tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post2078343069490566355..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Smith on Parfit: 9 of 15: The Rationality of DesireAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-18264704792435829592009-10-08T22:46:38.369-06:002009-10-08T22:46:38.369-06:00Suppose that I am a computer scientist. Can I desi...Suppose that I am a computer scientist. Can I desire that one problem is easy and another hard when the two are equivalent? Could I desire that the Axiom of choice be true and that the Well-Ordering Principle be false? Could I desire that the Peano axioms be consistent, complete, and decideable? Does it matter if that I am aware of the inconsistency?<br /><br />I see no trouble with holding desires that are logically contradictory. It would simply be impossible to fulfill both of them, a situation that is quite common when practical constraints are added into the picture. If given a choice between fulfillment of logically inconsistent desires, an agent would act so as to fulfill the stronger desire, just as with practically inconsistent desires.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01507954405287073680noreply@blogger.com