Freedom of Expression: "It is unacceptable to think . . ."

I fear that MSNBC commenter Kieth Olbermann is going down the same road that created the likes of Ann Coulter. This path began when Olbermann went into a rant against President Bush that earned him a lot of praise. That must have felt good. This 'positive reinforcement' induced him to do this again -- for which he obtained more praise.

So, he wants to do it again.

This requires that Bush does something that Olbermann can rant against. If Bush does not cooperate, then the next best thing is to distort and twist something that Bush says into something he can rant against.

The 'left' will not mind. The 'left' will accept his interpretation simply because they enjoy rants against Bush, and Olbermann will get his praise, even if his rant is substantially dishonest.

I want to note that I am not accusing Olbermann of conscience deception. Rather, he probably chose to twist Bush's words because, when he thought about this interpretation and what he could do with it, the thought 'felt good' to him. He then mistook this good feeling (anticipation of praise) with accuracy and moral legitimacy.

He was wrong.

Here are the specifics:

Colin Powell sent a letter to Senator John McCain regarding the treatment of detainees. In this letter, Powell wrote, "The world is beginning to doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism."

When Bush was asked at a press conference to respond to this statement, Bush said:

If there is any comparison between the compassion and decency of the American People, and the terrorist tactics of extremists, it's flawed logic. I simply can't accept that. It's unacceptable to think that there is any kind of comparison between the behavior of the United States of America and the action of Islamic extremists who kill innocent women and children to achieve an objective.

Olbermann then went from this to accuse the President of saying, "It is unacceptable to think."

What all of us will agree on is that we have the right, we have the duty, to think about the comparison. And most importantly that the other guy whose opinion about this we cannot phathom has exactly the same right as we do to think and say what his mind and his heart and his conscience tell him is right. All of us agree about that. Except, it seems, this President.

In this, Olbermann took Bush’s words out of context and twisted them into something that he could rant against – to the cheers of his audience who, like him, cares less for truth than they do for the fact that the can express self-righteous rage. Bush did not say, ‘It is unacceptable to think.” Bush's words, instead, are consistent with the proposition, “We can judge a person’s moral character by what they say, and some things allow us to judge a person’s character harshly.”

It is a proposition that happens to be true.

In fact, it is perfectly legitimate to condemn a person because of what they say and think. If a person were to say, "All niggers are nothing but a bunch of overly educated baboons," then this person deserves to be condemned as a bigot. Condemning him does not say that he has no right to his opinion. It says only that his opinion is not right -- not factually right, and not morally right.

The right to freedom of expression IS NOT a right to be free from condemnation and criticism for what one says or thinks. If it was, then all expressions of condemnation and criticism would have to be prohibited, which contradicts the very idea of freedom of expression. This interpretation of the concept of ‘freedom of expression’ is entirely incoherent.

The right to freedom of expression is, in fact, an obligation on the part of others to limit their response to condemnation, criticism, and the free expression of their private acts. By 'free expression of their private acts' I refer to private decisions such as who to date, who to marry, who to invite over to one's home for dinner, who to socialize with after work, and who to vote for or against.

The right to freedom of expression prohibits a violent response (which includes criminal sanctions) to somebody else's words, while permitting non-violent condemnation.

So, when Muslims respond to Pope Benedict XVI's speech or a group of cartoons with condemnation, that is legitimate. They are even permitted to demonstrate their anger with peaceful, non-violent demonstrations. When President Bush responds to critics with harsh words and condemnation, this too is legitimate. Anybody who says otherwise does not understand what 'freedom of expression' means.

However, when Muslims respond to words by making death threats, by bombing churches, by murdering nuns, these people step over the limits of legitimate response to (what they see as) offensive and contemptible speech. If President Bush should demand that legal penalties be applied to those who disagree with him, then this would be beyond the limits of legitimate response to speech that he does not like.

However, President Bush did not step over that line. He limited his response to harsh words of condemnation and criticism - which he has every right to do. He did not threaten to impose legal penalties against those who disagreed with him. He did not call for or sanction violence to be done with those who disagreed with him.

He did not commit the wrong that Olbermann accused him of.

At the low point in Olbermann’s speech, in a line that is comparable to Bush’s warnings about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction in its strategic rhetorical intent, makes the accusation – unjustified and unsupported – that the President is one step away from making disagreement with him a criminal offense. Specifically, Olbermann said, “we can no longer forecast what next will be said to, or about, anyone… who disagrees.”

President Bush did do something wrong – something worthy of contempt. In spite of the fact that Bush said what his head and his heart and his conscience told him was right, he was still wrong in fact, and contemptibly wrong.

President Bush twisted Powell's words into a foul distortion of what Powell said in fact, ‘bearing false witness’ against his former Secretary of State by saying that he, Powell, dared to compare America to Al-Queida. In fact, Bush makes this accusation against any dare to assert that Bush’s actions are immoral – a group that I proudly belong to.

In fact, Bush’s response above has caused me to think that Bush has come to hold a peculiar and narrow moral code. I have discovered that the best way to explain and predict Bush’s response to critics comes from the assumption that Bush has attached himself to a moral code with only one commandment; “Thou shalt not intentionally kill innocent women and children.”

This would explain why Bush thinks there is nothing wrong with torture, rendition, arbitrary arrest, indefinite imprisonment without a trial, warrantless spying, killing innocent women and children (as long as they are innocent bystanders and not intentionally targeted), and the like are all perfectly legitimate actions. None of these are examples of intentionally killing innocent women and children.

This would also explain how Bush could interpret the phrase, "beginning to doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism," to mean “accusing America of intentionally killing innocent women and children.” If intentionally killing innocent women and children is the only moral crime that exists, then accusing America of immorality must be understood as accusing Americans of intentionally killing innocent women and children.

In other words, since the Bush Administration (which Bush likes to equate with ‘America’ as if they are the same thing) is not intentionally killing innocent women and children, then it is unacceptable to think that the Bush Administration is doing anything wrong.

That’s not say that the Bush Administration is not killing of innocent women and children. It is not wrong to kill innocent women and children – it is only wrong to intentionally kill innocent women and children. A person does not do anything wrong if there just happens to be a bunch of innocent women and children standing where a person happens to be killing.

Note: Bush did not actually use the word ‘intentionally’ in his speech. I am giving him the benefit of the doubt that he left this word out inadvertently, but including it more accurately describes his attitude. I think that this is a writer’s obligation – to give another person’s words their best interpretation.

That’s not a principle that President Bush seems particularly interested in following – nor Keith Olbermann for that matter – or those people who give Bush and Olbermann praise when they score rhetorical points by distorting the words of others. Or so it seems.

The Moral Case against the "Christian Supremacy Act"

House Resolution 2679, (h/t DailyKos) which went to the floor of the House on September 14, is an attempt to effectively repeal a part of the First Amendment to the Constitution – the part prohibiting governments from establishing religion – without going through the effort of officially repealing this part of the Bill of Rights.

The mechanism for doing this is to make it so expensive to enforce the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment that religious majorities can establish whatever religion they please, even turning the country into a Theocracy, without any real fear that the citizens might interfere through the courts.

Specifically, the bill will prohibit people who have proved that they have suffered a violation of their rights from collecting attorneys fees.

There is a long established moral principle that states that whenever one person wrongs another, that the person who does the wrong is responsible for all of the costs he inflicts on his victims, to the degree that he is able to compensate the victim for those costs.

To illustrate this principle, imagine that you are driving your family to church one Sunday morning. I, who have had too much to drink, run through a red light and smash into your car. Also, let us assume that I am very wealthy – that I have vast resources at my disposal – resources, say, to match those of a government entity who can simply tax the citizens if it wants more money.

As a principle of morality, I owe you compensation for all of those damages and all expenses that you are forced to endure, that you would not have had to suffer if I had not smashed into your car. I am morally responsible for those costs to the degree that I am able to pay. If I do not pay, that further compounds the injustice I already inflicted on you by making you the victim of my recklessness.

Also recall that it is a basic element of moral principles that they are supposed to be universal. Any person who attempts to write a “special exception” into morality for themselves is treating others unjustly and immorally. The fact that this case concerns the victimizing others by hitting them with an automobile, and the original case concerns victimizing others by attempting to coerce them into participating in somebody else’s religion, is materially irrelevant when we consider the fact that moral principles must be universal.

Now, let us assume that we live in a society that accepts the moral principles the Republican members of the sponsors of this bill (specifically, Rep. John Hostettler [R-IN]) would have us live under. Let us assume that, even though I am clearly guilty, I refuse to admit guilt and to pay you any compensation for having caused that accident. Therefore, you decide to take me to court.

If you win, I will still appeal the decision. If there is any area of contention, I will pay my lawyers to argue the point. I will do all of this because, under the principles of Hostettlerian Morality, even if you can get me to purchase you a new car and cover the costs of lost work and medical bills, you will never be permitted to recover your legal costs. Those costs will have to come out of your own pocket. All I have to do is drive the costs up high enough, and at some point you will not be able to afford to pursue the case any further. In fact, all I have to do is threaten to do this to you, and this should be sufficient to prevent you (if you are at all rational) from even trying to file that lawsuit against me.

Similarly, HR 2679 is designed to prevent people from filing lawsuits to enforce the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The establishment clause will still exist, but for all practical purposes it would have been repealed because it would have been made unenforceable.

A very wealth person who has a hundred thousand dollars at his disposal may still decide to demand that his rights not be violated. Anybody who does not have a hundred thousand dollars to spare effectively has no rights. Hostettlerian Morality says that the extremely rich (the top 1%) have rights, the rest of us do not.

One may be tempted to argue that this is enough – that when the rich protect their rights that the decisions will also protect the rights of the poor. However, this is not the case.

To see this, imagine that there is a Constitutional Amendment in place that bans cruel and unusual punishment. Imagine that some town has established a speed limit on the highway going through town, and those who violate the speed limit are burned slowly over a low fire until they die. Two people get caught speeding through town. John Smith is very wealthy, while Jack Smith makes $50,000 per year, has a mortgage, a few credit card debts, and is saving to put his kids through college.

Let us also assume that the U.S. Congress wrote another Hostettlerian Morality into law by stating that anybody convicted a crime who wishes to argue that their punishment is cruel and unusual must pay a $250,000 filing fee when he files the case – in cash, up front, with no possibility that he will ever get any of this money back.

John Smith can afford the $250,000 fee, so he pays it. His case goes to the Supreme Court, who decides that slow roasting a man to death for the crime of speeding is “cruel and unusual punishment”.

Jack Smith is still no better off. The city can still go ahead and kill Jack Smith. Who is going to stop him? If Jack Smith wants to file a lawsuit saying that the decision reached in John Smith vs. State should be applied to his case, he is still going to have to come up with his own $250,000. Which he does not have.

Under Hostettlerian Morality, only the very rich have rights. The rest are rendered powerless against any state encroachment into their own rights.

It is true that Hostettlerian Morality is only being applied to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. However, to say that this is a defense of the moral principle involved is to say that murder is permissible if one only murders people over 6’10” tall. The argument establishes that Hostettlerian Morality is unjust in principle. Injustice cannot be turned into a just action simply by saying, “We are not going to be victimizing everybody, just these people over here.”

Hostettler says that the purpose of this legislation is to:

eliminate the chilling effect on the constitutionally protected expression of religion by State and local officials that results from the threat that potential litigants may seek damages and attorney's fees.

This is another fatal flaw of Hostettlerian Morality.

We hold that the drunk driver who plows into another driver’s car victimizes the person whose car he hits. He wrongs that person. Because wrongs are . . . well . . . wrong! we do not want drunk drivers even taking a risk that they might violate the rights of others. It does not matter that drunk drivers can sometimes drive home safely. It is still patently absurd to argue that we must “eliminate the chilling effect on drunk drivers who can reach home without having an accident that results from the threat of potential litigants may seek damages and attorney’s fees that result from the off chance of an accident.”

Hostettlerian Morality is patently unjust and evil. It is an attempt to grant one group of people with power and money – the power of government and the money derived from the power to tax – to impose their will on others while denying others the ability to protect themselves. The government, under this law, gets the power to violate the First Amendment with impunity. All they need to do is be willing to drive up the court costs to a degree that no citizen would be able to afford to defend his rights. It will be sufficient, I this case, for the government to simply announce a willingness to do so to ensure that no violation of the Establishment Clause will be challenged in court.

It is particularly ironic that this is being done by people who claim that their faith gives them a particular incentive to be treat others fairly, justly, and morally. It turns out to be yet another case where militant theocrats use God’s name to justify the victimization of others.

Defending the Constitution

The Bush Administration will be using these next few weeks get Congress to formally embrace the Bush Administration’s policies on torture, rendition, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, indefinite imprisonment without trial or even formal charges, warrantless searches and seizures, and a destruction of the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances.

I have written several posts on this subject, and I am not here to repeat those arguments. Those who are interested will be invited to revisit those posts below.

Here, I want to point out that the Bush Administration’s power to influence Congress is shrinking and will only get lower from this point on. So, if the American people can make a goal-line stand to defend these moral principles from those who would violate them, then the job of protecting them will only get easier in the future.

The Bush Administration argues that we need to brutalize prisoners to protect America from attacks. I argued in “The Ethics of Torture” that we get more and better information from people who join our side because they think that we are good and honorable people who have a right to win this battle.

The Bush Administration argues that he needs these special military commissions to ensure that those who are accused of being terrorists are convicted and never allowed to threaten America again. I argued in “Punishment and the Case for Due Process” that in addition to punishing the guilty, we need to make sure that those punished are actually guilty.

Whenever the Bush Administration discusses these principles of arbitrary arrest and indefinite imprisonment, it speaks as if everybody they capture is guilty, even though over 90% of the people captured are eventually set free. More importantly, they are being set free after having had months to years in prison learning to hate Americans – a hatred that they then teach their family and their neighbors once we release them. If they were not anti-American before capture, it is easy to understand how we teach them to be anti-American with the injustice inherent in our principles of capture and interrogation.

An article in Salon magazine out today titled, “U.S. War Prisons Legal Vacuum for 14,000” tells of people rounded up on their sleep, hauled off to prison, and then brutalized until they give information on who else can be rounded up. (You may have to click to view an advertisement to get to the article.) We know from experience that people will simply give names to avoid further abuse – even when the abuse is not physical, as happened in the Red Scare in America in the 1950s. Then, Americans gave false information about others just to save their jobs. And those victims were only blacklisted and interrogated, not abused in prison.

The Bush Administration says that it needs this power to evesdrop because they want to listen in when Al-Quida calls America. I argued in “Who is Bush Spying On, Really?” that the purpose of judicial oversite (warrants) is not to prevent the Bush Administration from spying on our nations enemies. It is to make sure that the Bush Administration is not using these powers for political purposes (to spy on political rivals) or personal gain. MSNBC carried a war today titled, “Ties to GOP trumped skill on Iraq team,” to report how, in assigning jobs to rebuild Iraq, “loyalty to Bush administration was paramount.”

We saw with Hurricane Katrina that even important jobs of protecting Americans from natural and man-made disasters went first to political loyalists without experience or competence to do the job. We saw, in short, how the Bush Administration was willing to sacrifice the safety of Americans to use their power to benefit political friends and allies.

We have reason to suspect that the Bush Administration might find it somewhat easier to add a name to the list of people it spies on if they think that the person is not sufficiently enthusiastic about Bush Administration policies.

One of the arguments that the Bush Administration makes about the treatment of prisoners is that the principles in the Geneva Convention are too vague to be a useful guide to interrogators.

I argued in, “Outrages on Personal Dignity Made Legal” that much of our law contains vague terms (like “due process” and “just cause” and “cruel and unusual punishment”) because being more specific creates loopholes for anybody sufficiently imaginative to devise a form of abuse that does not fit any of the precise definitions.

Senate Justice Committee chairman Arlen Specter’s proposed bill to give the President the authority to take its case secretly to the FISA court, and then ignore the results, was the subject of a posting I wrote called, “Unchecked Power = Tyranny”

Finally, I asked the question of whether you thought the government should reflect your moral values. Then, assuming that the answer is ‘yes’, I asked the simple question, “Are These Your Moral Values?”

Some of us are very much concerned about the decline of moral values in America -- a decline precipitated by an Administration that tells the children of today all around the world that torture is okay, rendition is okay, arbitrary arrest and indefinite imprisonment are okay, warrantless spying is okay, and an executive unencumbered by a system of checks and balances are okay.

When it comes to standing up against these abuses, I am not speaking about sending letters to your various Senators and Representatives. They are going to listen to the polls. A better strategy would be to take these issues up with your family, friends, co-workers, neighbors, and in any public forum that you have available. A vocal and public outcry against these policies (and those who endorse them) is far more powerful than any letter.

So, take some time, come up with a couple of sharp arguments, and spread those arguments among the people. We can complain about how well or how poorly legislators defend the Constitution. However, ultimately, it is our job to defend the Constitution, and this is one of the greatest assaults the Constitution has ever been subjected to.

Do you care enough to help defend it?

"Choosing" A Moral Theory

Today’s discussion of moral theory is inspired by a posting in a thread called “Sam Harris On Morality” at the Internet Infidels Discussion Board.

In response to a quote attributed to Jeremy Bentham that stated, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morality and legislature," a poster using the name Janus wrote:

Sure, a saying like the one above can be a great foundation to build a coherent system of morality. But what's objective about choosing that one? Why not "Might makes right.", or "God's Will be done.", or something else? Anything else? The possibilities are practically endless. If the choosing of a moral foundation is subjective, the moral system built on it must be subjective as well, as much as we'd like to pretend otherwise.

I have encountered this argument quite often. Typically, it takes the form, “Why should I choose to be a desire-utilitarian? Why can’t I choose to be something else?”

My answer is that seeing moral theory as a “choice” in this sense requires a set of questionable or question-begging assumptions.

This question invites us to view ‘choosing’ a moral theory to be like ‘choosing’ what movie to go to. Naturally, people choose their movies based on individual tastes. One person may choose a romantic comedy, while another may choose an action adventure. The same person may choose one type of movie one week and a different type of movie a different week, to fit his changing mood. The important point about making such choices is that they depend on the mood of the chooser. There is no ‘objectively right’ choice except that choice that fits the mood of the user.

I would like to compare this to a different model for choice – the choice one uses to pick a theory. Consider, for example, that there are two theories as to the origin of mankind. One theory suggests billions of years of evolution. The other theory suggests the actions of a God something less than 10,000 years ago. How do we choose?

We choose according to which theory best fits the evidence. Really? This may be a great foundation for a coherent system of scientific investigation, but what is objective about choosing that one? Why not “the theory that best conforms to what is written into my Holy Book?” What about “the theory that postulates the most exotic entities?” The possibilities are endless. Have I now proved that science is subjective?

In arguing about whether morality is objective or not, my real purpose has always been to argue that it is as objective as science. Questions about the objectivity of science then become irrelevant. So, I do not need to answer these questions about science. I only need to show that these questions do not generate any special problem for moral theories. We can find them everywhere.

I can give an objective reason to throw out any divine command option – because no God exist and all claims that a particular action is favored by God is (objectively) false. I can also give an objective reason to throw out any intrinsic value option – because intrinsic values do not exist and all claims that a particular action has intrinsic merit is false. I can even give an objective reason for throwing out common subjectivist morality – because it requires an inference from one person’s sentiments to what others ought or ought not to do that is invalid.

As for the greatest happiness principle, I can give objective reason to reject that as well.

The greatest happiness principle either says that happiness is the only reason for action that exists; or it says that other reasons for action exist, but happiness is the only one worthy of consideration.

The second option is incoherent – saying, in effect, ‘other reasons for action exist that are not reasons for action.”

The first option is simply false, as I have argued in the recent posts, “Happiness vs. Desire Fulfillment” and “More on Happiness and Desire Fulfillment.”

Briefly:

(1) There is no more reason to assert that we have one value from which all other values are derived than there is to assert that we have one belief from which all other beliefs are derived.

(2) Happiness theory cannot explain options in which people report that they would sacrifice happiness.

(3) Happiness theory cannot explain how two people with identical beliefs can still perform different intentional actions without adding a third and so-far unexplained variable.

(4) Happiness theory cannot account for peoples’ refusal to enter an experience machine.

(5) Happiness theory cannot account for the incommensurability of value – the sense of loss associated with “the road not taken.”

As the referenced posts argue, desire fulfillment theory can handle all five of these issues. Desire fulfillment theory says that a desire for happiness is one of the reasons for action that exists – and one of the things that one can point to in order to recommend for or against doing some action.

The greatest happiness principle requires the assumption that happiness is the only reason for action that exists, and this turns out to be objectively false.

Might makes right turns out to have a similar problem. ‘Might’ can give a person the power to ignore certain reasons for intentional action that exist (particularly those that exist on the part of the victims). However, ‘might’ does not change the fact that those reasons for action do exist. Regardless of how powerful the slave owner becomes, reasons for intentional action exists for overturning the institution of slavery – and will continue to exist, so long as there are slaves. “Might makes right” tells us to live in an imaginary world in which we pretend that a set of real-world reasons for action do not exist.

Why choose desire utilitarianism?

This was the original question.

Desire utilitarianism does not ask that anybody chooses anything. It is a theory about how choices are to be made – that they depend on reasons for action that exist and that reasons for action that do not exist are not reasons for action that are relevant to any choice.

Desire utilitarianism states that choices must consider the more and the stronger of the reasons for intentional action that exist, that desires are the only reasons for intentional action that exist, that desires are propositional attitudes – mental states that identify a proposition as something that is to be made or kept true, and that desires provide reasons for action for bringing about particular states of affairs in which a proposition is true to a degree proportional to the strength of the desire.

I might be wrong in any of these claims – but these are claims about the structure of the universe in which we live. These are claims about what exists and what does not exist, and about how they work. As such, they stand or fall in the same way that claims made in any scientific theory stands or falls.

Mostly, I would like to know where there is anything in this theory that leaves anything up to arbitrary choice. Furthermore, I would like to know how anybody can make a choice except by citing “reasons for action that exist” for making that choice, or what evidence exists for “reasons for action that exist” other than (or in addition to) desires.

Desire Utilitarianism vs. Act Utilitarianism

My new plan is to devote the weekend posts to moral theory, and talk about moral application on weekdays.

This weekend’s topics are:

Today: Desire utilitarianism vs. act utilitarianism

Tomorrow: “Choosing” a moral theory

Desire Utilitarianism’ and ‘Act Utilitarianism’?

This blog is based on a theory called “desire utilitarianism.”

Many people who hear this term immediately assume that I base it on a theory that says, “Do that act that provides the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number.” Some will provide objections to such a theory, explaining how difficult it is to determine the act that brings the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number. Some will point out how it is sometimes possible that slavery or genocide will bring about the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number. Some will challenge me to prove to them that they should choose to be a desire-utilitarian, and assert that I cannot come up with an objective answer to that question.

All of these objections fail, because desire utilitarianism does not say, “do that act that brings about the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number.”

The theory that would make this claim is an act utilitarian theory. It is a theory that says, “Do that act that provides the greatest utility.” It then defines “utility” in terms of desire fulfillment. However, the primary object of moral evaluation is still the act.

Desire utilitarianism says that the primary object of moral evaluation is the desire. To make moral evaluations, the first thing we are going to do is evaluate desires – classify desires as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Once we have this information, then we are going to classify acts as acts that correspond to ‘good’ desires and ‘bad’ desires. Desire utilitarianism does not say, “Do that act that provides the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number.” It says, “Do that act that corresponds to good desires.”

The classic distinction in utilitarian moral theory is the distinction between act-utilitarian theories and rule-utilitarian theories. Act-utilitarian theories say, “Do that act that produces the most utility.” Rule-utilitarian theories say, “Do that act that corresponds to good rules, where good rules tend to produce the most utility.”

Desire-utilitarianism is a rule-utilitarian theory. What desire-utilitarianism adds to rule-utilitarianism is the claim that the ‘rules’ are written into the brain in form of desires. These rule-utilitarian rules are not just any old rules that somebody happens to imagine. These rule-utilitarian rules are desires. As such, these rules have all of the properties and limitations that of desires, and this affects how rule-utilitarianism works.

The Fatal Flaw of Action-Based Theories

The basic problem with theories that state that the evaluation of actions is primary is that they skip over the very important fact that they ignore the causes of intentional actions – beliefs and desires.

A person comes to the road. He has a choice to turn left or right. What determines his choice is his beliefs and desires. He will take the turn that he thinks will lead to the greater fulfillment of his desires, given his beliefs. If anybody wants this person to turn in the other direction – this requires changing either his beliefs or his desires. Arguing for a turn in a different direction while holding the agent’s beliefs and desires constant is nonsense. It cannot happen.

So, any ‘ought’ recommendation applied to an action must imply a change in the agent’s beliefs and desires. Furthermore, that change must be a change that will cause the agent to perform the recommended action.

If I had room, I would give an argument for removing beliefs from consideration and focusing entirely on desires. In the space I have, I am merely going to assert this. Beliefs map to truth. A person should have a belief that P only if P is true; if P is false, than an agent should not believe that P. Since belief already maps to truth, this leaves desire to map to value.

That is to say, to change a person’s choice, we must change their desires.

However, a change in desire is not only going to affect this action, but all other actions where that desire is relevant. We would be foolish not to consider all of the effects of any change in desires. When we begin by evaluating desires, we move from act-utilitarian theory to desire-utilitarian theory. Desire utilitarian theory fully considers the causes of human action.

Note: Desire utilitarianism, as a moral theory, also does not require free will. In fact, it actually requires determinism. Desires are the primary object of moral evaluation because intentional actions are caused by desires.

Revisiting the Objections

Now, let’s look at some of those objections to act-utilitarian theories:

(1) It is difficult to determine the act that brings the greatest fulfillment to the greatest number.

This is true. However, it is far less difficult to determine the effects of particular desires on the fulfillment of other desires. An act of rape might produce good consequences. The victim might be motivated to study the psychology of rape and come up with a way of treating sex offenders so as to drastically reduce the number of rapes. These would be good consequences. The act-utilitarian theory would then have to say that this particular rape was a “right action.”

Desire-utilitarianism asks whether the desire to rape will tend to produce good consequences. It might be the case that, under some highly unusual circumstances, a particular rape may do more good than harm. However, desire-utilitarianism does not care about this. It cares about the overall tendency of the desire to rape. There, it is quite reasonable to conclude that the tendency of the desire to rape is to thwart other desires. If nobody had a desire to rape, there would be fewer desires being thwarted. Consequently, we, as a society, have reason to pursue a state where the desire to rape does not exist.

It is hard to predict the consequences of any given lie, but it is not so difficult to predict the consequences of a widespread aversion to lying. It is hard to predict the consequences of any particular theft, but not so hard to predict the consequences of an aversion to taking property that belongs to another.

It is sometimes possible that slavery or genocide will bring about the greatest desire fulfillment for the greatest number.

Actually, I see the claim that slavery or genocide can produce maximum desire fulfillment to be like the claim that pigs can fly. The fact that people can imagine something does not prove that it can happen. The problem with slavery and genocide is that it is not possible – not in any real-world sense – that they can bring about maximum desire fulfillment.

Take slavery, for example. We are asked to imagine a case in which slavery brings about maximum desire fulfillment – the suffering of the slave is less than the greater desire fulfillment of the master. Now, let’s add one small change to the system. The master, who gains, transfers something of value to the slave to compensate for the loss. Because the master gains so much, the master can give much and still end up with a net benefit. Because the slave looses so little, a small gain will be enough to give the slave reason to do the act voluntarily. This one small change in the rule will help to ensure that it is the case that the master always gains more than the slave loses. However, this one little change turns the ‘slave’ into a free and voluntary employee, and slavery no longer exists.

“But, what if we made those changes, and it turned out that slavery produced the most utility.”

Well, then, we would have to rethink the laws of morality – in just the same way that if pigs could fly we would have to rethink the laws of physics. However, we do not have to rethink the laws of morality or the laws of physics in the real world where pigs do not fly and where the absence of an aversion to harming others will create more instances of people doing harm to others.

(3)Prove to me why I should choose desire-utilitarianism over any othe rmoal theory.

This is the subject of tomorrow’s posting.

Accusations of Treason

From the political left I am starting to see a fallacy that is highly destructive of any meaningful debate on the best course of action to take in Iraq.

The left has long protested the tactic of those who favor the American action in Iraq of equating dissent with treason. These pro-war individuals issued a false dichotomy that said, “Either you support the President’s plan, or you want the terrorists to win.”

Those opposed to action in Iraq have responded by saying, “Dissent is not treason. Saying that the President’s strategy will not work is not ‘pro-terrorist.’ It is ‘pro-having-a-better-strategy-for-fighting-the-terrorist.’

Now, some members of the anti-war faction have adopted their own fallacy. This is a fallacy that says, “If you criticize our opposition to the war in Iraq, then you are accusing us of treason.”

An example of this can be found in a posting on Crooks and Liars called “Jimmy Carter smacks Lieberman – Lieberman’s camp calls him a liar.”

First, former President Jimmy Carter said that Lieberman has equated dissent with the war with supporting terrorists. Lieberman denied that he had he had ever done such a thing. The folks at Crooks and Liars (referencing Atrios said that that they have the proof and offered the following quote:

"If we just pick up like Ned Lamont wants us to do, get out by a date certain, it will be taken as a tremendous victory by the same people who wanted to blow up these planes in this plot hatched in England. It will strengthen them and they will strike again."

To the anti-war faction:

The statement, “your plan of withdraw will not work,” is not the same as “you are traitors,” and it is a malicious distortion to say these are the same.

It is perfectly legitimate for me to say, “I recognize that you are as interested in fighting and defeating the terrorists as I am. However, to defeat the terrorists, we need a strategy that actually works. Your strategy will not work. Your strategy will have the effect of being taken as a tremendous victory by the terrorists, improve their moral, aid their recruiting efforts, and leave America in a much worse situation than we are in now. I am not saying that you want these effects. In fact, I am certain that you do not want these effects. However, these effects will come nonetheless, and they will do us harm, whether you intend us to suffer that harm or not.”

Both of these rhetorical tricks – the pro-war faction trick of equating dissent with treason, and the anti-war faction trick of equating anti-war criticism with accusations of treason, are meant to shut down debate for it even starts. They both eliminate the possibility of meaningful discussion by turning the discussion on the best policy to pursue to into a personal attack. A person cannot even open his mouth and say, ‘I have an idea,’ without being accused either of treason, or of making accusations of treason, against all who have different ideas.

We must allow meaningful debate on this topic. To allow meaningful debate, people need to recognize that there is an important difference between saying, “Your plan will have the following bad effects,” and “You are advocating this policy because you want to bring about these bad effects.”

The second statement is an ad hominem fallacy that does more harm than good – it is wrong to make this type of statement without some very good evidence. The first type of statement must be permitted and debated.

Which means that a third type of claim that we must condemn are those by people who take the words of those who make the first type of statement (“My plan is better than your plan.) and twist and distort it into the second type of statement (“You want bad things to happen to this country!”)

Which is what the people at “Crooks and Liars” has done.

The Ethics of Torture

Last night I listened to a CSPAN presentation by Jan Goldman, author of “The Ethics of Spying.”

The presentation began with a description of the paradigm case used to examine the moral legitimacy of torture; “the ticking bomb scenario”. A bomb has been placed in a school, and you have a person in custody who knows where the bomb is and how to disarm it. Do you torture this person to get this information?

The Effectiveness Argument

Mr. Goldman reported that, among laymen, the standard response is to do “whatever it takes” to get the information. However, Goldman says, “The overwhelming response I get from professional interrogators is that extreme methods of acquiring information does not work. You will get information, but you will not get information that may be reliable or valid.”

I want to point out that this response from professional interrogators says nothing about the ethics of torture. Claiming that an action will not produce the desired results is not the same as saying that it is wrong.

Imagine somebody coming to you claiming that he wants some money and he plans on robbing a local convenience store. Perhaps you can talk him out of it by saying that he will probably get caught and that convenience stores do not have much money. However, this is not the same as arguing that robbing convenience stores is wrong. The practical argument implies that it is permissible to rob the convenience store if one can get away with it and the store has a lot of money. The moral argument would imply that it would still be wrong to rob the liquor store even if one could get away with it and the store had a lot of money.

Similarly, if the argument against torture is, “it does not work,” this is not an argument that says that torture is wrong. This argument still implies that it would be permissible to torture if torture was an effective means of getting quantities of useful information.

The ineffectiveness of torture tells us as little about the wrongness of torture as the ineffectiveness of robbing convenience stores tells us about the wrongness of robbing convenience stores.

The Rehabilitation and Alliance Arguments

We can get better and more reliable information from a prisoner by converting that prisoner than we can by torturing him. This can be called a ‘rehabilitation’ argument against torture. Torture a prisoner, and the prisoner will still provide you with as little information as possible with that information being as unreliable as possible. It can easily include fictions meant to muddy the water.

However, convince the prisoner that you should win and that he should become a partner in that victory, and you are going to get a lot of information that is much more highly accurate.

I am not saying that this is easy. Certainly, torture is the easier option. However, this is a question of measuring the ease of the action with the quality of the results (the value of the return on investment).

The main points of the rehabilitation argument can be applied to people who are not directly involved in the conflict – at least not yet. From this, we get an “Alliance Argument.”

One of the best sources of useful information comes from the eyes and ears of ordinary people. The recent CBS News show, “Five Years Post-9/11: How Safe Are We?” mentions the case of a Muslim who found out about a fellow mosque member planning to detonate a bomb in New York. He reported this to authorities. He also volunteers to help the authorities find out more about the plot. This illustrates the point that the greater the number of people in the world who are loyal to the American cause and willing to put effort into ensuring its success, the better off we are.

It is possible to criticize Bush’s policies in part on the ground that it has weakened support for the American cause. This, in turn, is likely to have cost us information that we might have otherwise gotten through these sources.

Consider, for example, the Bush Administration’s policy on torture. One of the effects of this policy is that those have an aversion to torture and a dislike of those countries and leaders who practice and promote the use of torture have less of an incentive to being on our side in this conflict.

The Bush Administration’s policy on secret prisons alienates those who have an aversion to secret prisons and an affection for the idea of fair trials. Its policy on blowing up houses where families are gathered in the hopes of killing a suspected terrorist that might be present alienates those who have an aversion to blowing up civilians.

People in the Bush Administration have been claiming recently that they have gotten useful information from these prisoners by their use of “aggressive interrogation techniques” (a.k.a. torture). They are asking for legislation that will permit them to continue the practice.

However, the quality of whatever information they did receive has to be weighed against the quality that the Bush Administration did not receive from people who have an aversion and a contempt for those who endorse doctrines of torture, unjust imprisonment, and insufficient regard for protecting civilian lives.

Once again, it is important to add that the information that we get through torture is from people whose interest is in giving us as little information as possible and information that is as unreliable as possible. The information we get from those who view us as people who deserve to win this conflict because of our moral character is as much information as possible and as reliable as possible.

How many informants are we turning away because they are disgusted by the moral tone that this President and his administration are setting?

At this point, I must add that this argument does not yet say anything about the wrongness of torture. The argument is still only talking about effects. So far, all I have said is that not torturing will generate the support (and get information from) those with an aversion to torture. But what is it that makes aversion to torture right? Racist attitudes will foster the cooperation of racists. A simple bribe will generate the cooperation of the corrupt. The fact that an act generates cooperation from some segment of people does not make the act right. We are still in need of a moral argument.

The Ethics of Spying

To get an actual argument on the ethics of spying, I would like to turn to the desire-utilitarian format that is the foundation of all of these posts.

In an example I have used elsewhere, morality is concerned with finding ways to keep people from taking money out of your purse or wallet (or bank account) – or robbing convenience stores, or committing rape or murder – from doing so even when they can profit from it and they can get away with it. Desire utilitarianism advocates doing this by giving a people aversions to these types of acts. An aversion to taking money would work like an aversion to the pain. The aversion to pain keeps a person from putting their hand in a hot fire even in private. An aversion to taking the property of others, rape, torture, and assassination prevents a person from engaging in these acts even when it would otherwise be profitable for them to do so.

Now, let me combine this with the point made in the previous section – that our actions will cause those with desires compatible with our actions to support us. Now, we are not only going to ask whether our actions will buy us support from a particular group of people. We are also going to ask whether those whose support we gain (or lose) are the type of people we are better off with (or without).

The question now becomes something more than, “Will our policy solicit the cooperation of others?” This is not a moral question – this is merely a prudential question. Our question now, on a desire-utilitarianism model, is, “Are we soliciting the cooperation of the type of people that it would be wise to have as members of one’s community?”

I mentioned above that the Bush Administration’s policy on torture alienates those who have an aversion to torture. Here, I add the fact that we have a lot of very good reasons for promoting a community of people adverse to torture. However, we cannot promote an aversion to torture while promoting a government that advocates its use. These two goals are incompatible. We promote an aversion to torture by promoting a government that expresses an aversion to torture.

The same argument applies to other Bush Administration policies – indefinite confinement without a fair trial, rendition, arbitrary and unchecked executive power. We are better off as a community if our neighbors have an aversion to injustice, rendition, and arbitrary unchecked power. We are safer surrounded by these type of people than we are surrounded by a community that values injustice, rendition, and unchecked power. To promote this type of community, we need leaders that express an aversion to injustice, rendition, and arbitrary unchecked power. We are not getting any benefits from an Administration that expresses a fondness for these qualities.

The Return of the Ticking Bomb

So, what do we do with the ticking bomb scenario?

Actually, my answer is that torture and other extreme questioning techniques should remain illegal. We should be seeking the cooperation of those who share an aversion to these types of actions.

The fact that an act is illegal does not imply that it should never be done. We may set a speed limit on private roads of 55 miles per hour. However, the parent whose child is in shock after being stung by a bee may violate the law to get his child to the hospital. In extraordinary circumstances, an individual weighs aversion to breaking the law with the desire to save his child’s life. In breaking the law, he takes his chances – he risks punishment. It would be absurd to argue for eliminating the speed limit because of the rare situation in which a person may be justified in violating it.

The fact that torture is illegal does not mean that the interrogator, faced with certain knowledge of a bomb and limited time to get this informant to talk, and good reason to believe that torture would be useful in this situation, cannot use torture. It means that he, like the person speeding to get his child to the hospital, has decided that the situation is important enough that he will take his chances with the system. He will suffer the consequences of breaking the law, if it comes to that. We keep the law as an expression of society’s attitudes – that we consider these types of actions to be wrong, and anybody who commits this type of act had better be able to come to us with a very good reason.

Obligations to the Dead

I received the call just the other day from somebody with a moral question. (By the way, I do take requests. Just send me an email with a question and I will try to give a reasoned answer.)

This caller asked about promises to dead people – particularly in the context of desire utilitarianism. Dead people have no desires, so breaking a promise to a dead person cannot thwart their desires. So, can we have any obligations to dead people?

First, I'm not inclined to accept any theory that suggests that there is some mysterious supernatural 'ought' force that reaches out of the grave that binds our actions to the wishes of the deceased. Those types of entities fall well within the classification that I call, "reasons for action that do not exist."

Morality has to confine itself to reasons for action that do exist -- and the only reasons for action that exist are desires.

Dead people have no desires. They have no pulse, they have no sense of humor, and they have no desires. So, they cannot be the source of reasons for action.

What does exist is the reasons for action of those who stay alive. Those of us who are alive have reason to support institutions that will execute certain of those wishes after we are dead. True, once we die, the desire to execute those wishes do not exist -- but there will be others (living) who will have an interest in maintaining the institution. Maintaining that institution requires executing those final wishes.

However, there are some caveats. If a person dies, leaving his estate to Al Quieda, so that it can better finance its terrorist activities, we do not have to execute the final wishes of this person. Our right to refuse the execution of these wishes in death is no different than our right to refuse the execution of these wishes in life. Bad wishes – evil wishes – are not wishes of the dead that the living have any reason to execute.

Wills, Trust, and Desire Utilitarianism

Before I go further, I would like to address a point of possible confusion. I have built this blog on desire utilitarianism. However, some people get desire utilitarianism confused with a different theory that could best be described as desire-fulfilling act utilitarianism.

(1) Desire-fulfilling act utilitarianism: Do that act that will fulfill the most desires.

(2) Desire utilitarianism: Do that act that a person with good desires would do, where good desires are those desires that tend to fulfill the desires of others.

The type of 'desire utilitarianism' that I am talking about is the second type. I reject all 'act-utilitarian' theories regardless of whether they are ultimate founded on pleasure/pain, happiness/unhappiness, eudemonia (ancient Greek happiness), preference satisfaction, desire fulfillment, number of rocks sitting at the bottom of the Marianas Trench, or any other consequence.

Note: In this, the start of my second year of blogging, I am confining detailed discussions of moral theory to the weekend posts. This weekend, I will discuss this distinction between two “desire utilitarian” conceptions in detail. I will also address the question, “Of all of the types of moral theories available, why should I choose desire utilitarianism and not some other theory?" This is a rhetorical question that is supposed to “prove” moral subjectivism, because it has no objective answer.

For purposes of this post, I will skip over those details and say that desire utilitarianism argues for promoting desires that tend to fulfill other desires – that is to say, promoting desires where there exists reasons to promote those desires.

People have reasons to promote a desire to execute the last wishes of the dead. In promoting such an aversion, we can help bring it about that people will execute our last wishes after we die. While it is true that our desires will cease to exist when we die, they still continue to exist when we live. Those who are living establish and maintain these institutions – and, in this case, the reasons for doing so are reasons that actually exist.

Promises

So, what about promises to the dead?

A wife, visiting her dying husband, might promise him that she will visit his grave every day. After he dies, her life goes on. Eventually, she finds the daily visits to the cemetery to be a burden. What is her duty with respect to her earlier promise?

Desire utilitarianism says that we as a society have reason to promote an aversion to breaking promises to the dead. It gives us a sense of security that our final requests will be obeyed. However, one desire or aversion needs to be weighted against others. We also have reason to promote an aversion to lying (lying is wrong). Yet, we permit, and perhaps even require, the person to lie to the Nazi or the slave catcher and say, “I do not know the location of any Jews/escaped slaves,” while Jews or escaped slaves are hidden in his cellar.

There should be a reluctance to break promises to the dead – but a reluctance that can be outweighed by other concerns. One of these concerns is a consideration of what the deceased would want if the deceased were a good person.

“If you, my former husband, truly loved me, then you would have wanted me to have this happiness in the life I have remaining. You would have given me permission to revoke the promise. I am going to assume that you were a good person, and you would not want me to keep this old promise where it was the source of such misery and loss in my remaining years. If you did value my suffering and hold me to that promise for this reason, then you are evil, and my obligation to suffer that evil is no less than the German citizen’s obligation to tell the Nazi guards where the Jews are hiding.”

The Estate Tax

This model has important implications over the debate with the estate tax. There are those who hold that there is something inherently immoral with a 'death tax.' These people are making reference to a type of bizarre metaphysical force that reaches out to us from beyond the grave that, frankly, does not exist. The only reasons that do exist for having or not having a death tax are existing desires. We have reason to support the honoring of the last wishes of the dead. However, we also have reason to weigh that desire with the desire for the good that can be done with the money that the person who has died no longer has any use for.

To balance these concerns, we set a limit -- that we will respect the wishes of the deceased to a certain extent, but we will not completely ignore the well-being of the community that provided the context in which the deceased was able to acquire great wealth.

Ultimately, desire utilitarianism supports Warran Buffett's view of the estate tax. Buffett recently donated over $30 billion of his personal wealth (at a rate of 5% per year for 20 years) to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

His view of the estate tax is that it should be maintained. However, it is not for the purpose of transferring money into the government treasury from those who have had prosperous lives. It should exist, instead, as an incentive for people with great wealth to set up or contribute to private donations. Buffett believes (and is accurate, I think) that governments do a poor job of spending money wisely. They collect money and then hand that money back to the highest bidder (in terms of campaign contributions and votes). The highest bidder is seldom the person who can do the most good with it.

By setting up or donating to private charities, those with great wealth prevent their money from entering into the public trough, and give it instead to those who, they think, can do the most good with it. It’s not the case of having the government spend the money. It is the case of having private charity spend the money, and an incentive to see to it that private charity gets money to spend.

A wealth person should have a desire to establish some sort of foundation that helps others anyway. Society clearly has an interest in promoting in all people, including the rich, a desire to contribute to the well-being of others, through its tools of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. The desire to establish foundations that one thinks would be useful is clearly a desire that tends to fulfill other desires, and one that society has reason to promote.

An unwillingness to contribute excess wealth to the well-being of others my be viewed like the wish to have one’s wealth inherited by Al Queida; a bad desire that society has no obligation to execute.

The estate tax is merely a reflection of these values.

Bush on National Security

My first post of the new year.

I am actually going to start the year with two posts put together; (1) a short section on Bush’s speech, and (2) a longer section on national security.

Topic 1: Bush Calls for Unity

I read this after just reading a headline about the President’s speech on the 5th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The headline reads, “Bush Urges Unity on Terror War.” (The site has since changed its headline.)

Bush does not urge unity. He urges unquestioned, blind, “ask no questions; follow all orders” obedience.

There is an easy way to tell the difference between a person who is truly asking that we set aside our differences, and a person demanding obedience. The person who seeks to set aside differences follows this up by saying, “These are the differences I will set aside. I am making the first step. Now, it is your turn. And if you do not take a step in my direction, then we will all know that you are more interested in obstruction than in cooperation.”

But Bush, in telling us that we should set aside our differences, does not give us a list of differences he will set aside. He is not going to budge. He is telling the rest of us to meet him, where he stands. We are to put aside 100% of the differences. He is to put aside 0%.

That is not a call for unity. That is a call for voluntary servitude – a willful slavery and blind obedience of another.

Another piece of evidence that Bush’s request for unity is insincere is his statement in the speech that, “"Whatever mistakes have been made in Iraq, the worst mistake would be to think that if we pulled out, the terrorists would leave us alone. They will not leave us alone. They will follow us."

Gasp! Really? Who’d a thunked it?

Bush cannot even express opposing views honestly. He has to make up ridiculous straw men that no rational person would accept, and attribute those absurdities to his critics. He either lacks the will to understand what others are saying, or the intelligence to do so.

A person cannot honestly say, “Let us put our differences aside and work together” if he is unwilling or unable to understand anything other than his own view.

The evidence suggests that Bush does not want us to put aside our differences. He wants our unquestioned obedience to his dictates. He wants to be a dictator. Like all dictators, he fantasizes about how wonderful it would be, “If I could be dictator and everybody willingly does whatever I say and marvels at me and tells me how brilliant I am at all times.”

“Mr. Bush. Do you really want us to put aside our differences? Prove it by putting aside some of yours. Not all of them . . . just some of them. Until you are willing to do that, then you are not sincerely asking us to put aside our differences. You are asking us to be voluntary slaves obeying your commands. That is something you have no right to demand, and that we have no duty to provide.”

Topic 2: National Security

Dear President Bush

I have spent several days now listening to you using the 5th Anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon to promote your political agenda regarding national security. I have heard you say that you consider it your principle duty is to protect us from being killed or maimed by terrorists. It is, indeed, one of your duties.

I have no interest in being killed by a terrorist. You and your surrogates act as if any who would criticize you has a perverse desire to be blown to bits, poisoned, infected with disease, irradiated, or all of the above. Clearly, this is absurd. More than that, it is an insult.

A rational mind recognizes that we face many threats – not just those from terrorists. It does no good to be safe from a terrorist bomb only to be killed by a hurricane, or a disease that medical research could have cured, or pollution dumped into our air, water, and food.

Mr. President, we face a great many threats. One of them is terrorism. However, all of us can kill and maim us and those we care about.

Hurricane Katrina

I am particularly concerned about the hurricane example. When it comes to threats to the United States, Katrina proved to be a much bigger threat than Al-Queida. While you were protecting us from terrorists, you were weakening our defenses against hurricanes. from hurricane. You may boast that there has been no loss of life or property in the United States due to a terrorist attack in five years. Yet, you let our defenses against hurricanes deteriorate to the point that you lost 1800 of those American lives you swore to protect – not to mention an economic and property loss that exceeded the cost impact of the 9/11 attacks.

More importantly, if you had taken actions that a rational President would have taken to defend us from terrorists – those same acts would have protected the people of New Orleans. The levees in New Orleans could have been destroyed by a terrorist bomb. If your job is to protect American lives from terrorist bombs, then it includes protecting them from the consequences of destroying the levees around New Orleans. A group of terrorists would not have given us three days advance notice to prepare for an attack. So, compared to a terrorist attack, protection from Katrina should have been a breeze.

It was not a breeze. If your administration is incapable of protecting us from hurricanes with advance warning, then your administration thereby proves its incompetence at protecting us from the effects of a terrorist attack.

Chemical Weapons

You claim that you want to protect us from weapons of mass destruction that might kill and maim us. You put chemical weapons on this list. A part of your plan is to spend hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives to make sure that terrorists are not able to kill and maim us with the use of chemicals.

So, it is only reasonable to ask, "Why you are willing to allow corporations to poison our air and water for profit?" The poisons that come to us through air and water pollution leave us just as dead or just as sick as other weapons of mass destruction. The only difference between a terrorists and the corporate executives is that the terrorists aim to kill us, and the corporate executive is simply indifferent as to our survival.

However, the effect on the victim is the same. Whether he is killed or made sick by somebody who wants him dead or somebody who does not care, he is just as dead or just as sick. Your duty to protect us applies as much to the person who will intentionally kill us as those who will kill us with indifference.

On this issue of chemical weapons of mass destruction, how many American lives does the tobacco industry claim every year?

Biological Weapons

You also claim that you want to protect us from biological weapons of mass destruction. So, I have to ask you why protecting me from the effects of anthrax is worth hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of American lives. Yet, protecting me from the effects of diabetes, cancer, heart disease, stroke, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and the like is worth so little to you.

If you truly believe that your job is to protect us from those who will kill and maim us, and we know that these diseases are killing and maiming us, then why are you not protecting us from them?

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

You claim to be concerned that terrorists may set off a dirty bomb in one of our cities, or even a nuclear bomb, rendering whole portions of the city unusable – or requiring multi-billion dollar cleanup projects. This, you tell us, is a part of your job as President. This is part of what it means to protect us.

Yet, you do not seem to show much concern to the damage to American cities that would be caused by sea-level rise.

Vice President Cheney once said that his philosophy required treating a 1% probability that we will suffer some sort of attack as being equivalent to certainty.

(Actually, Cheney is being foolish to adopt such a strategy. This amounts to basing policy on a false premise – on living a lie. This doctrine says that we should live our lives on the premise that 1 = 100. However, it is simply false that 1 = 100 and it is foolish to pretend that they are equal. We truly need an administration that is capable of basing its policies on the facts, and not on myth and falsehoods.)

However, when it comes to global warming, your administration seems to have a different philosophy; that 1% = 0%. That unless a threat is at least 75% certain, that it should be treated as no threat at all and ignored. So, while you seek to prevent the destruction of our cities as a result of some terrorist weapon, you ignore the threat that sea-level rise will do significant damage to those same cities.

Tyranny

One last thing that I need to protect me and those that I care about from, Mr. President, are tyrants. These are megalomaniac people who are convinced that God has specifically chosen them to create a model world and that anybody who disagrees with them are to e swept aside.

There is nothing that a tyrant loves more than an opportunity to work in secret, without having to answer to anybody else. They decide on their own who counts as an enemy of the state, who gets arrested, how long they spend in prison, and what happens to them when they get there. They do not need to worry about asking anybody else’s permission. They can even make it a crime to let it be known what they are doing.

This is the tyrant’s wet dream.

You protect us from tyrants by protecting a system of government that maintains a system of checks and balances. Presidents must appeal to the courts or the legislature to double-check their work and make sure it is not tyrannical. No President will ever judge his own actions excessive. That job must be left to an outside authority – a judge or a legislator. Take away that outside authority, and you have removed the only barriers that might exist against a new tyrannical government.

Summary

In the last five years, I have seen how your surrogates work. They take the words of any critic and twist them into something rediculous, rather than actually listening to what others have to say. So, I suspect that, if they were to read this, they would claim how absurd it is to abandon the war on terror so that we can address these other concrens

I would hold that it is as absurd to abandon the war on terror to address these other concerns, as it is to abandon these other concerns so that we can address the war on terror. Each concern deserves attention proportional to the magnitude of its threat. I dare suggest that global warming, pollution (air and water poisoned by Americans for profit), and disease are real and significant threats.

You say that you consider it your job to protect us. You will do everything in your power to protect us from terrorists. I want to know why you will protect us from the city-destroying power of a bomb, but not the city-destroying power of a hurricane or of global warming. You will protect us from chemical weapons launched by Al Queida, but not by the poisons put in our air and water by American companies seeking a profit. You will tirelessly work to make sure that we are not infected by anthrax, but you invest less and less in making sure that we are secure from the threats of cancer, Alzheimer’s, and other diseases. You seek to protect us from being conquered from without by militant Islamic theocrats, by giving some future local-grown tyrant complete freedom to establish his own tyranny.

You are not protecting us, Mr. Bush.

You are making our lives decidedly less secure. More Americans will die as a result of your actions than you can ever hope to save.

Sincerely,

Alonzo Fyfe

Blog Birthday: 1 Year Old

My blog is 1 year old today.

I think that it is time for some healthy self-reflection and self-criticism – where this blog is at (the good and the bad, as I see it) and where it is going.

First, some general impressions.

Of course, I want everybody on the planet to read my blog and think it is the best thing ever written. That hasn’t happened. However, I have been able to accomplish more with this blog than I think I would have been able to do in another of my favored professions – that of teacher. (Specifically, a lecturer in moral philosophy.) If I had been such a teacher, I would have had 30 students each in two classes that I talked to three times each week.

Here, I have 100 people visit me every day and, though I am sure that some of them scream and run out of the room as soon as they get a peek at what is going on, there are a few who stay. Hopefully, when they did leave, a few of them have taken away something of real value.

Remember, I am somebody who believes that there is such a thing as “real value.”

Of course, if I’m wrong in anything I say, and I convince others, that does not have “real value.” I need to be right – which means that I need to be careful. There is no value in spreading lies or even from error. People make mistakes. But a mistake, even if unintentional, is still a mistake. It leads people down wrong paths and makes the world worse than it would have otherwise been, not better.

So, I try to be careful. To give real value I have to be right – and I have to be careful. I do actually try to make sure that the 100 people who will visit me each day will find something that actually improves their understanding of the world – that they leave with a little more truth and understanding, instead of a pack of lies and misrepresentation that aims to manipulate them into actions that I (or my ‘faction’) would benefit from.

So, that’s what I try to do. I try to give those who come here a better understanding of some of the arguments being thrown about in order to decide policies, to help separate the good from the bad, in order to help people make better decisions. That, I have decided, is where I want to put my efforts in my time on this earth.

Do I think that I am always right?

Heck, no. However, I do know this: I am better than Bill O’Reilly, Ann Coulter, and the people who are responsible for that miniseries “The Path to 9/11”. I am better than Karl Rove and Dick Cheney and smarter than George Bush. I think that a person who cares about truth will still make mistakes, but will have a higher batting average than those who care only about effect, and are willing to lie for effect.

Self Criticism

I know that this blog does have a traits (one a fault, the other is not) that tends to keep the readership lower than it would otherwise be.

(1) The posts are just too bloody long.

Newspapers have a limit of about 800 words on their articles, and they do that for a reason – because people do not read more than 800 words. They get about that far, and they stop. Newspapers want readers. Newspapers lose readers if they write more than 800 words, so they refuse to let their opinion writers write more than 800 words.

Back in February, I tried to limit myself to about 800 words. When I did, I found that I was merely making assertions. Those assertions only spoke to the people who agreed with me; and gave those who did not agree with me any reason to change their mind. It was actually during this period that I “missed days” on my blog because I could not figure out how to write something I felt was worth writing within those assigned limits.

When I filled in those assertions with arguments and I took the time to anticipate and consider objections, the posts grew longer again.

I found that I wrote comfortably at about 1600 words.

I know it is too long. However, I can also imagine somebody saying to Albert Einstein, “You have a wonderful proof for relativity here, but it is 235 steps long. Cut it down to 70, and we’ll consider giving it our attention.” Of course I am not saying that my proofs are as elaborate or rigid as Einstein’s. I am saying that if I cut things out of an argument, I must leave it up to the reader to fill in the gaps. This generates two hazards. First, a certain percentage of the readership will fill the gap in incorrectly. Second, hostile readers almost always respond to these shortcuts by saying, “You have this gap in your argument. Therefore, your argument sucks!”

So, I am back to filling in the gaps, and using extra words to do so.

I’ll keep working on this. Perhaps I will think of something.

In the mean time – this is not going to become a ‘news’ blog. I will write about arguments – why they are good or bad – and what they tell us about the character of the people who use them.

(2) Criticizing the Liberals

I have also noticed that my readership takes a massive hit whenever I say something bad about liberals.

I am not talking about some subtle shift in the numbers. I am talking about a nose-dive every time I point out that some liberal organization lied or they are using arguments not unlike the arguments they criticize when Republicans or Conservatives use them.

These reductions are serious and significant – and it takes a while to build readership back up again. I have found that “successful” blogs seldom say things that would antagonize the tribes that make up the bulk of their readership. They will criticize dishonesty, but will not criticize a member of their own faction for dishonesty. They will condemn hypocrisy, but not suggest that there is anybody on their side who has ever been guilty of this.

I can see why. All a person needs to do is see the effects of doing something like that once and, if he has any interest in running a successful blog, he learns, “never criticize the tribe.”

I am not accusing these people of insincerity. I think that the mind works in more subtle ways than that. I think it has more to do with the phenomenon I discussed yesterday – an ‘uneasiness’ that causes a person to think that there is something more important that needs doing – something other than criticizing the tribe.

I do not consider this a fault with this blog. I suspect that those readers who stick around even when I criticize liberals are those who are, like me, more interested in truth and integrity than in party loyalty. Those are the people that I want to write for anyway. Those are the readers worth having.

Besides, I think that criticizing the tribe is good for the tribe. It makes it stronger.

Advertising and Other Sources of Revenue

I would love to be able to do this for a living. Unfortunately, I fear that doing this for a living might leave me vulnerable to compromising certain principles in order to get paid. I am pleased that I have the liberty to write what I think, and not what I think will make money.

I don’t collect any revenue through this site. One of the reasons is because I want to focus on the quality of the arguments, and not on some irrelevant feedback criterion such as income. I have watched how advertising – the need to increase eyeball count – has damaged or destroyed many things of value, from The Learning Channel to cable news.

However, I’m working on a book. It is a smaller, simpler book than the “Desire Utilitarianism” book that appears on my web site. It simply presents the case for the moral theory that I use in this blog.

Its chapters include:

• Introduction: There Are Moral Facts
• Desire Utilitarianism
• Objectivism and Subjectivism in Ethics
• Ethics from Scripture
• Dong Good without God
• Moral Persuasion
• Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’
• In Defense of Realism: Answering J.L. Mackie
• Rational Self-Interest
• A Problem with Faith
• Morality as Evolved Sentiment
• The Love of True Belief
• Using the Founding Fathers in Moral Arguments
• The Meaning of Life

Some of these come from posts here on the blog. Others come from my web site. All of them have been rewritten in light of comments that people have made here and in other conversations.

It is written. I will clean it up some, and then I will make it available. I hope you will find in it something of value.

The Future

Tomorrow, I will write my first substantive post of the second year.

I do think that this will be a good time to introduce some changes – to try to make this blog better than it has been. “Better” does not mean “more popular,” by the way. “Better” means “contributing to the fulfillment of more and stronger desires regardless of whose they are.” That’s how I work things here.

I hope that you have a pleasant day and that I will see you here again in the future. I hope that when you come I have something of value to offer you. In the mean time, I hope that you get what you want out of life (unless it involves doing harm to others).

See you tomorrow….

Alonzo Fyfe

Morality from the Gut

I had originally thought to title this posting, "Why Osama Bin Laden is still alive." I meant to suggest that, perhaps the Bush Administration is not putting as much effort into capturing or killing him as they could be, because they find it more useful to have him alive and free than dead or captured. If he were dead or captured, people would indeed have a sensation of “mission accomplished,” focusing their attention less on terrorism and more on other concerns. The Bush Administration will be less able to offer the bargain, “Give me unquestioned obedience, and I will give you security.”

Now, I do not believe in conspiracy theories. I would not argue that a bunch of government officials huddled together in a dark room and said, “I know . . . let’s destroy the World Trade Center!” Nor are they meeting in the corridores of power and saying that, even though they have Bin Laden in their sites, they should let him go because it is politically expedient to keep him alive. I am suggesting something far more sublte than this.

The Fundamental Problem with Morality from "The Gut"

President Bush has stated that he makes his decisions from the gut. For all practical purposes, his moral philosophy seems to be one that says that God speeks to him through his gut (his sentiments). He asks God what he should do, and God gives him a "feeling" for the course to take. He prays for guidance. Yet, he is the one who must interpret the signs.

As is always the case, people will read into the signs what they want to see. So, Bush -- when he wants to attack Iraq -- will read into the signs that God wants him to attack Iraq. When he wants ease up on the attack on Bin Laden to focus on other things, he reads into the signs that God wants him to ease up on Bin Laden and do other things. To ignore those feelings -- those "signs" -- is to ignore (to slight) God. If the evidence contradicts their “feelings”, then the evidence is flawed and must be re-examined.

It is a very useful moral philosophy to have -- precisely because one can always read into the moral or divine 'signs' their own wishes. So, they always get to do what they want. And if others suffer, then this too must be a part of God's will.

A few weeks ago, in a post called "Fact-Based vs. Fiction-Based Policy," I wrote a post about how a person who depends on “his gut” to tell him what is true and false cannot tell the difference between a glass of clean water and a glass of poison. I suggested that this might not be the best way to determine what to drink and what to leave. I suggested that it would be better to listen to the scientists to determine whether the contents of the bottle are healthy or poisonous.

This post concerns a similar mistake. Instead of going from sentiment to conclusions of the form, "X is true" or "X is false," they go from sentiment to conclusions of the form "X is permissible" or "X is obligatory." The inference is as absurd either way. The only thing that sentiment can tell a person -- the only inferences one can legitimately draw from sentiment -- are conclusions of the form, "I like X" and "I do not like X." Yet, this has as little to do with X being permissible or obligatory as it has to do with X being true or false.

Many slave owners in the 1800s let their conscience be their guide, and found nothing unconscionable in slavery. When a person consumed by hate appeals to his ‘gut’ or his ‘heart’ to tell him what to do, he finds an advisor that is shouting as loudly as it can, “Kill them all!” Hate comes from the gut.

In fact, every major moral attrocity committed -- from slavery to genocide -- was committed by people where a substantial portion asked their "gut" if their actions were permissible or obligatory and got back an answer of "Yes" -- particularly when a "yes" answer was politically or economically useful for them.

Other Expressions of Morality From "the Gut"

There are a lot of atheists who are just as guilty of making this fallacious inference as the members of the Bush Administration. This is the way of thinking for common moral subjectivists. They think that the words 'permissible' and 'obligatory' are really nothing more than another way of stating that one has a particular 'gut' feeling. It is as if to say that if one's 'gut' says that it is permissible to burn infidels at the stake, then it is permissible 'for you' to burn infidels at the stake. It does not mean that I have to enjoy it -- but I cannot condemn it as something that it would be 'wrong for you' to do.

We also find this fallacious inference in evolutionary ethics. This group does not say, “I should listen to my gut because it is the voice of God.” They say, “I should listen to my gut because it is the voice of evolution.”

Yet, they fail to explain what it is about evolution that allows one to say that, "If our interest in doing X came through evolution, then we have a real obligation to do X." Can a person not have an evolved disposition to do something immoral? After all, evolution created the categories of ‘predator’ and ‘prey’. Evolution created all sorts of beings that survive – not through cooperation with others, but by living at the expense of others.

We also have some popular phrases describing this piece of advice. “Let your conscience be your guide,” and “Follow your heart,” are among the more popular. Yet, it is absurd to believe that the 9/11 hijackers, for example, refused to let their conscience be their guide and were not following their heart. In their case, their conscience and their heart (and their gut) all said to carry out the attack.

How Use of Gut Feelings Might Keep Bin Laden Alive

I suggest that one of the reasons that Bin Laden lives is because President Bush’s ‘gut’ gets nervous whenever Bush thinks about how he is going to rule the country without the ability to use Bin Laden to target peoples’ fears. Since Bush listens to his gut, thinks of his gut as speaking for God, Bush thinks that it is God telling him not to worry about Bin Laden just yet – not until after he has taken care of some more important things later.

On this model, Bush never needs to consciously consider the possibility that he is keeping Bin Laden alive and free for political purposes. If anybody accuses him of this he can sincerely assert that he is genuinely interested in seeing Bin Laden killed or captured. It’s just that . . . well . . . being President is hard work and he can’t do everything at once. So far, killing or capturing Bin Laden just has not happened.

We can think of this in terms of an alcoholic who, intellectually, knows that he should quit drinking. Only, he wants that drink. He ‘listens to his gut’ which tells him that getting the drink is a good idea. So his ‘head’ comes up with excuses for drinking. ‘I can’t give up drinking now – I have all of this pressure on me and I just can’t add one more stress to my life. I will give up drinking once these other stresses are taken care of.”

Or, “I will finish the job of capturing or killing Bin Laden once the Iraq situation is taken care of.” Then, “I will finish the job of capturing or killing Bin Laden once the Iran problem is taken care of.” Then . . . well, I’m certain that the President can come up with a long list of ‘urgent issues’ that command his attention before he can afford to devote his time to an all-out effort to capture Bin Laden.

The alcoholic can always come up with just one more excuse. We may listen to him for a while. However, after a few years have passed and he has not found the opportunity to quit drinking, it eventually makes sense to suggest, “Maybe you don’t really want to quit drinking?” Of course, the alcoholic will get angry at us for suggesting such a thing. He will feel genuine outrage over the idea that we do not understand or appreciate his situation. Doctors will speak of these defense mechanisms using terms like “denial” and “rationalization.” They are very real, and they are very powerful forces. They can keep an alcoholic drinking even when he knows he should stop. They can distract a President and keep him from committing the forces he needs to actually kill or capture Bin Laden.

Conclusion

Whenever you hear of somebody who bases his moral judgment from “gut feeling” or anything similar, you have reason to be worried. Things might be fine. Perhaps he is somebody who was raised correctly – raised so that his “gut” tells him that he does not want to kill innocent people, take property that belongs to others, lie, or rape. Perhaps his he was raised so that his “gut” lacks the bigoted sentiments that have plagued the bulk of humanity throughout history.

Then again, maybe not. Remember, every major atrocity ever committed has been committed by people who were morally very much at ease with their actions. They, too, listened to their “gut,” and we can easily see what their “gut” told them to do.

Heck, we can see the process operating in President Bush. Whatever he does – torture, rendition, the acquisition of unrestrained power – we can bet that he does them with a clear conscience – with a “gut” that tells him that what he is doing is right (no matter how wrong it is). This is the reliability one can expect from listening to one’s “gut”.

More on Happiness and Desire Fulfillment

Last week I wrote some objections to the theory that happiness is the sole ultimate value and the sole concern of ethics. Today, I want to add a couple more objections to happiness theory. However, I first want to spend a few sentences on the question, “Why does it matter?”

Is there anything that you want? I hold that morality is concerned with how best to help people get what they want. The lack of concern with morality prevents people from getting what they want, while the strong moral institutions help people to get what they want.

Of course, we cannot have an institution devoted to helping people get what they want until we understand what it is that people want. One theory suggests that people only want happiness. If this is true, then it is a fine basis for morality. If not, then the pursuit of happiness as the sole good, when it is not the only thing that people want, means that a lot of other wants will get left behind.

I hold that happiness theory is a mistake.

As it turns out, a couple of days after I posted my last article on the subject, “Happiness vs. Desire Fulfillment”, Ebonmuse at Daylight Atheism http://www.daylightatheism.org/ added a posting called, “The Roots of Morality II: The Foundation,” that said,

No matter what quality anyone proposes as the root of morality, it is always possible to ask why we should value that quality and not some other - except for one. There is only one quality that is immune to this question and that therefore can truly serve as the foundation of morality, and that quality is happiness.

This is precisely the thesis that I am arguing against.

Last week I made the following claims:

(1) There is no more reason to feel compelled to adopt the position that there is one basic desire (e.g., a desire for happiness) and that all other desires are a manifestation of this, than to adopt the position that there is one basic belief (e.g., a belief in God) and all other beliefs are manifestations of this.

(2) Using a story of a prisoner who can obtain happiness only by sacrificing her child, I argued that happiness theory cannot adequately explain the choices that people make.

(3) Happiness theory cannot explain how two people with identical beliefs will perform different actions without introducing a mysterious “third variable” (belief, desire for happiness, and ‘something else’) that makes happiness theory inadequate.

This week I would like to add two more arguments:

(4) The Experience Machine Problem.

The experience machine problem involves cases in which a person is given a choice between living in the real world with its uncertainties and entering an experience machine that will give her the impressions of living in the real world under ideal circumstances.

The experience machine is designed to read the agent's thoughts and to feed them those experiences that would make them as happy as possible. If the agent gets too concerned that everything is too easy, it will feed the agent experiences of difficulties so that the agent’s maximum happiness is maintained.

Many people presented with such a choice report that they would prefer to live in the real world. However, happiness theory cannot explain this preference since, Ex hypothesi, the experience machine will produce more happiness than the real world.

One cannot avoid this conclusion by stating that the agent in the machine is not “truly happy.” There is no qualitative difference between the happiness that the person will experience in the machine and the happiness of identical events happening in the real world – not without adding some really bizarre elements to the ‘happiness’ that Occam’s Razor would certainly threaten.

People say that they would not enter into the machine even if the experiences were guaranteed to be indistinguishable from real-world happiness. Nor do they express any longing for such a machine in the sense of saying, "Wouldn't it be great if such machines really could exist?" All of this suggests that people seek values besides happiness – values that sometimes outweigh their desire for happiness – and, in some cases, a fake experience that produces happiness has no value at all.

Desire fulfillment theory has no trouble handling the experience machine. Desire fulfillment theory says that we act so as to make true the propositions that are the objects of our desires. The experience machine has absolutely no ability to make true the objects of most of our desires. Consequently, desire fulfillment theory suggests that the happiness of the experience machine will sometimes (often?) have no value for agents.

The machine can certainly fulfill my desire for happiness. In fact, by removing the frustrations and the pains of the real world, I am quite convinced that I could be very happy in the machine. However, I have desires that the machine cannot fulfill. It cannot fulfill my desire to leave the world better than it would have otherwise been – because I would be locked in a machine accomplishing nothing. To fulfill that desire, I have to be a part of the real world. I can't waste my time being locked in a machine, no matter how happy the machine would make me.

I want to quickly point out that 'desire fulfillment' theory does not regard 'desire fulfillment' as a sensation or any other specific entity. It is merely a term used to describe a relationship between a 'desire that 'P'' and a state of affairs in which 'P' is true. That is it. There is nothing more.

I have often faced critics who attempt to argue that 'desire fulfillment' has the same problem, because the experience machine can provide the sensation of 'desire fulfillment.' The machine cannot provide 'desire fulfillment.' Only a state of affairs in which 'P' is true can fulfill a desire that 'P'. There are some desires (e.g., a desire for happiness) that the machine can full. For that, it may be tempting. However, there are other desires that the machine cannot fulfill. Thee are, then, some people who would have no interest in such a machine.

5. The Incommensurability of Values

The incommensurability of values concerns the ability that one value has to substitute for another.

Money is an example of a commensurable value. Assume that an investor has two mutually incompatible options. Option 1 will pay a 10% rate of return in 1 year; Option 2 will pay a 9% rate of return. Assume that the risk profiles are identical. The agent has every reason to go with the Option 1. More importantly, the agent has no reason to regret or even give a second thought to the fact that he did not choose Option 2. It is an easy choice that requires absolutely no agony – and over which the agent would have no regrets.

Much of our decision-making is not like this. Real-life decision making is not like that. A person faces two career options. He could study moral philosophy and try to live his life as an ethicist, or he could study planetary astronomy and engineering and try to get a job in the unmanned space program. His interest in making the world a better place is slightly stronger than his interest in being a part of the unmanned space program. So, he invests his energies in the study of moral philosophy. However, the loss of the opportunity to be a part of the unmanned space program still carries its regrets. There is a hint of loss sitting in the background.

This sense of loss is an indicator that we are dealing with incommensurable values. One value may outweigh another, but it does not substitute for the other. It is not a choice between, "the same" and "more of the same." It is a choice between two distinctly different options.

Happiness theory attempts to reduce all value to one concern – happiness. It claims that all human choices are made between two options; 'happiness' and 'more happiness'. If this is an accurate description of the situation, it seems to lack an explanation for the fact that the person who chooses 'more happiness' over 'happiness' should have any regrets for the 'happiness' that he did not get.

However, desire-fulfillment theory also handles this phenomenon. The agent has two desires – a desire that 'P' and a desire that 'Q' where it is not causally possible that 'P' and 'Q'. We may assume that the desire that 'P' is slightly stronger than the desire that 'Q'. Therefore, the agent acts so as to make 'P' true.

However, 'P' is not 'Q'. The fulfillment of the desire that ‘P’ still leaves the desire that ‘Q” unfulfilled.

Because $100 is commensurate with $200, the desire for $100 is fulfilled in a state where the agent get $200. There is no sense of loss because there is no loss.

If an agent’s choice is between 200 units of happiness versus 100 units of happiness, the desire for 100 units of happiness is fulfilled in a state where the agent has 200 units of happiness.

However, the fulfillment of the desire that 'P' leaves the desire that 'Q' unfulfilled, Desire fulfillment theory predicts and explains a sense of loss that happiness theory does not account for.

Conclusion

We have two theories; happiness theory and desire-fulfillment theory. Of these two, desire-fulfillment does a better job of explaining and predicting a large set of events that focus on human choice. That gives us reason to reject happiness theory and accept desire fulfillment theory in its place.

Ebonmuse also wrote,

In addition, there is a strong, purely practical reason to create a moral system that encourages individuals to contribute to the happiness of others, rather than the opposite. Namely, if your happiness is obtained in a way that makes other people unhappy, they will always oppose you and work to hinder your goals. On the other hand, if your happiness is derived wholly or partially from other peoples' happiness, they will be far more likely to assist you, since their goals aligning with yours, and you will be more likely to achieve your own ends and be happy as well.

Please note the few references of 'goals' and 'ends' in this quote. The idea that happiness is the only value suggests that Ebonmuse should be talking about a single ‘goal’ or ‘end’ (happiness) rather than use the plural. Though desire –fulfillment theory suggests multiple goals and ends.

I suggest that Ebonmuse needs this talk of ‘goals’ and ‘ends’ and run with it – discarding all references to ‘happiness.’ This would yield something like,

In addition, there is a strong, purely practical reason to create a moral system that encourages individuals to acquire desires that tend to fulfill the desires of others, rather than the opposite. Namely, if your desires are fulfilled in a way that thwarts the desires of others, they will always oppose you and work to hinder your goals. On the other hand, if your desires are fulfilled wholly or partially from the fulfillment of the desires of other people, they will be far more likely to assist you, since their goals aligning with yours, and you will be more likely to achieve your own ends.

This also exposes another consideration. We also have reason to use the tools of social conditioning at our disposal to promote in others those desires which tend to fulfill the desires of others, because we are the 'others' whose desires become more likely to be fulfilled. If we have an aversion to being killed, then we have reason to cause others to have an aversion to killing – because the others they will then not kill include us.

At the same time, they have reason to cause in us an aversion to killing, a love of truth and honesty, and an aversion to taking that which does not belong to us.

Through the institution of morality, we promote this aversion to killing, deception, and theft by the widespread use of social tools such as condemnation. Hopefully, this will reduce the number of people with these desire-thwarting desires, and reduce the strength of these desire-thwarting desires where they do exist.