tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post2451106472845503592..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Bigotry and the Ethics of BeliefAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79700899603500353502007-02-09T05:14:00.000-07:002007-02-09T05:14:00.000-07:00"It would seem that if the belief that no God exis..."It would seem that if the belief that no God exists is not a matter of choice and therefore not subject to moral criticism, then Hunter’s beliefs are not a matter of choice and therefore not subject to moral criticism."<BR/><BR/>It does not follow from the involuntarist position that belief is not subject to moral criticism. You can be morally criticized for results you did not choose because you can be held responsible for the events leading up to those consequences which you did choose.<BR/><BR/>You do not "choose" to be involved in an auto accident, but you can be held responsible for leaning over to grab the bagel that rolled off the seat, thus distracting you. You do not "choose" to believe "X is true," but you can be held responsible for only consulting certain sources, not looking at contrary evidence, refusing to apply consistent standards of reason, etc. Yes, we can also look at their desires as well. All of this can come in for moral criticism, and thus allow us to criticize their belief. This does not make the belief itself an act of will, any more than a person involved in an accident directly willed that to happen.<BR/><BR/>I do not "will" myself to believe any particular proposition. I do not look across the room, see the table, then exert some act of will to believe that the table is there. I do not look across the room, not see any elk, then exert some act of will to not believe that here are no elk under the table.<BR/><BR/>I think you are making an error in placing this within the scope of "free will" discussions. This isn't a free will question because the involuntarist position on beliefs is compatible both with accepting and denying free will. You can deny that we have free will to choose things and hold the involuntarist position. You can defend the idea that we have free will and also hold the involuntarist position.<BR/><BR/>"This “desire to see others as worthy of condemnation and harm regardless of the facts” is a desire that tends to thwart other desires, so it is a desire that morally concerned individuals have reason to condemn."<BR/><BR/>That's true even if a person doesn't end up believing the things in question. If I desire to see you unjustly humiliated and develop a bad reputation, that's worthy of moral condemnation even if I never do anything about it. Your position that desires are appropriate targets of moral praise or criticism seems to be independent of whether beliefs are acts of will or not. You don't seem to need to reject the involuntarist position to hold the desire-position you are describing. I agree with the above statement, and I note no contradiction with my involuntarist position.Austin Clinehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15277940533571121800noreply@blogger.com