tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post8168325024532883009..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Objections Considered: ArbitrarinessAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-16433112091260081422010-01-28T01:05:09.583-07:002010-01-28T01:05:09.583-07:00"I'm pretty sure that when I "want&q..."I'm pretty sure that when I "want" something, that's the same as saying that it "fulfills my desires"."<br /><br />Then why do you care about a definition that is concerned with OTHER desires? It is simply not a topic of interest.יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-8484960948121204222010-01-25T08:26:29.411-07:002010-01-25T08:26:29.411-07:00> "What's useful for us is what we wan...> "What's useful for us is what we want to do, not what tends to fulfill other desires."<br /><br />I'm pretty sure that when I "want" something, that's the same as saying that it "fulfills my desires".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-77193369724537881542010-01-24T03:57:45.275-07:002010-01-24T03:57:45.275-07:00My critique has to be read in context. I agree tha...My critique has to be read in context. I agree that all word assignment is arbitrary. My accusation was specifically in regards to the relation between the theory and the people. Egoism, a la Carrier, defines "good" in a way that is founded on what humans desire, and therefore is not arbitrary <i>in this sense</i>. Desirism defines "good" arbitrarily in that its definition is founded on which desires tend to fulfill other desires, which bears only coincidental relation to what people desire.<br /><br />This is truly a semantic point of little importance. The important thing is not how desirism defines the word "good", but whether this definition is useful to us. It isn't. What's useful for us is what we want to do, not what tends to fulfill other desires.יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-23518082279253121892010-01-23T18:19:18.443-07:002010-01-23T18:19:18.443-07:00You did not answer my question, Alonzo. You answe...You did not answer my question, Alonzo. You answered a different question. I will try to clarify it. First, let me quote the original question I presented:<br /><br />==================<br />When considering what one "should" do, we consider the desires in question. A murder "should" dispose of the murder weapon (because it will tend to fulfill his desire of not being caught). However, you have said that when we consider moral questions, the desires in question become "all desires that exist". Why? It doesn't seem to me that common usage of the term would imply such. If anything, it might mean "all desires that we know about", or "all desires that we care about". But, "all desires that exist"? I don't think people mean that. So, how do you defend your usage? How do you get from the practical-ought to the moral-ought, without already instilling your own values into the equation (the value of considering all desires that exist)?<br />===================<br /><br />I don't care what labels you are using -- that's not what I'm talking about. You claim that moral oughts refer to "all desires that exist", as opposed to a subset of desires that exist. Why do you make that claim? Where is the evidence or reason?<br /><br />I ask because I'm not so sure that is true. It seems to me that when people make moral claims, such as "it is immoral to steal", they are implicitly only including the desires of their "in-group". Specifically, the group from which they would engage in some sort of moral discourse, to reach a sort of "harmonicity of desires".<br /><br />They don't include desires of the "out-group" -- others from different tribes, or nations, or families, or species that they do not try to form "harmonicity of desires" with.<br /><br />If you would say they "should" consider those desires, then you are begging the question, since you are already infusing a moral value into the equation in order to make that "moral-ought" statement.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-13925742760367090012010-01-21T14:53:28.822-07:002010-01-21T14:53:28.822-07:00supersage400
You say here and have said elsewhere...<b>supersage400</b><br /><br /><i>You say here and have said elsewhere that there is no is/ought dichotomy at all.</i><br /><br />No, I said that there is no <i>mutually exclusive</i> is/ought distinction.<br /><br />An is/ought distinction does exist. However, it has the same form as the rectangle/square distinction or the cat/tiger distinction.<br /><br />All ought statements are is statements. However, it is not the case that all is statements are ought statements.<br /><br />Because of this, it is possible to gather a set of is statements that <i>do not</i> legitimately imply an ought statement. It is possible to try to infer an ought statement that is not justified by the specific 'is' statements the author provides.<br /><br />Specifically, 'ought' or 'should' refers to reasons for action that exist. If the premises do not include reasons for action that exist then the inference is invalid. The speaker has committed the is-ought fallacy of deriving a reasons-for-action conclusion with no reasons-for-action premises.<br /><br />However, it is perfectly consistent with this view to hold that reasons-for-action premises are still 'is' statements. They are just a particular subset of 'is' statements - a subset that too many people often leave out of their arguments.<br /><br />So, I assert that an is-ought distinction does exist and is often violated. However, it is not a <i>mutally exclusive</i> distinction that makes it permanently impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' because they refer to two different types of things.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-22101835938296519522010-01-21T13:30:57.172-07:002010-01-21T13:30:57.172-07:00Alonzo, I'm curious about something. You say h...Alonzo, I'm curious about something. You say here and have said elsewhere that there is no is/ought dichotomy at all. However, elsewhere, you have accused some folks, such as Ayn Rand, of committing an is/ought fallacy of deriving an ought from an is. I am a bit confused. Surely they can't be accused of a fallacy which is based upon something that does not exist?SS400https://www.blogger.com/profile/17307796666410840170noreply@blogger.com