence'. She would both, at the same time, desire and be adverse to having sex with her brother.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-81188726628588259292008-01-15T22:01:00.000-07:002008-01-15T22:01:00.000-07:00"If you can't provide a coherent argument for why ..."If you can't provide a coherent argument for why X is wrong then how do you really know that it is?"<BR/><BR/>Good thing this is horrible logic - as Fyfe quite throughly points out. A sort of combination God of the Gaps, reverse Argument from Ignorance (you can't explain to my satisfaction), and with the occasional bit of Moving the Goalpost tap dancing as needed.<BR/><BR/>Does anyone else feel that the framework is strikingly similar to that of anti-evolution trolls? It's almost as if they're trying to artificially create a gap in our concept of morality and magnify it to the point of a permanent foothold on ambiguity.<BR/><BR/>Any explanations of morality, no matter how sound and thorough, are dismissed almost without rebuttal if your "intuition" isn't fully convinced or they can conjure a particular moral perspective that makes the situation even more complex. <BR/><BR/>Then the gapists simply proceed to declare victory for themselves and insist that we should just act as we've evolved to act - or to embrace religion depending on whether the person feels that religion is generally a good thing for humanity.<BR/><BR/>Anyone else get that vibe - or is just me?Uber Miguelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17903598951047377349noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-53922619748198686742008-01-15T04:02:00.000-07:002008-01-15T04:02:00.000-07:00I read the incest example as challenging such beli...I read the incest example as challenging such beliefs rather than validating them: If you can't provide a coherent argument for why X is wrong then how do you really know that it is?<BR/><BR/>But aside from that, I'm in more or less complete agreement with what you've written.Matt Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08062352280843955046noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-34083993914411923642008-01-15T02:09:00.000-07:002008-01-15T02:09:00.000-07:00I might butcher this, but let me take a stab at it...I might butcher this, but let me take a stab at it.<BR/><BR/>There are a couple types or levels of desires, and some of them are compatible with aversions while others are not. I have trouble thinking of a scenario where someone can be simultaneously averse to incest yet have a desire-as-ends to engage in incest. <BR/><BR/>Alternatively, I can very easily think of a scenario, say: someone puts a gun in your mouth and tells you to engage in an incestuous act, where one may be averse to incest yet may engage in incest as a desire-as-means to satisfy other desires, such as the desire-as-ends to survive. Also, false beliefs can play a heavy role - perhaps you are not aware that the gun is a water pistol or that the other person is a relative.<BR/><BR/>Of course, other less dramatic desires-as-means would also allow such a seeming violation of one's aversion, such as desires to satisfy a curiosity, to be a rebel and break rules, to win a bet, etc - provided that these other desires-as-ends are strong enough to engage in incest as a desire-as-means to reach a different, stronger desire-as-ends. <BR/><BR/>However, if one has a simple desire-as-ends to engage in an act of incest, then it doesn't make much sense to suggest that they are also averse to incest. In such a situation, it would make more sense that they are not averse to incest but are actually averse to others finding out about their taboo desire for incest.Uber Miguelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17903598951047377349noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-13886112243868972152008-01-14T23:59:00.000-07:002008-01-14T23:59:00.000-07:00Is it possible for someone to have both an aversio...Is it possible for someone to have both an aversion to incest and a desire to engage in a specific act of incest?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com