tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post3587772653259660373..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Desire Utilitarianism: A Few DetailsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-72873839188784124782010-08-23T07:11:41.993-06:002010-08-23T07:11:41.993-06:00I agree with Kip here. Alonzo's blog has over ...I agree with Kip here. Alonzo's blog has over a thousand posts, and I tend to get scared of reading material that's years old (since he never mentions updating any of them). I think there should be some place somewhere, where he keeps updated the core of his theory, a place he'll promise to keep updated.Tshepang Lekhonkhobehttp://tshepang.tumblr.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-38566050392277777462009-06-18T20:14:18.137-06:002009-06-18T20:14:18.137-06:00Luke> If other reasons for action exist, then d...Luke> If other reasons for action exist, then desire utilitarianism is false, and I think both Alonzo and I would immediately include these reasons for action in our moral calculus.<br /><br />I'd love to see how you compare multiple types of objects of evaluation to determine which is "more and stronger".<br /><br />Luke> Re: spreading the mistake. Unfortunately, it would take thousands of hours for Alonzo to edit every post and page.<br /><br />Of course he wouldn't and shouldn't update everything he's ever written. That's a strawman, and not what I am recommending.<br /><br />I suggest that if Alonzo wants to make the world a better place, and thinks that DU would help do that, then he should have a central place where he maintains an up-to-date description of the theory. That way, people can learn what he really thinks, and not waste their time reading outdated material.<br /><br />Obviously you have much time and energy invested in this, so be aware that you may tend to be emotionally invested.<br /><br />Luke> And frankly, the revised statement is merely a more general form of the original. If it remains true that desires are the only reasons for action that exist, then the original statement is still true.<br /><br />Indeed. And "more general" is "less specific". If it's not necessary, then it's only serving to obfuscate the theory. And if there are more "reasons for action that exist", then DU has to be completely revised, anyway. As Alonzo alluded to, that's not going to be an easy revision. You cannot compare desires & something else on an equal basis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-1481075991986781312009-06-18T19:52:31.958-06:002009-06-18T19:52:31.958-06:00Kip,
If other reasons for action exist, then desi...Kip,<br /><br />If other reasons for action exist, then desire utilitarianism is false, and I think both Alonzo and I would immediately include these reasons for action in our moral calculus.<br /><br />Re: spreading the mistake. Unfortunately, it would take thousands of hours for Alonzo to edit every post and page. Thinkers of all types change their minds about things over time, and they do not go back and destroy all of their old work or modify it.<br /><br />And frankly, the revised statement is merely a more general form of the original. If it remains true that desires are the only reasons for action that exist, then the original statement is still true.Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-42750962399690272812009-06-18T18:44:15.052-06:002009-06-18T18:44:15.052-06:00Alonzo> It is simply not possible to go through...Alonzo> It is simply not possible to go through the whole body of everything I have written and update it each time I change my mind.<br /><br />Perhaps you should have a central place where you put the core tenets of the theory, and update those as you are refining the theory? If you think your theory will help make the world a better place, then this would be much more helpful than having someone read the entire history of your blog to try to understand your theory.<br /><br />Just a suggestion, for what it's worth.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-14016517991877118052009-06-18T12:41:19.283-06:002009-06-18T12:41:19.283-06:00Kip> "Either 1) You are unnecessarily comp...Kip> "Either 1) You are unnecessarily complicating DU by allowing for possible other reasons for action that exist (when you have said there aren't any), or 2) If other reasons for actions do (or might) exist, then DU would need to be scrapped."<br /><br />Alonzo> DU would need to be scrapped. At best it could be made a part of a larger theory that encompassed this larger set of "reasons for action that exist", but I cannot even imagine what modifications would be required to shuffle DU into this larger theory.<br /><br />Alonzo> Ultimately, one can falsify DU by showing it is not the case that desires are the only reasons for action that exist.<br /><br />Then, I think my #1 still holds. You are unnecessarily complicating the theory. Just have that "desires are the only reasons for action that exist" as one of the premises (axioms, presuppositions).<br /><br />You said you were mistaken when you said that "'Good' means 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question." You "corrected" that to be: "[Good] means 'that for which there are reasons for action that exist to realize.'".<br /><br />But, if the only reasons for action that exist are desires, or at the very least that DU necessitates that to be the case, then there is no reason to obfuscate the definition like you did.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-78070980489887762282009-06-18T12:29:13.441-06:002009-06-18T12:29:13.441-06:00Kip wrote: "Either 1) You are unnecessarily c...Kip wrote: "Either 1) You are unnecessarily complicating DU by allowing for possible other reasons for action that exist (when you have said there aren't any), or 2) If other reasons for actions do (or might) exist, then DU would need to be scrapped."<br /><br />DU would need to be scrapped. At best it could be made a part of a larger theory that encompassed this larger set of "reasons for action that exist", but I cannot even imagine what modifications would be required to shuffle DU into this larger theory.<br /><br />Ultimately, one can falsify DU by showing it is not the case that desires are the only reasons for action that exist.<br /><br />Eneasz seems to have some ideas as to what route to take if it were to be shown that some other type of reasons for action exist. My preference would be to leave that investigation with him. I do not want to go there myself. For may part, if it is ever shown that some other type of reasons for action exist, all bets are off. I can't say, from here, how desire utiltiarianism would fare in those alternative universes. I have trouble enough investigating how the theory fares in this universe.<br /><br /><br />"I'm also reading your book, and I think you propagate that same mistake. It's quite aggravating, actually. I feel like I've been wasting my time trying to learn your theory."<br /><br />It is simply not possible to go through the whole body of everything I have written and update it each time I change my mind. Throughout history, readers have had to deal with the fact that writers change their mind over time and that there is a body of works out there that was written before the author discovered some error.<br /><br />I hope that I will continue to grow and to learn and to change my mind.<br /><br />That is one of the reasons why I switched from the web site to the blog - is the blog makes it easier to date text.<br /><br />Everything on the website predates the blog.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-27619143141045447372009-06-18T10:12:40.287-06:002009-06-18T10:12:40.287-06:00Eneasz: If beliefs & desires were reasons for...Eneasz: If beliefs & desires were reasons for action that exist, then what happens when a desire tends to thwart more and stronger desires, but tends to fulfill more and stronger beliefs? We can compare the relative weights of desires to find what "more and stronger" is, but we cannot do that with multiple objects of evaluation -- it would require comparing apples & oranges (so to speak). DU would then fail (not to mention it would have to be renamed to "Desire & Belief Utilitarianism".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-83777543953735421092009-06-18T09:50:23.083-06:002009-06-18T09:50:23.083-06:00Hello!
Either 1) You are unnecessarily complicati...Hello!<br /><br /><i>Either 1) You are unnecessarily complicating DU by allowing for possible other reasons for action that exist (when you have said there aren't any)</i>,<br /><br />It is better to be complete, in case reasons-for-action other than desires are discovered in the future. That way we won't be locked into continuing a mistake that was made ages ago when it was believed desires are the only reasons-for-action that exist.<br /><br /><br /><i>or 2) If other reasons for actions do (or might) exist, then DU would need to be scrapped. If anything else besides desires are needed for the moral calculation, then I don't see how you're going to make DU work</i>.<br /><br />I don't see how this follows. One would simply amend the statement. For example, it has been argued before that beliefs are also reasons-for-action. If this was actually the case, the statement would read "Good desires & beliefs are those that all people generally have reasons to promote, and bad desires & beliefs are thsoe that all people generally have reasons to discourage." And, of course, the reasons they have to promote/discourage those beliefs & desires is because those beliefs & desires tend to fulfill/thwart other beliefs & desires.<br /><br />(yes, that last statement doesn't completely make sense, but that's because beliefs aren't actually reasons-for-action)Eneasznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70247615345063391652009-06-18T08:29:59.654-06:002009-06-18T08:29:59.654-06:00I'm concerned about some comments you made in ...I'm concerned about some comments you made in this post: <a href="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2009/06/two-types-of-moral-relativism.html" rel="nofollow">http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2009/06/two-types-of-moral-relativism.html</a><br /><br />Specifically, these:<br /><br />Alonzo> "If reasons for action other than desires are shown to exist, they would be immediately relevant to value claims."<br /><br />Either 1) You are unnecessarily complicating DU by allowing for possible other reasons for action that exist (when you have said there aren't any), or 2) If other reasons for actions do (or might) exist, then DU would need to be scrapped. If anything else besides desires are needed for the moral calculation, then I don't see how you're going to make DU work.<br /><br />And then you made this comment:<br /><br />Alonzo> "Kip wrote: "On your website you write: "'Good' means 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question'. If there are no 'desires in question', then there is no 'good'."<br /><br />Alonzo> "Let me start by saying that this is one of the things about desire utilitarianism that I have changed over time as people convinced me that I was mistaken."<br /><br />Alonzo> "'Good' does not mean 'is such as to fulfill the desires in question'. It means 'that for which there are reasons for action that exist to realize.'"<br /><br />You really should update your website with this new information so as not to continue to spread the mistake. I've been studying your theory, assuming the information you presented on your website was accurate. Now I find out it's not.<br /><br />I'm also reading your book, and I think you propagate that same mistake. It's quite aggravating, actually. I feel like I've been wasting my time trying to learn your theory.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com