Military vs Civilian Choices

Typically, I wake up in the morning, select a topic, and write my first draft on the bus as I go to work. I research the topic some more during the day, and edit the piece on the ride home.

When I woke up this morning, I read a report that the Army had killed 70 insurgents, and I began a posting about some of the issues that I had with the war. I started by writing some of the moral questions that the news report had put into my head.

The Morning Report

Is this good or bad? Is killing 80 people better than killing 70? Or would it have been better to have killed 60 instead?

What is an insurgent? How does one identify a particular body as belonging to an insurgent, as opposed to a civilian casualty? Is there room for something in between? Do we have to view everybody as either “for us” or “against us”? Can’t there be some who have not made up their mind yet?

Body Counts

I have a problem with judging a war by body counts. Doing so tends to put a higher value on stacking up a larger number of bodies. We saw this in Vietnam where a focus on body counts caused soldiers to report casualties that did not exist, and to kill a few more people than necessary to drive up the count of bodies that did exist. Neither of which are admirable traits.

Now, I am not talking about a person who thinks, “I need to add a few more bodies to the pile” and kills people at random. I am talking about the effect that these institutions have at the margins, where an individual has to make a judgment call. It creates an atmosphere where an act that would have fallen on the “let live” side of the fence ends up falling on the “kill” side – because the fence itself has been moved a little to put a larger percentage of options on the “kill” side.

In a military action, there is no trial to determine if those who were attacked are guilty or innocent. There is no opportunity to hear from the accused, to determine if what the accuser thinks he sees is accurate or has an innocent interpretation. A military operation is like a trial, where the accused is not allowed to speak or call witnesses, and where a conviction targets not only the accused, but whomever is within the blast radius of the accused.

When guilt is assigned in this way, mistakes are inevitable, and far more common than they would be in a court of law. That is why we have courts of law. This is why we invented trial by jury, to eliminate the high risk that those who would otherwise inflict harm on somebody too easily agree that the individual deserves the harm that he is being made to suffer.

Victory is not best measured by killing as many people as possible. Nor is it best measured by killing as few as possible. It is best measured by teaching a moral lesson that says that those who endanger innocent lives will be subject to severe sanction, and those who defend the institutions that aim to protect innocent lives will be seen as heroes. Victory is measured by the degree to which the survivors better recognize the value of the rule of law.

The Afternoon Report

As the day wore on, the news carried additional information about the attacks. There were stories of civilians being killed in the attacks – over 25 civilians including 18 children, according to the Washington Post.

I do not know if there were civilian casualties. Does the military?

I do not want this to be taken as an anti-military rant about a group of hotheads that are out killing people indiscriminately. I have no doubt that the military takes pains to ensure that they attack valid military targets. Yet, every order to fire is a judgment call, and every order to fire is made with the possibility of error.

This is the major difference between a civil society and a society governed by war. Most of the provisions of a civil society are created specifically for the purpose of making sure that the power of the state is used only against those who are guilty, and to protect the innocent.

Why are the accused presumed innocent until proven guilty? Because innocent people should be free to live their short lives on this planet as well as they can – so long as they do not harm others – and it is a great tragedy when that innocent life is ruined by a wrongful conviction.

Why do government authorities need an indictment from a Grand Jury to hold somebody for more than a short amount of time? It is because we do not want innocent people to be constantly harassed by a government. Before the government can interfere so violently in a person’s life, they must prove to a Grand Jury that they actually have a case. If not, then the private citizen is left alone.

Why does the Constitution require that agents must obtain a warrant before they can search somebody’s place? Why does it state that the warrant must list precisely what is to be searched and what the agents are looking for? Again, because the burden of proof is on those who want to forcefully interfere with somebody’s life. They have to show that they have enough evidence to identify what the accused is involved in and what evidence one expects to find.

None of these protections are available when the military strikes. An intelligence report comes in, a decision is made, and a bomb gets dropped. Usually, it is dropped on a crowd of people. Even if some of them are “guilty” in the eyes of the military, there is a good chance that the bomb will harm others who are not guilty.

If the police move in on a group of people, they can separate the guilty from the innocent, move the guilty off to jail, and free the innocent. A bomb dropped on a crowd makes no distinctions.

A bomb acts on the same philosophy that the Catholic forces used when the captured Beziers, a city populated by both ‘heretics’ and Catholics. Unable to tell one from the other, and fearing that many ‘heretics’ were lying, the victorious commanders gave the order, “Kill them all. Let God sort them out.”

The Problem

Here is the problem that distinguishes between the military and the civil way of dealing with criminals. The military formula puts more emphasis on God or the fates sorting guilty from innocent. The civil formula puts the burden on civil authorities – judges, juries, and grand juries.

Civil institutions – at least just and moral civil institutions – show their moral quality by showing their concern for making sure that the person struck by the violent force of the state’s resources actually are a threat to others, and not merely standing within the blast radius of those who have been called ‘guilty’ in a one-sided trial.

Of course, this greater concern not to harm the innocent comes with risks. Those who would harm innocent people are able to more easily escape those who are hindered by the rules that aim to protect the innocent.

Yet, what is the difference between the “them” and “us”? Clearly, the only difference that is worth fighting and dying for, is that “us” have a greater concern with protecting innocent life. It has to be that “us” are interested in using human institutions to sort the guilty from the innocent, and leaving less to the fates.

Here, then, is the gamble. If “us” show a greater interest in making sure that we do not harm innocent people, and a greater willingness to use civil institutions to sort the innocent from the guilty, this might – just might – convince the people that they are better off supporting these principles and institutions than those that are less concerned with innocent lives.

Perhaps, just perhaps, people in society can ask themselves, “With whom will I be better off? With those who have rules of evidence, warrants, grand juries, presumed innocence until proven guilty, trials, and rules against cruel and unusual punishment to protect the innocent from the violent instruments of the state, or those who think that these tools just get in the way?”

Deceptive Truth and the Use of Averages

In reading some text against a referendum on the ballot here in Colorado, I saw an argument that fits in a family that I resolved a few years ago never to use again.

I was using a member of this family of argument against the government’s deficit spending. I said to a co-worker that the government’s deficit for that year was the equivalent of $1,500 worth of additional debt – added on to the debt the government already had -- for each man, woman, and child in the country. That meant $7,500 in debt for each family of five.

Then I thought about it for a while and realized that I was using rhetoric to make my point. I was misleading my co-worker about the actual facts regarding the deficit, and doing so for the purpose of manipulating his sentiments about that deficit. I wanted him to fear the deficit more than reason said he should. It seems that telling the truth was not good enough.

As soon as I realized what I was doing, I resolved to stop doing it. I also saw a reason to distrust any who would use this argument, because they are probably more interested in manipulating people than they are in informing people.

The Flaw with the Argument

The fact is that different people will not all pay back the same portion of the deficit. An individual who earns no money will not be paying back $1,500 worth of debt. His debt will be shifted onto somebody else.

In fact, the bulk of the burden in paying back that debt will be shifted onto those who pay the most taxes. My friend’s “share” of the deficit is equivalent to his “share” of the taxes. If he pays an average amount of taxes each year, then he will be paying an average amount of the proportion of the debt (with tax). If he pays less than average in taxes, he will pay back less than average proportion of the debt. On the other hand, if he pays more in taxes than the average citizen, then he will pay back a higher portion of the debt.

My point here is to show how an argument is deceptive, not to come up with actual numbers. So, let’s assume that the deficit for a particular year is $500 billion. Let’s also assume that the only way that the government makes money is through income taxes.

In 2003, according to the a report from the Congressional Budget Office, the top 10% of all income earners account for a little less than half of the Federal tax liabilities. So, out of this $500 billion deficit for one year, $250 billion will be paid by 10% of the population. My co-worker was not a member of that part of the population. He was, along with the remaining 90% of the population, responsible for the other half.

My friend and his family would actually be responsible for less than $7,500 in debt. Yet, I was telling him that his family was responsible for an equal portion of the deficit. I was doing this because an “equal portion” was higher than the actual portion that will be taken out of his and his children’s future salaries (unless he or one or more of his children became very wealthy).

Because the average portion was higher than his actual portion, I could expect it to summon more anxiety and, thus, summon more opposition against those who are responsible for the deficit.

Do not misunderstand me. I have arguments against a national debt. I think that running up huge deficits represents a moral crime against future generations. However, in arguing against the deficit, I have resolved not to use arguments that are fundamentally deceptive. I will use arguments that I actually think have merit (and I will not judge merit according to ability to manipulate others).

The “average” argument is deceptive.

Truth, Fiction, and Deception

An interesting fact about my attempt to manipulate my co-worker is that I did not lie. I told him the truth – the government deficit for that year was, in fact, equivalent to $1,500 for each man, woman, and child in the country.

Yet, my intention in reporting that fact was to deceive. I knew how he would likely take this fact. He would imagine an additional $7,500 attached to his family’s debt. He would think about the trouble that he is having with the debt he already owns, and feel a sense of desperation at having another $7,500 added to it. He would react as if I had told him that he, as the provider for his family, would have to come up with the money.

I define a lie in such a way that it covers more than making a false claim. A deceptive truth -- a truth that invites somebody to draw a false conclusion -- is just as deceptive.

This the deceptive truth is the bread and butter for many political consultants. In that business, an individual who is skilled at coming up with the best deceptive truth is somebody who can make a great deal of money.

In fact, there are solid scientific methods for evaluating the effectiveness of deceptive truth. Through focus groups and other techniques, a company in charge of marketing a political idea can test a number of deceptive truths, identify the most effective ones, and give them to the client, who uses the resources at their disposal to spread the deceptive truth as far as possible.

Colorado's Referrendum C

I don't want to discuss the Colorado Referrendum per say, but to use the argument I found as another example of deceptive truth.

In this case, the discussion concerned a change in the tax law that would allow the state to keep, rather than refund, a substantial increase in tax revenue. Regardless of the merit of the tax cut. Those who are arguing against the referendum (thus, arguing for the tax refund) say that, “The estimated five-year total for all refund methods, including the sales tax refund, averages $1,106 per taxpayer.”

This message suggests that the average Colorado voter can expect to be over $1,100 wealthier if he votes against this measure. A reader, thinking of himself as an average taxpayer, thinks that voting against the referrendum will bring him over $1,100.

However, the amount of money that an individual taxpayer will get depends on how that individual squares off against the different types of refunds. Most of the refund will come through a sales tax, where the more one spends, the more one saves. Other savings come through fifteen other refund categories which include reductions in capital gains for Colorado assets.

The way averages work, one person who gets $10,000 in refunds, balancing against nine people getting $118 in refunds, will generate an average refund of $1,106.20. Yet, in this hypothetical case, 90% of the people will get significantly less than the average amount, and one person gets substantially more.

These are hypothetical examples, and it remains open to question as to how the Colorado distributions will actually stack up. The point is not to make a specific case regarding either the national debt or Colorado’s Referrendum C. The point is to make a case against a certain line of reasoning, and the problems with it.

Summary

The main point is that, if you hear somebody starting to talk about “averages” in terms of cost or benefit for a government program, be careful. Because of the distribution in income levels in this country, it is quite likely that that the “average” is a deceptive truth. It leads the reader to thing that he or she can expect whatever the “average” is reported to be, in terms of costs or benefits.

In fact, those costs and benefits will be distributed in such a way that the “average” (or median) American can expect something quite different from the “average” being reported.

I began writing this blog in part because I saw deceptive truth to be too widely accepted and, as such, doing a great deal of harm. I not only resolved not to use those arguments myself, I wanted to expose them so that those who do use them can find themselves condemned, rather than rewarded with pay raises and bonuses for their skilled use of deceptive truth. We are made worse off by this practice, and it is in our interests to condemn that which makes us worse off.

We would be better off to the degree that society learned to recognize and to treat the deceptive truth like any other lie.

The instant that somebody starts speaking about “averages”, the way that I divided the national deficit equally among all taxpayers, or the opponents of Referendum C in Colorado are speaking about distributing the tax benefits of rejecting the Referendum, take this as a clue to ignore everything else that individual has to say. He obviously sees nothing wrong with deceiving you into accepting his position, and is not to be trusted, until he repents and rejects the use of those types of arguments.

Democracy and Tyranny of the Majority

With Iraq having voted on its new Constitution, I thought that this would be a good time to say something about morality within a democracy.

Clearly, it is not the case that the majority is always right. If we take a poll in a society and determine that 85% of them believe that capital punishment is morally acceptable, 10% of the people are opposed, and 5% are undecided, this does not prove that 85% of the people are right and 10% are wrong. It is possible that the 85% are victims of a popular injustice.

Against Cultural Relativism

To illustrate the problem with the idea that the majority is always right, imagine a society where 85% of the people want to simply round up and kill everybody belonging to a genetic subgroup or religion within that society. Let us assume that this subgroup makes up 2% of the population – it is too small to defend itself. Naturally, this 2% is opposed to the slaughter. Let us also assume that 8% of the remaining are opposed as well.

So, we have a society with 85% favoring this slaughter, 10% opposed, and 5% undecided.

Being a member of the 10% opposed to the slaughter does not mean that one is wrong. It does not matter that the slaughter would pass a popular vote, it is still wrong.

For a moment, let’s take seriously the claim that right and wrong (for a society) are determined by what people within that society tend to say is right or wrong. If this is true, then a person answering the question, “Is X wrong?” is being asked “Would people in this society tend to disapprove of people doing X?”

Applying this to the example discussed above, the people being asked if this slaughter is wrong are being asked, “Is it the case that people generally will support such a slaughter?” We would have to interpret the 85% of the people saying ‘yes’ as saying ‘the majority of the people would support such a slaughter.” The 5% of the people who are undecided would have to be understood as saying, “I do not know whether people would generally approve of this slaughter or not.” The 10% opposed to the slaughter would be understood as saying, “People generally are saying that this slaughter is wrong.”

Clearly, when people answer this question they are not trying to divine what people in society would generally approve or disapprove of. They are trying to decide whether the slaughter has “something else” – a moral quality, with 85% saying ‘yes’, 10% saying ‘no’, and 5% being uncertain, and with 85% being wrong, in this case.

This is fatal to the idea that right and wrong is determined by what the bulk of a society approves of. This is fatal to the idea that all you have to do in a society is take a vote and you arrive at a moral truth (for that society).

There are wrongs other than slaughter, by the way. The 85% majority may decide to enslave the minority. This slavery might be as obtrusive as putting 2% of the population in chains and allowing them to be bought and sold, or it could involve allowing them to work while taking from them everything (or almost everything) that they earn.

The 85% could force the minority onto a reservation, building a wall around them, and not allowing them the freedom to move about that others are allowed to enjoy. It could mean prohibiting the minority from enjoying liberties that others enjoy – such as prohibiting them from working at jobs they enjoy and are competent to perform, or prohibiting them from entering contracts that others of equal competence may enter.

These points are relevant to those who push around the following piece of “wisdom”:

It is said that 86% of Americans believe in God. Therefore, it is very hard to understand why there is such a mess about having the Ten Commandments on display or "In God We Trust" on our money and having God in the Pledge of Allegiance. Why don't we just tell the other 14% to Sit Down and SHUT UP!!!

There are two moral objections that can be raised against those who are sympathetic to the ideas expressed in this message.

The first is that a fair and just government is a government of, by, and for 100% of the people, not 86% of the people. This is (or should be) neutral ground where people of different backgrounds and beliefs meet to peacefully negotiate their differences. A majority that insists on putting up its own flags, signs, and banners is trying to claim this ‘neutral territory’ as its own, and destroying its neutrality. They are saying, “We are not equals here. We are the masters, you are the servants. We have the right to command, you have the duty to obey.”

The second is that the majority never has the right to tell the minority to sit down and shut up. This is cultural moral relativism at its worse. It represents not only an arrogant presumption that the majority is always right, but it lays the foundation for a tyranny of the majority in that the majority assumes the right to demand that the minority “sit down and shut up.”

Anybody who promotes the idea that the minority can be told to “sit down and shut up” is somebody who has lost his moral compass and who shows a disturbing inability to distinguish right from wrong.

Tyranny of the Majority

So, what happens in a democracy where 85% of the population actually think that they have a right to impose these unfair and unjust burdens on 2%; and only 8% of the remaining population are willing to say that it is wrong?

How does a democracy ensure the power of the majority does not corrupt them to the point that they subject the minority to unfair and unjust treatment? What protections are there against a tyranny of the majority?

If the courts decide to defend the rights of the minority, the majority has the power to replace those judges with those who are willing to accept, and even eager to promote, injustice against the minority. It may take some time, but it can be done.

We can see this as an issue in Iraq, where certain minorities fear that they will be subject to a tyranny of the majority.

So, how do we set up a democracy that avoids this problem? How do we set up a society so that the majority recognizes that the fact that they have the most votes does not prove that right is on their side, and there are things they may not do to the minority?

Defending Right from Wrong

I see this as being analogous to a situation where a kidnapper is holding a gun on a hostage. What is the hostage to do if he is at risk of being treated unfairly and unjustly? Let us also assume that the hostage taker has a physical advantage – fighting back is out of the question, both because the hostage-taker has all the power, and the hostage is adverse to using violence to solve problems.

One option is to point out, as I did at the start of the post, that “popular” does not mean “right”, and minorities have no duty or obligation to serve the majority or to sit down and shut up. But what is the use of reason in this case.

In other words, the minority can appeal, through reason, to the moral facts and hope that the majority can be made to recognize and respect those facts. This is true just as the hostage may try to appeal to the hostage-taker’s better nature in trying to negotiate his own safety. However, this requires that the hostage-taker have a better nature.

There are ways, I think, to reason with the majority, because there is no absolute majority. Anybody can find themselves in a minority, depending on how the political allegiances line up. In matters of race, gender, cultural heritage, physical location, in any number of ways an individual can find himself in a minority. At this point, the question becomes, “What type of rules would you want the majority to adopt regarding the treatment of minorities, given that shift in the political allegiances at any moment may make you a minority.”

Do you agree that the majority should think it right to tell the minority to sit down and shut up? Do you agree that the governments should be neutral ground where all citizens are treated as equals and none have a right to lay claim to them by posting their side’s flags and banners around as if to convey the message, ‘This is our territory; you are allowed here only insofar as it pleases us to allow you on our territory?”

The rules of a democracy need to be established with these types of considerations in mind. The majority has no right to tell the minority to sit down and shut up. The majority has no right to take possession of ‘neutral territory’ represented by the government institutions and to put up its banners and signs and to take possession of ‘neutral territory’ as its won.

These are just two of the rules that bind the majority -- that say, "Regardless of how many votes you can muster, regardless of your ability to take control of courts and make your own members the judge of everything, there are still some things that you have no right to do."

These rules are essential to protecting against a tyranny of the majority. These rules are essential to protecting minorities from abuse and injustice that majorities will otherwise be tempted to inflict on them.

The establishment of an Iraqi Constitution is a good thing. Though, ultimately, peace and justice requires a recognition that, even in a democracy, being popular is not the same thing as being right. And even God cannot give the majority the right to take possession of the neutral ground that is Government, or to tell the minority to sit down and shut up.

Follow Up on Dobson’s Remarks

Follow Up on Dobson’s Remarks

Four days ago, I wrote about James Dobson, the founder and head of Focus on the Family, admitted that a wrongdoing had taken place when he said that he knew things, "…that I probably should not know."

Last night, on his radio show, Dobson said that Carl Rove had released him to talk about their conversations. He said that in those conversations, Rove had assured him of Miers' personal anti-abortion position without committing Miers to any vote on a future issue. Rove had also mentioned that other potential candidates had said that they did not want the nomination because they wanted to avoid the approval process.

Regarding the information that "I probably shouldn't know", Dobson said that it was that Harriet Miers was on the President's short list.

And what I was referring to is the fact that on Saturday, the day before the President made his decision, I knew that Harrier Miers was at the top of the short list of names under consideration. And as you know, that information hadn’t been released yet, and everyone in Washington and many people around the country wanted to know about it and the fact that he had shared with me is not something I wanted to reveal.

I have a slight problem with this. The nomination was announced on Monday, October 3rd. Dobson made the statement, "...things that I shouldn't know," on Wednesday, October 5th. More importantly, he spoke in the present tense -- not about things he learned earlier than others but could not talk about, but things that others did not know on October 5th that were relevant to his decision.

It is hard to tell what he meant. Therefore, I want Dobson brought before the Senate committee, put under oath, and asked directly, “You stated that there were things that you probably should not know regarding Harriet Miers or other subjects relevant to her nomination. What were those things that you probably should not have known?”

If he answers with some innocent fact that could be easily assumed or there was no reason to keep secret, Dobson should be reminded that he swore an oath to tell the truth and that lying to the Senate is a crime.

If Dobson invokes the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination to keep from revealing that information, he is at least on the record as far as this issue goes, and the Senators can act accordingly.

If Dobson actually comes up with things that he should not have known, the Senate can decide the best course of action to take with that information once it is made known.

The explanations that Dobson gave on his own radio program were not made under oath, with no particular reason to believe that Dobson was telling the truth.

I would like to note that Dobson did not specify that he learned that which “I probably should not know” from Rove. He simply stated that he knew things he probably should not know in the context of discussing the Miers’ nomination. Senators questioning Dobson should keep this in mind when framing their questions, and not focus narrowly on his conversations with Rove.

When Only Priests May Be Judges

The Bush Administration and the Religious Right ultimately want all Americans to face trial, not by standing in front of a secular judge, but by being hauled before a religious priest. Thus, having the correct view of the Bible becomes the single most important fact to know in determining if a nominee is qualified to be judge.

Only Priests May Judge

When I was young, one of the jobs that I had on my short list of preferred professions was "Judge", with an interest of sitting on the Supreme Court. It was not a deep, overriding passion -- I had some suspicion that I would not be good enough to qualify. However, my interest prompted me to study legal issues. This included a year-long course in the History of the Supreme Court, and concentrated study in the Philosophy of Law as a graduate student, where I taught Philosophy of Law.

However, I had a problem with that profession. A judge's job is to apply the law that exists, regardless of whether that law is just or unjust. If the law said that harboring escaped slaves was punishable by fine or imprisonment, I would have to be an agent through which violators were fined and imprisoned, regardless of my sympathies for the abolitionists. I was more interested in making just law and opposing just law, than in enforcing the law independent of whether it was just or unjust.

However, I wonder what would have happened if I had pursued that particular American dream. What if I had gone to law school and excelled, graduating near the top of my class? What if I became a practicing lawyer, where I acquired a reputation for keen intellect and solid knowledge of the subject matter? What if my reputation included a strong moral character where people felt safe assuming that I would bend no rules?

If I had done all of this, according to President Bush, I would still not qualify to be a judge in the United States, because I would fail his religious test. In noting why he picked Miers, Bush said that “part of her life is her religion.” Suggesting, of course, that a person for whom religion was not a part of her life would be considered less qualified, and probably unqualified.

Ultimately, Bush and his supporters among the religious right do not like the idea of Americans being judged in secular courts. They want Americans to stand trial in a church court before accepted members of the Conservative priesthood. Consequently, only priests are qualified to be judges.

Constitutional Provisions

Article 6, Section 3 of the Constitution states:

The senators and representatives before-mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

I want to speak to this statement, not as a principle of law, but as a principle of ethics in a free society.

There can be no law that prohibits an individual from basing his decision to vote for or against a candidate on religion.

There can be no law that prohibits an individual from basing his decision to vote for or against a candidate on race. However, the person who does this violates a moral principle, even if no law can be passed against it. This is a person rightfully classified as a bigot. Parents interested in raising morally decent children rightfully point to such individuals and say, "Do not be like him, he is of poor moral character."

We can pass no law against these types of decisions. However, we can justifiably condemn and criticize anybody who advocates this type of behavior, treating them honestly like the bigots they are. We can make an example of any citizen whose bigotry inspires him to stand before a microphone and use race as a criterion for voting. People may still do this, but they will do it without the sanction or approval of society at large.

We could write into the Constitution that there shall be no racial test shall be required for any office of trust in the United States. However, we do not have to. It is written into our moral code, and that is enough.

The same argument applies to religion. The individual who stands before an audience and demands that candidates pass a religious test demonstrates the same morally contemptible bigotry as the man who advocates voting on the basis of race. A fair and just society would greet those who suggest such a thing with the same contempt. A society that does not greet those who suggest such a thing with the same contempt is not fair and just.

Implications

What does it mean to say that only those belonging to a particular religion are qualified to judge the law?

If you say that a person is not qualified to judge the law, then you must also be saying that he is not qualified to obey it. In a sense, we are all judges. We live our lives safe from legal entanglements only to the degree that we are capable of knowing what the law requires and on which side of the law our actions would fall. If people belonging to the wrong religion are not qualified to see the line, they are not capable of keeping their actions on the good side of the line.

When an individual encounters a complex law, he contacts a lawyer. To a certain extent, a lawyer's job is to predict what a judge would or would not say about a case, and advise the client accordingly. An individual who is not competent to judge the law is not competent to advise clients how to stay on the right side of that law.

If only priests and practitioners of the right religion are qualified to be judges, then only priests and practitioners of the right religion are qualified to be lawyers as well, or to be full citizens.

These are the implications of the religious bigotry that rest behind the decision to use a religious test to decide who to appoint, or who to vote for, for public office.

A Pattern of Bigotry

While the Constitution of the United States says that no religious test will be required for all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, will need to pass a religious test, 8 State Constitutions still require a religious test.

The Supreme Court has blocked enforcement of these provisions. However, they have not been removed.

Imagine the uproar that would exist if the Constitution of any state still required a racial test to hold a political position in any state. The people would instantly recognize that having that wording in the state Constitution, even if it is not enforced, was tantamount to an endorsement of racism -- an expressed wish to return to the days when racial bigotry and discrimination was the norm and blacks knew their place.

In some circles, this is not a wish, but a policy. Fortunately, a fair and just society rejects this view and recognizes that morality and justice require the condemnation of those who do not reject it. Such a bigot may still have a right to speak, but not a right to our respect. Society shows that it accepts that this view is wrong by removing these archaic provisions from their constitutions and laws. A society that keeps these provisions still has not found the moral courage to leave its bigotry behind.

Keeping these religious provisions inside the State constitutions admits to the same type of bigotry. It is an expressed wish to return to the good old days when religious bigotry and discrimination was the norm and non-theists knew their place. Among some circles, this is not a wish, but a policy. Unfortunately, the principles of fairness and justice that says to condemn this policy has been ignored.

A fair and just society would remove these bigoted provisions from their constitutions, and thereby remove the approval of the religious bigotry contained in these provisions implicit in the decision to keep these rules in place.

In addition, a fair and just society would react to a President who says, “You can trust she will make a good Judge. She is one of us – because of her religion” will face the same reaction as the President who says, “You can trust she will make a good Judge. She is one of us – because of her race.”

Democratic Hypocrites

A hypocrite is a person who accuses somebody else of doing something that the accuser would readily do himself if given a chance -- much like we find in the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives.

On October 7th, the House of Representative took a vote on a new Energy Bill to expand refinery capacity in the United States, reduce clean air provisions, and protect energy companies from lawsuits.

The vote was scheduled to last for five minutes. However, at the end of those five minutes, the Republican leadership was behind by two votes. Therefore, instead of gaveling the vote closed when the five minutes were up, they held the vote open. During this time, Republican leaders met with members of their party to cajole and coerce them into switching their vote in favor of the law.

It took that Republican leadership 40 minutes to round up the necessary votes. As soon as they acquired enough votes, the closed the vote and declared a victory. Immediately after doing so, the Democrats shouted from their side of the isle, “Shame! Shame! Shame!”

After the vote, the Democratic Leadership held a press conference where they condemned the Republican leadership in harsh terms. (See http://www.c-span.org: “Democratic Representatives on Energy Bill Vote, 10/05/2005)

The Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi (D - CA) called the act, “A shameless display of the culture of corruption that the Republicans have brought to the House of Representatives,” and “A sad day for democracy.”

House Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer (D - MD) called the Republican action a corrupt act.

Hypocrisy

However, in defending his use of the term, Mr. Hoyer cited Vice President Dick Cheney’s remarks when the Democratic leadership used the same tactic a few years earlier. According to Hoyer, “Corruption is a tough word to use. It was the word that Vice President Cheney used when Jim Wright, on a Budget bill, on an economic policy for our country, held the vote open for 28 minutes. Mr. Chaney called it the most corrupt action he had seen on the floor of the House of Representatives.”

In this sentence, Hoyer admits to hypocrisy in all but name. He admits to the fact that Democrats have used the House rules to hold votes open to gather additional votes. He appears to endorse Cheney’s words in calling this an instance of “corruption” yet, at the same time, does not offer a word of contrition or an inkling of a suggestion that the Democrats would not do the same thing again if the opportunity came up.

Hoyer’s words make clear that he has one set of standards that apply when the Democrats are in power, and a different set of standards that apply when Republicans are in power.

If his claims about Vice President Cheney are correct, then Cheney also holds to this double standard. He calls an act “corrupt” when carried out by Democrats that he accepts as “policy” when committed by Republicans.

Demagoguery and the Fillibuster

In fact, the House rule allowing the leadership to hold a vote open long enough to shift the burden of a tie in its favor is no different morally than the Senate rules that allow for a filibuster. It is a procedure built into the rules that either side is willing to take advantage of when it benefits them to do so. It makes no sense to call “fowl” when the other side does the same thing.

Also, like the filibuster, if the House of Representatives dislikes the rule that allows the majority party to hold a vote open long enough to get a bill passed, then the House can vote to change the rules. These are the rules that they adopted, and these are the rules that they are playing by. Protesting acts that the rules allow would be like a football team protesting as corrupt an opposing team’s decision to go for a 2-point conversion instead of an extra-point kick.

Rhetoric and Demagoguery

One problem with protesting these make-believe wrongs is that it weakens moral language when it is to be used against actions that actually deserve condemnation. This is the story of the boy who cried wolf, with a twist. In this case, it is the story of the politician who cried fowl. Because he cries fowl at make-believe wrongs with, perhaps, the aim to rally the people, the people learn not to trust him even when he detects a genuine wrong. He cries fowl then genuine injustice has been done, and the people or click to the next web page, because they have heard these false cries too often.

From lying under oath, to “ad hominem” defenses, to bribery and cronyism, there are a great many things that deserve condemnation. There is no need to make up wrongs in order to find a reason for moral condemnation. Opportunities for legitimate moral condemnation occur every day. When the moral message is diluted by using it in obviously hypocritical accusations, it simply makes all of the other wrongs much easier to get away with, and much more common as a result.

With this in mind, it would be useful if at least one reporter would have the wits and foresight to see these cases when they occur. The next time a politician stands up to condemn an action by the other party that his party would readily use when given the chance, this reporter can ask one simple question. “Excuse me, sir. Can I report that your party has adopted a policy that you will never use these tactics, and will brand as corrupt anybody in your own party that would use them?”

After this happens a few times, perhaps we will see the end of politicians making phony charges of wrongdoing.

Plame Case: Rule by Intimidation and Fear

While others are concerned with whether key members of the Bush Administration, and Karl Rove in particular, broke the law in revealing the identity of a CIA operative or answering questions afterwards, I wish to look at the moral issue.

A Theory

A plausible interpretation of the moral story goes like this:

Key members of the Bush Administration wanted the United States to attack Iraq, alone if necessary, long before they became key members of the Bush Administration. Whether it was a just (justified) war or an unjust war did not matter, as long as Iraq fell into friendly hands.

No doubt, these people thought that such an attack was the right thing to do. Yet, people generally find it very easy to convince themselves that they are doing good deeds, even when they are not. In fact, it is difficult to find anybody, from a common thief to genocidal tyrant, who does not assert with conviction that their acts served a greater good.

To buy support for this war, the Administration needed to manufacture a supply of fear and inject it into the body politic. People are afraid of nuclear weapons, so this is a very powerful ingredient to put into this potion of fear.

It makes sense to think that Vice President Dick Cheney would be pleased to hear rumors that Iraq was trying to buy uranium in Niger. If it could be proved, this would make the case for war irrefutable. Cheney asked the CIA to check the story out.

When the report came back that these rumors were unfounded, Cheney and his associates were probably disappointed.

However, manufacturing fear does not require evidence, only belief. Therefore, the administration continued to use the rumor that Iraq had tried to buy uranium. In doing so, they sought to manufacture fear and, with this, to manipulate American voters into supporting aggression against another country.

I actually think that these Administration officials probably believed that Saddam Hussein was trying to create nuclear weapons. The absence of proof was the fault of the investigators; any competent person doing their job would have found the evidence, they thought.

However, suspicion that somebody might perhaps be a threat at some time in the indefinite future is a poor excuse for a war. If our standard for going to war is, ‘the other country might, perhaps, be up to something, even though we have no evidence that they are,” then any country may justifiably invade any other country at any time.

There is no foundation for peace – there is no national security -- unless war requires at least something more solid than suspicion without evidence.

Exposure and Retribution

Then, Joe Wilson, who went to Africa to investigate the original rumor, wrote an article for the New York Times saying that he had investigated the rumors, found them to be unfounded, and reported this to the Administration. Admitting that his findings could have been in error, he publicly asked whether his findings had been outweighed by other evidence or selectively ignored.

(Note: Recent developments suggest that the Bush Administration was looking for ways to damage Wilson earlier than originally thought, when news articles citing an unnamed source disputing the Niger claims appeared in the New York Times on May 6 and the Washington Post on June 12th, 2003)

Accused of manufacturing fear, Administration officials did not answer the challenge to provide outweighing evidence. Instead, they decided to attack their attacker. To attack Joe Wilson, they asserted that he was a crony recommended for the job by Wilson's wife, formerly Valerie Plame; now, Valerie Wilson.

Somehow, the Administration believed that there was something wrong with hiring close friends and supporters to perform important government functions, and wanted to argue that this cronyism justified questioning Wilson's qualifications and competence.

The moral story ends here.

Well, the first chapter ends here. We still have the issue of being careless with national security information. This carelessness told agents and potential contacts throughout the world that American government officials would sell them out if it could buy them a few political points. However, that is not the moral story I am concerned with here.

Moral Considerations

Here, I am talking about deceptively manipulating the American people into approving an act of aggression against another country that they would not have supported if they had known the truth. I am talking about a government that injected unjustified fear into American lives in order to make them submissive and pliable. I am talking about attacks made against those who questioned their tactics.

Under different circumstances, the Bush Administration might have found ways to attack Joe Wilson in ways that were perfectly legal. This would not have changed the first part of this moral story. This would have had no effect on what I am writing about here.

In seeking answers to the Judy Plame issue, we have quit demanding answers to a question that is at least as important; did the Bush Administration deceptively manipulate the American People into supporting an attack that, if they had known the truth, they would have considered immoral?

The Moral of the Story

The lesson that these government officials want the American People to learn is clear. "Even if you have evidence that we have done wrong, do not dare to mention it, or you will suffer. We insist that you remain silent when you have evidence of our transgressions. Those who do not do so will be made to suffer."

This is the type of America that these people are trying to create -- one in which government officials routinely employ a tool of intimidating potential critics into silence.

If we reward this type of behavior -- if we allow those who use these tactics of misdirection, ad hominem, and accusing the accusers, to profit from them, then we teach important lessons that the next generation of politicians will no doubt learn and put into practice. We make intimidation an attractive practice.

To the degree that we put these types of people on the social 'protected species' list, coddle and protect them, to that degree we can expect them to thrive, and to raise more who are just like them.

Regardless of how any other part of this story turns out, the American people are well advised to consider how much they value leadership by intimidation and fear.

Appendix: Just War

Note: I want to add a point of clarification. One cannot consistently be opposed to immoral actions and be tolerant of tyranny. Turning a blind eye to the suffering caused by tyrants is its own moral crime.

On moral grounds, the first Persian Gulf War was right because the world needs to stand up to countries that invade their neighbors, just as the community needs to band together against those who will invade one of their houses.

Clinton's actions in the Balkans was nothing other than the defense of innocent people from murderers and butchers.

The war in Afghanistan was a war against people who spread death and destruction across the entire face of the globe.

I could have been talked into defending the invasion of Iraq if it had been grounded on a decent respect for the principles of a just war. However, a unilateral attack grounded on manufactured fear deprived this war of its moral footing. That, more than anything, has contributed to the high price we have had to pay, and that we will continue to pay.

Dobson's Acknowledgement of Immorality

On Tuesday, October 4, James Dobson, the founder and leader of the religious conservative organization Focus on the Family, said on his radio program, "When you know some of the things that I know, that I probably shouldn't know, that take me in this direction, you will understand why I have said with fear and trepidation, why I have said that I believe that Harriet Miers will be a good justice.”

There is no way to understand the terms "shouldn’t" in this case to refer to anything other than a moral claim. Dobson is saying nothing less than that, "I learned something that I would not have learned if everybody else had done their moral duty."

This has a number of further implications that we will get to shortly.

The speculation is that the person who gave Dobson the information he probably should not know was Senior White House Advisor Karl Rove, though this is speculative. He was talking about being pressured to discuss conversations with Rove when he made the comment about “things that I know that I probably shouldn’t know.”

Dobson certainly knows of at least one immoral act that took place. He said so.

Furthermore, he senses that it was wrong for him to have this information. Again, he said so when he said that this information was probably something he should not know.

Furthermore, Dobson does not seem even a little bit upset that somebody did something that they ought not to do. He does not seem to be concerned that a wrong had been committed. In fact, he seems almost happy at the fact, and certainly shows no interest in correcting these wrongs by seeing that the wrong-doers get punished.

From this, we can infer that Dobson's moral character is that of a person who does not care if an immoral act is committed as long as it advances a project of his. In this, he certainly is not presenting himself as a paradigm of moral virtue he claims to uphold.

So, now, we have strong reason to suspect that somebody in the Bush administration (perhaps Rove) has been giving out information that they probably should not be giving out, and that Dobson knows about this, and is aware that it is probably wrong.

We need to ask about the nature of what Dobson knows.

We know that some of what Dobson probably should not know leads him to believe that Harriet Miers would probably be a ‘good justice,’ using Dobson’s concept of a ‘good justice’. This means somebody who will put the 10 Commandments above the 10 Amendments, and the Bible above the Constitution.

We have no reason to believe that Dobson learned that, "Harriet Miers is a fair and impartial lawyer who will judge each case on its merits and not try to legislate from the bench." This is not the type of information that Dobson ought not to know.

In fact, we can be relatively confident that, whatever Dobson was told, he was not given an argument that aims to prove that Miers was the best qualified in terms of credentials and impartial personality to be a member of the Supreme Court. There is simply no reason to keep this type of information secret.

We also know that the-fact-that-should-not-be-known turned Dobson into a supporter of Harriet Miers. What type of fact-that-should-not-be-known could have had this type of effect? The most reasonable option is that Dobson learned that his own social agenda can be advanced further and faster with Miers on the Supreme Court than with any other candidate. He knows that with Meirs on the Supreme Court, he is that much closer to claiming victory in establishing his political agenda. This seems the only cause that could have had this particular effect.

So, we have reason to believe that a wrong has been done. Dobson knows that a what was done was probably wrong, and that he does not care because the wrong will likely advance his political agenda. We know that this probable wrong concerns Harriet Miers, and that as a result of this wrong Dobson is more confident that Miers will not be far and impartial in hearing cases that come before her, but instead will be partial towards supporting Dobson and his political agenda.

Either that or he is lying (which also does not say anything favorable about Dobson’s moral character).

If we have reason to believe that Harriet Meirs' approval will complete some immoral activity -- even if we do not know what that activity is, then we have reason to oppose the nomination of Harriet Miers on moral grounds. We have reason to see to it that immoral activities not reach a successful conclusion -- particularly immoral activities that as one of their objectives the placement of a particular person in a position as powerful as Supreme Court Judge.

This is not a trial. This is not a case where we must assume that a person is innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, we do not have to go beyond reasonable doubt; reason to doubt alone is good enough.

Speaking politically, I do not think that Harriet Miers’ withdrawal will do any good. Evangelicals want Bush to nominate a judge with bona fide conservative credentials – somebody who is on the record as saying the things that they want to hear. They want Bush to nominate a candidate that the Democrats cannot support. They want to force a battle, because they think that they can win and defeat the battered forces of liberalism, giving them even fuller control over America.

This is likely what will happen if Harriet Miers is defeated.

Yet, politics is not my realm of expertise. I am concerned with ethics. In that realm, Dobson has proved that he is a person of poor moral character, willing to support and participate in actions he knows to be wrong in order to promote his agenda. A wrong action is, by definition, an action that a person of good moral character would not support, yet Dobson supports them.

There is one additional fact regarding Miers’ nomination that should be defeated. Since Bush started to be attacked on the right for naming Miers to the court, he and the rest of the administration has sought to defend his choice. However, they have not done so by showing Miers’ excellent legal qualifications to do the job. Rather, the evidence they have offered as proof that Miers should have the job primarily concerns her religious stand. Miers’ should be a Supreme Court Judge because she is a born-again Christian, as if this is a requirement for office.

In short, when an American citizen stands before a Bush-appointed judge, he should plan his case with less reliance on statute and the Constitution, and more reliance on the bible, in proving his actions right or wrong. Because the judges he appoints are not expected to know the law and the Constitution as much as they are expected to know (Bush’s interpretation of) scripture.

Knowledge of scripture seems to have become the only criterion to look at in determining whether an individual is qualified to be named as a judge.

Two Victories for Morality

In the past week there were a couple of positive developments in the morality realm to report.

(1) Israel's Supreme Court prohibited the practice of using innocent shields in arrests.

When the Israeli army went after suspected Palestinian terrorists, they would sometimes take an innocent neighbor from his house and require that he be the first to approach the suspect residence.

The army defended this practice by saying that the suspects would be less inclined to shoot at a neighbor than at an Israeli soldier, thus reducing the chance of a gun-battle.

In one such instance the innocent shield was 19-year-old Nidel Daraghmeh. He died in the gun battle that followed. In other incidents, innocent shields were wounded.

It is important to note that the people forced to act as innocent shields were not, themselves, suspects. It would be as if the police came to your house, told you that they thought that there were armed murderers a few houses down from yours, pulled you out of your house and forced you to go first into the suspects’ house. The police, of course, would be wearing their helmets and body armor. You would have on a T-shirt and pair of jeans.

I remember hearing of the concept of innocent shields brought up in my ethics class in school. The professor (I do not recall which one) would describe incidents during World War II where the Nazi army would fasten innocent shields taken from a village to their tanks when they went out to fight the partisans. The partisans could not attack the tanks without risking death or injury to the innocent shield.

It is not a tactic that we would expect from people of good moral character. In fact, using this tactic assumes that the enemy, in this case, has a better moral character than the protectors – that the suspect is less willing to risk the lives of innocent people than those who would use the innocent shield.

Here is a test for somebody who thinks that it is okay to take a stranger from his house and use them in that type of situation. Have the person who thinks that this is moral take somebody from his own family along to play the role of innocent shield, or to suffer the same fate. If the innocent shield should die, the family member also dies. If the innocent shield is wounded, the family member suffers the same wound.

Would the person employing innocent shields be willing to agree to this?

Morality is concerned with universal principles -- principles that apply equally to anybody. Failure to apply this concept equally leads to charges of hypocrisy and the infamous "double standard."

We tell the person of good character from those who are not because the person of good character lives by rules that he or she is willing to apply to everybody. If he is not willing to allow his own family to suffer the fate of the innocent shield, then he will not force that fate on others, then he is a hypocrite and certainly not a person of good moral character.

(2) Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) got the U.S. Senate to pass an amendment to the military spending bill that provides that “no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States government, regardless of nationality or location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The law is in response to reports that have frequently come out of US controlled prisons of prisoner maltreatment. The Bush Administration has answered these challenges by saying that those who actually torture prisoners and treat them inhumanely are being dealt with, but that its interrogation techniques count neither as torture or inhumane.

It is an attempt to make these acts legal by changing the definition of the words used in the law. It would be like arguing that the 20-year-old caught drinking did not break the law by asserting that 20 is greater than 21, and thus his acts are not illegal.

McCain, who was a prisoner during the Vietnamese War and tortured by his captors, stated that one of the firm beliefs he and his fellow prisoners had that helped them through this time was the belief that we were better than they were. McCain proposed this amendment as a way of preserving the moral high ground – a high ground that says that we are not only stronger than our enemies, but that we are better than them as well.

The Bush Administration argues that these techniques are necessary to save lives. However, we must also ask what it is that makes a life worth saving. The standard should be that the life saved belongs to somebody who holds to certain minimum standards regarding how others are treated.

The murder facing a death sentence that wounds a police officer in the course of his escape can honestly say that he is trying to save lives – in this case, his own. However, he is not saving a life that deserves saving, so his actions do not grant him the moral high ground.

Every day, the moral person gives up some personal advantage for the sake of what is right. He sees property he could take, but does not do so, because it is wrong. He sees a way to gain an advantage by lying, but foregoes the advantage, because lying is wrong. It is Machiavellian, at best, to argue that gaining some advantage is all that is needed to justify certain actions.

Others see this as well. In deciding who to support and how much support they deserve, they are wise to do so by looking at which side is the most deserving. It is reasonable to expect that those who look at the actions and policies of the Bush Administration find in them a team that is not worthy of as much support as they would otherwise be willing to give.

Some, perhaps, do not see much difference between us and our enemies. McCain’s Amendment, on the other hand, forces the recognition that ours is the morally superior side in this conflict. We recognize standards of human rights and decency that our opponents seek to ignore.

Nor can I ignore the fact that I, at least, cannot say who is being tortured. I have not heard of any trial taking place to determine who the victims will be. For all I know, the military picks up a group of citizens, tortures them for information, and keeps those who provide something useful. However, the guilty and innocent alike may be subject to torture.

I am not saying that this is taking place. However, the moral character of those who are responsible for these activities tells me that I cannot be sure that they are not taking place.

The next step for this law is a conference between the House and the Senate to iron out differences in the two versions of the bill. There is still a chance that this amendment may die in conference, giving Senators a chance to say that they voted against torture (by an overwhelming margin), while still allowing the practice of torture to go unchallenged. However, for this to happen, McCain would have to allow his amendment to die a quiet death.

I hope that this does not happen. I hope that we can prove that we are better than that.

Physician Assisted Suicide

States need the freedom to experiment with different ways of balancing the interests of those who have no reason to continue living with those who have an interest in avoiding a premature death.

Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments regarding Oregon’s law allowing patients with a terminal illness having less than 6 months to live to obtain a doctor’s assistance in ending their own lives. The patient must meet a set of requirements that includes two oral requests made at least 15 days apart and a written request with two witnesses. The doctor’s assistance, in this case, consists in writing a prescription for a lethal dose of barbiturates, which the patient administers to himself or herself.

John Ashcroft, when he was Attorney General of the United States, attempted to use the Controlled Substances Act – a law empowering the federal government to fight the recreational abuse of drugs – against doctors who prescribe a lethal dose of drugs.

Again, I want to say that I am not going to write about what the Constitution may or may not say on this issue. I am interested in the question of what the law should say, not on what the law actually says.

There are two issues under consideration here. The first issue whether patients ought or ought not to be allowed to seek medical help in ending their lives. The second issue is whether the Federal Government should interfere with a State’s decision to allow this practice.

With respect to the first issue, I am not going to limit myself to cases of patients who are conscious, of sound mind, capable of asking for assistance in ending their own lives, and capable of administering their own lethal dose of drugs, which the Oregon law requires. I am interested in a more general set of cases that include euthanasia, where a doctor administers the lethal dose because the patient is not able to.

The Right To Die

I can imagine myself, some time in a future, laying in a hospital bed, unable to do the things that mattered to me in life. For me, this means lacking the ability to log onto a computer, read what others have written, comprehend their words, and write a lucid and meaningful response that would be useful to others; and with no reasonable chance of ever regaining that ability. (Let’s leave aside the question of whether I can do these things even today.)

I have spent my life attempting to save a fairly substantial portion of my earnings so that I can leave something behind when I die – something that I can offer as a donation to a project for making the world better. One of my worries is that this money gets wasted caring for my body when it is of no further use to me. Somebody has to pay for this. While the doctors keep my body alive, they would be draining my savings and destroying that which gave my live meaning.

In that case, I regard this body as just so much wasted protoplasm, and I see no particularly good reason to keep this body alive.

Furthermore, I want that death to be done right. When my body and mind become no longer useful to me, I may not be able to take my own life. If I could, I would still be reading and writing. If I can no longer read and write, I am not likely going to be able to take my own life.

There are some who say that assisting me in my death would violate the doctor’s obligation to care for his patient. This begs the question. Caring for the patient means doing what is in the best interests of the patient. Harming a patient means acting against the patient’s interests. The case I described above is one where the patient’s interests are better served by death than by life. Other cases would have to consider the patient’s interest in avoiding pain. In these cases, the greater harm is done by keeping the patient alive.

Two Concerns

In spite of the arguments given above, I have a number of concerns. Two of the biggest concerns are the possibility that those who pay for medical care may go into the business of marketing death, and the effects of weakening the aversion to killing.

Insurance Incentives

One problem is that a patient’s doctor often works for the patient’s insurance company. The insurance company is interested in keeping costs down. Permitting such a ‘right’ will create situations where an insurance company is collecting, let us say, $500 per month of health insurance, but paying out $5,000 per month in treatment. To improve the bottom line, it would be profitable for the insurance company to market death as an alternative treatment.

I am not talking about some callous insurance executive working diligently to promote early death, gleefully marking progress on a graph that shows an ever increasing use of early death options and money saved (though this might happen).

I am more concerned with the subtle ways in which a person’s interests taint the way he interprets data. Personal interest sits in the background, causing people to give extra weight to evidence that supports a desired conclusion, while creating a dismissive uneasiness over evidence that contradicts the desired conclusion. These insurance companies would be convinced that they are promoting early death because it is the right thing to do without consideration of profits. Only, their sense of ‘right thing to do’ is tainted by a subconscious background consideration of profits.

They will market early death options under this mindset. Many patients, in turn, will probably respond to the insurance company’s marketing efforts.

Respect for Life

Another potential concern would be the effects of weakening respect for life.

I think it is possible that regions with no capital punishment tend to have lower murder rates is because they teach their children to have a stronger aversion to killing. Children growing up in a society opposed to capital punishment learn, “Killing is so bad that you should not even kill those who murder and are captured.” Because they have a stronger aversion to killing, the idea to killing is less likely to enter their minds when they get angry or desperate.

If it is true, then we also need to worry about the effect of saying that early death options are permissible. This, too, may lower an aversion to death that makes other types of death easier to contemplate.

This is not a ‘slippery slope’ argument saying that if we allow these options we will end up killing anybody who we find unattractive or unpleasant in any way. I’m certain that people are intelligent enough to draw these distinctions. These arguments are used as scare tactics by people who are unwilling to look at the situation more rationally and objectively.

However, there is room for a lot of wrongful death well before we get to the point where we are executing anybody who displeases us.

States Rights

With respect to both of these concerns, it may be possible to arrange things to harvest the true benefit of early-death options in those cases where it applies, while avoiding the harmful effects. In order to find out what the answers are, we need data.

In a country such as the United States, we can get some of this data by allowing each state to seek its own way on this issue. We should let each state experiment with systems that, to them, seem most likely to secure their safety and happiness. As the results of those state-level experiments come in, other states can use that information to improve upon their own system.

This is part of the value of freedom. Each of us allows our neighbors to live their lives as they see fit (within certain constraints), allowing them to experiment and, perhaps, to fail in what they seek to accomplish in their lives. We learn from them, as they learn from us, which (hopefully) will generate more success than failure. ‘States Rights’ harvests this value of freedom at the state level.

What this means for the case that is before the Supreme Court is that the morally best option (though, perhaps, constitutionally prohibited) is for the federal government to leave this issue in the hands of the separate states and their citizens. Even if the Attorney General has the power to categorize lethal doses of medicine as drug abuse, he should not have this power.

Ethics Without God II

A religion that tells its follows to attack their neighbors, or take over the government and use it against the interests of his neighbors, cannot foster morality, because attacking a neighbor is the very essence of immorality.

Note: I spent my day preparing for my appearance on the Infidel Guy show, so I had my head filled with thoughts about the relationship between God and ethics. I would like to address some of the issues that came up.

(1) There can be no objective values without God. Objective values exist. Therefore, God exists.

First, the standards of 'good neighborliness' that I discussed in yesterday's blog entry say that objective values can exist without God. It would be difficult to classify a rapist as a 'good neighbor' in the context that I described yesterday.

Second, the people who make this argument also believe that humans could not exist without God. They argue, "There can be no humans without a designer (God). Humans exist. Therefore, God exists."

Even if we assume that atheists (incorrectly) believe that the human body was not created by a God, this does not imply that he cannot study medicine and become a good doctor. In fact, atheists make very good doctors in spite of the fact that they do not believe in God. This is because questions about how the body came about -- by design, by evolution, or by guided evolution -- it functions the same way. Anybody can study it, learn how it works, and how to repair it.

Similarly, the first argument does not prove that somebody has to believe in God to be a good ethicist. Regardless of how morality got to be the way it is, the atheist can study it and learn how it works.

In a sense, this argues that ethics can be treated like science. There are many religious scientists. As they study and uncover the laws under which the universe works, they think of themselves as uncovering God's laws. God made the world this way, they think. That knowledge does not hinder their ability to study the universe, create theories to describe its working, and even apply those theories in engineering projects. Just as science says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of a God, neither does ethics.

(2) The reward of heaven and the fear of hell are good ways to encourage people to do good deeds and avoid evil. Atheists gain no reward of heaven and fear no hell, so they are less inclined to do good and avoid evil.

First, even if this is true, it does not prove the existence of a heaven and a hell. A snake oil salesman can get people to buy more snake oil if he can convince them that it cures baldness, but this doesn't mean that snake oil cures baldness.

Second, actually, empirical evidence does not support this claim. Atheists are less likely to commit crimes than theists. Countries in which atheists make up the largest portion of the population have lower murder rates, divorce rates, and teenage pregnancy rates than countries with more religious populations.

Now, I want to make an important statement about how these statements are not to be used. They disprove the statement that hell is a good way to motivate people against doing evil. The evidence suggests it does not work.

This evidence is not to be used to argue that atheists are morally superior to theists. Each individual has a right to be judged on his or her own record, not on his statistical association with some group. Evaluating individuals on the basis of group statistics is the very essence of bigotry and prejudice.

Third, whether the fear of hell and promise of heaven actually motivates a person to do good deeds depends on what that person has to do to avoid hell or get into heaven.

If he is encouraged to crash airplanes into skyscrapers, he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to hunt down and kill (i.e., burn at the stake) those who assert such things as the Earth is at the center of the solar system, he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to attack a neighboring town or country, killing its civilians, in some cases slaughtering every man, woman, and child, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to carry bombs onto busses and trains and into restaurants and shopping malls to kill as many innocent people as possible, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to take slaves, or to see nothing wrong when his neighbor takes slaves, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to stand in the way of important medical advances such as surgery, immunization (because preventing plagues will thwart God's will), or stem cell research, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to interfere with his homosexual neighbors' desires to live together in peace, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to stand in the way of women getting an education, or enjoying basic liberties such as driving or walking about in the fresh air, or the right to deny consent to the use of her body by another person, then he is not being motivated to be moral.

If he is encouraged to stand in the way of students getting a quality education in basic scientific principles such as evolution -- the foundation for advances in ecology, agriculture, and medicine -- then he is not being motivated to be moral.

In short, if a religion commands a follower to live in peace with his neighbor it may have some positive effect. However, if a religion commands followers to attack their neighbors -- perhaps directly, or by supporting laws that attack the interests of certain neighbors favor followers over non-followers, and the promise of heaven and fear of hell encourages these attacks against another’s wellbeing and happiness, then these forces are promoting evil deeds, not good deeds.

Whether a religion promotes that which is good depends on how good the religion is to start with.

Conclusion

Anybody reading through these blogs should be able to see them as applying the rules of good neighborliness.

A good neighbor does not prohibit his neighbor from getting the same government aid that other nonprofit organizations can get merely because his neighbor's nonprofit facility is a religious facility. Government Help Rebuilding Religious Facilities

A good neighbor does not support a Pledge of Allegiance that counts his peaceful neighbor's beliefs (a neighbor that does no harm) in the same category is as rebellion, tyranny, and injustice.The Moral Argument Against 'under God'

A good neighbor supports a search for the truth and institutions that best expose the truth. The Davis Committee

A good neighbor uses the Justice Department to target those who do wrong, rather than use it to target political opponents. Departmentof Injustice: Targeting Political Opponents

A good neighbor is at least as concerned with ending terrorism as he is with ending war. Anti-War/Anti-Terrorism

A good neighbor does pays his own bills, and does not pass those bills along (with interest) to his neighbor's children. National Debt

A good neighbor supports social policies that ensure that society does not suddenly find itself running out of resources that are vital to its health and wellbeing. Energy Prices and the Folly of Price Controls

These are all part of what it means to live at peace with one's neighbor and not attack him. There will be more examples to come.

Ethics Without God

I am going to be appearing on the Infidel Guy show at 8:00 Eastern Time on Friday, October 7th.

The topic of that discussion will be Theistic moral claims and why they fail.

In this regard, I assume that one of the questions that people may have over the possibility of this site is that "The Atheist Ethicist" is a contradiction in terms -- like "The Round Square". Since you cannot have ethics without religion, you cannot have an ethicist who does not believe in God.

Ethics Without God

Actually, you can, quite simply. Let me explain how by laying out the foundation for an ethics without God.

When I was a young teenager, I put my hand on a piece of hot metal -- my whole hand, palm-down, on a piece of metal that had just cooled to the point that it no longer glowed. I snapped my hand back immediately, but the metal still blistered the palm of my hand with 2nd degree burns.

I do not need to believe in God to know that I do not want anything like that to happen again. A person does not have to believe in God to have likes and dislikes, and to dislike some things (e.g., 2nd degree burns) very much.

I don't need to believe in God to have a reason to take action to prevent those things from happening. If we talk more generally about "being burned", I do not need to believe in God to have smoke alarms installed in my house, make sure the house is well wired, and have a fire department established and staffed with people who will rush over and rescue me and my family.

The same is true of my neighbors. They, also, do not need to believe in God to take precautions against the possibility of fire or the creation of a fire department to fight a fire if one should start.

Also, my neighbors and I have reason to hold electricians and fire-department staff to certain standards. We want our houses wired so that they do not catch fire. If they do catch fire, we want the fire-fighters there promptly and sufficiently trained to do the work assigned to them.

It's also not the case that just any old standards would do. We cannot draw a set of random standards out of a hat and say, "These will be our standards for a good electrician, or a good firefighter." Some electricians will be better than others.

Not only do we have reason to set standards for electricians and firefighters, but we also have reason to set standards for neighbors. Again, it is not the case that just any old standards will do. We have reason to seek neighbors that will help in times of need, and refrain from doing harm at all other times.

Furthermore, we have tools available to help us establish these standards. Those tools are praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. The individual teaching others the standards for being a good neighbor praises those who are kind and helpful, and condemns those who do harm. The technique is particularly powerful when it is applied to children; they pick up these standards much more easily. However, it also works on adults.

The standards that I use when I write these essays are the standards of good neighborliness.

If There Is No God

"Alonzo, if there is no God, than what is to keep you from doing evil things?"

Answer: Because I do not want to.

Assume that I have an opportunity to walk off with something that belongs to somebody else -- some money that they have left sitting around, or something else of value. I know that there is nobody watching, no hidden cameras, no way to tell that I took the money.

The question, "Why don't I take the money?" is like the question, "Why don't you stick your hand on a hot metal plate?" Because of my aversion to being burned, you can trust that I will not stick my hand on a hot metal plate (on purpose), even if you were to leave me alone in a room with nobody to watch over me. I do not need to be told of a God who will punish me if I put my hand on that plate. I can be trusted not to do this even if there is no God.

The same is true with taking other people's money. I do not take it because I am adverse to taking things that belong to other people. Even when there is nobody looking over my shoulder, I am no more inclined to take the money than I am to touch the hot metal plate.

In the previous section, I discussed how we teach the standards for being a good neighbor through praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. This is what we are teaching. We are trying to create people who are so averse to taking things that do not belong to them, that they will not take money even when there is nobody looking over their shoulder.

We do so by praising honesty and condemning dishonesty to the degree that each of us approaches the possibility of taking money belonging to somebody else the way we view sticking our hand on a hot metal plate. We will not do it, even when we are alone.

Similarly, we are trying to create people who like to help others to the degree that they will volunteer to do so even when there is no reward in it, just like those who do not ask, "What is in it for me?" before they will eat a donut. The answer of the question, "What is in it for me?" is, for the good person, the simple fulfillment of the desire to help others.

The Meaning of Life

On a broader scale, there is the question, "How can your life have meaning if you do not believe in God?"

Answer: There is no God. Spending one's life in service to an entity that does not exist is a waste. It is like spending one's life digging a hole to bury something that does not exist, or holding up a wall that has no chance of falling. If a person remains ignorant that his life served no purpose, he may die thinking that he has lived this fulfilled life. In fact, tragically, his life was wasted.

I choose to help entities that are real. I choose to help people who are a part of the real world, who feel real pain and suffering, and who know real joy and sorrow.

Furthermore, the beings that I choose to help lack perfect wisdom and omnipotence, so they could use my help. Even if there is a God, He does not need me and there is nothing that I can do for Him that He cannot do for himself. If a neighbor at risk of suffering some harm or injustice exists or will exist, I might be able to offer real help. I might be able to help him avoid suffering he might not have been able to avoid himself.

I choose to help real people who could use my help, rather than an imaginary being who would not need my help even if it actually did exist. Comparing the two options, it is easy to decide which has the most meaning.

Government Help Rebuilding Religious Facilities

The American Atheist organization is opposing S 1765 on the basis that it contains a provision for rebuilding churches and other religious facilities damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The organization thinks that it is wrong for the government to pay for the construction of churches -- that it violates the Constitutional separation between church and state.

Before I get into this discussion, I want to insert my usual disclaimer. This blog is concerned with ethics, not Constitutional law. Any Constitution can allow immoral and unjust laws -- such as slavery before 1865.

There is a moral argument for the separation of church and state that transcends any constitutional argument. This means, even if the constitutional prohibition against blending the two, there is a moral objection.

The moral principle at stake here is that no citizen should be required to fund a church that he does not belong to and does not support. Each religion should stand depend solely on the support of those who voluntarily elect to support it, and no church should be permitted to step outside that circle and compel support from those who are not members.

Each church, or each religion, may certainly attempt to persuade others to become members. If a religion cannot gain enough voluntary followers to do what it wants, it has no right to turn to the Government and say, "Make him pay!"

Accordingly, the moral principle of separation of church and state says that I shall not prohibit you from building a temple on your property if you wish to do so; you shall not require me to pay for its construction.

Katrina Damage

So, why is it that repairing damage done by Hurricane Katrina does not violate this principle?

The provision of S 1765 under consideration says this:

SEC. 204. DISASTER RELIEF EQUITY: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the religious status of a private nonprofit facility located in an area in which a major disaster relating to Hurricane Katrina was declared by the President under section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 12 Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170), or of the owner or operator of such a facility, shall not preclude the facility from being eligible to receive Federal assistance for use in repairing, restoring, reconstructing, or replacing the facility following damage or destruction of the facility as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

The relevant part of Title 42 mentioned above allows the President to make contributions “(2) to a person who owns or operates a private nonprofit facility damaged or destroyed by a major disaster for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of such facility and for associated expenses incurred by such person.”

This provision does not set aside money specifically for the purpose of aiding religious organizations. Rather, it says that religious organizations, as nonprofit organizations, should obtain exactly the same benefits available to other nonprofit organizations -- no more and no less.

Flood Insurance

Flood insurance is issued by the federal government. People do not buy flood insurance for their homes primarily from private businesses; they buy it from the federal government. In case of a flood -- a serious flood such as when a river overflows its banks -- the federal government pays the costs.

We do not prohibit religious facilities from purchasing flood insurance. In spite of the fact that the money comes from the federal government and goes to a religious institution, this does not violate the separation of church and state – as long as the religious institution is treated like any other customer.

In fact, the moral requirement to separate church and state would be violated if the federal government were compelled to deny flood insurance for a facility that would otherwise qualify, if it were not a religious institution. This type of restriction puts religious institutions at an unfair disadvantage.

We have to ask the same question of those who suffered damage from Hurricane Katrina. Why put that special advantage whereby they cannot obtain the benefits that every other nonprofit organization may obtain? The only answer is, "Because they are religious," as if that provides a legitimate ground for exclusion.

Equal Consideration

Equal consideration, in this case, means that religious institutions have to fulfill the same limits and criteria as non-religious non-profit organizations.

They cannot use the money to construct a new church. This would violate the principle that "You may freely build a temple on your property if you wish; but you may not compel me to pay for it." They may restore what the natural disaster has taken from them to the same degree that any other nonprofit may do so, but they may not go beyond that and build things they did not have before using my money.

Abuse

The one legitimate concern that this issue raises is that of abuse. A President could easily decide to make significantly greater contributions to religious institutions than he makes to nonreligious nonprofit institutions. In fact, a President lacking the virtue of fairness may spend all public money on repairing only the facilities of religious institutions and leaving others to suffer.

Yet, the abuse could also go the other direction, with religious nonprofit institutions getting none of the funds available to other nonreligious institutions.

The possibility that an individual may act in prejudicial and discriminatory manner in executing the duties of his office is not an argument against giving him those duties. It is an argument for making sure that the people who are put in that office have a sense of fairness and justice, and for holding accountable those who do not.

Conclusion

I have a sense that the American Atheists may have jumped on this issue simply by looking at the fact that it is a government issue that puts money into the pockets of those who believe in God.

This, itself, is not a moral crime. It is simplistic at best to look at an issue merely according to whether money goes from the public treasury to a religious institution to determine if a person has been treated unfairly. It is just as unfair to put an institution under a special disadvantage relative to others.

Some may question what this implies about faith-based initiatives. Would I argue that religious institutions have an equal right to participate in these funds?

Here, I would argue that they had an equal right before Bush’s faith-based initiative began. Religious institutions had every right to set up a secular organization that could qualify for government assistance to help those in need. The separate function helped to guarantee that no individual ended up supporting a religion that he did not belong to. The “Faith-Based Initiative” did not correct an underlying unfairness in obtaining government benefits.

S1746, on the other hand, simply states that religious facilities are not to be placed at an unfair disadvantage in obtaining government assistance. It is a fair and just proposal.

Contempt for the Average American

A number of Republicans and Republican supporters are claiming that we the people of the United States cannot be trusted to competently perform the duties entrusted to us when we sit on Grand Juries.

Former Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Tom Delay (R- Tex), and other Republicans, are insisting that the Grand Jury system does not work. The reason it does not work is because the people who sit on Grand Juries -- average American citizens like you and me -- are too incompetent to do the job entrusted to us.

The Plot

DeLay is protesting that his recent indictment on charges of illegally funneling $155,000 in corporate contributions to Republican candidates in Texas is the product of a Democratic district attorney out for “political retribution”.

He claims that Travis County District Attorney Ronnie Earle was aiming to use House rule that a party leader must resign that leadership position if indicted. According to DeLay and his defenders, Earle is not really seeking to convict DeLay, only force him from power in the House.

However, District Attorneys are not empowered to indict people. They have to present their evidence to a Grand Jury. The Grand Jury has to decide whether there is enough evidence for a trial.

So, if DeLay is correct in saying that the indictment was concocted for political reasons, he must either think that the Grand Jury is a part of this conspiracy, or that its members are not competent to do the job that Grand Juries are supposed to do – which is to protect us from overzealous government officials.

Actually, DeLay has to say that two separate Grand Juries were incompetent. One grand jury handed down the first indictment on September 28th, while a second grand jury handed down separate indictments on October 4th.

This causes me to ask the question of whether DeLay and his defenders believe that it is even possible to have a competent Grand Jury capable of doing the job assigned to it.

The Purpose of Grand Juries

The purpose of Grand Juries is to prevent the government from harassing citizens with frequent, unfounded, criminal accusations. They did not want a state where government officials can arrest a person week after week on a different trumped-up criminal charge, playing havoc with the life of a citizen who could not fight back.

To prevent this abuse, the Founding Fathers enacted the 5th Amendment that “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” Several state constitutions follow the same rules.

In principle, the Grand Jury allows us, as free citizens, to live without the fear of arbitrary government arrest and imprisonment. The government cannot take us whenever it wants. It must, instead, present its evidence to a collection of fellow citizens and prove to those citizens that it has enough reason to demand our arrest.

Therefore, the people who sit on Grand Juries have a duty. They are not rubber stamps for the District Attorney’s office. If all we wanted was a rubber stamp, we could buy one that was a lot less expensive and inconvenient than a Grand Jury. Instead, a Grand Jury is a quality-control department for the criminal justice system. Their job is to review the District Attorney's work and make sure that it is up to standards, and pass only that work that meets or exceeds those standards.

Just to be clear; the people on a Grand Jury do not decide guilt or innocence. Their job is to make sure that the prosecutor has good reason to go after a fellow citizen -- to prevent the harassment and social disruption of a arbitrary arrests and trials. Their job is to prevent bad trials from taking place.

In light of this, whenever DeLay and his defenders say that these indictments represent a politically motivated attack by a partisan Democrat against a powerful Republican, they also have to be saying that the Grand Juries that handed down these indictments did not do their job. These Republicans have to be understood as saying that common people are not to be trusted in doing the job entrusted to them by the Constitution of the United States.

In fact, anybody who protests an indictment is saying that the Grand Jury that handed down the indictment was incompetent.

It is one thing to say, "Okay, now that I have been indicted, once you hear my side of the story, you will know that I am innocent." It is something else to say, "Even before you heard my side of the story, you should have known that there was no good reason to doubt my innocence."

The first comment says that the Grand Jury did its duty. The second comment accuses the Grand Jury of incompetence.

DeLay's Chorus

DeLay is not the only one making statements that implies that American citizens cannot perform the duties of manning Grand Juries competently. Robert Novak, in his nationally syndicated column, wrote that, “Democrats were . . . determined to use the criminal process to remove from power so formidable an antagonist.”

This is exactly the types of abuse that Grand Juries are supposed to prevent. Therefore, if the Democrats are seeking to use this strategy, then Grand Juries cannot be trusted to do their duty when these types of situations arise.

Representative Christopher Shays (R – Conn) bluntly stated that prosecutors can persuade a grand jury to “indict a tomato”. That is to say that prosecutors can convince us – you and me – to indict a tomato.

Maybe he is right. Maybe it is only vanity and ego that prevents me from seeing how easily I can be convinced to indict a tomato. Maybe Shays is identifying one of those ugly truths that people just do not want to hear.

Clearly, Tom Delay, Robert Novak, and Christopher Shays have contempt for our ability to deal intelligently and competently with the responsibilities handed to us when we sit on Grand Juries.

The question that remains unanswered is whether their contempt for our abilities is justified or unjustified.