"Choosing Wrong"

In my last post, I identified a couple of ways in which the belief-desire model for intentional behavior is inadequate. Beliefs and desires do not adequately account for habitual actions, nor for the phenomena of "forgetting" or "remembering" a relevant fact.

However, these types of failures do not concern the subject of this blog - which is value. It is still the case that only desires provide end-reasons for intentional action. Habits and memory are means for accomplishing ends or goals, they do not establish the ends or goals.

This subject came up because I was directed to a podcast about people making wrong choices.

The question is whether the theory can handle cases, such as those of professional basketball players Shaquille O'Neal and Wilt Chamberlain, who choose actions which the authors of the podcast at least say are obviously wrong.

Specifically, these players (and, actually, basketball players generally) score a smaller percentage of free-throws when they throw the ball overhand as opposed to underhand. Some players such as Wilt Chamberlain used the underhanded method for a while and increased their percentage of successful free-throws dramatically. Yet, Wilt returned to the overhand method, and others refused to try the underhand method at all.

Is this an instance of a person acting contrary to their desires, given their beliefs?

Note that the agents in this case know that their basketball scores would be higher if they would only choose to throw underhanded. This could not help but to increase their own statistics and to help their team win more games (at least, games against teams with players who refuse to adopt the new system).

Wilt Chamberlain responded to the question of why he did not use the new system by saying that he felt silly.

The thesis that a person acts on their desires given their beliefs can handle this situation. What Chamberlain described was an aversion. He was averse to appearing before others - particularly before those who watched him play - in a way that the audience would view negatively. It is this aversion that motivated him to shoot free-throws overhand, rather than underhand.

One could classify this as a bad desire - a desire that tends to thwart other desires. This would put it in the same category as drug or gambling addictions. The agent is more interested, in this case, in the good opinion of the members of the audience than he is in scoring the most points - and that this provides sufficient reason to argue against having such a desire.

But is this a bad desire?

Basketball players are, primarily, entertainers. Their primary job is not to win games, it is to please those who buy tickets and to make those tickets worth the price. Winning games has value, but that is because they contribute to the entertainment value of the game.

One question that went unasked in the podcast is whether people generally would value basketball as much if everybody were to use this method. Do people want to pay money to watch players make what are called "granny shots"?

It seems at least plausible that the "granny shot" is disliked by the audience precisely because it is too easy. As such, it does not display skill as well as the overhand shot. Also, the overhand shot - precisely because it makes the successful basket less certain - creates more risk and, thus, adds excitement to the game. Overall, it may may contribute to the entertainment value of the game in a number of ways, thus giving more value to the tickets that the basketball organization is trying to sell. Indeed, it may well be the ridicule and condemnation coming from the audience of paying customers - as demonstrated by the very name "granny shot" - that creates the aversion in players and owners against this style of shot.

It is relevant to note, in this case, that the underhanded shot loses its advantage if everybody did it. It provides only an advantage to those who use this method against those who do not. Consequently, it is relevant to ask what the popularity of basketball would be if everybody did this. Would paying customers be as interested in tuning into a game that predominantly contained "granny shots"?

Another type of case discussed in the podcast was that of football owners who refuse to trade a first-round draft pick for a larger number of second-round draft picks. This would save the club owner money (since the first-round draft picks tend to be the star players who command higher salaries), and a larger number of second-round players are often better for the team in terms of winning games than a single first-round player.

Once again, we need to bring into the discussion the fact that the goal of a football team is to sell tickets. It is at least reasonable to suggest that a star football player results in more ticket sales, in the same way that a star movie actor improves the box-office take of a movie. In the movie industry we can well argue that for every big-name star with a huge salary there is another actor - a better actor - willing to play the same role for a lot less money. However, the big-name actor gets the job because the use of that actor will sell tickets. Where the end is to make a quality movie, the use of the big-name, high-cost actor seems to be a "wrong choice" - but not when the choice considers that the goal is to make money.

I find it interesting to note that the one person presented in the interview who did throw freethrows underhanded was also presented as somebody who seemed to care very little about the opinions or feelings of others. Scoring points seemed to matter more to him than anything else - including the opinions and feelings of other players or members of the audience. Everything that exists - and everyone that exists - has value only insofar as they serve as an effective means to scoring points.

A concern for the opinions and interests of other people may be a "bad desire" in terms of scoring points in a game. However, there are other reasons - some of which are relevant off the court - for rejecting the idea that it is a bad desire over all. Being somebody interested in not only scoring points, but in the opinions and feelings of other humans, is a better type of person to be, even if it does cause one to shoot overhanded rather than underhanded. That cost is hardly a good reason to cause people to be less concerned with the opinions and interests of others.

Ultimately, in this case, we do not have a clear example of a situation where the belief-desire model breaks down. Those types of situations exist (as when habits and memory come into play), but this does not seem to be one of them.

In addition, there are reasons to question whether this actually represents a "wrong choice". If the only end of value is scoring points then, yes, the over-hand free throw is a poor choice of a means for that end. However, if the end is to introduce risk into a game, to make it more exciting, to demonstrate skill, and to appeal to the likes and dislikes of fans (ticket buyers), it may not be a wrong choice at all. Scoring points neither is nor should it be the sole end of human action, nor should it be the sole measure of the merits of those actions.

Complicating the Belief-Desire Model of Intentional Action

A member of the studio audience directed me to a podcast on National Public Radio called "Choosing Wrong".

The motivation behind this recommendation is grounded on the fact that much of what I write assumes a belief-desire model for intentional actions. On that model, a person performs that act that would fulfill the most and strongest of one's desires in a universe in which their beliefs are true and complete.

Some of the points made in that broadcast are meant to show that this may not be true.

Actually, the belief-desire model is not entirely accurate. I can mention a couple of areas where the model fails.

The belief-desire model is an empirical theory, which means that it is supposed to explain and predict a range of observations. In this case, it is meant to explain the actions of intentional agents. This means that we can demonstrate that the theory falls short if we can provide relevant observations that the theory cannot handle. This means that we either need to throw out the theory or modify it.

Here is a couple sets of observations that the belief-desire model cannot handle.

Habit

Take a standard keyboard that a person has been using for years and change two letter. For example, switch the keys for the letters 'a' and 's'. Now, tell the experimental subject to type something. You will discover that there will be repeated cases where the subject typed the letter 'a' where he meant to type 's' and visa versa. The agent may, for example, type 'thia' instead of 'this', or 'thst' in place of 'that'.

Typing is an intentional action. Indeed, typing a specific word such as 'this' or 'that' is an intentional action.

We cannot explain this behavior of typing the wrong letter in terms of change in desire. We are assuming that the agent wanted to type the words 'this' and 'that' - but the agent failed to realize these states of affairs.

We cannot explain the failure in terms of a false belief. The agent knows that the letters have been switched. We may even have the agent switch the letters himself. In many cases, the agent will realize the instant he types the wrong letter that he has typed the wrong letter - because he knows where the letters are in fact.

In order to explain this behavior, we have to add a new element to our belief-desire model. This new element is 'habit'. Habits exist. Habits also influence intentional actions. We do not actually have a belief-desire model for intentional action. We actually have a belief-desire-habit model.

Remembering/Forgetting

An agent resolves to pick up some toilet paper on the way home because she is almost out. On the way home, she drives past the store, pulls up at her house, walks in, and suddenly remembers the toilet paper.

We cannot explain the failure to get the toilet paper in terms of a change in desire. Nor can we honestly say that the agent's beliefs suddenly changed such that, for a few moments, she believed that she had toilet paper at home. If this was a genuine belief it would require some evidence that would convince the agent that she was in error - but no evidence is required.

Instead, we explain the failure to pick up the paper in terms of "forgetting'. Intentional action not only requires certain beliefs - it requires that the beliefs that actually control an action be, effectively, in working memory. Other beliefs may exist, but if they are not in working memory then they are forgotten, for the time beling.

Now, we have a belief-desire-habit-remembering/forgetting theory of intentional action.

Avoiding Complications

In most of my writings, I leave out habits and remembering/forgetting because, even though they influence intentional action, they do not create reasons for intentional action. Desires are the only mental states that actually give a person a reason to choose one option over another.

In fact, we can categorize a habit as a good habit or a bad habit according to whether it serves the agent's desires. Nothing becomes good or bad in virtue of its ability to serve a habit.

Similarly, a good memory is a memory that places into working memory those beliefs that are useful and keeps out those that are irrelevant. In other words, a good memory, like a good habit, is one that puts relevant beliefs in working memory so that they can guide action to fulfill current desires.

Neither habits nor remembering/forgetting generates end-reasons for intentional action. Since they do not provide end-reasons for an agent to do things, they are not relevant to the question of value. Consequently, I set them aside and use the belief-desire model for the sake of simplicity.

Interim Conclusion

There are likely other complications when it comes to the behavior of intentional agents. For example, we will need to handle the set of observations whereby people make good choices when they consider something in the future (e.g., buying a membership in a gym so that they can exercise) and yet fail to act properly in the short term (e.g., never actually goes to the gym),

In the light of this, it may be interesting to look at the claims made in the podcast "Choosing Wrong".

I will look at the claims made in that podcast in my next post.

Redistributing Wealth Into the Top Quartile

I wrote something - as a Facebook comment - that was wrong.

Worse, I think I wrote it because I wanted to write something that people would like. I wanted a conclusion that people would favor.

However, I was wrong.

I wrote the comment in response to the claim that the poor are getting poorer while the rich are getting richer.

This is not true.

An examination of global income levels in the past twenty-five years shows that the rich have gotten richer.

It also shows that, except for a few hundred million of the very poorest people on Earth, the poor have also gotten richer.

However, incomes for the global "upper middle class" - the people in the 75% to 90% range - have stagnated. They have not gotten any poorer - but they haven't gotten any richer either - over the past 25 years.

This chart from the World Bank shows the income growth from 1988 to 2008.

See: Global Income Distribution from the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession.

I listened to a podcast from the London School of Economics today, Globalisation, Migration and the Future of the Middle Classes where Branko Milanovic, the researcher responsible for the graph above, asserted that new data extends these findings to 2013.

So, after making this correction, I offered the suggestion that it would be fair to tax the top 10% to provide benefits to those in the 75% to 90% range so that everybody can participate in the benefits of globalization.

I felt that readers who are in this 75% to 90% range would likely look favorably upon this argument - because it means giving them more wealth. It means making them better off. It's something that should please them and cause them to like my comment.

On the surface, this has a hint of fairness.

The people in this range of the top 75% to 90% have gotten RELATIVELY poorer. They sit at this income level and they see people below them getting jobs, making money, and getting regular pay raises. They see the people in the top 10% making more and more money - more money than they can even imagine. They are falling further and further behind the people on their right, and the people on their left are catching up to them. Meanwhile, they sit with the same income that they had 25 years ago. They do not like standing still while everybody else gets ahead.

It is easy to imagine the frustration these people must feel. They are like a runner who is in third place in a 20-person race. She sees the people in first and second place pulling ahead. Meanwhile, the pack that is behind her is catching up. There is bound to be a sense of frustration.

However . . .

We are not talking about winning a race. We are talking about income.

On the left side of this graph there are still 750 million people still living off of less than $2.00 per day. These are the people whose children suffer health and developmental disabilities due to malnutrition, whose bellies are bloated by parasites they cannot afford to have removed.

My suggestion in that comment would be to ignore the plight of these people - to turn a blind eye to the reduction in suffering that we could provide to them - and benefit people in the 75% to 90% income range instead.

On any measure of the types of kindness and sympathy that we have reason to promote, the money should be redistributed first to those making less than $2.00 per hour. There is no argument to be made that says that redistribution should benefit first those who are already in the top quartile and, only incidentally or as an afterthought, used to help those who are undergoing the greatest suffering.

I was wrong to suggest that the money be redistributed into the 75% to 90% income range.

Now, what should we do for the people in that range - the people who have not obtained any benefit from globalization.

I must repeat - we are talking about people who are already in the top quartile. Indeed, 99% of of the population of the United States is "above average" in terms of global income - they are at 50% and above. Only a very few Americans are in the bottom 50%. It is odd, at best, to see these people as "suffering" and in need of assistance - particularly at the expense of those who are worse off than they are.

Politically, they may use their power to demand some benefits for themselves - demand some redistribution of wealth into the top 75% to 90% income range. Politically, they may have the power to vote for Brexit or support Donald Trump (or Bernie Sanders - who built his campaign on a campaign promise to redistribute income into this the 75% to 90% range) for President.

However, having the political power to force a program through the political process does not imply a moral right to do so.

I wrote in a facebook post that we should be redistributing income into the top quartile. I was wrong.

Desirism Book: Part I - Table of Contents

Well, here's a lists of posts for the first part of the Desirism Book series.

If you are looking for a place to go (or to send people) to see at least the foundations of desirism, before we start adding flesh to the bones, this would be the place to go.

Part 0001: Introduction. Some words about the methodology and goals for what follows.

Part 0002: One Person, One Desire. We start with one person (Alph) and one desire (a desire to gather stones).

Part 0003: Means, Ends, and Unintended Consequences A look at the the three ways that the consequences of intentional action can be related to desires.

Part 0003.5: Sisyphus and Alph An examination of what these ideas say about the life of Sisyphus - condemned to try to roll a rock uphill only to have it fall back.

Part 0004: Ultimate Ends. A discussion of some different views of what can count as the ultimate ends of intentional action such as happiness.

Part 0005: Intrinsic, Instrumental, and End Values An examination of the relationship between desire and value.

Part 0006: Nozick's Experience Machine An examination of Robert Nozick's though experiment - do people have reason to choose to spend their lives inside an experience machine?

Part 0007: Reasons An examination of the concept of reasons for intentional action with a focus on Bernard Williams' "A has a reason to φ iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his φ-ing."

Part 0008: Desire (Preference) Satisfaction An examination of the similarities and differences between desire fulfillment and preference satisfaction.

Part 0009: Pushpin and Poetry A look at the claims that Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill made regarding the relative worth of pushpin to poetry.

Part 0010: GE Moore's Beautiful World A look at G.E. Moore's claim that it is better that a beautiful world exist even if nobody were around to experience it.

Part 0010.5: Hume's Destruction of the World An examination of David Hume's idea that it need not be irrational to prefer the destruction of the world to a cut on one's finger.

Part 0011: Socrates, the Pig, and the Unbiased Observer It is, as John Stuart Mill claims, better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied?

Part 0012: The Reader's Point of View The ability of a reader's sentiments to obscure the conclusions of these essays.

Part 0013: The Value of Truth True beliefs commonly determine the difference between successfully and unsuccessfully fulfilling a desire.

Part 0014: The Truth about Value The ability for a value claim to be objectively true.

Part 0015: The Location Analogy Using location claims to explain how statements can be objectively true or false without being about intrinsic properties.

Part 0016: Realism about Values The sense in which value claims are claims about real things.

Part 0017: Summary of One Person and One Desire Before bringing a second person into this world, this posting summarizes the important parts of the discussion involving one person with one desire.

Part 0018: Introducing Bett Adding a second person to our world and giving this new person a desire.

Part 0019: Incentives and Deterrence Attempting to mold Bett's behavior by the use of incentives and deterrence.

Part 0020: A Belief in Goodness Rejection of the idea that it is possible to modify behavior by modifying beliefs in goodness alone.

Part 0021: Molding Desires The use of rewards (such as praise) and punishment (such as condemnation) to modify desires themselves.

Part 0022: Proto-Morality A case where everybody has reason to use condemnation to promote a desire among all people in a society.

Desirism Book - Part 0022 - Proto-Morality

With this posting, we will have a foundation on which a moral system can be built. We will have all of the essential elements and all of the necessary tools. The next step, then, will be to actually build a moral system on this foundation.

At this point, our universe contains two people, each with one desire. There is Alph with a desire to gather stones, and Bett with his desire to scatter stones.

I also want to stipulate that both Alph and Bett are so constituted so that praise can create new desires, while condemnation can create new aversions. For example, if Bett condemns Alph for scattering stones, Alph will acquire an aversion to scattering stones. In our hypothetical universe, Bett has no reason to do this (since Alph has no reason to scatter stones to begin with). However, the power exists if a reason to use it should appear.

I also want to add the stipulation that this feature is not very precise. Creating an aversion to scattering stones is easier than creating an aversion to scattering red stones. This, in turn, is easier than creating an aversion to scattering a red stone after one has already scattered a blue stone.

In other words, the propositions that this system will select to be the objects of its new desires and aversions will tend to be simple and general propositions. It would be possible to create an aversion to scattering red stones - it will only require more work as one condemns the scattering of red stones only and praises the scattering of stones that are not red until the brain figures out the rule.

With these stipulations in place, we have a world in which Alph is spending all of his time gathering stones, and Bett is spending all of his time scattering stones. Both are making or keeping true the propositions that are the objects of their desires. It is the best of all possible world.

Now, I am going to give each person a second desire - an aversion to their own pain. This may be described as "a desire that I not be in pain."

At this point, neither participant cares about the pain of the other. Thus, Alph can be fully aware that an act of his will cause Bett pain. However, so long as Bett continues to scatter stones, Alph has no reason to refrain from that action. It is true that Alph has reason to avoid injuring Bett or doing anything that would prevent Bett from scattering stones, but he has no reason to avoid causing Bett pain.

Similarly, Bett has no reason to avoid causing Alph pain.

However, Alph's aversion to pain does give him reason to cause Bett to acquire an aversion to causing pain to others. Alph can create this aversion in Bett by condemning Bett whenever Bett performs an action that causes pain. Once Bett acquires this aversion, then Bett will seek to create states of affairs in which both propositions, "I am scattering stones" and "I am not causing pain to others" are true at the same time.

Everything said here about Alph is also true of Bett. He has a reason to cause Alph to have an aversion to causing pain to others. He can accomplish this by condemning Alph whenever Alph performs an action that causes pain.

The next thing to note is that both Alph and Bett can become aware of these relevant facts. They can both come to realize that they live in a world in which "everybody" (that is, both Alph and Bett) has a reason to promote a universal aversion to causing pain by condemning anybody who causes pain to others.

If we want, we can imagine a world with 100 Alphs and 100 Betts. It will still be true that everybody has reason to promote a universal aversion to causing pain by condemning those who cause pain.

With this, we have all of the makings for a proto-moral system.

I call this a proto-moral system because it is still just a foundation on which a moral system can be built. We still have a lot of building to do. However, all of the basic elements are here.

If we were to come across this community, we would see a group of people who habitually condemned those who caused pain to others. In doing so, they would not ask those who they condemned, "What were you trying to do?" or "Would that have been an effective means to accomplishing your own ends?" These do not matter to the assessment. Seeing their behavior, we would almost certainly translate their linguistic utterances into the English phrase, "It is wrong to cause pain to others," with all of the relevant behavioral characteristics.

We would even discover these people defending themselves from condemnation by claiming, "It wasn't my fault," meaning, "Even with an aversion to causing pain to others, that pain you want to condemn me for could not have been avoided. Condemning people under these circumstances simply does no good - it is not something that people have any reason to do."

In other words, this community would have a fully compatibalist concept of free will and responsibility.

I am going to get into each of these details and more in the posts to come. More specifically, the next step is to discover what can be said about this community of people who each have two desires (a desire to either gather or scatter stones and an aversion to pain) and the capacity to create new desires in others using praise and condemnation.

George Will's Wrong Move - Leaving the Party

George Will has left the Republican Party in protest over Donald Trump.

That's the wrong thing to do.

Really, the only thing George Will has accomplished in leaving the Republican Party is to take the party one step closer to being the Trumpublican Party. And the Trumpublican Party will be the party that is in charge of picking the next round of candidates in the next election. Many of those candidates will be in "safe" Trumpublican districts - guaranteeing that we will find Trumpublicans in the House and Senate.

This is simply not a smart thing to do.

The right thing to do is to stay in the party and to use one's influence as a member to improve the quality of the candidates that the party is putting on the ballot.

One of the principle ways we have gotten ourselves into the mess we are in is that moderate and sensible people - fed up with the stupidity and extremism of the Democratic and Republican parties, have left the parties. The parties themselves are being left more in the hands of arrogant extremists who shun compromise and see themselves as incapable of error.

This system is not working to give us effective government.

Whether we like it or not, the real world in which Americans live is one in which the two major political parties choose the candidates for the general election in almost all cases - one of whom will become President. If you, the reader, happens to live in a region where this is not the case, you may consider yourself lucky. However, what I describe here is the accurate real-world situation for the vast majority of voters.

This means we are turning the process for selecting candidates over to the most extreme, narrow-minded, uncompromising elements in the country.

The government that we see is the government that results from this type of behavior.

What we need to do to reverse this problem is to get into the position to influence who actually gets selected for public offices at the stage where those decisions are actually being made.

One of the things that this means is that, in a district where one of the major parties is dominant, one should join that party and become a part of that party's selection process. If one lives in a region where whoever the Democratic Party selects for an office is the one who will win, one should join the Democratic Party and work for the candidate (with a chance of winning) that most closely represents one's views. Even if one prefers a Republican candidate, if the Republican candidate has no chance of winning, one has a reason to support, instead, the most Republican of the Democratic candidates.

This applies to a Democrat living in an area that the Republican Party (or Trumpublican Party) dominates. One should join the party and at least support the most Democratic candidate among those available. At least in this way one has a voice in who wins the election.

Even as a member of the dominant party - with sympathies to the minor party - once the dominant party has selected the best candidate - one can still vote for the other party's candidate in the general election. However, given the fact that this candidate will almost certainly lose, the winner from the dominant party will not be as bad as he would have been without your input.

Or, we can continue along the same road we are travelling - allowing both major parties to become increasingly extreme and averse to compromise.

Desirism Book - Part 0021 - Molding Desires

We have an imaginary universe in which one occupant (Alph) has only one desire (to gather stones) in a world where the number of stones is limited. Because of this, Alph has to spend half of his time scattering stones so that he can gather stones again.

We have introduced a second person, Bett.

Alph has a reason to cause Bett to scatter stones. By doing so, he can cause Bett to scatter the stones so that he can spend all of his time gathering them.

Three posts back, Alph had a serum that, when injected into Bett, would cause Bett to scatter stones. He also had a reason to give Bett the injection - so that Alph could make and keep true the proposition, "I am gathering stones".

This time, we will give Alph a slightly different means for creating the same effect.

We are going to create Bett in such a way that, when Alph praises him for scattering stones, he will acquire a desire to scatter stones. More specifically, Bett will acquire a desire "that I am scattering stones".

In this universe, we will get Bett started in gathering stones by making Bett so that he also responds to simple instructions while they are being given. As a result, Alph can instruct Bett in the act of scattering stones. It is important in this example that Bett not be understood as performing an intentional action in this case. Bett is acting on no belief or desire of his own. He is an automaton, specifically obeying Alph's instructions.

However, when Bett successfully completes an action, Alph can praise him. As a consequence of this praise, Bett acquires an actual desire to scatter stones just as, three posts back, he did when he was given the proper serum. He acquires a desire "that I am scattering stones".

We must be careful to understand how praise is being used here. Praise is not being used as an incentive. In this universe, Bett has no desire for praise that motivates him to scatter rocks so that he can realize a state in which "I am being praised". Bett has no initial desires at all - thus no reason for action. When Bett begins to scatter stones, it does not even make sense to say that the actions are his - any more than the actions of a toaster are those of the toaster.

The effect that we are looking at in this case is the effect of causing Bett to have a desire to scatter stones for its own sake. Instead of being motivated by a desire for praise (a desire "that I be praised"), the praise causes Bett to acquire a desire to scatter stones (a desire "that I am scattering stones"). This is the proposition that Bett wants to keep true. I this universe, he acquires this desire as a result of Alph's praise. Alph, in turn, has a reason to praise Bett for scattering stones based entirely on Alph's desire to gather stones and the fact that he keeps running out of stones to gather.

In our language, praise tends to use value-laden language. Alph may say that Bett is a good person for scattering stones, and that he is doing a good thing by scattering stones. However, we should not allow these linquistic habits to the conclusion that Alph is trying to convince Bett that scattering stones is good. We should particularly avoid the interpretation that, Alph is trying to motivate Bett to scatter stones by convincing him that scattering stones is good. Even if Bett acquired such a belief, it would not motivate Bett to actually scatter stones unless Bett also had a desire to "do that which is good (in the relevant sense)". Bett has no such desire, and we are leaving the idea that a belief that something is good is inherently motivating on the shelf until we need it. We do not yet need it.

For our purposes, where praise uses value-laden language, Bett will merely understand "good" in this case to mean, "that which Alph has reason to praise." Alph's claim that Bett is a good person, and his claim that scattering stones is a good thing to do, are perfectly true statements. Alph does, in fact, have a reason to praise Bett for scattering stones. However, because Bett has no desire to be a good person or to do good deeds, these beliefs fail to motivate action directly.

I am also not ruling out these desires - any more than a physicist discussing mechanics in a universe with frictionless pulled and massless strings rules out friction and mass. I am excluding them at the moment to simplify the model and focus on the relevant elements.

The relevant elements are that when Alph's praises Bett for scattering stones, this has a material (causal) effect on the structure of Bett's brain such that Bett acquires a desire "that I am scattering stones". Praise, in this case, has the same effect as the serum in an earlier post. It is merely a fact of Bett's biology that this type of interaction with the environment alters his body in this particular way.

Human brains (and animal brains) have a feature something like this - the reward center. It takes rewards and punishments (including praise and condemnation) and uses them to create new desires and to mold existing desires. In the same way that Alph has a reason to use praise to cause Bett to desire to scatter stones, we have reason to use reward and punishment (including praise and condemnation) to cause those around us to have certain desires and aversions.

This is the system that I will build on in the posts ahead, with the expectation that I will arrive at something so similar to what we call the institution of morality that it will be difficult to tell the difference.

However, we are not there yet. Scattering stones is hardly an obligation, particularly in a universe where half the population has no reason to scatter stones and nobody has a reason to get that half of the population to scatter stones. In fact, half the population has reason to cause the other half to gather stones instead.

We must introduce a few more elements into our imaginary world to get a moral system.

Desirism Book - Part 0020 - A Belief in Goodness

Through several postings, we have had a universe with one person (Alph) with one desire (to gather stones). This is a universe with a limited number of stones, so Alph needs to spend half of his time scattering stones so that he can gather them again.

Recently, we introduced a second person (Bett) with no desires.

In our first model, we gave Alph two syringes. One had a red serum that would give Bett a desire to gather stones, and the other had a green serum that would give Bett a desire to scatter stones. I argued that Alph's one desire gave him a reason to give Bett an injection of green serum. This will cause Bett to scatter stones, allowing Alph to spend all of his time gathering stones.

In our second model, Alph tried to use incentives and deterrance to influence Bett's behavior. However, these tools are ineffective on a being with no desires. Bett had first to be given a desire - any desire. Furthermore, Alph needed the power to fulfill or thwart that desire. Then, Alph could agree to fulfill Bett's desire if Bett would scatter stones, or threaten to thwart Bett's desire unless Bett scatters stones. Again, the motivation to scatter stones came from Bett's desire.

In this third model, Alph will try to cause Bett to scatter stones by causing Bett to believe that scattering stones is good.

A belief does not need to be true to motivate action. A person who believes that there is a dragon outside that will eat him if he leaves his house will be motivated to stay inside. Similarly, Alph does not need to worry about whether the proposition “scattering stones is good” is true. As long as Bett believes it, he will scatter stones.

Or will he?

In order for the false belief about the dragon to keep our agent above inside, the agent also needs a reason not to be eaten. The belief that there is a dragon outside - by itself - motivates noting.

Similarly, for Bett to actually be motivated to scatter stones, he not only needs to believe that scattering stones is good, he must have a desire to do that which is good. Without that desire, the proposition “scattering stones is good” is just data - like the proposition that there is a dragon outside. It sits in the databank and does nothing – until it becomes useful for some end, to realize some desire.

There are those who claim that merely giving Bett the belief that something is good would be enough to motivate Bett. However, this view is filled with such metaphysical and ontological mystery that we should set it aside unless something compels us to pick it up. We can bring these metaphysical and ontological mysteries to the fore by asking, “What does it mean to say that ‘scattering stones is good’ is true, such that it can motivate an agent into acting just by believing it?”

Once we set this idea aside, we will discover that we never have a reason to pick it up again. We can simply let those metaphysical and ontological mysteries sit on the shelf. We can understand everything we are trying to understand using desires that determine the ends or goals of intentional action, and beliefs that select the means for those actions.

There is still a question of what it takes for the proposition “X is good” to be true.

In this set of postings, I am going to try to avoid talk of something being “good” or “bad” for a while – simply because it brings a lot of confusion into the story that we do not need just yet. I will be talking about it being the case that certain states of affairs fulfill desires. It will talk about facts where an agent has a desire that P and there is some state of affairs S where P is true in S. In this case, the agent has a motivating reason to realize S. In other words, S has value to the agent, grounded on the fact that the agent has a desire that P and P is true in S. I will also be speaking of this type of situation by saying things like S has value to the agent.

However, I will come to a point where I will be using the term “good” to refer to some of these relationships. But today is not that day.

For today, I will simply assert that we are sticking with the idea that desires provide the motivational force. Beliefs simply guide that force. Desires select the destination for intentional action, and beliefs choose the route. For Alph, merely causing Bett to believe that scattering rocks is good will not have any effect.

Brexit

I am not a citizen of Great Britain, but I do have an opinion regarding Brexit - Britain's referendum on whether to remain in or leave the European Union.

First, I want to object to the idea that, "Simply because you are not a citizen, you are not entitled to an opinion on such a matter."

The fact is, I am entitled to an opinion on the moral concerns that are relevant in this decision. This is true in the same way that I have a reason to be concerned about a country that is rounding up and killing all of the Jews, or refusing to give voting rights to its black citizens, or practicing slavery, or systematically discriminating against its women. Moral concerns - insofar as they are moral concerns - do not end at national borders.

Furthermore, people are entitled to an opinion on matters that effect them. There is reason to believe that Brexit will have an effect far outside of England. It will certainly effect the European Union. In particular, it also has a lot to say about how nations are going to interact with each other. This, in turn, will have implications for international relationships elsewhere in the world. This, in turn, will have implications for human interaction and cooperation on a global scale - a scale at which important decisions have to be made.

On the moral side of the equation, one of the primary reasons being given for Brexit is, in effect, an appeal to tribal psychology. This is the psychological comfort that people find in dividing the world into "us" versus "them" and attributing to one's own group all of the good qualities, while seeing "them" as the victimizing and dangerous "other".

It is a part of human psychology, but it is not one of the good parts. It is the seat of a great deal of injustice, hatred, fear, and violence. It is something that each of us needs to fight against at all times if we are to create a peaceful and just society.

Brexit is both built on and feeds tribal bigotry. It grows from this disposition to hate "the other" and then feeds back on itself to further promote and nourish a fear and hatred of "the other". It is not a legitimate reason for England to leave the European Union. Instead, it is a reason for England to put some effort into tamping down these tribal sentiments and the ill effects that come from them.

Many of the other reasons for Brexit are, in effect, rationalizations by people who, being human, have bigoted sentiments that they do not want to admit to in public, and may even want to hide from themselves.

Much of the money Britain pays as dues for membership in the European Union is returned to England directly, and others come back to England in terms of economic and political benefits.

The European Union regulations that people in Britain complain about will still be in effect once Britain leaves the EU, and will still apply to British exports to the EU. British manufactures will still have to meet European Union standards for the same reason that car manufacturers who ship cars to the United States must meet American standards regarding safety, gas mileage, and pollution.

The weakness of these arguments suggest that there is some other motivation that is driving people into seeing them as having merit. It is not unreasonable to hold, at least in many cases, people are motivated to seeing these as strong arguments because they provide a useful cover to emotions and reasons they do not wish to admit they have.

On the side of international relations, it is no longer the case that we can pretend that we are a planet of isolated and independent tribes. From greenhouse gas emissions and the emissions that damage the ozone layer, to deforestation, to pollution that crosses national borders and enters the sea and air, to joint and universal responses to global economic problems, to preventing international corporations from playing one country off against another by forming a joint bargaining position against them, there are reasons for nations to work together.

The isolationist, "build a wall and pretend that we are somehow not connected to the rest of the earth" attitude is irrational - and dangerous.

Of course, every country that enters into an international organization is going to want to be the one and only dominant member that gets to dictate policy to all the others. This is true in the same way that anybody who enters into a civil society with others is going to want to be the dictator of that society. They will likely see themselves as a good dictator - unable to understand why others question their perfect wisdom and generosity. Yet, they will be disposed not to trust others to govern them.

This, too, is a part of human nature.

These psychological facts, like the bigoted tribalism discussed above - is another part of our psychology that works against our interests. We need to replace these attitudes with attitudes of cooperation and consideration, and with institutions built on negotiations that "will not always go our way". We need to recognize that it is, at best, immature to pick up one's ball and go home just because one did not get their way in their dealings with others. The mature country, like the mature individual, stays and tries to work things out.

Our global interdependence is growing. The number and size of issues that will require an international response will grow with it. We need to admit to this future and start to plan for it - not run from it and pretend it does not exist.

Desirism Book - Part 0019 - Incentives and Deterrence

In my last post, I introduced Bett - a person with no desires - into a world that originally contained Alph with his one desire to gather stones. I also gave Alph the ability to give Bett a desire - either a desire to gather stones or a desire to scatter stones.

I then claimed that Alph's one desire to gather stones in a world with a limited number of stones to gather gave him a reason to cause Bett to scatter stones. Bett's stone scattering gives Alph the opportunity to spend all of his time keeping true the proposition, "I am gathering stones."

In this post, I wish to give Alph a new set of ways to influence Bett's behavior - incentives and deterrence.

In order to have the option to use incentives and deterrence, Bett first has to have some desires of his own.

Alph would be providing Bett with an incentive by offering to fulfill one of Bett's desires if Bett would, in return, perform some action that fulfills one of Alph's desires.

So, for example, let us give Bett a desire to eat chocolate and give Alph control over a supply of chocolate. Alph can then say to Bett, "If you scatter some stones, I will give you some chocolate." Bett's motivating reason to make the proposition, "I am eating chocolate" true becomes a motivating reason to scatter stones.

Similarly, Alph would be providing Bett with a deterrence by threatening to thwart one of Bett's desires unless Bett performs some action that fulfills one of Alph's desires.

In this case, let's give Bett an aversion to pain or, in other words, a "desire that I not be in pain." Alph threatens to make true the proposition, "Bett is in pain" unless Bett scatters stones. Bett's reason to avoid a state in which he is in pain becomes a reason to scatter stones.

These exchanges work the other way as well. Bett can refuse to scatter stones unless Alph gives him some chocolate, or unless Alph refrains from any action that causes Bett to experience pain.

Even if it is the case that the only desire Bett has is a desire to scatter stones, this can be used to create incentives or deterrence if Alph ever comes up with a reason to do so. Assuming that Alph controls the pile of stones that has been gathered, he can tell Bett, "I will give you access to these stones to gather if you will do something for me." Similarly, assuming Bett already has access to the stones, Alph can threaten to take away Bett's access unless Bett performs some action that will fulfill one of Alph's desires.

There is no morality in this system. These tools of incentives and deterrence belong to the realms of law and economics, not morality. They are the instruments of coercion or of trade. However, without morality it is not even possible to determine which is which.

We must also take care at this point not to sneak any morality into our understanding of this relationship. Alph's control of the pile of stones he gathered does not depend on any type of natural right which Bett feels a reason to respect. It can only mean a physical ability to keep Bett away from the gathered stones. Similarly, Bett's desire to scatter stones would give him a reason to kill Alph if he could, and by doing so he can get to the gathered stones that Alph is protecting.

Still, in the case where Alph has a desire to gather stones and Bett has a desire to scatter stones, they have no reason to engage in these types of exercises. It is enough for each to leave the other alone, leaving Alph to gather the stones that Bett will scatter, and leaving Bett to scatter the stones that Alph will gather.

Desirism Book - Part 0018 - Introducing Bett

We have a universe with one person (Alph) and one desire (to gather stones).

Recall that his desire to gather stones is a motivating reason for him to make or keep true the proposition "I am gathering stones."

Let us assume that there is a limited number of stones such that Alph has to spend half of his time scattering stones so that he can gather stones again (return to making true the proposition "I am gathering stones").

Now, I am going to plop a second person down on this world - Bett.

Bett has no desires.

However, we are going to give Alph two syringes; a syringe of red serum, and a syringe of blue serum. The red serum will cause Bett to have a desire to gather stones – making Bett like Alph. The blue serum will cause Bett to have a desire to scatter stones.

I would like to repeat that Alph has only one desire – a desire to gather stones. Furthermore, we are using Williams’ concept of reasons:

There is a reason for A to φ iff there is some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his φ-ing.

This means that Alph has a reason to give Bett the red serum if and only if this will serve his desire to gather stones. The same is true of injecting Bett with the blue serum.

Alph’s desire to gather stones provides him with no reason to inject Alph with the red serum. The red serum will actually put Bett in competition with Alph for gathering stones – effectively leaving Alph with half as many stones to gather. When it comes to scattering stones, both Alph and Bett will have a reason to wait for the other person to scatter stones and then gather the stones the other scattered.

On the other hand, Alph’s desire to gather stones does provide him with a reason to give Bett the blue serum, giving Bett a desire to scatter stones. Under this arrangement, assuming that both work at the same speed, Alph will no longer have to spend time scattering stones in order to gather stones again. Bett will be scattering stones for him, allowing Alph to spend all of his time gathering stones. In other words, Alph will be able to do a better job of keeping the proposition “I am gathering stones” true if he gives Bett the red serum.

There is an important fact here that I want to shine a light on.

Alph has no sense of altruism or fellow feeling. Alph has no interest in Bett's welfare or the quality of Bett's life. Nor does Alph has any interest in cooperation for its own sake, no love of fairness, and no sense of duty or obligation. Alph's interest in Bett is limited to Bett's usefulness - his ability to scatter stones so that Alph can gather them.

Nor is it the case in this example that Alph is giving Bett any sense of empathy or sympathy, no interest in Alph's welfare, nor any sense of duty or obligation.

Yet, Alph's desire alone is enough to give him a reason to establish a cooperative system with Bett whereby Alph gathers the stones, and Bett scatters them.

It will turn out that empathy, sympathy, communal interests, and altruism, and distinctly moral sentiments are all unnecessary when it comes to establishing a system of morality. They may be put to good use where they are present. However, morality can exist even where they are absent.

Those who equate the discovery of altruism or empathy or a sense of fairness or justice in humans with the discovery of the foundation of human morality are mistaken.

I am going to continue to leave these types of sentiments out of this equation for a while, just to show what we can accomplish without them. I will eventually come to argue that the only things necessary for morality are (1) intentional agents with (2) some malleable desires where (3) those desires can be molded through rewards and punishments.

I also want to note that, while Alph is, in a sense, treating Bett as a means only (which is all he can do), he is not forcing Bett to do anything that Bett does not want to do. That is to say, he is not sacrificing Bett's interests for his own ends. He is, instead, giving Bett ends that compliment his own ends.

We do not have a moral system yet. At this point, Alph’s action of giving Bett an injection of blue serum more comfortably fits under the institution of medicine. No praise or blame, no rewards or punishments, are due to Bett in virtue of his lack of interest in either gathering or scattering stones. Instead, Alph merely has a reason to give Bett an injection.

Even here, one may argue that we do not even have a reason to claim that Bett has any type of illness, for which the injection of red serum may be thought of as a “cure”. However, we will discover that in our own larger and more complex society we will tend to talk about situations much like this in medical terms.

However, my interest is in morality. In the next post on this subject, I will take another step in that direction.

Desirism Book - Part 0017 - Summary of One Person with One Desire

I am about to add a second person to this imaginary universe. Before I do, I would like to review what we have.

We have a universe with one person (Alph) who has one desire (to gather stones).

Desires are propositional attitudes. That is to say, they take as their object a proposition - a sentence capable of being true or false.

A desire is a motivational force directing the agent to make of keep true the proposition that is the object of the desire. So, for example, Alph's desire to gather stones motivates him to act so as to make or keep true the proposition, "I am gathering stones."

Note that this is different from a desire that the stones be gathered. With respect to Alph's actual desire, having a large pile of stones is merely an unintended consequence of the desire to gather stones. It bears the same relationship to the desire to gather stones as getting or causing pregnancy has to having sex. It may be a cause of the action, but it is not the reason for the action.

I am using Bernard Williams' account of what it means to have a reason.

A has reason to φ if and only if A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his φ

On this account, Alph has a reason to gather stones. He has a desire to gather stones that would be served by gathering stones. If he runs out of stones to gather, then he has a reason to scatter stones, since that is the only way he can make true again the proposition, "I am gathering stones." Alph also has a reason to avoid a crippling injury or death where these would prevent him from making or keeping true the proposition, "I am gathering stones."

These other goods - scattering stones if the supply of stones to gather runs out, avoiding crippling injury or death - are instrumental goods. They provide or preserve the means necessary to make or keep true the proposition, "I am gathering stones." They are not valued for their own sake, but for their usefulness.

There is no intrinsic value. A state in which, "I am gathering stones" has value for Alph in virtue of his desire to gather stones. However, nothing in this state generates a reason for anybody else (if they should exist) to realize or preserve such a state. A reason to realize a state in which a desire is being fulfilled requires a desire that desires be fulfilled, or some other desire made true in a state where a desire is being fulfilled.

Note that not even Alph is motivated by desire fulfillment. Alph is motivated by a desire to gather stones to realize a state in which, "I am gathering stones" is true. It is, "I am gathering stones" that has value for Alph, not "My desire that I am gathering stones is fulfilled."

We should also note that Alph, in this case, has no reason to enter a Nozickian experience machine that will stimulate his brain and feed him the illusion of gathering stones. Such a machine cannot make or keep true the proposition, "I am gathering stones." Similarly, a parent who cares that his children are safe and happy cannot settle for an experience machine feeding him the illusion that his children are safe and happy. His desire motivates him to seek the actual safety and happiness of his children.

If the reader thinks that Alph is wasting his life pursuing a meaningless end, then this would be because the reader is appealing to her own desires. The reader is saying, "I would not want to life that life." This is true, but it is a separate issue. The fact that Alph is content gathering stones does not imply that the reader - with the reader's own set of desires - would be or should be content with a life of gathering stones.

Nor does the reader's discontentment imply that Alph has a reason to shun a life of gathering stones. Such inferences are mistaken.

There is no morality in this world. There is one end - Alph's end of gathering stones, a number of means, and some unintended consequences.

I am about to drop a second person into this world. When I do, we will look at what is required for a rudimentary morality - though not right away.

Desirism Book - Part 0010.5 - Hume's Destruction of the World

[Author;s Note: This is intended to be inserted between posts 0010 and 0011.

It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. It is not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Section III)

The nature of beliefs and desires that I am using in these postings owe a great deal to David Hume.

Given what we have already discussed, we can make sense of Hume's claim noted above.

We have been postulating a universe with only one being (Alph) having only one desire (to gather stones). To understand Hume's quote, let us change this one desire to an aversion to being in pain. This is all the agent cares about.

In this, I have already provided an example very much like that of the second claim that Hume made above. I have discussed a case in which Alph has only one desire - a desire that the planet Pandora B (a planet that will contain only plant life; no animals) come into existence.

In a situation where Alph could bring this planet into existence by pushing a button that would destroy himself, he has a reason to push the button and no reason not to. In this case, Alph is choosing his own destruction to realize a state of affairs in which the planet Pandora B exists.

To explain the first claim that Hume made, let's put Alph in a situation where he has two options. He knows that he is about to get a scratch on his finger. However, he can avoid this scratch by an action that will bring about the destruction of the world.

We will need to stipulate that the destruction of the world will cause Alph no pain - and Alph knows this. If it did, then Alph's aversion to pain would give him a reason to avoid the destruction of the whole world.

It is also important to add that Alph, in this case, has no desire that can only be fulfilled if the world continues to exist. If he had such a concern, then that would give him reason to avoid the destruction of the world.

We must even take from Alph the desire to gather stones since, if the world was destroyed, Alph would no longer be able to keep or make true the proposition, "I am gathering stones." Thus, having such a desire gives him a reason to avoid bringing about the destruction of the world.

All we have is Alph with an aversion to pain, and pain that can be avoided by (painlessly) destroying the world.

In such a situation, Alph has no reason to prevent the destruction of the world in order to prevent even a mild pain that would result from a scratch on his finger.

There are, according to Hume, only two roles for reason in directing action.

First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.

Let me put this quote into the language I am using for these posts.

First, reason can tell an agent with a desire that P whether P is true in any state of affairs S. If it is, then reason informs the agent that she has motivation to bring about S.

For example, let us assume that the destruction of the world would, in fact, cause Alph to experience pain, at least for a short while. When reason informs Alph of this fact, Alph would come to be averse to destroying the world - but only because Alph has an aversion to the pain that he would experience as a part of that destruction.

Second, reason can tell an agent with a desire that P that an act Q will realize S, where P is true in S. When this happens, then reason informs the agent that she has motivation to realize Q.

In other words, reason can inform Alph that the pain that would come from a scratch on his finger can be avoided if he performs an action that will (painlessly, in this case) destroy the world. If this is the case, the agent will wish to perform that action. Yet, here, too, it is the agent's aversion to pain that provides the motivation.

I will argue later that, contrary to Hume, there is a third sense in which a passion can be judged unreasonable. However, this will only happen when passions come into conflict, and agents have the capacity to choose whether or not to have (or to create in others) various passions. Consequently, it is not a fitting discussion for our current situation where we have an agent with only one desire. We will return to this possibility after we have introduced more desires, more agents, and the possibility of choosing desires.

Philippa Foot's Morality as Hypothetical Imperatives - Part 3 - What Ought We to Desire

In "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" (The Philosophical Review Vol. 81, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), pp. 305-316), Philippa Foot identified three relationships between doing the right thing and the motives of the agent.

Two of these relate to the traditional distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The former involved performing the right act because it gained the agent some benefit or advantage - because it was, in a sense, "profitable" for the agent to do so. The latter involved performing the right act because it was the right act - because it was the right thing to do.

The third option that Foot introduced to this discussion was performing the right act for its own sake. It involved performing an act of charity because one actually cared about the person who would benefit and telling the truth because one simply wanted to deal honestly with others. These count as hypothetical imperatives because it is the concern for others or the desire to deal honestly with others that provide the motivation for the action. However, in some cases, we judge such a person as being more moral than the person who acts on duty.

However, there is a question still left unanswered. What OUGHT we to desire?

In spite of all that has been urged in favor of the hypothetical imperative in ethics, I am sure that many people will be unconvinced and will argue that one element essential to moral virtue is still missing. This missing feature is the recognition of a duty to adopt those ends which we have attributed to the moral man. We have said that he does care about others, and about causes such as liberty and justice; that it is on this account that he will accept a system of morality. But what if he never cared about such things, or what if he ceased to care ? Is it not the case that he ought to care?

We should not that it is clearly the case that not everything an agent DOES desire is something the agent SHOULD desire - something that gives the agent moral credit. An agent may desire to play computer games, or even value belittling and bullying others. That he values these things does not make them moral. There are only certain types of desires - concern for others, aversion to deceit, aversion to taking the property of others without their consent - that gives a person moral credit.

What distinguishes the desires an agent does have from those that provide moral credit?

After asking the question, Foot does not provide an answer. It is sufficient for her purposes to note that a person does not have these desires "because they ought to". A parent who cares for a child does not care "because he ought to" - he simply cares about the child. A person who values honest dealings with others does not value honest dealings with others because he ought. It is one thing to say that an agent ought to engage in honest dealings with others because he ought - quite another to say that he ought to engage in honest dealings with others because he values it for its own sake, which is because he ought.

This blog goes a bit further than Foot did in this article by providing an answer to the question, "What ought a person to desire?"

On the account defended in this blog, there are certain desires that people generally have reasons to promote. These are desires that tend to fulfill other desires. They promote these desires through a system of rewards and punishments, where praise works as a type of reward and condemnation as a type of punishment.

To the degree that agents act so as to obtain the reward or avoid the punishment, this is outside the realm of morality. This fits more in with law and economics. Morality enters into the picture when this system of rewards and punishments causes people to value things for their own sake. Culture - in praising some and condemning others - promotes in people an interest in the well-being of others for its own sake - as one of the agent's ends. The aversion to deceit or to taking the property of others without consent becomes internalized so that the aversion overrides any reasons that may emerge to engage in deceit or to take the property of others without consent.

Morality is, then, a system of hypothetical imperatives. It is that system of hypothetical imperatives (desires and aversions) that people generally have reason to promote using rewards such as praise and punishments such as condemnation.

The Case for Super-Delegates

In his address to supporters, Bernie Sanders listed some objectives for his followers to work on in the years ahead. Many have merit, but a few deserve some second thought.

One of these is to abolish the system of super-delegates.

In the Democratic Party, about 85% of the delegates assigned the task of selecting the Party's next Presidential candidate are elected by people in primaries or caucuses. The remaining 15% are super-delegates - people who have been given a vote based on the fact that they have won an important public office (House of Representative, Senate, President, Governor), or a high-ranking position within the Party.

The primary argument against super-delegates is that they are undemocratic. They have the power to override the will of the majority as they have expressed it in their vote.

Yet, right next door, in the Republican Party, we have a living example of the merits of super-delegates. They provide a check against a wholly unqualified candidate getting the nomination - one with a potential to not only inflict significant damage to the Party, but who might get elected and inflict significant harm to the nation and the world.

Because the Republicans did not have a system of super-delegates, the nation itself is in peril - as is the global economy and world peace - with the potential election of Donald Trump.

We should note at the beginning that, in a vast majority of the cases, the super-delegate system will be a system not worth worrying about. If the super-delegates were ever going to decide an election against the will of the voters, it would have done so in 2008. There, the establishment candidate could have made the argument that she was the best, most qualified candidate, and she arguably even had a majority share of the popular vote. Yet, the super-delegates went with the popular choice.

In that case, the popular choice was a good choice.

What matters would be a case in which the popular choice is a Trump-like candidate; an entertainment figure adept at public manipulation but unfit to be President.

The idea that the popular vote should always prevail has long been known to have a significant problem - a tyranny of the majority. The majority is not always right. Sometimes, if is important to set up some sort of system to review the majority's decisions and judge if they actually make sense.

A principle that has been put into place in American politics is a system of checks and balances. No "branch" is given unbounded control over everything. Instead, each branch has an ability to nullify the work of a different branch. For example, the Supreme Court is an unelected, undemocratic check on the tyranny of the legislative and executive branches.

Super-delegates are not all-powerful. They have the ability to overturn a popular vote only if the popular vote is close. If the popular vote shows sufficient strength, then the super-delegates may not be able to override the will of the majority. They are useful only in a case of a relatively close election, and only to the degree that the super-delegates themselves are united.

Furthermore, the people have the power to influence and even select the super-delegates. As I have already mentioned, these are the people who have their status in virtue of having won a popular election or have been elected into a position of responsibility in the party. If the people wish to replace them, the people have the power to do so.

This has all of the earmarks of a system of checks and balances. Neither of the two groups - popularly elected delegates or super-delegates - has absolute power. Either can be checked and balanced by the other, under the appropriate circumstances.

This does not imply that the super-delegate system as it exists is perfect. We still have reason to ask some questions.

For example:

Is 15 percent the right size? Is it too big or too small? Remember, the 15 percent will often be divided - it does not vote as a solid block. If the popular elected candidates are supporting a Trump-like candidate, it would take substantial agreement among the super delegates to put a quality candidate in his place.

Is the selection criteria for picking super-delegates the best available? Perhaps, rather than draw super-delegates from the pool of successfully elected Democrats and office holders, a pool of super-delegates should be drawn instead from typically marginalized groups as a tool for protecting minority rights. It is, after all, one of the purposes of a system of checks and balances to protect from a tyranny of the majority.

Well, these are some thoughts. In short, I do not hold that Sanders and his supporters will be making any significant progress by ridding the Democratic party of super-delegates. Furthermore, if it does wish to rid the party of undemocratic institutions that not only have the potential but have the proven capacity to distort the will of the voters, it would focus on caucuses instead. Evidence abounds that this is the area where the will of the majority of the voters is most likely to be overridden by rules that keep a substantial number of potential voters from participating.

Philippa Foot's Morality as Hypothetical Imperatives - Part 2 - Reasons to Act Morally

Typically, in discussions regarding the relationship between right action and motives, we encounter a contrast between two types of reasons.

There are those who do the right thing because they find it useful, like the person who makes a charitable contribution because others will praise him and speak well of him.

And there are those who do the right thing because it is the right thing to do - the person who makes a charitable contribution because he ought to make a charitable contribution.

Philippa Foot, in "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" (The Philosophical Review Vol. 81, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), pp. 305-316), adds a third type to this list.

Foot is responding to Kant's claim that morality is a system of categorical imperatives. Kant's distinction between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives matches the first two of these three types of reasons. Hypothetical imperatives depend on having a desire for something - doing something because it is pleasurable (and having no reason to do it if it is not pleasurable). Categorical imperatives are to be done regardless of what the individual desires. They are to be done because they are right, not because they bring the agent pleasure.

Foot's third type of relationship is one in which an agent tells the truth, for example, not because it is useful, and not because it is the right thing to do, but because the agent wants to tell the truth. The agent values honesty for its own sake, or has an aversion to dealing with others dishonestly.

In my own writings, I rely heavily on this third type of reason - arguing that morality is primarily concerned with using rewards (such as praise) and punishments (such as condemnation) to promote such things as a desire to interact honestly with others and an aversion to deceiving others.

If we bring in the fact that desires are propositional attitudes, we can distinguish these three types of reasons by the propositions that are the object of each desire.

First, there are selfish desires - a decision to make a charitable contribution as a way of obtaining the praise of others, or a decision to turn in a wanted criminal merely to collect a reward or bounty. Such a person is acting on a desire like a desire, "that I acquire wealth" or "that others speak well of me." This type of agent loses the reason to do the right thing when it does not bring him wealth or improve his reputation.

Second, an agent may do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. This agent has a desire "that I do the right thing" and a belief that charitable acts and honest dealings with others are among the right things to do. These types of actions make the proposition, "I am doing the right thing" true.

What Foot introduces is a third option whereby an agent makes a charitable contribution, for example, because he wants to help others.

But what reason could there be for refusing to call a man a just man if he acted justly because he loved truth and liberty, and wanted every man to be treated with a certain minimum respect? And why should the truly honest man not follow honesty for the sake of the good that honest dealing brings to men? Of course, the usual difficulties can be raised about the rare case in which no good is foreseen from an individual act of honesty. But it is not evident that a man's desires could not give him reason to act honestly even here. He wants to live openly and in good faith with his neighbors; it is not all the same to him to lie and conceal.

This third type of person is acting on a desire "that others not suffer," and performs the charitable act because it will make the statement that another is suffering false. Similarly, a person can tell the truth because he wants to be honest with his dealings with others and has an aversion to deceiving others. This requires no belief that telling the truth is the right thing to do or that lying is something one ought not to do - any more than choosing butterscotch ice cream over chocolate requires a belief that eating butterscotch is the right thing to do and eating chocolate is wrong. Charitable actions, honest dealings with others, and eating butterscotch ice cream are simply among the things the agent likes.

We are disposed to say that the person who performs an action for selfish reasons is not a good person. On the other hand, a person who performs an action because it is the right thing to do is a good person. What about the person who is charitable because he is adverse to the suffering of others or honest because he values honesty?

In some cases, we are disposed to think that this type of person is more moral than the person acting "because it is the right thing to do."

Assume that you are in the hospital. Somebody you judge to be a friend comes to see you. You ask him why he came. Now, compare these three answers.

(1) "Because people will think more highly of me when they know that I have come to visit you. They will speak well of me and they will smile and treat me well as a result."

(2) "Because it is the right thing to do. People have a duty to visit their friends in these types of situations, so, I came here because it is my duty to do so."

(3) "Because I care about you. I was worried. Besides, I thought of you laying here with nothing to do so I thought I would stop by and maybe we can play some chess or something. It's a lot better than laying in bed watching soap operas."

I think a lot of us would think more highly of the person who visits because he wants to over one who visits for selfish reasons or out of a sense of duty. In fact, if our visitor gave either of the first two answers, we may just tell them to go away and not bother visiting in the future.

However, this third type of reason is a hypothetical imperative. One tells the truth because one wants to tell the truth. One deals honestly with others because one wants to deal honestly with others. It is the desire that provides the reason to act.

Yet, there is still a distinction to be addressed between what we want to do and what we ought to want. We do not say that a person may lie if he has no desire to tell the truth, and may deal honestly with others if he is inclined to do so.

I will address that third question in Part 3.

Islam vs The West: Trump vs. Obama

In this post I want to present my understanding of the position that the Obama administration takes on the use of rhetoric regarding the conflict against ISIL and al-Quida.

First, Obama asserts that ISIL and al-Quida wish to frame the conflict as a battle between Islam and The West.

To the degree that they are able to accomplish this, to that degree they can an increasing portion of 1.6 billion Muslims to participate in the conflict on their side. They will obtain access not only to potential volunteer soldiers, but to the money and the resources that its portion of these 1.6 billion people have access to.

If ISIL is completely successful, they would control a force capable of fighting a world war on multiple fronts.

Furthermore, many of these potential soldiers are living among us - those that ISIL says is the enemy. These people could inflict significant harm if they could be recruited.

Second, anything said on our side that suggests that our enemy is Islam and that targets all Muslims supports the enemy claim that this is a battle between America and The West on one side and Islam on the other. The winner will continue to exist, and the loser will be eliminated; in other words, either America or Islam must perish.

Consequently, such statements aid ISIL in its goal to unite Muslims in a war to defend their religion.

To block ISIL in this attempt, Obama argues that we must make it clear that America and Islam can co-exist - that this is not a battle for the survival of Islam. It is only a battle against a faction within Islam that refuses to live in peace with others.

That, then, are the two main points of Obama's argument. ISIL wishes to frame the conflict as one in which either Islam or America must perish, and Obama wishes to frame the conflict as one in which America and Islam can co-exist peacefully, though we must work together to eliminate those who cannot accept peaceful co-existence.

That is Obama's argument, as I understand it. As a moral philosopher, I would like to add a bit more.

The moral principle at play here says that those who do nothing wrong shall not be subject to any burdens not imposed equally on all other free and morally responsible individuals. Only those with murderous intent (in this case) or who provide direct aid to those with murderous intent will be dealt with as enemies.

In contrast, Donald Trump's moral message is, "I care nothing about your actions or attitudes as individuals. I will treat you as guilty merely because I know you are Muslim."

Obama warns of the consequences of inflicting harms on all Muslims around the world, even those in the United States, regardless of who they are as individuals. Here, we must imagine creating or encouraging pockets of anti-American Muslims anywhere that there are Muslims - from Morocco to the Philippines and from California to Florida. The whole Muslim world will have stories to tell about people suffering harms merely because they are known to be Muslim - stories of innocent people being treated unjustly - if Trump's policies are adopted. Those stories will provide reason for anger, and specifically anger directed at America because of its injustices.

On the subject of morality, "injustice" is an appropriate term here. To prejudge a person as guilty and treat that person as guilty without evidence against them is unjust. If America were to adopt policies that harm innocent Muslims as if they are guilty, regardless of whether they are guilty, then it would be perpetrating injustices. Regardless of whether these injustices result in the types of anger that Obama warns about, it is still accurate to call them unjust.

Insofar as America and Americans value justice - in order for America to be deserving of the support of those who value justice - we would condemn harming the innocent or prejudging individuals as guilty. Insofar as we wish to be treated justly by others - and not to be prejudged ourselves - it seems practical to cultivate the aid and cooperation of those who love justice and who have formed an aversion to injustice. Yet, this is only possible - among those who love justice - to the degree that America is a just nation with just policies.

In addition to earning the anger of otherwise potentially friendly Muslims for our unjust actions, and weakening the support of those who value justice and are averse to injustice, there is a third cost associated with this policy.

To the degree that America promotes injustice and condemns and, in a sense, spits upon justice and those who defend it, to that degree America will be teaching the rest of the world a moral lesson. We cannot perform injustice without asserting to the world that it is good and that it is something that they may - perhaps should - do themselves. We cannot spit upon justice without sending a message to the world that everybody should spit upon justice and hold the defenders of justice in contempt.

This is the nature of morality. We - all of us - teach by our example. That which we do, we teach others that they may do. That which we condemn, we teach others to condemn. With Trump, what commit acts of injustice - and teach the world to be unjust. We condemn and belittle those who defend justice, and teach a contempt for justice to the rest of the world as well.

That is the situation as I understand it.

Putting Good Before God

There are people who tell me that I need to "find God" or seek religion if I am going to understand morality.

However, I do not see how that is going to work.

For this discussion, let us assume that there is a god and that the God wants us to do what is right.

Question: What does god want us to do?

Where does one even start to answer this question?

Some may suggest that I find the answer in scripture.

Which scripture?

And even if I had a scripture to choose, how do I discover what it actually tells me to do?

This option presupposes that one can trust scripture. However, there is nothing in "God exists" and "God wants us to do good," that implies "Trust scripture." You need to add more premises to this to get to that conclusion.

One could assert that, if there is a god, and that God also wants us to do good, then that God would give us a clear set of instructions, and that is what we will find in scripture.

However, that clearly did not happen. We see before us a huge array of opinions regarding what god wants us to do, with no clear way to choose among them.

At best, it seems, one can take a random guess - like drawing a card out of a massively large deck and hoping that one happens to draw the one and correct card.

Actually, there is an option. If there is a God and this God wants us to do good, then there exists a way to choose which scripture - and which interpretation of that scripture, is correct. One determines what is good or evil, then one looks at scripture, and determine whether it is commanding one to do good or evil. If it commands what is evil or prohibits what is good, then it can be tossed aside as a poor account of what God wants us to do.

Let us use slavery as an example.

Slavery is wrong. Consequently, a good God would not want us to practice slavery. With this in mind, one can turn to the various religions and ask, "Does it command us not to practice slavery?" If it does not prohibit us from owning slaves, then we may conclude that it does not provide us with an accurate account of what God wants us to do. This means that we have reason to look elsewhere - for something that tells us that God wants us to prohibit slavery.

Or, let us consider the act of killing homosexuals. Again, this is obviously wrong. Consequently, we can use this to help determine whether any religious text or tradition is actually and accurately telling us what God wants us to do. If it commands killing homosexuals, then it is obviously a poor guide as to what God wants, and one needs to search elsewhere.

Does scripture say that the victims of rape are morally obligated to marry their rapists? Well, that's obviously not telling us what a good God would want us to do. A morality that makes this claim is clearly the one that comes from a morally imperfect being - a human mind - that has somehow convinced people to accept his beliefs as those of a God.

To some, this might suggest the question, "How we are to know what is right or wrong if God does not tell us?"

However, that represents a poor understanding of the problem. the wrong question. This question forgets the initial observation that God has not provided us with a clear set of instructions.

The real question is, "How are we going to determine what is right or wrong?" Then, to anybody who tries to tell us to find it in scripture, we can raise all of the problems identified above - problems that tell us that we do not even know which scripture to get the answer from without prior knowledge of what is right and wrong.

Do you want to try faith? All one needs is a casual glance at history - and current events - to see how often those who rely on faith get the wrong answer. If, as a morally responsible person, you are looking for a reliable method, faith obviously doesn't work.

Finally, while you are looking for a reliable way to determine what God actually wants you to do, I would like you to keep another question in mind. "Is it not possible for somebody who does not believe in God to use the same method and get the same answers?"

This is the situation that I find myself in. As somebody who genuinely wants to know what is right and wrong - good and evil - I do not see how "finding god" or religion is any help at all. I would not even have a hint as to which god to believe in or which religion to adopt unless I already knew what was right and wrong - and used that to choose the correct religion. If I have already answered the questions of right and wrong, then the need to turn to religion to find these answers disappears.

The Left and the Problem of Criticizing Islam

There are voices, some of them liberal, who assert that liberals do not have a proper attitude towards Islam. These critics accuse (other) liberals of being warm and welcoming of those who slaughter homosexuals, kill blasphemers and apostates, and abuse women while, at the same time, those same liberals criticize and condemn the people who would object to slaughtering homosexuals and abusing women. Their specific target is those liberals who would assert that their criticisms are bigoted and prejudicial.

I assert that their criticisms are bigoted and prejudicial.

Furthermore, those bigoted and prejudicial tendencies are not only targeting Muslims. These people are also applying their bigoted and prejudicial tendencies to the liberals who would criticize them.

It is true that there is a liberal ideology that refuses to condemn different cultures, regardless of the practice. Whether we are discussing the Holocaust or slavery or the abuse of women and children, they assert that right and wrong is determined by one's culture. They deny that there is any (objective) basis for raising objections against another culture. If one tries, then the only thing one is doing is using one's own culture to condemn the other - imposing one's own (groundless, subjective) attitudes on people who have their own (groundless, subjective) attitudes.

The view is incoherent at the start. People who hold this view condemn others for the practice of condemning others. Their attitude effectively boils down to a moral commandment that there are no moral commandments, a prohibition on prohibitions, the condemnation of condemnation. Those who hold this view want to assert that the holocaust, slavery, and the subjugation of women cannot be condemned because condemnation is always wrong, and on the basis of this condemn those who would condemn other cultures.

In saying this, I want to put a spotlight on the fact that what I am engaging in here is the practice of "criticizing an idea." I am taking the attitudes of moral nihilism and cultural moral relativism and I am asserting that using these as a foundation for a universal moral prescription against condemning others is, at best, incoherent. When the targets of my criticism respond that I am claiming that it is wrong (racist or bigoted) to criticize an idea, I would like the reader to note that they are making this accusation against an individual who knowingly and self-consciously wrote this article with the understanding that it involved criticizing an idea.

Criticizing an idea is not wrong - but, as with all things, it can be done incorrectly.

The second type of liberal - the type that the bigoted and prejudicial target of this essay fails to distinguish from the first - is the type that claims that accusations of wrongdoing must be precisely targeted against those who are actually guilty. Sweeping the innocent and the guilty together in a large group, then using the wrongs of the guilty to promote hatred and distrust of the innocent, is itself a moral wrong. It is something decent people would try to avoid doing.

Again, please note that I am not arguing that it is wrong to criticize an idea or a practice.

Nor is it the case that the fact that I am condemning this particular bigoted practice implies that I somehow cannot, at the same time, condemn those who would slaughter homosexuals, slay infidels and apostates, and abuse women. There is no rule in morality that says that one thing and only one thing is worthy of condemnation. In fact, there is a long list of things that deserve condemnation. This includes not only the slaughter of homosexuals, slaying of infidels and apostates, and the abuse of women. It includes making broad derogatory overgeneralizations that use the wrongs of the guilty to promote a hatred and distrust of the innocent.

Against this type of liberal, the accusation of incoherence and inconsistency is going to be harder to support.

But, then, we are dealing with a group of people who demonstrate a diminished capacity to make distinctions among individuals - to separate the guilty from the innocent.

Those who cannot recognize the distinction see a criticism of overly broad derogatory statements - a criticism of bigotry and prejudice - as a defense of slaughtering homosexuals, the killing of infidels and apostates, and the abuse of women. They take the position of, "If you criticize me, then you must be a defender of these practices." Yet, in terms of logical consistency, this response is like saying that anybody who objects to Trump's claim that Mexicans are rapists must be defenders of rape.

If one can understand how it can be the case that a criticism of Trump's characterization of Mexicans as rapists is not a defense of rape, then one should be able to understand how it can be the case that the characterization of Muslims as terrorists is not a defense of terrorism.

When an individual then asserts that, "I am not saying that all Muslims are terrorists," this still must be held up against the fact that Trump did not say that all Mexicans are rapists. Yet, in the same way that Trump still promoted the attitude that one should fear and hate Mexicans as if they are all rapists (because we cannot clearly know who is not), the critics of Islam are still promoting an attitude of fear and hatred of all Muslims because we cannot tell them apart.

On the idea that criticizing an idea is not an element of bigotry or prejudice, I covered that idea earlier. You can find my response to that argument in the post Criticizing an Idea."