tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post8437561287646683773..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: George Carlin on the Absence of RightsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-85460690934201592712008-04-01T10:48:00.000-06:002008-04-01T10:48:00.000-06:00You said: "Another argument that Carlin uses to ar...You said: "Another argument that Carlin uses to argue that rights exist is to say that rights cannot be taken away. He uses the fact that Japanese Americans were interred during World War II."<BR/><BR/>I think you meant "Another argument that Carlin uses to argue that rights DON'T exist is to say..."Rosangela Canino-Koninghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03772885034951971715noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-89581954555589125382008-03-08T07:18:00.000-07:002008-03-08T07:18:00.000-07:00Brian CheekFor a part of your answer, we need to d...<B>Brian Cheek</B><BR/><BR/>For a part of your answer, we need to distinguish between two closely related moral theories:<BR/><BR/>(1) Desire utilitarianism (the right act is the act that a person with good desires would perform, and good desires are those that tend to fulfill the most and strongest other desires)<BR/><BR/>(2) Desire-fulfilling act utilitarianism (the right act is the act that fulfills the most and strongest desires)<BR/><BR/>Act utilitarian theories ignore the fact that people act so as to fulfill the more and the stronger of their desires, given their beliefs. The only way that an individual can consistently follow option (2) is if he had only one desire - a desire to fulfill the most and strongest desires. If he had any other desire (e.g., aversion to pain, hunger, thirst, desire for sex, preference for chocolate over vanilla) then there are instances in which he simply will not be able to do the right action.<BR/><BR/>Desire utilitarianism repects the fact that people act so as to fulfill the most and strongest of their desires and asks, "Given this, what are the best desires that we can possibly cause a person to have?"<BR/><BR/>So, we are not talking about slavery itself per se on such a theory. We are talking about a love of liberty.<BR/><BR/>Slavery is the symptom of a culture that has an insufficient love of liberty. A society filled with people who love liberty is a society that is filled with people who abhore slavery. A slave society, in turn, is a society filled with people who have no love of liberty.<BR/><BR/>In order to protect my own freedom, I have reason to promote a love of freedom in others. In promoting a love of freedom in others, I am promoting an aversion to slavery.<BR/><BR/>I could, of course, promote an arbitrary and groundless assertion that 'those people over there don't count; they can be enslaved". Yet, if I do that, then I am promoting an arbitrary and groundless assertion that I don't count, or somebody that I care for does not count, and that they may be enslaved.<BR/><BR/>Not only am I safer in terms of not being arbitrarily excluded from the group that may not be enslaved, but I can negotiate the cooperation of a far larger number of people. Somebody else may <I>define</I> freedom to exclude those who are enslaved, but those who are enslaved still have many and strong reasons to oppose slavery. We cannot define their reasons out of existence. They still exist, and they will still motivate slaves to act in particular ways, and it motivates them to side with those who propose a wider concept of liberty.<BR/><BR/>The best option is a generic love of freedom. Everybody is safer in a society where there is a general love of freedom for everybody. Including me.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-27942347542967235952008-03-08T06:41:00.000-07:002008-03-08T06:41:00.000-07:00Alonzo,I don't think your clarification of your de...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>I don't think your clarification of your definition of "rights" successfully addressed the first problem that Secular Planet had with it, namely that your definition of "rights cannot be absolutely defined" because people's desires are different. Your response simply moves the problem from the sphere of individual desires to "people in general"'s desires, which themselves are subject to great change and variety - the problem of relativism, in a nutshell.<BR/><BR/>Who are these "people in general", and how did they arrive at a consensus on such things?<BR/><BR/>In particular, your slavery example is problematic. "If you deny that there is such a right to be free, then you deny that it is wrong for his masters to have put his chains on the slave." But it seems that your definition of "rights" allows for such a denial. If enough people - "people in general" - have good reason to promote slavery, then "people in general" have a right to own slaves.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps a good counter argument to this is that "people in general" must include those enslaved, and they of course do not have good reason to promote slavery. However, this is easily avoided by the slaveholder by defining the slaves as a group that is something other than completely human (which, of course, is not only a logic lesson but also a history lesson).<BR/><BR/>What am I missing in your definition to which you could appeal to stop this sort of thinking?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-32451424539336958112008-03-04T05:13:00.000-07:002008-03-04T05:13:00.000-07:00Secular PlanetOf course people have different desi...<B>Secular Planet</B><BR/><BR/>Of course people have different desires.<BR/><BR/>However, my definition does not identify rights in terms of the desires that people have. It identifies rights in terms of desires that people have reason to promote.<BR/><BR/>I have a number of desires. You do not need to know what my specific desires are to know that I cannot fulfill a vast majority of those desires if I am dead, or if I am a slave to somebody else. In order to protect my life and my freedom, I have reason to create in others an aversion to murder, and an aversion to slavery. The claim that there is a right to life and a right to be free is simply to say that people generally, regardless of their specific desires, have reason to promote a society around them in which people generally have an aversion to murder and to slavery.<BR/><BR/>Also, this definition of 'rights' is subject to the law of morality that 'ought' implies 'can'. For example, it is not the case that a rescue worker has a duty to teleport a child out of a burning building, because it is not the case a rescue worker should teleport a trapped child out of a building burning. Since it is not the case that he 'can' teleport a child out of a burning building it makes no sense to say that he 'ought to' to do so.<BR/><BR/>The so-called 'right' to $100,000 per year would be nonsense, because it is absurd to say that we 'ought' to give everybody $100,000 per year when it is not the case that we 'can' give everybody $100,000 per year.<BR/><BR/>Since people do not have a reason to promote a desire that cannot be fulfilled, it is not the case that my definition actually supports such a 'right'.<BR/><BR/>The definition of rights that I use would, on the other hand, support the claim that people have a right to a certain minimum level of food, shelter, and health care to the degree that society 'can' provide it. Contrary to the claim that my definition is 'too broad', there are people who argue that we do have such a right.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-73652888439588504782008-03-04T04:50:00.000-07:002008-03-04T04:50:00.000-07:00Stefan MonsaureusCarlin is not, in fact, working w...<B>Stefan Monsaureus</B><BR/><BR/>Carlin is not, in fact, working with the concept of 'rights' as a codification of a social contract. This concept of rights defines them as elements of an <I>ideal</I> contract - a contract that everybody in a 'state of nature' would have reason to sign themselves to. Carlton instead looks as 'rights' as the creations of actual 'contracts' or systems of law. He looks at the so-called 'rights' that governments do recognize, when moral rights are concerned witht he 'rights' that an ideal government would recognize.<BR/><BR/>Only an idiot would try to argue that there is freedom of the press under a totalitarian regime. However, it is true that the people have a right to the freedom of the press in the sense that people generally have reason to promote such a freedom. If there were no right to freedom of the press in a totalitarian regime, then anybody in a totalitarian regime who claims that the government is immoral and should be over-thrown, in part, because it violates such a right would be mistaken.<BR/><BR/>And if slaves have no right to be free, then it would be a mistake for them to fight for their freedom. A slave who tries to throw off his chains first says, "I have a right to be free," meaning, "My masters are morally wrong to have put these chains on me." If you deny that there is such a right to be free, then you deny that it is wrong for his masters to have put his chains on the slave.<BR/><BR/>The 'good' that it does to recognize that a person has a right to X even though he would be arrested for doing X is that it identifies a goal that is worth fighting for, even perhaps at some personal cost. It tells us the side in a dispute - between the pamphleteer and the tyrant, or between the slave and the master - we should support. It tells us who <I>should</I> win such a struggle.<BR/><BR/>The good that it did to say that slaves had a right to be free even where they were not free in fact is that it motivated people to fight for their freedom. The good that it does to say that people have a right to a fair trial by a jury of their peers where tyrants kill people on a whim is that it motivates people to fight to replace the tyranny with a system of just laws.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-11613519961810818582008-03-04T03:49:00.000-07:002008-03-04T03:49:00.000-07:00I can't accept your definition of rights as "state...I can't accept your definition of rights as "states of affairs that we have reason to promote a desire for or an aversion to." People have different desires and thus rights cannot be absolutely defined; a community accepts a set of conventions. It's also far too broad and would apply to things no one recognizes as rights (e.g., everyone on earth making $100k+ per year).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-11519912538417085192008-03-04T03:39:00.000-07:002008-03-04T03:39:00.000-07:00Carlin's point, I think, was to demonstrate that r...Carlin's point, I think, was to demonstrate that rights are not absolute, nor are they permanent. Working with the common understanding of "rights" as the codification of a social contract, he challenges his audience to question their own assumptions. In an age that is sadly bereft of critical thought and in which some civil liberties have been placed at risk, I won't quibble too much with his underlying philosophy.<BR/><BR/>With respect to your description of "rights" as "states of affairs that we have reason to promote a desire for or aversion to" I have to wonder if this suggests that a freedom of the press exists under a totalitarian regime, but is simply being violated, as certainly it is a state of affairs that a majority might wish to promote. Similarly, would slaves have a right to be free, even if they have no legal basis under which to assert that right? If so, there seems little actual value in this conception of rights. What good does it do to say that one has a right to do X, but will be arrested for doing X?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com