tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post222442812399724568..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Morality and the Possibility of HarmAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-38573997876497885452007-09-04T13:19:00.000-06:002007-09-04T13:19:00.000-06:00Alonzo,I think the category of cases moral philoso...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>I think the category of cases moral philosophers consider that has no actual application is quite small. So, while your objections do work against them, it's a fairly minor point.<BR/><BR/>I'm not sure why you think that the inference from moral intuition to what should be valued is invalid. As I pointed out, whether you think there's a gap between what you do value and what should be valued really depends on a network of underlying ontological and epistemological committments. This is not to say you can't be wrong -- that is, there can still be a "gap" between what should be valued and what is valued if the latter isn't the same as the former because of an error -- but that it's by no means obvious that there has to be a strong distinction between the two categories.ADHRhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00854569640217600183noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-56704880728563511772007-08-31T22:02:00.000-06:002007-08-31T22:02:00.000-06:00Alonzo,Seems to me that those lapses of judgement ...Alonzo,<BR/>Seems to me that those lapses of judgement would be so common that if many took the measures such as you took, nobody anywhere would get anything done, or move on after learning a hard lesson. We would be paralyzed!<BR/><BR/>This is not to morally excuse those lapses of judgement because they are common, as you argue against.<BR/><BR/>Recently, my wife was T-boned by a 19 year old uninusured driver, who ran a stop sign while talking on her cell phone. My wife's injuries were relatively minor, but have still resulted in a couple thousand dollars worth of medical bills. This has led to the stress of us having to stall bill collectores, while we wait to sue or come to a settlement with our own insurance company. <BR/><BR/>Given some distance from this time today (because I would like to wring that girls neck right now), I would say to that girl: "I hope you have suffered enough inconvenience and stress from losing your license for a few years that you improve your driving and always have insurance in the future."<BR/><BR/>I couldn't imagine thinking and recommending that she should never drive again.<BR/><BR/>While I can recall some careless driving moments in my youth, fortunately I am a driver who has never been in an accident that was my fault.<BR/><BR/>My point is. <BR/>I am glad you brought up your driving experience again because I found that a rather curious story. Why would you assume that a careless moment in your youth should imply that you would not learn and improve your driving skills in your future?<BR/><BR/>On the other hand, living without a car is admirable if you can make it work for you. I wish we as a society would plan cities and infrastructure to make this more workable for more people.<BR/><BR/>p.s. But is also regrettable that your lack of a car limits your ability to get out of town and see parts of our beautiful country.Sheldonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03743116454273042629noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-10903021774941618552007-08-31T13:01:00.000-06:002007-08-31T13:01:00.000-06:00Let me explain my answer in terms of a sports anal...Let me explain my answer in terms of a sports analogy.<BR/><BR/>You are a baseball coach, trying to decide on the best strategy for your team to go to and win the World Series.<BR/><BR/>In planning your strategy, hypothetical examples about what you should do in case there were five bases, or what you should do in case ten of your players have heart attacks before the 32nd game, simply are not worth considering. Impossible events are those you do not have to worry about. Extremely unlikely events can simply be classified as, "We will cross that bridge when we come to it."<BR/><BR/>It is a waste of time to plan a strategy, "So that I can be in the best position possible in the event that 10 players have a heart attack before the 32nd game."<BR/><BR/>A lot of examples that moral philosophers talk about fit these criteria.<BR/><BR/>If an "earth as a lifeboad" analogy can show that a set of cases have real-world application, then these objections do not apply. IF it is the case that we really are facing such a situation.<BR/><BR/>Even then, I would hold that our intuitions will tell us only what we value, and not what we should value. The inference from moral intuition to "should value" is entirely invalid.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-74119222624179090522007-08-31T11:53:00.000-06:002007-08-31T11:53:00.000-06:00Alonzo,You're kidding, right? I would've thought y...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>You're kidding, right? I would've thought your target was someone like Frances Kamm, who is notorious for her off-the-wall examples. <BR/><BR/>Trolley cases, lifeboat cases, et al. are supposed to be instances of general patterns, like prisoner's dilemmas. A PD never literally occurs (except in some crazy legal system I would never want to be part of), but many actual cases exhibit features of PDs. The same applies to the types of cases you cite. Lifeboat cases are the easy example: they're often invoked in discussions of environmental ethics, with the Earth being analogized to the lifeboat. Far from being unimportant, these classes of cases are fundamental to moral thinking.<BR/><BR/>The screwdriver-hammer business is disanalogous in an obvious way: the connection between what people <I>do</I> value and what people <I>should</I> value is much closer than the connection between the screwdriver and the hammer. Indeed, on certain moral ontological views, the distinction between fact and value becomes vanishingly small.ADHRhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00854569640217600183noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-50676499486411309842007-08-31T09:44:00.000-06:002007-08-31T09:44:00.000-06:00Addedum: Actually, determining which screwdriver m...Addedum: Actually, determining which screwdriver makes the best hammer is not the same as determing which tool makes the best screwdriver-hammer combination. Even these are separate questions.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-33636835854872863712007-08-31T09:41:00.000-06:002007-08-31T09:41:00.000-06:00It was not my intention to 'characterize' moral ph...It was not my intention to 'characterize' moral philosophy as being concerned (exclusive) with strange thought experiments. However, it is a significant part of what goes on. From trolly examples to lifeboat cases to doctors cutting up healthy patients for their organs to Hitler's nursemaid to a host of other examples -- all of these, I hold, are relatively useless and unimportant.<BR/><BR/>Much of what I write about is in the field of moral philoosophy (e.g., the ontology and epistemology of value, deontic logic, the meaning of moral terms). Yet, are not concerned with these types of strange thought experiments.<BR/><BR/>I even use strange thought experiments - but not to elicit some sort of deep moral truth, but simply to identify what people value (leaving the question of what people <I>should</I> value open to question).<BR/><BR/>Morality is not created for the types of cases that I am protesting.<BR/><BR/>Those cases are like asking, "Which screwdriver would make the best hammer?"<BR/><BR/>Even if you find out which screwdriver would make the best hammer, this tells you <I>nothing</I> about which tool makes the best screwdriver. It tells you which tool makes the best screwdriver-hammer combination. But, if we have no use for such a tool, then who cares?Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-45588996569568454432007-08-31T09:25:00.000-06:002007-08-31T09:25:00.000-06:00Alonzo,It really depends on the philosopher whethe...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>It really depends on the philosopher whether they are interested in far-out cases or cases that regularly occur. Characterizing "moral philosophy" as generally concerned with strange thought-experiments implies an unfortunate level of ignorance on your part.<BR/><BR/>Second, you seem to have missed the point of moral thought-experiments. The idea isn't to create a situation that actually could occur with some level of probability. Most sets of moral principles going today give approximately the same answers in usual cases. (And, if they didn't, that'd amount to a <I>prima facie</I> objection.) It's in the unusual cases where they diverge; so it's by considering unusual cases that we can figure out which set of principles is better.ADHRhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00854569640217600183noreply@blogger.com