Finishing the Last Paper, Planning the Next

In 271 days I attend my first class.

Recent projects include reading John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism, and starting John Locke 's Two Treatise on Civil Government.

I am actually including the first treatise, which is usually skipped, and for good reason. In it, Locke argues against a Sir Robert Filmer, who used scripture to defend the absolute power and divine right of kings. Locke argues that scripture contains no such proof.

I, of course, hold that scripture provides a foundation for nothing in morals or politics, it being the imaginative fictions of substantially ignorant tribes. Still, it is an interesting cultural study of what once was - and in some unfortunate parts of the world still is - thought to be an important process.

In this treatise, one can still see and be impressed by Locke's sharp mind - and surprised at how that sharp mind can treat scripture as revealed truth rather than an ancient fiction.

As a side note, he also gives an excellent account, from scripture, of the equality between men and women - or, at least, of husbands and wives. And argues that a wife's subjugation to her husband, like the pain of child birth, provides no reason to continue to suffer that state any longer than it takes to find the means to end it. This - in the late 1600s.

Oh, and I, at one time, thought of Mill as a type of motive utilitarian. He does make the noises of a motive utilitarian when discussing the love of virtue and the sentiment of justice, he does, for the most part, fit a rule-utilitarian mold.

And, I continue work on my paper - which I am now calling, "A Motive Utilitarian Account of Condemnation and Punishment."

As is usually the case, "editing" a document involves completely rewriting it - and this is no exception. However, I am going to make it a rule that, once I get done with this draft, there will be no more substantive rewrites unless evidence is found that I have made a significant error. Instead, I intend to do what philosophers had done generally - which is to create a new edition that addresses some concerns and mentions some additional implications, but the structure of the paper will not change.

I have, as promised, added footnotes and citations - linking to the works of other authors.

I am not mentioning desirism because (1) I still find it a bit pretentious to have my own ethical theory, and (2) I do not want to clutter the discussion. However, in the conclusion of the paper I will point out how the considerations raised in the paper actually yield an implication that utilitarianism - as traditionally understood - is flawed. Motives are not ultimately to be evaluated according by the degree to which they maximize utility, but motives are to be evaluated by the degree that they fulfill or thwart other desires - this providing the reasons that exist to either promote or to inhibit the desire in question.

In this edition, whole sections have vanished - such as the section on the neuroscience of punishment. I need to study that field more before I make claims about its findings - and that is something I intend to do in graduate school. I can take a limited number of courses outside of the department - and I think a class on the neuroscience of "reward" (and punishment) will be rewarding. And the University of Colorado at Boulder has a "Center for Neuroscience" that coordinates activities in 13 departments including philosophy.

As a possible future course of action, I may send the center an email describing my research interest to see if there is anybody there willing to give me some advice on the topic. This, in turn, can be the subject of another paper.

In fact, now that I am nearly finished with this one and I am resolving not to make substantive changes, I want to start researching and working on the next paper - and I am trying to figure out what that next paper should be.

Perhaps I will build on my criticism of Peter Singer and Sam Harris and their use of "external reasons" that do not exist.

Perhaps I will write a paper on the distinction between reasons that an agent has ("to have a reason") and reasons that exist ("there exists a reason").

Perhaps I will discuss the false dichotomy of objective versus subjective morality, and how the vague definitions of these terms keep people debating something that would be settled if people only learned to speak clearly.

Perhaps I will defend my claim that J.L. Mackie is a "schmoral" realist.

Perhaps I will explain how J.S. Mill can defend his utilitarianism from the criticisms of G.E. Moore.

Perhaps I should write on a theory of excuse that describes moral excuses as statements that break the implication from what looks on the face of it to be a wrong action to the conclusion that the agent failed to have good motives.

Perhaps I will address Henry Sidgwick's objections to motives being the ultimate object of moral evaluation.

. . . . um . . . that last one. Yeah. That sounds like a good project. I have already been reading Sidgwick - and it will contribute to my project of getting a basic understanding of moral and political philosophy before classes start. Sidgwick is one of those authors that moral philosophers would be expected to have read and understood. And I will try to write it in such a way that a fan of desirism can hand it out to their friends and family and say, "See, this is what I am talking about. Morality is about evaluating motives, not about evaluating actions."

A Moral Aversion to Harming the Innocent

306 days until the first day of classes.

Motivated by comments made by David Jocquemotte, I have made a couple of attempts to get my previous post, Sam Harris and Peter Singer's External Moral Reasons out in the world a bit - so that those authors and their followers can at least take a look at and assess the objection.

In other news, I learned in an email from Dr. Boonin that he has not been following the literature on theories of punishment since he published his book. Which is too bad. It means he would likely not have an interest in reading my response either. But, I will finish the argument.

Which I should get to presently.

Let's see now . . . where did I leave off?

In Part I I presented a moral aversion theory of punishment.

In Part II I looked at Boonin's definition of punishment and showed how moral aversion theory was a theory of punishment on his definition.

In Part III I presented the consequentialist theory of punishment and some of the major problems with it - particularly the problem that it sometimes justifies punishing the innocent when it can do the most good.

Now, here, in Part IV, I will look at how moral aversion theory begins to tackle the problem of punishing the innocent.

Punishing the Innocent

Standard utilitarian arguments have a problem in that they justify punishing the innocent. They look only at the effects of punishment - not at the punishment itself (except at the harm contained within it). The guilt of the accused has relevance in the justification of punishment only insofar as it has relevance in determining the effects of punishment. The objection, “But he is not guilty!” can be set aside with, “So what?”

Moral aversion theory touches on this problem first by noting that the way to generate a moral aversion is to punish and condemn people for the types of actions that one wants people to have an aversion to performing. To create an aversion to lying one condemns liars. To create an aversion to theft one condemns and punishes theft. The punishment must be about that which one wants people to form an aversion to. It makes little sense to hold an innocent person's hand in a fire until everyone else is the room acquires an aversion to romance novels.

However, one can still obtain the benefits even of promoting moral aversions by punishing someone that people believe committed the type of actions that one wants to promote an aversion to. 

On the other hand, if one is going to invent a fiction to promote a moral aversion then one might as well make it a fiction through and through. A parable, novel, or book in which the villain is punished - or even suffers misfortune - because that villain committed a particular type of action would have the same effect without harming an innocent person. One could respond that specific harm may be particularly useful in bringing about specific deterrence, but if the accused is not guilty, there is no need for specific deterrence. 

This is going to bring up a question, “Why punish at all? Why not just use stories?” This is an important question, and I will return to it later. 

For now, I want to turn to a more direct answer to the problem of punishing the innocent. 

The critic of utilitarianism tells us a story about punishing the innocent. We find this intuitively wrong. What is going on when we find this to be intuitively wrong?

I suggest that this moral intuition is, in fact, an a moral aversion expressing itself in our feelings about a state in which an innocent person is harmed. Moral aversion theory then takes this moral aversion - this intuition – and asks what it means to have such an aversion and whether we should keep it. 

Technically, I would argue that what we have is a moral aversion to harming the innocent and, since to punish the innocent is to harm that person, this implies a moral aversion to punishing the innocent. 

What does it mean to have a moral aversion to harming the innocent? 

Having a moral aversion means that we are going to see the fact that a person is innocent as a reason not to punish that person. This reason is an end-reason. That is to say, our reluctance to punish the innocent person is not grounded on knowing that doing so will thwart some others desire (e.g., maximizing human flourishing). It means avoiding a state of punishing the innocent simply because because it is a case of punishing the innocent. This is true in the same way that a decision not to eat broccoli for somebody who has an aversion to eating broccoli is something that the person avoids for its own sake, not because eating broccoli will thwart some other desire or interest. It means avoiding a state of eating broccoli because it is a state of eating broccoli. 

Having a moral aversion to punishing the innocent also means that the agent has a reason to avoid eating broccoli even if it doing so would otherwise create a better world. A world that is better when we ignore the fact that it contains an instance of harming the innocent becomes worse when we add that fact to the mix. It means that the agent who is considering the option of punishing the innocent has a reason to look for another alternative that does not contain an instance of punishing the innocent - and to take it - even if the world in which the innocent person is punished - when we ignore that fact - would be a better world. It means accepting an inferior outcome when the otherwise superior outcome requires harming the innocent. 

However, it also means that if the other concerns are weighty enough, they may outweigh the aversion to punishing the innocent. For example, put the  survival of humanity sits on the scale opposite that of punishing the innocent, then the agent may overcome the aversion and punish the innocent. However, that will not end the foul taste that would come from harming the innocent to realize this important end. The health benefits of broccoli might give us a reason to eat it in spite of its taste, but it will not make broccoli taste good. The benefits of saving humanity from destruction will not make the fact that one had to punish an innocent person taste good either.

An aversion to harming the innocent is consistent with having no aversion to harming the guilty. However, the aversion would generate a motive to make sure that the person being punished is not innocent. This would motivate such institutions as a trial by jury and a presumption of innocence that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

What does it mean to keep the aversion? 

It means if we catch somebody intentionally harming the innocent, we are going to be disposed to condemn and possibly punish that person. We are going to punish that person BECAUSE that person harmed the innocent. We are going to do so while asserting that harming the innocent is to be avoided for its own sake – even when it is a means to achieving some other end. 

Now, if we justify creating and promoting this aversion based on its consequences, we are going to have to ask if some other set of motives may produce better consequences. If harming the innocent is sometimes useful, then perhaps we should not be generating an aversion to harming the innocent in all cases. Where punishing the innocent is useful, perhaps we should have no aversion to punishing the innocent in those cases. 

Boonin brings up these types of considerations in his objections to rule-utilitarian theories of punishment. The rule utilitarian argues that a rule to punish the guilty but not the innocent produces the best consequences, so that is why we should adopt this rule. Any specific case of punishment is then justified in virtue of conforming to this set of rules. Boonin argues that there are three ways in which the rule utilitarian defense can fail. It can fail in virtue of the fact that it is not the case that the best rules always prohibit punishing the innocent. It can fail in virtue of the fact that the rule utilitarian defense still implies the uncomfortable conclusion that if such a rule maximized utility, then punishing the innocent would be justified. Finally, the rule utilitarian defense needs to explain why it is not permissible to violate the rules when violating them would produce the best consequences. Boonin argues that a moral-aversion theory would have to handle the same set of objections.

I am going to look at these issues in the next post.

Sam Harris and Peter Singer's External Moral Reasons

A member of the studio audience pointed me to a podcast of a discussion between Sam Harris and Peter Singer, where they spent the first few minutes discussing meta-ethics. The relevant part of the discussion takes place in the first 30 minutes or so of Episode 48 of Waking Up with Sam Harris

Both Harris and Singer reach a quick agreement that moral value exists in states of affairs that somehow generate reasons for everybody to act so as to realize such a state. Somehow, when matter arranges itself in particular ways, these reasons emerge and they are automatically applicable to every sentient creature, regardless of their individual interests or concerns.

Explaining what these external regions are, how they emerge, how they interact with every sentient creature, and how we know they exist is a problem. It is such a problem, in fact, that the most reasonable position to hold is that external reasons - like God - do not exist. They are pure fiction.

In fact, there is a close relationship between building morality on a foundation of external reasons and building morality on a foundation of divine command. God is, after all, the ultimate external reason. The atheist who believes in external reasons is an atheist who believes in God without the attributes of personality - at least insofar as the relationship between the object of that belief and morality goes. The commandments of external reasons - the commandments that external reasons theorists preach about - have the same status as divine commandments.

Let me make good on this claim that Harris and Singer are postulating the existence of external reasons.

Harris and Singer ask us to imagine two possible worlds. In the first world, every conscious creature is enduring as much suffering as possible for as long as possible. The other world contains less suffering. Harris tells us that it is a simple fact that the second world is better than the first world. We are then told that this implies that everybody has a reason - that there exists some sort of reason - to bring about the second world rather than the first world.

The fact that this is an external reason is grounded in the fact that this reason applies to everybody, regardless of their individual concerns.

Let us imagine a slightly different scenario. Let us imagine a universe in which every being but one is suffering as much and as long as possible, and one being is content and happy. Compare this to an alternative universe in which all being but one is content and happy, and one being - the same being that is content in the first universe - is suffering as much and as long as possible. We can agree that it is true that the second world is better than the first world. However, it does not follow that the one creature who is contented in the first world has a reason to choose the second universe over the first. If he has a reason, what is it? Where did he come from? How did he get it? If, when you point out to him that the rest of the world is suffering as much and as long as possible, when he shrugs his shoulders and says, "So what? What is that to me?" what is your answer?

There is no answer. External reasons do not exist. Internal reasons are the only kinds of reasons that exist.

Bernard Williams defended a concept of internal reasons (all reasons that exist) that I find quite useful.

A has a reason to φ iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his φ-ing. (Williams, B., 1979. “Internal and External Reasons,” reprinted in Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 101–13.)

My pain creates in me a reason to act in ways that would reduce or eliminate that pain, but it does not create a reason for anybody else to act so as to reduce my pain. They only have a reason to act if they have a desire that would be served by removing my pain.

In other words, suffering provides internal reasons for the being that suffers. However, for everybody else, reasons to end his suffering would count as external reasons - they are, after all, external to those who are not suffering.

This is not a defense of egoism (though many egoists mistakenly believe that it is). This is because others can have a desire that nobody be in pain, or there may be specific others who have an aversion to my being in pain. Thus, they may have non-selfish reasons to act to bring about an end to my pain. Non-selfish desires exist. The egoist equivocates between the fact that a person's reasons to act are found in that person's own desires and aversions (which is true), and a person's desires and aversions are always self-interested (which is false).

Desires and aversions create reasons to act for the people who have them. No desire or aversion creates a reason for anybody else to act. Nothing other than desires and aversions create reasons to act.

It follows as a matter of fact that, in a universe in which every being suffers as much as possible for as long as possible (an example that Sam Harris uses) is that every being has a reason to remove itself and those others that it cares about from that situation. It is built into the definition of suffering that it is a state that the sufferer has an aversion to being in - and thereby has a reason to avoid. If the sufferer shrugs its shoulders and says, "This isn't bad. I kinda like this," then it is not suffering.

However, it is not the case that any individual has a reason to remove any other individual from that state. Being A has a reason to remove being A from that state, but has no reason to remove being B UNLESS being A has a desire that would be fulfilled by removing being B. If, for example, A is in love with B and is perhaps suffering BECAUSE being B is suffering, then A would have a reason to remove B from that state. However, in the absence of a desire, an agent has no reason to act.

Here, a lot of atheists make another mistake. If we cannot be realists about external reasons, then we cannot be realists about morality. External-reasons realism and moral realism walk hand in hand, sharing the same fate.

This is not true.

Internal reasons are real. That is to say, desires and aversions are real and help to explain observations we make in the real world (e.g., the behavior of intentional agents). An objective morality built on internal reasons would be real.

In fact, I am a moral realists. There are moral facts. However, no moral fact depends on the existence of external reasons - just as no moral fact depends on the existence of God.

There are cases in which it is objectively true that A has a desire that P. There are cases in which it is objectively true that φ-ing will fulfill this desire that P. Consequently, there are cases in which it is objectively true that A has a reason to φ. This means that there are cases in which it is objectively true that A ought to φ.

There are different meanings of "ought". Here, I am not talking about a moral ought. I am talking about a prima-facie practical ought - a practical ought. This is an ought that exists, but can be overridden by counter-weighing reasons not to φ. If this were the only reason that exists - if there were no counter-weighing reasons not to φ, then it is also true that the agent ought to φ all things considered. Why not? The only kind of reason that can be given not to φ would, itself, have to come from another desire served by not φ-ing.

Now, if A is in a state where A is suffering as much and for as long as possible, then A has a reason to remove itself from that state. If A can remove itself from that state by φ-ing, then A has a reason to φ.

Now, let φ-ing be an act that makes a change in agent B. For example, let us assume that A is suffering is being B is hitting him with a stick. Let us further assume that A can cause in B an aversion to hitting B with a stick. A now has a reason to φ - to cause B to have an aversion to hitting A with a stick. As soon as B has an aversion to hitting A with a stick, B has a reason to stop hitting A with a stick. This reason - as well as the reason that A acted on to bring about this change in B - are both internal reasons.

These are all knowable facts in a universe where these reasons exist. Nothing here is imaginary or just a matter of opinion.

We can talk about these same types of facts being true in whole communities. It is not at all difficult to see that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote aversions to lying, thieving, raping, murdering, breaking promises, assault, and a list of similar act-types. Another of the things that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote that Harris seems particularly interest in is an aversion to responding to mere words with violence – a moral aversion that can be described as "the right to freedom of speech". Women – and anybody who cares about them – have reason to cause people to have an aversion to denying women the opportunity to live rich and fulfilling lives. The reasons for establishing these states are all internal reasons – no external reason exists.

Saying that people generally have many and strong reasons to bring about these aversions does not imply that each individual has a reason to bring about these aversions. This is true in the same way that the fact that the average height of a group of people in a room is 5'8" does not imply that every individual is 5'8". However, it is objectively true nonetheless. One cannot disprove it by pointing to a person who is 5'4" - and one cannot disprove the fact that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote an aversion to theft by pointing out that Frank does not have a reason to promote an aversion to theft. Though, if Frank has a reason to be secure in his property, he certainly does have a reason to promote an aversion to theft.

Importantly, we have a way to cause people to have desires and aversions. The reward system of the brain processes rewards and punishments to change what individuals like and dislike - it alters their preferences. Praise functions as a type of reward to produce desires, while condemnation acts as a type of punishment to produce aversions. There is a reason why rewards (such as praise) and punishments (such as condemnation) are built into the heart of morality. These are the tools we use to mold desires - to create such things as the aversion to breaking promises and the desire to repay debts.

Consequently, the claim that people generally have many and strong reasons to φ, where φ = condemn and punish thieves, is an objective fact. The same applies to praising acts of charity and self sacrifice, as well as condemning lying, rape, murder, assault, slavery, genocide, and the like.

All of these facts are built entirely on internal reasons. We do not need to postulate any external reasons. Nor do we need to postulate the existence of any gods.

If you want to have moral claims that are true in the real world, then you are going to have to have a morality that is grounded on internal reasons alone. Internal reasons are the only kinds of reasons that exist. Building morality on external reasons - as Harris and Singer have done - is as flawed as building morality on the existence of a god.

The Intrinsic Value of an Animal Life

Classes start in 346 days.

I am nearing the end of my project of going through all of the Philosophy Bites podcasts - about 25 to go. I still think that I can make a contribution. I find philosophers saying things that I take to be mistaken.

Let's consider Christine Korsgaard on the Status of Animals.

Korsgaard holds a Kantian theory of value. This is an intrinsic value theory that holds that some acts or states of affairs are good in themselves - independent of desires.

She accepts the idea that all good is good for some conscious creature. It seems that she would deny that a waterfall in a mountain valley surrounded by forest vegetation, but devoid of animals, has any value. It would have value for any animals that lived there, so long as the environment was compatible with their living a long and healthy life. For Korsgaard, an animal living a healthy life has intrinsic value - it is a good that provides all people with a reason for action. Thus, it is morally permitted to act in a way that denies an animal a healthy life - to do something that is not good for the animal, such as to kill it and eat it.

In other words, using Kant's model, it is wrong to treat an animal as a means only and not, at the same time, as an end in itself. One must always consider what is good for that animal. In other words, it is wrong to kill an animal and eat it.

Korsgaard provided a useful analogy between her view and Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism. The usefulness of this analogy is found in the fact that people often compare and confuse the theory that I defend with Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism. I received a question on that issue just a few weeks ago.

Korsgaard reported that Peter Singer expressed the view that there would be no moral difference if one animal (one's pet dog) died and another animal stepped in to replace him. There would be just as much doggie desire satisfaction in the world, and that is what determines moral value.

The view I defend is different from both of these. Desires provide the only end-reasons for intentional action and, only then, they are reasons only for the being that have the desires. They are reasons to use tools such as praise and condemnation to mold the desires of others - thus giving others different reasons to act and, thereby, causing them to behave differently. The desires of the cat living in the scene described above gives the cat reasons to act in particular ways - even if the cat does not know this.

Against Korsgaard, no end-reason for intentional action can be found that is intrinsic to a state of affairs in which an animal is living a healthy life. Against Singer, no end-reason for intentional action can be found merely in the fact of a satisfied preference. The animal has reason to seek its own healthy life; in fact, a "healthy life" is simply a life in which one's physical and mental functioning is such as to fulfill the desires of the creature living it. Similarly, the animal's desires provide the animal with reasons to act so as to fulfill those desires. That is as far as it goes.

Intrinsic values do not exist. Korsgaard and Singer are "making things up" - the way that one may make up the commands of a god that does not exist in order to get people to do what this imaginary god requires them to do. This is not to say that they are being deceptive - they sincerely believe that these entities exist, just as many people sincerely believe that a god exists. The fact is, they do not.

One of the ways to see that these types of entities do not exist is to look at the relationship between an animal predator and prey. The antelope's long and healthy life does not create any type of intrinsic reason for the lion to refrain from hunting the antelope. Nor does the antelope's preference satisfaction create such a reason. The lion's reasons for action have to do entirely with the lion's hunger and other interests, such as feeding and caring for her young.

The main point of this illustration is to point out that there is no reason to believe that

The standard respose to this is that lions are not moral agents - but that response is not applicable here. We are talking about the existence of a reason. When we observe what is happening in nature with respect to the lion or the antelope, we see no reason to believe that an "intrinsic value property" (what J.L. Mackie calls and intrinsic "ought to be doneness" or "ought not to be doneness") is anywhere in the picture. We can understand everything that happens without inventing such an entity.

Animals do have reason to cause us to behave in ways that are compatible with their interests. Unfortunately, they do not know how to do this. Evolution takes care of this to some extent by making them "cute" to us, or useful to us, but these poorly track their interests at this point. However, animals lack the capacity to intentionally take actions for the purpose of molding our desires in such a way that will consider their interests. Only other humans have the capacity to do that.

Humans do have reasons to cause other humans to be concerned with the interests of others - including others who cannot defend themselves. We want other humans to be concerned with our interests and the interests of those we care about, even when those people cannot defend their own interests. We have reason to consider cruelty to animals to manifest itself also as a lack of interest in the harms that other people may suffer - which gives us reason to morally condemn those who display a lack of interest in the well-being of animals (or even an actual interest in harming animals). Animals have many and strong reasons to morally condemn us, but they lack the capacity to do so.

It would be a mistake to consider this merely an instrumental account of a concern for the welfare of animals. A purely instrumental account says that the only reason we have for promoting a concern for animals in others is because it will tend to cause people to behave in ways that benefit us (or avoid behaving in ways that harm us). This would deny that we have any reason to be concerned for the welfare of animals themselves.

What we would be promoting is an aversion to that which causes suffering in others. Once a person has such an aversion, that person has a reason to avoid anything which causes suffering in others for its own sake - not as a means to some other end, but as an end in itself. This aversion is justified on account of its instrumental value (in virtue of the fact that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote such an interest). However, once established, the aversion provides a reason for action - not the desires and aversions that give reason to create such an aversion.

The intrinsic reasons for intentional action that Korsgaard and Singer believe in simply do not exist. This is a metaphysical claim. It cannot be disproved by looking at our intuitions. Our intuitions will tell us what we wish to be true, not what is true in fact. We live in a universe that does not contain such entities and, to the degree that we want to live in the real world, these are the facts we have to live with. There is no intrinsic prescriptively dictating human behavior towards animals, there are only the reasons that people have in virtue of their desires, and the reasons they have reason to modify by promoting some desires and aversions and inhibiting others.

Desirism Book - Part 0008 - Desire (Preference) Satisfaction

In the model I am using, we have one person (Alph) with one desire (to gather stones). This means that there is only one reason for intentional action that exists (to realize a state in which Alph is gathering stones), and only one kind of state that has end-value (a state where "I am gathering stones" spoken by Alph is true.

Some may see this as a desire-satisfaction theory. In one sense, it would be correct. However, in another sense - or a couple of other senses - this would be wrong. To prevent future confusion, I want to clarify the exact type f desire-satisfaction theory this is.

One popular form of desire satisfaction theory focuses on the felt sense of satisfaction. In this sense, satisfaction serves the same role that "pleasure" dies in traditional hedonism. "Pain" is replaced with the felt state of  "frustration".

However, on the theory being advanced here, the felt sense of satisfaction or frustration has no value. As we did with pleasure, pain, and unhappiness, we can look at satisfaction and frustration in two ways. Either (1) it is a felt sensation alone, where the agent can have an independent desire for or aversion to that sensation, or (2) the term refers to a type of sensation for which the individual has a built in desire or aversion.

If it is the former, then satisfaction and frustration can exist in this model, but the agent lacks the independent desire or aversion. Thus, the agent lacks an end-reason to seek satisfaction or avoid frustration.

If the latter, then satisfaction and frustration cannot exist within our model. We are assuming that out agent has only one desire - and that is a desire to gather stones. There is no desire for a felt sensation of satisfaction, and no aversion to a felt sensation of frustration.

Another popular form of desire satisfaction theory imagines that desire satisfaction is a thing in itself having intrinsic value. As such, it is that thing to be maximized in utilitarian theories. "The right act is the act that maximizes desire satisfaction."  Peter Singer's moral theory seems to follow this model.

An agent is to consider the preferences of a close family matter as being equal to those of a total stranger.

This is not that theory. Intrinsic value does not exist.

On this model, Alph seeks one thing - to be gathering stones. He is not seeking desire satisfaction. He is seeking a state in which he is gathering stones. Desire satisfaction, as something distinct from gathering stones, does not exist.

We can use the phrase, "desire satisfaction" to refer to the fact that Alph has a reason to realize a state in which he is gathering stones founded on a desire to gather stones. However, this phrase introduces nothing new. It is a description of what already exists.

In order to put some distance between this theory and theories that refer to the felt sense of satisfaction, I tend to use the term “desire fulfillment”. A desire that P sets up a set of condition to be realized. As soon as P is made or kept true, the condition has been met and the desire that P has been fulfilled. There is no need for a felt sensation of satisfaction. This does not imply that such a sensation cannot exist or that a person cannot desire “that I am experiencing a felt sense of satisfaction”. It simply is not necessary and is not a part of our model at this point.

It may help to see the difference between desire satisfaction and desire fulfillment if we imagine Alph with a different desire. Let us give Alph a desire that the planet Pandora B come into existence. The only way for Alph to bring Pandora B into existence is to press a red button labeled “Create Pandora B”. However, pressing the button will destroy Alph. He will cease to exist as Pandora B comes into existence.

For the sake of this example, Pandora B will come into existence without any form of life – without any creature capable of having desires and without the possibility that a desiring creature can evolve on Pandora B. We do not want to confuse the issue by adding additional desires.

If we look at the reasons for action that exists, Alph has a reason to press the button. Alph has a desire that P where P  = “The planet Pandora B exists”. Consequently, Alph has a reason to press the button.

Alph has no reason not to press the button. Certainly, doing so will end his existence, but Alph has no desire to continue to exist. Nor does he have a desire that requires his continued existence as a means. He has this one desire – that Pandora B come into existence – and the fulfillment of that desire requires that he live no longer than needed to press the button.

So, he presses the button.

He ceases to exist, and Pandora B springs into existence.

The desire has been fulfilled. That is to say, the check box “Pandora B exists” can now be checked – this has been made true.

However, there is no desire satisfaction. In fact, there is no desire at all. The one and only desire that did exist no longer exists. All that exists is Pandora B.

Some people may want to refer to this as a desire satisfaction theory, and streatch the definition of “satisfaction” to include cases in which the object of a desire has been realized even though it generates no felt sense of satisfaction. There are those who write about “objective desire satisfaction” that covers situations in which a desire is fulfilled or thwarted without the agent knowing about it.

However, I fear that the term will confuse some, so I will stick with the term “desire fulfillment”. A desire that P is fulfilled in any state of affairs where P is made or kept true.

Effective Altrusim

I have been looking into the movement known as “Effective Altruism” recently, particularly in the light of Peter Singer’s presentation at TED.



To a large extent, this is substantially consistent with my interests since high school. I wanted to make the world a better place. However, I had a question that needed answering, "What is 'better'?"

In the Civil War, many Confederate soldiers made a significant "contribution to charity" - sacrificing years of labor, their health, even their lives in defense of something that they felt had real value. Yet, what they defended, in fact, had little value.

The same can be said about the Kamikaze Pilot in World War II, and the suicide bombers. These are - at least in the minds of those who performed them - acts of charity.

We can apply this analysis to a number of political causes that people support. For example . . . abortion. Is the time and money donated to protecting a woman's wife to choose, or the right of the conceptus' to life, a "good thing"?

Is it the case that those who are fighting for handgun regulation making the world a better place? Or does that honor go to those who are fighting against that regulation? Capital punishment? Homosexuality? The balance between invasions of privacy versus security? Euthanasia? Protecting the environment?

Look at any political campaign . . . or all political campaigns. Billions of dollars and countless labor-hours are donated - charitably contributed - to advancing a political agenda. Those who do so think they are doing good. Yet, they are countered by people "charitably" donating billions of dollars and countless labor-hours on the other side.

How effective is this altruism?

In each of these areas, we have people spending countless labor hours and dollars on one side, versus those who spend countless labor hours and dollars on the other side. People on both sides think that they are making a valuable contribution - that they are being charitable. Yet, clearly, some of them are wrong.

From the very start I did not believe that I had the wisdom to be able to say with arrogant certainty that the side I selected was the right side, and those who disagreed with me are either co-conspirators with the forces of evil or manipulated dupes. Perhaps they were on the right side, and I was the manipulated dupe.

How can we know?

Here, then, is the first question of effective altruism.

How do you know when you are being altruistic?

Under the topic of "effective altruism", there is a lot of talk as to which causes are more effective than others. Indeed, the whole focus of the movement is to identify a cause as "effective" or "ineffective". Some causes, it is said within the movement, are 1000 times more effective than others.

Actually, I would argue that the difference is greater than that. Some causes are infinitely more effective than others, because some of the causes that people are contributing to are causes that do no good and positive harm.

So far, the "Effective Altriusm" movement seems to be substantially ignoring the question, "When am I doing good?"

In much of what I read, they make the assumption that "lives saved" is a good thing - and that no life is intrinsically more valuable than any other. Yet, what is the value of saving the life of a boy who grows up to be a lieutenant in the service of a war lord who spends that life going around raping, stealing, and killing from rival war bands and any innocent civilian seen as vulnerable? Are you doing good to save the life that will be spent devoted to beheading anybody who "insults" their god or violently attacking any woman who seeks an eduction? Does it do good to save a life that will be spent promoting ignorance and superstition and actually fighting the sound scientific understanding that provide the intellectual foundation for our ability to treat injuries, cure disease, and understand the workings of the environment in which we live?

While it is the case that all lives have the same intrinsic value (that, actually, being no intrinsic value since intrinsic value does not exist), it is not the case and never will be the case that all lives have equal extrinsic value. Saving a life is not enough. Directing those saved lives so that they are spent in the service of that which is actually good rather than that which is evil is an essential part of making one's altruism truly effective.

A part of the extrinsic value of a life is the resources consumed - increasing competition and scarcity. In places already suffering from shortages of food and clean water, is it the case that another 1000 lives added is such a good thing? Perhaps the best charity is not to be understood in terms of "lives saved" but "births foregone".

How can we know?

Even where we can know, how do we direct those lives being saved to good ends rather than evil? Effective altruism can't be limited to just knowing, "X is good", but - to truly count as effective - has to direct human activity towards that which is good. So, "How can we direct the lives saved to that which is good rather than that which is evil?"

If one wishes to talk about "effective altruism", these are questions not to be ignored.

When is a person doing good? How do we know? How do we direct "lives saved" to the doing of good rather than the doing of evil?

On Population Ethics

I have been asked the following question from the studio audience.

What's your view on it? Should we maximize fulfilled desires in the world; fulfilled desires minus unfulfilled ones; or should we minimize the number of unfulfilled ones? This population-ethical question has vast implications for many real-world questions.

Answer: None of the above.

This set of options is based on a false set of assumptions. They assume either that desire fulfillment is the only thing that is intrinsically good (thus, is to be maximized), desire unfulfillment is the only thing that is intrinsically bad and the only thing that is intrinsically bad (thus, is to be minimized), or both.

Desirism holds that nothing has intrinsic value – not even desire fulfillment itself. A person with an aversion to pain does not need another aversion that the aversion to pain be fulfilled. The aversion to pain (the desire that “I not be in a state of pain”) all by itself is sufficient to motivate the agent to avoid states in which “I am in a state of pain” is true. What matters in this simple case is not “desire fulfillment” or “the reduction in desire thwarting”. What matters for the agent is “I am not in a state of pain” – and that’s as far as we can go.

Admittedly, the habit of looking for one intrinsic good to be maximized has a long history in moral philosophy. With Bentham it was pleasure and the freedom from pain. With Mill it was happiness. With Peter Singer it is preference satisfaction. Because of this tradition, many people interpret desirism as a theory that says to take desire fulfillment and maximize it.

However, this is not a correct interpretation. Desirism does not hold that desire fulfillment has some sort of special value property that warrants its maximization. It is simply a term used to describe the implications of the fact that a person with a desire that P has a motivating reason to realize states of affairs in which P is true. A person with an aversion to pain has a motivating reason to realize states of affairs in which, “I am not in pain” is true.

End of story.

Well, another part of the story is that a person with an aversion to pain has a motivating reason to mold the desires of others – using rewards (such as praise) and punishment (such as condemnation) – so that they are less likely to bring about states of affairs in which “I am in a state of pain” is true. And it is possible to look upon a whole population and see that people generally have many and strong reasons to use these tools to broadly mold the desires of people to make pain-causing behavior less common. For example, they have reason to praise those whose behavior makes it less likely that others are in pain and to condemn those whose behavior makes it more likely others are in pain.

However, please note, I still have not made any mention of “maximizing desire fulfillment” or “minimizing desire non-fulfillment.” I have only talked about people using social tools to mold malleable desires to avoid states in which “I am in a state of pain” is true.

With this, the next question is: How would desirism apply to population ethics?

We are going to look at the various reasons for action that people have and determine whether people generally have more and stronger reason to promote desires that bring about increased population. Some people may have an interest in maximizing desire fulfillment or minimizing non-fulfillment. However, this will be one interest among many – sitting side by side with their aversion to pain, desire for sex, desire for the health and happiness of their children, and the like.

Now, imagine a couple alone in the wilderness. Alone, they have many and strong desires that cannot be fulfilled as well as they could be if the couple had people around with whom they can trade and call on for help. There is nobody to take care of food gathering while they are sick or injured, nobody to set their bones or to help them with any task that requires more than four hands. They have a very limited capacity to take care of specialization and trade – allowing one person to spend all of their time making arrowheads so that their arrowhead production is most efficient and trading those arrowheads for food and hides. As they get older and less capable of doing things for themselves, they become more vulnerable to desire-thwarting events.

They have many and strong reasons to add to their population - and few reasons to promote desires that would inhibit population growth.

Yet, each additional person provides a smaller benefit. Yet, each additional person also consumes a share of available resources, some of which are finite. This greater competition for finite resources provides agents with reason to promote desires that limit population growth.

I take it to be a point in favor of desirism that it models the population debate as it actually exists. We see people bringing up reasons for action that exist for promoting desires that inhibit population growth. They are not talking about “maximizing desire fulfillment” or “minimizing desire thwarting”. They are talking about limiting competition as a way of avoiding wars, avoiding starvation and shortages of clean water, providing people with a comfortable living environment, and some measure of economic equality. Note: We have some reason to promote an interest in economic equality grounded on the fact that additional resources in the control of any one person provides diminishing marginal desire-fulfilling power. A poor person can fulfill more and stronger desires with a given $100 than a rich person.

Where desirism cannot account for the elements of the current debate in population ethics is where people bring fictions into that debate. Natural moral law (rich people have a natural moral right to keep all the property they can acquire), intrinsic values (including claims about the intrinsic value of desire fulfillment), divine commands (divine prohibitions on the use of birth control), impartial observers, social contracts, decisions made by committes behind a vail of ignorance, and other fictions that are a part of current debate are to be discarded.

This is how desirism would approach population ethics.

Desirism and Self-Sacrifice

A good person never sacrifices his own interests for the well-being of another.

This is not because a good person is selfish. Rather, it is because a good person is a person that has those interests that tend to fulfill the desires of others. A good person may rush into a burning building to save her children. However, this is not an act of self-sacrifice. It is the best way available to her (we may assume) to realize her own interest in her children's well-being.

A good person has an interest in being somebody others can depend on and in being honest. He enjoys helping others, and prefers spending money to provide a child with medicine to prevent blindness to buying tickets to a local sporting event or concert. He is not giving up anything he values when he does this. Instead, he is realizing the things that he values - he is pursuing the things that interest him. It's just that what interests him are things that produce benefits to others.

This topic comes up because of a post I wrote on space development.

In that post, I discussed the claim that money sent on space development is wasted and we should worry about the problems we have here on Earth before spending money on a space program.

One of me answers to this assertion is to note that if we are looking for something to cut spending on so that we can "solve the problems here on earth," the space program sits pretty far down the list. I mentioned computer games, movies, sports, and dining. I added jewelry, cosmetics, and ocean cruises.

We can clearly argue that the making of a film version of "The Hobbit" can wait until we have solved sone of the problems here on Earth. The 3 to 4 billion dollars people will spend on movie tickets for the trilogy can help a lot of children.

This invited a criticism (often applied to act-utilitarian theories, where it is valid) - that the theory is too demanding. It seems that one must give up very thing that one enjoys as long as there is a hungry child in the world.

For example, this has been a constant criticism of Peter Singer's preference-satisfaction act utilitarianism. "One should always perform the act that satisfies the most preferences, regardless of whose they are."

However, desirism is not so much about what we should do as much as it is about what we should want. It is not about sacrificing an interest in seeing "The Hobbit" so that one can provide health care to a sick child. It is about being interested in providing health care to a sick child instead of having an interest to see "The Hobbit." The good person does not say, "I would love to see 'The Hobbit', but my money should go to feeding the poor instead." Instead, her interest in seeing, "The Hobbit" is like her interest in watching grass grow. She sacrifices nothing in refusing to see "The Hobbit" because she does not care to see it.

Because she has this particular set of interests, the world is a better place than it would be if she was somebody who wanted to see "The Hobbit" but cared nothing about the welfare of a sick child. People generally have more and stronger reasons to promote the first set of interests over the second, and to use praise and condemnation to realize this end.

I do not write this from a position of perfect virtue. I spend time doing things where I know there is little to no reason to praise people who have those interests. I can be found wasting time with a computer game where an interest in something else would be motivating me to do more good. I spend money on dining that could better be spent helping those who are starving. However, the quality of the interests I have does not change what people generally have reason to promote or inhibit through praise and condemnation.

However, my personal interests do not change the fact of what people generally have more and stronger reason to praise or to condemn. People, of course, want to see themselves as more worthy of praise and less worthy of condemnation. Consequently, there is a tendancy to adopt absurd arguments that boost the value of one's own likes. Yet, the fact of the matter remains stubbornly independent of the agent's personal interests.

Furthermore, it is a mistake to interpret this argument as claiming that, "We must force people to give up what they enjoy so that the resources can go to something more useful." It is, instead, an argument about which interests we have reason to promote and which we have reason to inhibit. If people enjoyed working toward better health care for all children a little more, and cared a little less about who will win the Super Bowl, so that they spend more time and money on the former and less time and money on the latter, the world would be a better place. But they are not sacrificing an interest in sports to provide health care for children. Instead, they would not have the interest in sports to sacrifice.

This is the way desirism looks at moral issues. A good person and the villain are alike in doing what they like. The difference is not found in what they do except insofar as what they do is a by-product of what they want.

What Is Desire Utilitarianism?

Pardon me, but I am a little nervous. I am doing a web cast this evening. By the time I post this, the show will be over. At the time that I write this, the show is yet to come.

Understand, I am shy to the point that I get nervous ordering a pizza. Yes, I taught moral philosophy for six years. I even received an award for my teaching. There are some desires stronger than my aversion to public speaking - desires motivating me to do this webcast. However, the aversion to public speaking still exists, causing anxiety.

I can't help but try to anticipate the questions I will be asked this evening. Since that is where my mind is at anyway, I shall do my anticipating in today's post.

Desire Utilitarianism

"Mr. Fyfe, what is desire utilitarianism?"

I would love to find a way to answer this question that does not put people to sleep.

Okay, there are two ways to cut utilitarian moral theories; lengthwise, and widthwise.

All utilitarian theories say that we are going to maximize something called 'the good' and that we can talk about the good in terms of utility.

One way of cutting utilitarian theories is in terms of what 'the good' actually is.

'The good' is pleasure and the absence of pain according to Jeremy Bentham in the early 1800's. John Stuart Mill said it was happiness over unhappiness. There is a branch that says that we maximize well-being, but they need to explain what 'well-being' means. Peter Singer says that the good is preference satisfaction. I have to ask, "What is a preference, and what does it mean to say that it has been satisfied?"

The second way of cutting utilitarian theories cuts across the first. It asks, "What are we going to evaluate?"

Act utilitarians say that we evaluate actions; the right act is the act that maximizes the good. Rule utilitarians say that we evaluate rules; the best rules are those that maximize the good, and the right act is the act that follows the best rules.

Desire utilitarianism answers the second question by saying that we evaluate malleable desires - desires that we can change through social forces. We also evaluate actions, just like the rule utilitarians. However, the moral value of an action is derived from a prior evaluation of desires. The right act is the act that a person with good desires would perform. Right acts do not always maximize the good.

So, what is a 'good desire'?

A good desire is desire that tends to fulfill other desires.

The desire utilitarian does not measure utility exclusively in terms of pleasure, happiness, well being, or preference satisfaction. Desire utilitarians say that the good is found in all of the things that we desire. It is found in happiness to the degree that we desire happiness, and it is found in pleasure to the degree that we desire pleasure. It is found in the company of family to the degree that we desire the company of family. All value exists in the form of desire fulfillment.

Desires and Fulfillment

"Okay, Mr. Fyfe. You asked the preference satisfaction theorist to explain what a preference was and what it meant for a preference to be satisfied. So, I ask you, what is a desire and what does it mean to say that a desire has been fulfilled?

A desire is one of two propositional attitudes that regulate intentional action. The other is beliefs. A belief is the attitude that a certain proposition (e.g. "God exists') is true. A desire is an attitude that a certain proposition (e.g. "I am having sex with Sam") is to be made or kept true.

We are all quite accustomed to explaining intentional actions by referring to beliefs and desires. Why did Bush invade Iraq? Because he believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and he desired to protect America from harm. Or so he says.

Once we make our theories, we test them by asking whether they can be made consistent with other observations. “But there was no evidence for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. So, did Bush actually believe this, or did he just claim to believe this? If he lied about the weapons, then he lied about attacking Iraq to defend the United States. Why did he really attack Iraq? What did he really want?"

Desires identify the ends or goals of intentional action (protect America from harm). Beliefs supply the means (invading Iraq will secure these weapons).

Beliefs can be true or false depending on whether the proposition believed accurately describes the real world. If the real world does not match a belief, then the belief is to be changed.

Desires can be fulfilled or thwarted depending on whether the proposition that describes the object of desire is true or false. If reality does not conform to what is desired, the agent has a 'reason for intentional action' to change reality.

So, a desire that 'P', for some proposition 'P' (e.g., "I am having sex with Sam") is fulfilled in state of affairs 'S' if and only if 'P' is true in S.

A desire that I am eating chocolate ice cream is fulfilled in any state of affairs in which the proposition, ‘I am eating chocolate ice cream' is true.

So, that is what a desire is – a mental attitude that a proposition is to be made or kept true. That is what it means for a desire to be fulfilled – a state of affairs exists in which the proposition is in fact true. Value exists in these relationships between states of affairs and desires. A state of affairs has more value to the degree that it fulfills more and stronger desires.

Back to Good Desires

So, Mr. Fyfe, how does this get us to desire utilitarianism?

If we can evaluate movies according to how well they fulfill desires, jobs according to how well they fulfill desires, relationships according to how well they fulfill desires, and everything else according to how well they fulfill desires, then we can evaluate desires themselves (or states of affairs in which certain desires exist) according to how well those desires fulfill (other) desires. This is just the standard practice of evaluation – looking at how well a state of affairs fulfills desires – and applying it to desires.

The idea that we can use desires to evaluate everything else in the universe, but that we have to take desires for what they are and not evaluate them, is nonsense. There is no reason why we cannot evaluate desires the same way we evaluate everything else.

A good desire, then – like a good knife or a good job – is a desire that tends to fulfill other desires. A bad desire is a desire that tends to thwart other desires.

A good desire, insofar as it fulfills other desires, is a desire that others have reason to promote. A bad desire, insofar as it thwarts other desires, is a desire that others have reason to inhibit.

We use social forces to promote and inhibit desires; in particular, praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. Therefore, we have reason to praise and reward those who exhibit good desires (desires that tend to fulfill other desires) to make those desires stronger and more common. And we have reason to condemn and punish those with bad desires (desires that tend to thwart other desires) to make those desires weaker and less common.

This is why desire utilitarianism is concerned with malleable desires. If a desire cannot be molded using these tools, then it makes no sense to ask questions about using these tools to mold those desires.

True Beliefs

Can you give me an example of desire utilitarianism in action?

We can see how true beliefs are important to desire fulfillment.

Take, for example, a person who is thirsty. He desires a drink. He sees a pitcher and a glass on the table and helps himself, believing that the pitcher contains clean water. In fact, the contents of the pitcher have been poisoned, and he gets violently ill. True beliefs about the contents of the pitcher would have avoided this desire-thwarting state of affairs.

The value of truth suggests that we have reason to be surrounded by truth. This implies a reason to cause others to have a love of truth, so that they will be disposed to promote truth and reduce fiction. We can promote a love of truth by praising and rewarding honesty, intellectual integrity, and curiosity. We can also do this by condemning and punishing lies, intellectual recklessness, and intellectual laziness.

Conclusion

This, then, is the basic account of desire utilitarianism, and an example of its application. I suspect that this is what I will be talking about tonight.

Of course, the hard part comes next. This involves explaining why this form of utilitarianism is better than other types of utilitarian theory and better than non-utilitarian moral theories. It involves dealing with claims like the impossibility of deriving ought from is and the separation of fact from value.

But, then, that’s why I wrote the book – which is really what I am talking about this evening. You can find a reference to the book, “A Better Place,” on the right side of this blog.

A Further Analysis of 'Harm'

One of the greatest problems with theology are the mistakes they make about ‘harm’.

It is one thing to dis-educate (teach fiction) about the age of the Earth and the origin of man, about the existence of angels and ancient history. However, for the most part, these mistakes are as serious as failure to get a perfect score on a high-school history test. The facts are wrong, but the errors do little harm.

To be wrong on the nature of harm itself invites disaster.

There are two types of mistakes.

(1) Failure to recognize harms that exist in fact. This would include failure to recognize that death is an ultimate end, and to believe instead that those killed (at least those who are virtuous and killed) will continue their life in a better place. This failure to recognize how utterly harmful killing is helps to make it easier to kill. I have little (some, but little) doubt that Bush finds it easier to sleep at night because of the fiction that the innocent people killed through his actions are “in a better place” – allowing him to live in denial at the unspeakable cost that some people are paying for his mistakes.

(2) Asserting that harms exist where there are none. In fact, what some religions call a ‘harm’ might actually be a benefit. A woman’s education is thought to ‘harm’ her in some cultures. As a result of these mistaken beliefs, women are being denied a benefit. Indeed, the enforcement of these religious doctrines is the source of harm in these circumstances.

Every time people make mistakes about harm, other people suffer.

So, it is important not to make mistakes.

Unfortunately, theists are not the only ones who make mistakes about harm. Many atheists also have a poor grasp of the subject. As a result, atheists also often fail to recognize harms that exist in fact, and assert that harms exist where there are none.

Among the greatest mistakes that one can make about harm – common among atheists – is the idea that harm is merely a matter of opinion. This view is no less dangerous than the view that some religious text accurately depicts what harm is and what harm is not – because this view says that there is nothing to be gained from educating ourselves about harm and how to avoid it.

Indeed, it makes a mockery of criminal justice and many of the greater efforts people put in to preventing harm. If Person A harms Person B, we typically hold Person A responsible and seek to make him suffer. Yet, if harm is a matter of opinion, then Person B has chosen to make himself a victim of Person A’s actions by choosing to be harmed by it. The situation is no different than if Person B jumped in front of a car that Person A was driving.

This view – the ‘mere opinion’ view of harm – is no better than any theistic view of harm. It is just as mistaken and, as such, just as dangerous – far worse, in fact, than the theist’s belief in a young earth or denial of human creation.

Yesterday, I wrote a brief account of “harm”. Even more briefly, a harm is what thwarts strong and stable desires. In other words, since desires are the only ‘reasons for action’ that exit, a harm is that which a person has particularly strong ‘reasons for action’ to avoid.

It is not by accident that harms are bad – that harm is something to be avoided. It is true in the same way that circles are round and bachelors are unmarried – an a priori or necessary truth. Desire utilitarianism captures this fact.

As it turns out, when I was first beginning to wonder if the problems of moral philosophy could be answered by appealing primarily to an evaluation of desires, I took a graduate-level (800-level) college seminar in the Philosophy of Law focusing on the writings of Joel Feinberg. Feinberg had recently completed a series of books that were destined to become a classic in the field – the type of book that all people studying philosophy of law must read – on The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law

The first of these books was Harm to Others, and it began with a detailed analysis of harm. I recommend it. I could scarcely be able to provide as detailed an account in the confines of a couple of blog postings.

In that book, Feinberg presents an analysis of ‘harm’ that defines it as a ‘setback to interests’, where ‘interests’ themselves are grounded on ‘strong and stable desires.’ Feinberg lacked the strict definition of a desire as a propositional attitude, and fulfillment as the making or keeping true of a proposition that is the object of a desire. In fact, Feinberg spends more time discussing wants and throws the term desire in sparingly. Yet, virtually everything he says about wants can be captured in the more precise and useful concept of desire as I have used it. Similarly, much of his analysis of ‘harm’ as ‘setbacks to strong and stable interests’ can be translated into ‘harm’ in terms of ‘the thwarting of strong and stable desires’. (Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp 38-45)

Harms and Hurts

One of the points that Feinberg made was to distinguish ‘harms’ from ‘hurts’. According to Feinberg, the distinction rests on the strength of the desires being thwarted. To count as a harm, the desire has to be particularly strong and stable. The thwarting of a minor desire, some weak disappointment, counts as a ‘hurt’ (or, in some cases, an ‘offense’), not as a harm.

Harmed Without Knowing It

Feinberg, when he talked about ‘interests’, remarked that our interests are in states, and not in any particular affection such as pleasure or a physical sensation of satisfaction. He agreed with the view that a person can have an interest even in something that happens after his death. Once again, ‘interests’ in Feinberg’s sense are ultimately grounded on ‘wants’.

As a result, a person can be harmed without knowing it – without actually suffering any dissatisfaction at all. A wealthy property owner who remembers you fondly from the time you met in Las Vegas leaves you a substantial amount of money – without you knowing about it. I, his butler, am aware of the will and replace your name with my own. I have done you harm – even though you do not know about it. We may assume that you have a lot of strong and stable desires that the money could help you to fulfill. I have thwarted those desires by diverting that money. You are harmed.

This is one thing that the “preference utilitarians” get right. Preference utilitarian (of the type advanced by Peter Singer) recognized that people can find value in things that do not make them happy or give them pleasure. A person can value a good reputation that follows upon his death. Such a person can be harmed if others maliciously destroy that reputation through a campaign of lies. Preference satisfaction, which the preference utilitarians are concerned about, includes such things as a preference for a good reputation after death.

Note: What the preference utilitarians get wrong is the idea that preference satisfaction has intrinsic value and the idea that morality is focused on actions themselves according to whether or not they satisfy preferences. In fact, nothing has intrinsic value, preferences (desires) themselves can be evaluated as good or bad according to their tendency to fulfill or thwart other preferences (desires), and this evaluation of preferences (desires) is the proper focus of morality.

Welfare Interests

Feinberg, being concerned with the moral limits of the criminal law, had good reason to focus on welfare interests. Welfare interests are not things that are desired for their own sake. They can be desired for their own sake, but it is not in virtue of this that they are ‘welfare interests’. Instead, welfare interest are goods that are nearly universal means for the fulfillment of other ends. They include liberty, health, education, money, a good reputation, and life itself.

This is an example of an ‘interest’ that a person might have without recognizing it. The person who believes it is in his interest to sacrifice liberty, health, or an education is almost always mistaken. These goods often have value for a person (it is in a person’s interest to protect these things) even if the person does not recognize its value (its usefulness).

In a desire-utilitarian framework, Feinberg’s points about welfare interest argue for promoting particularly strong desires for institutions that protect liberty, health, education, property (wealth), reputation, and life. Failure to protect these welfare goods is substantially identical to an invitation to do harm.

Wrongless Harmdoing

Not all harms are wrong. There are several types of harm that one may inflict on others without doing anything wrong. Yet, we can account for these permissible harms on the part of their necessity in avoiding even greater harms.

Criminal Punishment: There is no way to deny that fines and imprisonment thwart the desires of those who are punished. Yet, without the harms of criminal penalties, we will suffer the greater harms of living in a lawless society.

Economic Harms: A business leader who takes customers away from a competitor by offering lower prices, greater convenience, or greater quality can drive that competitor out of business, thwarting the competitor’s desires. Yet, the benefit of this system comes from the desire fulfillment generated by the economic efficiencies that such a system generates.

Harms of Non Consent: If Jacob has a very strong desire for sex with Jenny, then it thwarts that desire for Jenny to refuse to have sex with him. This would count as doing harm to Jacob. However, it is a harm that comes without a trace of wrong, because Jenny must consent to these activities. Abandon the principle of consent, and the harms that people inflict through non-consent will be replaced by the harms of people being forced to participate in things against their will.

Thwarting Bad Desires: The thwarting of any desire counts as a harm. However, there are desires that tend to thwart other desires. The desires of the arsonist, for example, are destructive and life-threatening. It is quite rational to hold to a system that thwart’s the arsonists desires to prevent the greater harm of allowing arsonists to freely fulfill their harmful desires.

Conclusion

The greatest difference between the theory that yields these fine distinctions and the theistic or common subjectivist theories rests in the fact that we can even offer a clear analysis of ‘harm’ that yields these types of distinctions. ‘Harm’ does not refer to a mere matter of opinion. ‘Harm’ refers to something real – something that we can study and make objective claims about. By relating ‘harm’ to ‘setbacks to interests’ or ‘the thwarting of strong and stable desires’ (which amount to the same thing) we not only have a framework to place these distinctions, but we can make sense of them. We can explain what they are and how they function in real-world terms.

Ultimately, the difference here is a question of what reasons-for-action actually exist. Religions do in fact come up with different conceptions of harm. Yet, ultimately, what they are doing is making claims about what ‘reasons for action’ actually exist. They do this in the same way that they make claims about the existence of Gods, angels, miracles, heaven, hell, winged chariots, and the like. Their claims about ‘reasons for action’ that exist are just as error prone as their claims about the existence of these other entities.

As I said at the start, a mistake about the age of the earth or the existence of angels does not have much significance.

However, when religion causes people to make mistakes about the ‘reasons for action’ that exist – when a religion’s ‘reasons for action that exist’ differ from the set of ‘reasons for action that exist in the real world,’ they cause their followers to inflict harms that could otherwise be avoided. These are the types of mistakes that will determine the dangerousness of a particular set of religious beliefs.

Yet, I repeat, a person does not have to believe in God to make mistakes about the nature of harm.

Once again, I would like to remind readers that I give an account of the basics of desire utilitarianism, which provides the foundation of what I have written about 'harm', in the book, "A Better Place... "

Response to Comments at Pharyngula

PZ Myers at Pharyngula honored me by mentioning my book at his site a couple of days ago. A number of people there took the time to make comments – not so much about my book (since none of them could have possibly read it yet), but about morality in general.

Even though this is not ‘theory weekend,’ I would like to respond to those comments in a timely fashion. I posted a response at Pharyngula. However, owing to the possibility that others might have similar concerns, and since [name] thinks that I am not pushy enough in promoting my book, I would like to post an expanded version of those responses here.

Besides, Joe Otten yesterday wrote in a comment to yesterday's post that I was not pushy enough.

Taylor Selseth: I'm a Utilitarian myself, though my views are more similar to JS Mill's.

John Stuart Mill’s rule utilitarianism has two significant problems – both of which I discuss in the book.

(1) It collapses into act-utilitarianism.

What should you do if faced with an act that (a) is in violation of a rule-utilitarian rule, but (b) will produce better consequences (more utility) than obeying the rule?

If we assume that maximizing utility is all that matters, then this should imply that we ignore the rule and do the act-utilitarian best act. And even when we obey the rule, that act is still right because it is the act-utilitarian best act. Either way, we should do the act-utilitarian best act.

The only way to argue that we should obey the rule is to say that following the rule has value independent of the utility it creates. However, if we say that following a rule has value independent of utility, this throws utilitarianism out the window.

(2) Mill bases his theory on the intrinsic value of happiness.

Mill builds his theory on the assumption that happiness (and the absence of sadness) has intrinsic value. This concept of ‘intrinsic value’ is at least as strange as the concept of ‘God’ or ‘The Loch Ness Monster’ or any of a number of fictitious entities people invent to explain things. In short, intrinsic value does not exist – not in happiness, not in serving God, not in any of the countless things people try to attribute intrinsic value to.

In addition, people themselves often sacrifice happiness for other goods – such as for the sake of their children, even under conditions where their own happiness cannot be effected. This is a topic I covered in a blog post, “Happiness vs. Desire Fulfillment”

Happiness does not have intrinsic value. Desire fulfillment does not have intrinsic value either. Both claims are in conflict with the theory that I defend here. Desire fulfillment is not a ‘thing’ having value, it is a term that refers to a relationship between a desire and a state of affairs – that is all. In fact, desire utilitarianism holds that there are no intrinsic values. All that exists in the realm of value are relationships between states of affairs and desires. And that is all we need.

Also, desire utilitarianism is a form of rule utilitarianism that is not subject to the problem of collapse to act utilitarianism, because desires are rules that are written into the brain that do not allow for exceptions (except in a special sense that I discuss in the book). We are never faced with the question of what to do when we have the option of acting contrary to the rules because it is physically impossible to act contrary to the rules.

Hiero5ant For starters, his "desire utilitarianism" is not original, but basically just a poorly digested rehash of preference consequentialism, which has been formulated elsewhere and more rigorously by others, like Peter Singer and R.M. Hare.

Try as I might, I have not been able to find such a ‘well formulated’ presentation of preference consequentialism that answers basic questions such as, “What is a preference?” “What does it mean to ‘satisfy’ a preference?” “How do ‘preferences’ fit into action theory and the philosophy of mind?”

I can answer these questions. A ‘desire that P’ is a propositional attitude – a mental state that motivates the agent to make or keep a proposition true. A ‘desire that P’ is fulfilled in any state of affairs S where S is true. Desires fit into a general theory in the philosophy of mind that explains human action in terms of the propositional states ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ such that (beliefs + desires) -> intention -> intentional action.

Singer is correct insofar as he uses ‘preferences’ to signify the fact that the object of people’s actions are true states of affairs. However, there are still a lot of differences between Singer’s claims and my own.

For all practical purposes, Singer is an act-utilitarian. He believes that the right act is the act that produces the greatest utility. Utility, in turn, is understood as, what he calls, ‘preference satisfaction.’

In my book, I reject all act-utilitarian theories. Act utilitarianism is an impossible moral code. Desire utilitarianism is not an ‘act-utilitarian’ type of theory, but a ‘rule-utilitarian’ type of theory.

I go to great pains to make this distinction in the book, because it is the most common mistake that people make when they discuss desire utilitarianism. They take it to mean, “Do that act that produces the greatest desire fulfillment.” This is not “Desire Utilitarianism”, this is a different (and fundamentally flawed) theory that I call “Desire-fulfillment act utilitarianism.” This is the theory that is most similar to Singer’s “Preference utilitarianism,” and I explain in the book why I reject it.

Richard M. Hare’s theory comes closer to desire utilitarianism than Singer’s.

In saying this, I want to note that when Hare talks about his “language of morals” – and making moral decisions considering everybody’s preferences as if one had everybody’s preferences because this is what the logic of ‘ought’ requires – he is very much defending preference satisfying act utilitarianism – and suffers all of the problems that Singer suffers.

On the other hand, when he talks about his two levels of decision making – that of the ‘prole’ and the ‘archangel,’ he gets nearer to desire utilitarianism. A ‘prole’ (in Hare’s terms) who has acquired good desires does not need to worry about complex utilitarian calculations in choosing the right act. He simply needs to do what he wants. An ‘Archangel’ in the desire utilitarian sense uses utilitarian calculations to determine what desires ‘proles’ should have. (Note: We are all archangels and proles. This distinction identifies two levels of moral thinking, not two classes of people.)

The problem here is that Hare never attaches his moral theory to a theory of action. As such, Hare’s theory never answers the question – or even considers the question – “How are we going to get people to do the right thing?” On this, Hare is an internalist – one who believes that “to know the good is to do the good.” As such, all we need to do is convince him that our conclusion says, “X is good”, and once he sees the conclusion he will accomplish the task. This bit of magic is actually quite contrary to how the real world functions. It is a serious lapse in his theory that desire utilitarianism knows how to fill.

Rienck: [H]owever, another great book on this subject is on the list too and I recommend it to everyone . . .Erik J. Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 202pp, $20.99 (pbk), ISBN 0521607841.

Greg Peterson: Wielenberg has here provided a highly cogent foundation for secular morality and meaning that is perfectly satisfying.

Wielenberg claims that moral properties are transcendental unanalyzable ‘ought’ properties that cannot bear any relationship to the ‘is’ universe even though they are supposed to govern and be applied to actions that can only occur in the ‘is’ universe.

Any mention of transcendental properties causes me to hesitate unless one can prove that they are absolutely necessary. When comparing two theories – one of which argues for transcendental properties that are incompatible with the ‘is’ universe, and one which does not need such properties, there are good reasons to go with the latter theory, which is where my arguments go.

Weisenberg can give us very little (no) information on what these properties are. He can tell us what they are not (they are not ‘is’ properties) – which makes no sense, as I explain in the book. He tells good stories that suggest that certain things could not possibly be wrong – but he tells us nothing about what they are and why they cannot be wrong. Indeed, Weisenberg’s transcendental moral properties are at least as mysterious as any God concept.

hoody: He does nothing to show how those moral behavior originated, a major sticking point.

This objection (falsely) assumes that value in general, and morality in specific, is a thing and as a thing I need to somehow explain how it came into existence.

I deny that morality is a thing.

Value is a relationship between states of affairs and desires, and moral value is a relationship between malleable desires and other desires. We do not need to explain the ‘origin’ of a relationship. It would be like answering questions like: Where did ‘closer to’ originate? Or ‘taller than’ or ‘faster than’?

All I need are two things:

(1) Malleable desires as propositional attitudes (desires that can be affected by the environment – specifically, by praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment). We have that. This came about through evolution.

(2) Possible and actual states of affairs. We have had these since the day that the universe began.

From this, to get to value, the only question we need to concern ourselves with is whether a proposition ‘P’ that is the object of a desire is true in a particular state of affairs. That’s it. If an agent has a desire that ‘P’, and ‘P’ is true in state of affairs ‘S’, then that agent has a reason to act so as to bring about (or preserve) S.

This is a general account of value. Moral value is just a specific type of general value (the way that horses are a specific type of mammal).

There is no need to make things more complicated then this.

Happiness vs. Desire Fulfillment

Another popular idea that one encounters if one discusses value theory much – another idea that I argue should be rejected -- is the idea that all human action aims to achieve personal happiness – that happiness is the only thing that has real value.

Richard Carrier writes of this view in his book, “Sense and Goodness Without God.” He writes (p. 315),

On close analysis, I believe there is only one core value: in agreement with Aristotle and Richard Taylor, I find this to be a desire for happiness. I believe that all other values are derived from this, in conjunction with other facts of the universe, and that all normative values are what they are because they must be held and acted upon in order for any human being to have the best chance of achieving a genuine, enduring happiness.

This is false.

It is as much of a mistake to say that there is one core value and all other values are derived from this, as it is to say that there is one core belief and all other beliefs are derived from it.

Beliefs and desires are both propositional attitudes. They are mental states that take a proposition as an object and assign a flag to that proposition.

Belief states take propositions and flag them as “true” or “false”. A person who believes that God exists is a person who has flagged the proposition “God exists” as “true.”

Desire states take propositions and flag them as “to be made true” or (in the case of an aversion) “to be made false”. A person who desires that her child is healthy and happy is a person who has flagged the proposition, “My child is healthy and happy” as “to be made or kept true.”

There is no reason to say that belief states can take all sorts of propositions as its objects – belief that God exists, belief that it is September, belief that Tyrannosaurus Rex was a scavenger. If belief states can take all manner of propositions as objects, then why not desires? What is the problem in holding that a person can also desire that God exists, hate the month of September, or prefer that Tyrannosaurus Rex was a hunter?

As far as core values go, I will argue that it is this:

Humans act so as to make or keep true the propositions that are the objects of their desires, and human desires are (or can be) as varied as human beliefs. Insofar as a person has a desire to be happy (a desire “that I am happy”) then he will act so as to make or keep the proposition “I am happy” true. But this is one desire among many, and agents will often sacrifice happiness if it is necessary to fulfill some other desire.

I am going to make this argument the tried and true way that rational people should like – demonstrate that “make or keep true the propositions that describe the objects of our desires (a.k.a. ‘desire fulfillment’) theory” has far greater explanatory and predictive power than “happiness theory.”

People who have read the writings on my web site will be familiar with this example.

Assume that you and somebody you care about (e.g., your child) are kidnapped by a mad scientist. This scientist gives you two options:

Option 1: Your child will be taken away and tortured. However, you will be made to believe that your child is living a happy and healthy life. You will receive regular reports and even correspondence explaining how great your child’s life is. Except, they will all be fake. In fact, we will take your child to another location and spend every day peeling off his skin while soaking him in a vat of salt water, among other things.

Option 2: Your child will be taken away, provided with paid medical insurance, an endowment to complete an education, will be hired into a good job, and will be caused to live a healthy and happy life. However, you will be made to believe that your child is suffering excruciating torture. You will be able to hear what you think are your child’s screams coming down the hallway. We will show you video of the torture. It will all be fake, of course, but you will be convinced it is real.

Of course, after you make your choice, we will make you forget that you even had these options presented to you.

What do you choose?

Now, we are not going to kidnap people and make them choose. However, both theories need to explain the fact that the vast majority of parents, for example, report that, in such a situation, they would choose Option 2.

Happiness theory seems to suggest that the agent should choose Option 1. After all, the agent will be happier receiving news (that she believes) that says that her child is living a happy and healthy life. So, if happiness is what she is after, and Option1 delivers more happiness, then Option 1 is the rational choice.

Why do people choose Option 2?

Because happiness theory is wrong. In fact, people do not choose happiness. They choose “making or keeping true the propositions that are the objects of our desires.” In this case, the desire in question is the desire that one’s child be healthy and happy. A person with a desire that “my child is healthy and happy” will select that option that will make or keep the proposition, “my child is healthy and happy” true. That is Option 2.

Now, in science, when we have two competing theories, the thing to do is to come up with an experiment. If Theory 1 predicts State S1 under conditions C, and Theory 2 predicts State S2 under conditions C, then we test the theories by creating conditions C and seeing if we get State S1 or State S2.

Happiness theory predicts people selecting Option 1. Desire fulfillment theory predicts people selecting Option 2. We have people selecting Option 2. Therefore, we have reason to reject “happiness theory” and accept “desire fulfillment” theory in its place.

Note: “Desire fulfillment theory” is much like Peter Singer’s “preference satisfaction” theory. However, “preference satisfaction” does not give us precise definitions of what a preference is, what it means for a preference to be satisfied, or tie it in with a viable theory of action. “Desire fulfillment” theory comes with more precise definitions of “desire” (a propositional attitude whereby the agent is motivated to make or keep true the proposition that is the object of the desire), “fulfillment” (a desire is fulfilled by any state S in which the proposition that is the object of the desire is true), and a theory of action (belief + desire -> intention -> intentional action).

Desire fulfillment theory does not deny that one of the things that people desire is “that I am happy”. This desire exists, and it motivates some action. It is also the case that people have an aversion to pain (a desire “that I not be in pain”), a desire for sex (a desire “that I am having sex”), a desire for chocolate (a desire “that I am eating chocolate”) and the like.

In fact, this points to another problem with happiness theory – it is missing something.

Desire fulfillment theory explains intentional action as:

Belief + Desire -> Intention -> Intentional Action

Happiness theory says that the following describes all intentional action:

Belief + Desire that “I am happy” -> Intention -> Intentional Action

Now, take the “Happiness Theory” formula and plug in the assumption that two people have identical beliefs. According to the “Happiness Theory” formula, they would perform identical actions (in identical circumstances). If one would play a game of baseball, then the other would play a game of baseball. If one would watch cooking shows on television, the other would watch television shows on television.

“Beliefs,” according to this formula, is the only entity that has any variation.

Yet, we widely recognize that the sources of happiness also vary from individual to individual. That is what is missing in this formula – a variable for (an explanation for, a theoretical entity to account for) different sources of happiness.

Desire fulfillment theory does not have this problem, because people are as capable of having different desires as they are of having different beliefs. We can have two people with identical beliefs, where one desires “that I am watching a sitcom” and the other desires “that I am writing a philosophy essay.” This directly leads to different intentional actions without introducing a third variable.

For all of these reasons, I argue for rejecting “happiness” theory and putting “desire fulfillment” theory in its place. “Desire fulfillment” theory has far better explanatory and predictive power. (It also has more explanatory power than “preference satisfaction” theory, whose terms are too vague and are not closely tied to any given theory of intentional action.)

Peter Singer, Means, Ends, Intention, and Side Effects

Announcement: I am pleased once again to be participating in the Carnival of the Godless, this time appearing at "Beware of the Dogma."

Peter Singer, Means, Ends, Intention, and Side Effects

In a comment in an earlier posting on "John Stewart and Misrepresentation", Hume’s Ghost (who operates "The Daily Doubter") included a quote from Peter Singer that, I think, confused the distinction between means and ends with the distinction between intentionally and knowingly killing somebody. I would like to spend this post clarifying those distinctions and explaining their relevance to the distinction between killing embryos for stem cell research and killing civilians in Iraq and Lebanon as this distinction is being used within the Bush Administration.

Hume’s Ghost provided the quote:

In his speech on the use of embryos to obtain stem cells, Bush said: "Even the most noble ends do not justify any means." SO perhaps his view is that the evil we bring about must not be a means to the end we are seeking, but we may allow the same evil to occur as a side effect of achieving a just and sufficiently important end. On this view, Bush might claim that the civilian deaths were a side effect of his attempt to kill Saddam, and not a means to it. But again, the scientists could equally well claim that the death of the embryo is not a means to extracting the cells they require, but a side effect of that extraction.

This quote was provided in the context of a post where I was attempting to explain a moral difference between embryonic stem cell research and the war in Iraq (or Israel’s attack on Hezbollah) in terms of the moral distinction between intentionally versus knowingly killing another person.

I think it is reasonable to interpret Singer’s use of the phrase side effect as a reference to knowingly taking a life as opposed to intentionally taking a life. However, Singer also seems to be equating side effect with taking a life as a means to the end we are seeking as opposed to its being an end in itself.

It is a mistake to equate these two concepts. A person who takes a life as a means to some other end can still be guilty of intentionally taking a life.

Let us imagine that Exhusband is concerned about Exwife going out with other men. He simply cannot stand the idea of Exwife with some other man. Therefore, he seeks to create a state in which this will not happen any more. To do this, he fires several rounds of ammunition into Exwife’s body. His intention, in this case, was to prevent Exwife from going out with other men. Filling her body with bullets was only a means to that end. Yet, clearly, claiming that he knowingly brought about her death as a side effect of preventing her from going out with other men would be a tortured use of language. In fact, he intentionally killed her.

This is one example of an infinite list of examples that we can draw up that shows that killing somebody as a means and her death being a side effect of some other action are not the same thing.

This end hardly counts as a morally important end, but we can easily introduce this element while still preserving the distinction. In previous posts I have used an example of a cop who must kill a child to prevent that child from unwittingly setting off a nuclear bomb in a distant city. The cop aims at the child and fires, killing the child. This is still an intentional killing, even though it is a killing as a means of bringing about a morally significant end – saving the lives of those who live in the target city.

Now, I would like to put this distinction back in its original context. Two days ago I argued that, under certain assumptions – and these are assumptions that the Bush Administration accepts -- there is a morally relevant distinction between actions that knowingly kill civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Lebanon, and actions that intentionally kill embryos in order to make medical advances in embryonic stem cell research. This is a distinction that John Stewart recognized in the clip I referenced two days ago, but it is a distinction that most Democrats actually accept (except when they can distort it to make fun of Republicans).

If we accept the Bush Administration’s assumptions, then the battles in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon are like attacks made against Germany and Japan in World War II. Also, if we accept those assumptions, killing embryos is like killing children and cutting them up as spare parts for the sake of treating certain adults.

I wager that a vast majority of Democrats would accept the distinction that it was permissible to launch certain attacks against Germany and Japan in World War II that might result in the loss of innocent life (e.g., the killing of children), whereas we would never be justified in passing a law that takes unwanted (orphaned, abandoned) children and kills them in medical experiments or so that we could distribute their body parts among needy adults.

This is not to say that one must believe that all attacks that resulted in civilian casualties in World War II were justified. A person can hold, for example, that the bombing of Dresden, the British night-bombing campaign, and the atomic bombs were not justified. This argument stands in spite of these disputes -- unless one wants to claim that no civilian casualties are every justified.

If we look at the second part of John Stewart’s clip, and imagine that the Bush Administration is talking about civilians killed in attacks during World War II, and a law advocating the use of unwanted, orphaned children in medical experiments and as spare parts, we see that there is nothing there to laugh at.

The Bush Administration is speaking in exactly the same way about the attacks on Iraq and stem cell research as a Democratic president would speak about attacks against Germany during World War II and a law that funds experiments in which unwanted children are the test subjects.

It is a distinction that says that there is a stronger moral prohibition on intentionally taking a human life (in the case of using unwanted children in medical experiments in order to cure disease) and knowingly taking an innocent life (in terms of the civilian casualties killed by allied actions in World War II).

Now, Peter Singer might not accept this distinction. Yet, at the same time, it is an important and often-used distinction by people on both sides of the political isle. If Peter Singer does not accept this distinction, this might not be because all of us (Democrats and Republicans alike) need to reject a distinction in such widespread use, but because there is something wrong with Peter Singer’s moral theory in that it calls for us to reject something we have no reason to reject.

If Peter Singer’s criticism is valid as applied to the Bush Administration, it is just as valid when applied to the distinction between civilian casualties in World War II and the use of unwanted children in medical experiments that most Democrats not only accept but accept as some sort of unquestionable truth.

I want to make clear that we can question the Bush Administration’s claim that attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon are morally comparable to the attacks on Nazi Germany. By the way, I hold that this assumption is least questionable with respect to the attack on Afghanistan and almost certainly questionable with respect to the attack on Iraq. We can obviously question the claim that using an embryo in medical experiments is morally equivalent to using an unwanted child in medical experiments.

In fact, the whole point of these two posts is to say that we should be focusing on challenging these assumptions, because on these assumptions are mistaken. It is a mistake to ridicule the Bush Administration instead for recognizing a distinction between killing civilians in World War II and using unwanted children in medical experiments when Democrats themselves accept that distinction.

This still leaves open the question that seems to come from Singer’s remark, that Democrats and Republicans alike must rethink the claim that it is permissible to knowingly bring about the death of civilians in World War II, but not to intentionally use unwanted children in medical experiments. I addressed that issue in part in my posting on “Killing an Innocent Child.”

Here, I would like to say that Singer’s implied point seems to make sense because he blurs the distinction between ‘means’ and ‘ends’, and ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ taking a life. He points out that there are cases in which taking a life as a ‘means’ is as objectionable as taking life as an ‘end.’ He then slips from this into claims that ‘knowingly’ taking a life is as objectionable as ‘intentionally’ taking a life, as if this were the same thing. He ignores the fact that an agent can ‘intentionally’ take a life as an end, and ‘intentionally’ take a life as a means, and that these are, in fact, morally equivalent.

However, Singer does not make simple mistakes. By digging down a bit, we can find deeper argument that makes Singer’s point. I think we can illustrate this by using a common counter-example to act utilitarian theories. In this case, a doctor is faced with the option of killing a healthy patient so that he can use this patient’s body parts to save five others.

In a version of this case, the healthy patient’s blood contains an enzyme that can cure those patients infected by a plague. Let us assume that the doctor can save one plague victim for each 10cc of blood he removes. He removes 10cc of blood at a time. Eventually, he will remove so much blood from the healthy patient that the healthy patient dies. (Then, he can take the rest of that patient’s blood and cure a hundreds of additional patients.)

Is this a case of intentionally killing a patient comparable to using unwanted children in medical experiments? Or is this a case of knowingly killing a patient comparable to killing civilians in attacks on Germany in World War II? What does this say about the popular distinction that everybody makes – Democrats and Republicans alike – for these two categories of actions?

That is a complex issue that I cannot address in the confines of this point. I think that it is a philosophically hard question to answer. However, this does not change the fact that the principle that John Stewart held up for ridicule is one that almost all Democrats would hold to be sound and unquestionable if they only gave it a bit of thought.