tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post7009340843117362400..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Choosing a Moral LanguageAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger61125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-88073410848174483682009-05-02T09:59:00.000-06:002009-05-02T09:59:00.000-06:00"You seem to be objecting that the moral claim I s..."<I>You seem to be objecting that the moral claim I suggested for the slave-owner (that slaves should be treated unequally) is not rationally justified. Right?</I>"<br />Correct, it is your, not the slave-owner's, "moral" claim that I am seeking a rational justification for.<br /><br /><I>Well, I agree with that, if properly understood. I wasn't saying that the claim was rationally justified as to truth.</I>So you are making an unjustified "moral" claim? So you have no justification in asserting it, so why assert it, without justification why should anyone listen to you? Lets see if you indicate an answer to this in the rest of your reply:-<br /><br />"<I>My point was that it was rational for the slave owner to make such a claim, since it helps fulfill his desires</I>".<br />And is this addressing the wrong point as I think should be quite clear by now.<br /><br />"<I>If he understands what he is doing, the slave-owner's moral claim is a deception, designed to achieve his desires. But deception may be the rational course of action.</I>"<br />In order for there to be a "deception", there has to be a state of affairs over which one can be deceived. This is what we have been trying to discuss and you ahve been evading, yet you tacitly admit to our point here.<br />"<I> If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue reaping the benefits of slavery (and no contrary desires), DU will probably tell me to espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves.</I>"<br />To repeat this is not DU nor an inference you can draw from DU. Where is the justification of this claim?<br /><br />"<I>Perhaps to be clearer I should have said "a DU evaluation" instead of just "DU".</I>"<br />You have a strange concept of clarity. This is quite irrelevant.<br /><br />"<I>As I see it, DU says nothing at all about morality.</I>"<br />Then how about you tell what you mean by "morality" and it better not be a special discipline with special types of reasoning or we will demand a rational justification for asserting a special status for "morality". <br /> <br />"<I> A DU evaluation just tells me the actions to take to fulfill my desires.</I>"<br />Yawn. This is getting boring, this is called practical reasoning.<br /><br />"<I>The making of moral claims is just one of many types of actions that may be evaluated.</I>"<br />Like any other action - in terms of the desires that brought it about and those it affects.<br /><br />"<I> And DU does not confer any meaning on such claims</I>." <br />False, what would it be about a"moral" claim such that it does not confer meaning? A claim is a claim, you check its meaning - the asserted proposition - against reality to see if is justified or not. Just like any other claim.<br /><br />"<I>As far as DU is concerned they could just be meaningless utterances.</I>"<br />Nothing I have said could imply this, you are getting absurd.<br /><br />I read your quote from me next to realise I have to repeat my points as you are failing to understand. You say in reply to my quote and presumably much of my response above:<br /><br />"<I> All that matters is the effect they have on the listener.</I>"<br />False. One can use facts and arguments over beliefs to change beliefs, but desire are immune to such methods. One needs to use social power and persuasion to change desires, the question is the over he use such power and persuasions justified, and that depends on the desires being addressed.<br /><br /><I>(a) the content of a moral claim can be evaluated as to its truth; or<br />(b) the action of making a moral claim can be evaluated as to its fitness for purpose (to fulfill the agent's desires).<br /><br />I say that (a) is false and (b) is true. </I>Both (a) (in a way) and(b) are true but only by not relating moral claims as a special form of reasoning which is what you are doing and why you gave a different answer. You argument to make this distinction is:<br /><br />"<I>The content of moral claims cannot be evaluated as to truth, because they are not truth-apt propositions. To be able to evaluate them, you would first need to define the meaning of the moral terms used.</I>"<br />"Moral" claims are just as truth-apt as any other claims, not in virtue of making "special" claims but in spite of that. (A)That is if one thinks there is something called intrinsic goodness then one is in error but the statement are still truth apt. <br />(B)Similarly if one thinks that there is some special semantic convolution not applicable to any other claims, then one is in error but the statements are still truth-apt. <br />Both A and B are error theories but with different subjects, the first of the agent, the second of the assessor - you here.<br /><br />Your argument appears to based on committing a type B error, based, presumably, on a hasty generalisation of wanting to avoid type A errors (as an agent). Your mistake is to ascribe a special status to moral claims when there is none required. Unless you can justify this of course.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-12751719444938688292009-05-01T04:56:00.000-06:002009-05-01T04:56:00.000-06:00I have written a response to your slavery issue he...I have written a response to your slavery issue here:<br /><br /><A HREF="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2009/04/for-love-of-freedom.html" REL="nofollow">For Love of Freedom</A>Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-31656370080169925862009-05-01T04:02:00.000-06:002009-05-01T04:02:00.000-06:00Faithlessgod,
I wasn't going to post again, b...Faithlessgod,<br /><br />I wasn't going to post again, but your last post leads me to believe that we are mostly in agreement on the substance. We just haven't been understanding each other.<br /><br />You seem to be objecting that the moral claim I suggested for the slave-owner (that slaves should be treated unequally) is not rationally justified. Right?<br /><br />Well, I agree with that, if properly understood. I wasn't saying that the claim was rationally justified as to truth. My point was that it was rational for the slave owner to make such a claim, since it helps fulfill his desires. If he understands what he is doing, the slave-owner's moral claim is a deception, designed to achieve his desires. But deception may be the rational course of action.<br /><br />To remind you, I wrote:<br />< If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue reaping the benefits of slavery (and no contrary desires), DU will probably tell me to espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves. <<br /><br />Perhaps to be clearer I should have said "a DU evaluation" instead of just "DU".<br /><br />As I see it, DU says nothing at all about morality. A DU evaluation just tells me the actions to take to fulfill my desires. The making of moral claims is just one of many types of actions that may be evaluated. And DU does not confer any meaning on such claims. As far as DU is concerned they could just be meaningless utterances. All that matters is the effect they have on the listener.<br /><br />You wrote:<br />> Moral claims can be evaluated just like any other claim on the bases of rational and empirical enquiry. That is what I am saying. On what rational or empirical basis can you imply that that moral claims can must be excluded? This is what I have been waiting for from you. <<br /><br />I see now that our language is ambiguous. It's not clear whether "moral claims can be evaluated" means<br />(a) the content of a moral claim can be evaluated as to its truth; or<br />(b) the action of making a moral claim can be evaluated as to its fitness for purpose (to fulfill the agent's desires).<br /><br />I say that (a) is false and (b) is true. The content of moral claims cannot be evaluated as to truth, because they are not truth-apt propositions. To be able to evaluate them, you would first need to define the meaning of the moral terms used. That was my challenge to Luke and Alonzo, which they attempted and failed. I noticed on your blog a challenge to define moral terms. I thought your challenge was highly pertinent and well put. I assume you yourself do not claim to be able to define moral terms.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-26484683061650949772009-05-01T02:08:00.000-06:002009-05-01T02:08:00.000-06:00Eneasz, I think we will just have to accept that w...Eneasz, I think we will just have to accept that we have different judgements as to the likely outcome of DU evaluations conducted on behalf of slave-owners.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-15204830591471462022009-05-01T02:06:00.000-06:002009-05-01T02:06:00.000-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-37678768987336097112009-04-30T09:26:00.000-06:002009-04-30T09:26:00.000-06:00There have been many slave-owning societies in the...<I>There have been many slave-owning societies in the past...they seemed to have functioned pretty well and to the benefit of the slave-owning class... we can't say for sure that slavery contributed overall to the fulfillment of their desires, but I don't think it's unreasonable to hold the view that they did. And, if such empirical questions are too difficult to answer, then what practical use is DU</I>?<br /><br />I actually don't think it's that difficult to answer. Those societies did not function pretty well, they only functioned well enough to survive. And slavery was a disadvantage to the slave-owner as well, relative to how he would have faired in a slavery-free society. I conceed that this is counter-intuitive. Having a lot of slaves certainly feels like an advantage, and seems on the surface to be an advantage. That's why humanity embraced slavery for millenia and only a few centuries ago finally threw it off.<br /><br />However I dare say that as a species we have advanced at a phenominal rate in the last few centuries, compared to our rate of progress before. I realize there are MANY contributing factors to this, not just the decline of slavery, I am not delusional. However the values that made such progress possible are the same values that made people realize slavery is abhorent. I posit that a society that gladly embraces slavery <B>could not</B> advance at the rate we've been advancing due to the distinctly different values and attitudes that would require. As such, the person today who is not a slave-owner is better off than he would have been even as a slave-owner if society had never rejected slavery, because such a society would be far less advanced. Let's not forget that the average American has a much higher quality of life and average life span than any pre-modern king or emperor ever enjoyed.<br /><br />Again, I'm not saying this is because slavery was abolished, but rather because the change in values allowed for much stronger progress, and those values are ones that will naturally lead to a rejection of slavery.<br /><br />This is why "good" things are good. Recall that good = all people generally have many and strong reasons to promote this. All people have reasons to promote these desires for liberty, empathy, etc, because everyone is better off when these are strong desires, as recent history has shown.Eneasznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-39495897438286475012009-04-30T08:49:00.000-06:002009-04-30T08:49:00.000-06:00"that DU is both a method for finding the most rat...<I>"that DU is both a method for finding the most rational SAE"</I>No DU is based on what people do anyway, it is just considering this systematically.<br /><br /><I>"and some sort of moral calculus."</I>I do not argue that there is some special form of reasoning utilising as a moral calculus. Morality is no special or distinct category of reason. Moral claims can be evaluated just like any other claim on the bases of rational and empirical enquiry. That is what I am saying. On what rational or empirical basis can you imply that that moral claims can must be excluded? This is what I have been waiting for from you.<br /><br /><br /><I>"This is illustrated by your use of the word "justified" as a moral judgement,</I>Justification is a perfectly good word to use when evaluation justificatory claims of any sort.<br />Epistemic, biological, psychological, sociological, economic etc.<br /><br /><I>" even though we agreed at the start of the discussion that we were not talking about morality (yet)."</I>I see no need to talk about morality at all, only to the degree that people are using what they call moral justifications, there no ground for those. However for those it is useful to use moral terms but only as a reaction to their usage.<br /><br /><br /><I> And at no point did you subsequently bridge the gap from one to the other."</I>There is no gap to bridge because nothing to build a bridge to. You need to justify - that is provide evidence and argument - why you think there is.<br /><br /><I>I drew attention to your problematic use of the word "justified" very early in our discussion, but didn't pursue it then. Perhaps I should have done."</I>If you want to just play semantic games this can go on forever. I am not interested in that, only in constructive conversation.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-87189454333956118762009-04-30T01:33:00.000-06:002009-04-30T01:33:00.000-06:00Eneasz, you and I seem to be on the same page, so ...Eneasz, you and I seem to be on the same page, so I believe we can continue productively. Unfortunately, it's now doubtful that we are talking about the same DU as Luke, Alonzo and Faithlessgod.<br /><br />As you say, the disagreement between us is over the empirical question of whether espousing a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves would actually serve to fulfill slave-owners' desires. <br /><br />First of all, let me clarify that, when I said a slave-owner probably should (rationally) espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves, I didn't mean that slave-owners should simply disregard the desires of slaves. Obviously it's in the interests of slave-owners to keep their slaves healthy and sufficiently content not to rebel. But they can do that out of practical considerations, not because a moral calculus tells them to do so. Also, if I've made my claim too strong by saying "disregards the desires of slaves", try substituting "counts the desires of slaves as less important than those of other people".<br /><br />There have been many slave-owning societies in the past, which presumably had a moral calculus that accepted the ownership of slaves, and they seemed to have functioned pretty well and to the benefit of the slave-owning class. Of course, we can't say for sure that slavery contributed overall to the fulfillment of their desires, but I don't think it's unreasonable to hold the view that they did. And, if such empirical questions are too difficult to answer, then what practical use is DU?Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-13877093215143025732009-04-30T01:29:00.000-06:002009-04-30T01:29:00.000-06:00Faithlessgod, the reason we keep running into prob...Faithlessgod, the reason we keep running into problems is that you are putting forward two mutually inconsistent positions: that DU is both a method for finding the most rational SAE <I>and</I> some sort of moral calculus. This is illustrated by your use of the word "justified" as a moral judgement, even though we agreed at the start of the discussion that we were not talking about morality (yet). And at no point did you subsequently bridge the gap from one to the other. I drew attention to your problematic use of the word "justified" very early in our discussion, but didn't pursue it then. Perhaps I should have done. Anyway, you are now getting impatient (as am I) and I don't think it would be useful to continue. Thank you for an interesting (if frustrating) discussion.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-17273956664533038642009-04-29T18:59:00.000-06:002009-04-29T18:59:00.000-06:00P.S. Accidentally posted before I finished spell c...P.S. Accidentally posted before I finished spell checking. Still it is legible enough as it is.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-5572393633559134642009-04-29T18:56:00.000-06:002009-04-29T18:56:00.000-06:00Hi Eneasz
RichardW does have a point except I won...Hi Eneasz<br /><br />RichardW does have a point except I wonder whether he is using it in the wrong fashion by mistake or intent, I do not know.<br /><br />The slave owner, like the Nazis, Stalinists, Inquisitors of this world all did most likely think that they were justified, that were doing nothing morally wrong and what they were doing was realising seeking to fulfil the more and stronger of their desires.<br /><br />All were surrounded by peers who agreed and pursued and supported these same ends. It is quite possible, unlikely as it seems to us, that they were in other regards seen by their peer as decent, morally good people. This includes all the values you noted, except they only applied to their in-group. <br /><br />The out-group did not count whether they were, depending on the in-group: for slave owners and their peers - other citizens: slaves;for Nazis: Jews, Gypsys, Gays, atheists and so on; for Stalinists, the bourgeoisie and quite a few others; for Inquisitors, heretics and witches etc.<br /><br />The question is were they justified in doing this? Were they justified in having an in- and out-group specified this way? It certainly was to their benefit given the situation at those times.<br />The salve owner did benefit from their slaves - even if they treated them well. If they stopped owning slave they may not have been able to compete with those who did.<br /><br />The question becomes asking whether their justifications - whether assumed, considered, held unwittingly and so on. These are all examples of cultural relativism, when considered objectively instead of relatively, there was no grounds for making these distinctions except as to their advantage. For whatever reason they gave, it was their advantage in realising their ends that was the real justification. Their moral were constructed to support and justify these practices as it does in many other societies with double standards.<br /><br />We have repeatedly found when looking to see if such double standards are rationally justified by the empirical evidence they are not. If there are no grounds for double standards then everyone would generally be better off if these standards are removed. Of course, the ones preventing this are the ones that are benefiting.<br />The strong and the wealthy like to keep strong and wealthy by keeping the poor and the weak poor and weak.<br /><br />This all revolves aroudn power and persuasion. The ahve the power and control the means of persuaion through religion and other ideologies.<br /> <br />The problem becomes to classify abuses of such power and persuasion then what remedial action can be taken. We are only looking at the first question for now.<br /><br />The dispute becomes over what we might classify as abuses of power and persuasion are rejected by those with the relevant power and persuaion. We need objective means free of bias as possible. This is not to assume -as those in power do - that the status quo is correct and it is also not to assume that any alternative is better - such a voilent uprising.<br /><br />We need a means of evaluating and classifying double standards without introducing others. Too many debates and analysis of these issues seek only to change the parameters of the double standard rather than remove them, to change the parameters against them to be in favour of them.<br /><br />So the only likely tack to take is <br />not to assume a double standard - one way or another - and see what make sense then. This requires assuming as little as possible and seekng rational and emprical justification for any apparent bias or exception. Du is such a fraemwork.<br /><br />Enough for now.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79706082443632838292009-04-29T14:26:00.000-06:002009-04-29T14:26:00.000-06:00If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue rea...<I>If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue reaping the benefits of slavery (and no contrary desires), DU will probably tell me to espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves</I>.<br /><br />Actually, that is incorrect. If you picture DU as most effective method to find the best possible SAE (or at least the portion of the best possible SAE that answers "what desires should I give others?"), you will realize that DU will tell you to espouse a moral calculus that will lead you to the conclusion that slavery should be discouraged/abolished (yes, even as a slaver owner that profits from them).<br /><br />There are many reasons for this. One of them, naturally, is that the slaves, and friends/family of the slaves, may attempt to do you harm. However I view this as a nearly-inconsequential reason.<br /><br />The more important reason that DU will lead the slave owner away from slavery is because one of the desires identified by DU that everyone always has many reasons to promote is a respect for individual liberty. Strengthening this desire in those around you greatly increases the odds that you will be free to pursue your desires as you please, as they will have aversions to restricting what you do.<br /><br />Another one of these universally-usefull desires is empathy for others. The stronger you can make other people's aversion to seeing their fellow man in pain, the greater the odds are that they will go out of their way to make sure they do not hurt you, and even expend their resources to help you when they see you are in pain.<br /><br />Given that you have strong reasons to promote these desires in others, it follows that they have strong reasons to promote these desires in you. Therefore if those around you are at all succesfull in applying DU, you will be instilled with these desires as well, and will come to abhor slavery on your own. It will become a desire of yours to not be part of such a deplorable system. This will be in opposition to your desire to exploit the cheap labor of slaves. If the morality of your society is advanced enough, your desires for liberty and empathy will eventually grow stronger than your desire for cheap labor.<br /><br />Also of note is that it's entirely possible that I could be wrong when I apply DU like this. Perhaps it is not true that a desire for liberty, and an aversion to seeing others in pain, are things to be strongly encouraged. However these are empirical questions that can be answered objectively. And, looking at human history, I think we can draw the conclusion that yes, societies without slavery provide much better lives to everyone (even the potential slave owners) than those with slavery, and thus we can conclude that we were very likely correct in identifying those desires as ones that should be strongly promoted.Eneasznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-85947779283419738482009-04-29T11:36:00.000-06:002009-04-29T11:36:00.000-06:00RichardW
"Now that's settled, then the next quest...RichardW<br /><br />"Now that's settled, then the next question is what does this have to do with morality? It seems DU is not a moral calculus at all. Instead, it tells me how to create the moral calculus that will best fulfill my own desires (including my altruistic desires and the urges of my conscience). If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue reaping the benefits of slavery (and no contrary desires), DU will probably tell me to espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves."<br /><br />After this you have either not understood anything we are talking about and/or I am beginning to doubt you are really interested in constructive conversation.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-10551900448884609552009-04-29T02:11:00.000-06:002009-04-29T02:11:00.000-06:00Thanks to everyone who has helped finally make thi...Thanks to everyone who has helped finally make this clear to me!<br /><br />> "I submit to you that Desire Utilitarianism is simply the search for the best possible SAE (or at least, the search for the portion of the best possible SAE that answers "what desires should I give others?"). And that it is the most effective method created so far in approximating that ideal SAE." <<br /><br />Well, I wish someone had told me that when I first encountered DU. It would have saved me a huge amount of time, and also saved you guys a lot of time spent in fruitless arguments with me. Looking back now, I can see that that was what you were telling me from the start, faithlessgod, but there were elements of your terminology and explanations which were rather misleading. (I won't deny that my own posts were often far from perfectly clear too!) Also, I was misled by my prior expectation that DU was something more than that.<br /><br />Now that's settled, then the next question is what does this have to do with morality? It seems DU is not a moral calculus at all. Instead, it tells me how to create the moral calculus that will best fulfill my own desires (including my altruistic desires and the urges of my conscience). If I'm a slave-owner with a desire to continue reaping the benefits of slavery (and no contrary desires), DU will probably tell me to espouse a moral calculus that disregards the desires of slaves.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79468903458173933972009-04-28T18:48:00.000-06:002009-04-28T18:48:00.000-06:00RichardW
I would like to build on my earlier post...RichardW<br /><br />I would like to build on my earlier post discussing the great deal of similarity and the small differences between your sense of rational 'ought' to build a sense of moral 'ought'.<br /><br />Following the model of the physicist (who likes to talk about frictionless pullies and massless strings in illustrating points regarding force), let us take a simple society.<br /><br />There are three individuals.<br /><br />Agent1 and Agent2 both have a desire to scatter stones.<br /><br />Agent3 has a desire to gather stones together.<br /><br />Agent3 cannot gather stones as fast as Agent1 and Agent2 can scatter them, so the two agents must devote a portion of their time to gathering their own stones.<br /><br />Agent4 is about to join their community. Agent1, Agent2, and Agent3 have the ability to choose what Agent4 will desire.<br /><br />Agent1 and Agent2 both have reason to act so as to give Agent4 a desire to gather stones. Agent3 has no reason to act whatsoever. Regardless of whether Agent4 has a desire to gather or to scatter stones, Agent3 will still have the opportunity to spend his time gathering stones.<br /><br />So, now, it is objectively true that there the bulk of the reasons for action favor giving Agent4 a desire to gather stones.<br /><br />Even Agent3 can recognize this fact. This does not mean that Agent3 is motivated to give Agent4 a desire to gather stones. In fact, he has no such motivation. Yet, he can recognize the truth of the claim that there is more reason to give Agent4 a desire to gather stones than there is to give Agent4 a desire to scatter stones.<br /><br />And he can talk intelligently about that fact.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-78580210872720829042009-04-28T17:40:00.000-06:002009-04-28T17:40:00.000-06:00Eneasz
"I submit to you that Desire Utilitarianis...Eneasz<br /><br />"I submit to you that Desire Utilitarianism is simply the search for the best possible SAE (or at least, the search for the portion of the best possible SAE that answers "what desires should I give others?"). And that it is the most effective method created so far in approximating that ideal SAE."<br /><br />Exactly! <br /><br />Now I have come to dislike the name Desire Utilitarianism, sorry Alonzo, apart from typing it, it makes Du look like another competing moral theory when, in my view it is not. <br /><br />It is what remains once one realises one does not need any of the inadequacies of both moral objectivity (relying on non-existent facts) and moral subjectivity (relying on opinions), moral relativism (saying nothing really) and moral non-cognitivism (irrational semantic contortions). <br /><br />I am suggesting a new name, one easier to type and less prone to confusion with other utilitarianisms - "Desirism".Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79269257223818277612009-04-28T16:13:00.000-06:002009-04-28T16:13:00.000-06:00RicahrdW
I really do not understand your issue is...RicahrdW<br /><br />I really do not understand your issue is. I think your SAE/MAE terminology is confusing you.<br /><br />We all agree on what motivates anyone, there is no issue on this.<br /><br />You seem to be obsessed with denying that you or anyone can rational assess the interactions of others by evaluating one agent's ends against others. <br /><br />This is what we do all the time. We make predictions of others behaviours doing this and assess the results of their and our predictions and learn and update our abilities to do this as a result of this.<br /><br />We analyse a teams performance as a team and how individual players perfomed and evaluate whather they could have done better. Did the manager execute the right strategy, was he justified or not etc.<br /><br />We do this in film, TV and literature. We do this on our friends, work colleagues, family and strangers. We use all this in predicting how others will react to us, whether the are individuals, groups or people in general - when we apply the same methods to our own intentions and actions. We use this extended rational analysis as part of our belief set in selecting and pursuing our ends. Some are better able to do this than other depending on how much they pay attention others and learn from their predictions both from afar and in their own interactions.<br /><br />Everytime you think of an interaction between friends and think A and B are not going to like what C is doing, you are perfoming a extended rational anlaysis.<br /> <br />Sufferers from autism and less so aspergers are impaired in such social skills.<br /><br />So armed with this knowledge we may modify our choices or may not, for example A may go ahead with some plan knowing everyone will complain and plan to deal with their complaints etc. B has not paid attention goes ahead and is unprepared frrom other reactions, <br />C decides not to pursue this end, <br />D might try and find a way of doing this without anyone knowing, E might try to convince others they are mistkaen in teir disapproval and so on. All of this informed or not by prior extended rational assessments and precitions others reactoins.<br /><br />A better informed and a better predictor person would know more accurately know whether their actions will meet with approval or disapproval from the relevant other agents, that is whether others will think their actions justified or not.<br /><br />I think you are creating a false dichotomy between your SAE and MAE.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-81671176752291977592009-04-28T11:48:00.000-06:002009-04-28T11:48:00.000-06:00Considering the answer you gave below:
> I hat...Considering the answer you gave below:<br /><I> > I hate to interrupt, but the question that a MAE answers is pretty straight-forward. "Given that everyone uses SAEs, what desires should I try to give people in order to best fulfill my desires?" <<br /><br />That's a question about how to fufill my own desires, so it's answered by the best possible SAE <br /></I>.<br /><br />And your summary of your position:<br /><I>only one's own desires are treated as final ends. Other people's desires are only treated as means to achieving one's own ends</I>.<br /><br />I can't see where we differ. This is what DU states as well. It looks like we agree and are merely arguing over word definitions, which - as Alonzo pointed out - is one of the greatest wastes of effort in ethics.<br /><br />You've stated that the best possible SAE will answer what desires to try to instill in others. And you seem to be asserting that the best possible SAE is never used (due to limited resources/knowledge/etc) but people strive to use the SAE most closely approximating the best possible SAE.<br /><br />I submit to you that Desire Utilitarianism is simply the search for the best possible SAE (or at least, the search for the portion of the best possible SAE that answers "what desires should I give others?"). And that it is the most effective method created so far in approximating that ideal SAE.Eneasznoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-77765748848949987292009-04-28T10:38:00.000-06:002009-04-28T10:38:00.000-06:00RichardW wrote:
"Given that we are only motivate...RichardW wrote:<br /><br /><br />"Given that we are only motivated by our desires...This includes desires for other people's welfare and desires to be moral...But only one's own desires are treated as final ends. Other people's desires are only treated as means to achieving one's own ends."<br /><br />This is true. Each person seeks to act so as to fulfill the most and strongest of his or her own desires. The desires of another person cannot be the direct cause of our intentional actions. We may consider the desires of others, but only insofar as the desires of others are the objects of our own desires.<br /><br /><br />"...the rational policy to follow is one which maximises the fulfillment of one's desires."<br /><br />I am willing to simply define practical rationality as rationality based solely upon the desires of the agent. <br /><br />"The perfectly rational policy would be one which takes full account of all available information about the world, including other people's desires."<br /><br />No. There can be irrelevant data. I do not need to know the number of planets that existed in the universe 5,987,234,983 years ago to be rational. Indeed, this would make practical rationality wholly impractical.<br /><br /><br />"In practice, we can only approximate to the perfectly rational policy, given the limits of our knowledge, our inferential abilities and the time we're willing to spend analysing the situation."<br /><br />True. Except for the phrase "willing to spend". It may be the case that a person may not be willing to spend time that he should spend. However, it is still the case that we have a limited amount of time available.<br /><br /><br />"Apart from these sorts of limitations, deliberately choosing some other policy would not be rational."<br /><br />But why should we be rational in this sense?<br /><br />If we ask, "Why practical-rational-should I be rational in this sense," the question is a tautology.<br /><br />But we could ask if there are other senses of "should" other than the practical-rational sense.<br /><br />With respect to location, I can only speak intelligibly about how I would get to some other location by looking at directions that start (at least implicitly) at my current location.<br /><br />However, I can still speak intelligibly about directions from other locations other than my own. I could give my brother, for example, instructions on how to get to a location by considering his current location.<br /><br />I can even speak intelligibly about the location of an object relative to a group of people. I can be in a conversation about people living in Mexico and speak intelligently about the fact that they would have to travel north to get to the United States.<br /><br />Just as it makes sense for me to consider relationships between the location of things and the location of people other than myself, it also makes sense for me to consider relationships between states of affairs and desires other than my own. It is sensible for us to build a language where we can talk about these relationships.<br /><br /><br />"Some of the policies (methods of evaluation) that faithlessgod is proposing involve treating other people's desires as final ends."<br /><br />Well, I need to look at the methods of evaluation that faithlessgod is proposing more closely. However, it does make sense to treat other people's desires as <I>their</I> final ends. In fact, it would be a mistake not to.<br /><br />Your desires cannot motivate my actions directly. However, in predicting what will result from my actions I do have to consider the fact that you will treat your desires as ends for you.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-41824415775285180262009-04-28T09:54:00.000-06:002009-04-28T09:54:00.000-06:00I forgot a couple of things.
Question: if I'm...I forgot a couple of things.<br /><br />Question: if I'm conducting a SAE which takes into account other people's ends purely as means to the agent's end, do you call that an "extended" evaluation?<br /><br />> You are evaluating the players and the manager against the requirement of the sport - who it wins games, leagures and cups. <<br /><br />Sure, that's no problem. You're evaluating those things with respect to a certain end, e.g. how good the player is <I>at winning games</I>. In the case of an MAE, what is the end with respect to which you are evaluating?Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-26086197207417141522009-04-28T09:26:00.000-06:002009-04-28T09:26:00.000-06:00Would an MAE claim be something like, for instance...Would an MAE claim be something like, for instance, "This school wants to give its students the best education it can"? If every individual that can be considered part of "this school" agrees in their own SAE with giving the students of the school the best education they can, it's probably a true MAE claim.<br /><br />If not, I think I'm completely lost in your arguments . . . but nonetheless fascinated.Emu Samhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05352556221263050952noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-5185247200609385682009-04-28T09:13:00.000-06:002009-04-28T09:13:00.000-06:00Hi faithlessgod,
> I have been answering your ...Hi faithlessgod,<br /><br />> I have been answering your question how about you do me the courtesy of answering mine. Is you position that of psychological egoism or not, if not what is it? <<br /><br />I've only just seen your previous post. Our last couple of posts crossed (from my point of view). I'm not familiar with the term psychological egoism, so I'll leave it to you to judge whether the view I expressed can be so called.<br /><br />> 3. <I>"Would you agree that your various methods of evaluation can be divided (without overlap) into SAEs and MAEs",</I> No I do not agree as the above should make clear, you are still confusing motives and justifications. <<br /><br />I don't understand your objection. All I'm trying to do is divide your evaluations (scopes) into two categories. If the way I've described my division is unclear or incoherent, please list your various scopes, and I'll indicate which ones I consider to be in each category.<br /><br />> You said: <I>"What question does a MAE answer (if any)?"</I> Any time anyone makes claims, assesses or appraises claims about others ends, groups or singular, they are specifying the scope of agents involved - say a team, a religion competing political parties or whatever they are using extended rationality. We can compare and contrast their claims using extended rationality, practical rationality cannot do this. <<br /><br />I get that an MAE assesses ends. Using your earlier terminology, I assume you mean it evaluates how "justified" they are. But then what? Does it give us any guidance on how to act? If so, then there must be another question that it is answering (about how to act). If not, what use is it?<br /><br />> This makes no sense! If someone is making an MAE claim then what else is there to use but extended rationality? The MAE claim may or may not be rationally justified, that is what extended rationality can empirically and objectively show. <<br /><br />But what is an MAE claim? If it's a claim about whether an end is "justified", then why should I be interested in such a claim? Remember, we haven't yet introduced any concept of "morality", so "end X is justified" is not a moral claim. And an end is not a proposition or an action, so we can't talk about whether it's rationally justified in the senses we normally mean by that. What does "justified" mean in this context?<br /><br />By the way, could I ask you please to check your posts for typos. They often make it hard to understand you.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-33008326593608370872009-04-28T05:35:00.000-06:002009-04-28T05:35:00.000-06:00I have been answering your question how about you ...I have been answering your question how about you do me the courtesy of answering mine. Is you position that of psychological egoism or not, if not what is it?<br /> <br />You seem to be bizarelly fixated that one cannot evluat one person's ends against another as if this is not rational but this makes no sense. We do it all the time.<br /><br />The reasons why you like one sport or another and one team or another are your ends but one you have such an interests the rational evalutation of the time is independent of your ends. You are evaluating the players and the manager against the requirement of the sport - who it wins games, leagures and cups.<br /><br />And the same goes for many other endeavours such as science.<br /><br />You write as if it is only possible to have agent-relative reasons and anything else such as agent-neutral and assessor-neutral reasoning is impossible, but this is absurd. <br /><br />Science would not exist if this were the case. Science's epistemic objectivity requires agent-neutral and assessor-neutral reasoning on behalf of the scientist otherwise they are not being (epistemically) objective - they are letting their ends corrupt the experiments or results. That they have certain ends so they have become a scientist and are pursuing a certain research is their ends but to confuse the two is to commit the genetic fallacy.<br /><br />There are many names for what I am talking about I just like the label extended rationality which is not an original invention, many references on the internet are similar - but not all.Martin Freedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-18130691641684039182009-04-28T05:09:00.000-06:002009-04-28T05:09:00.000-06:00It may be helpful to summarise my current position...It may be helpful to summarise my current position as simply as I can, without using any special terms.<br /><br />Given that we are only motivated by our desires, the rational policy to follow is one which maximises the fulfillment of one's desires. This includes desires for other people's welfare and desires to be moral. The perfectly rational policy would be one which takes full account of all available information about the world, including other people's desires. But only one's own desires are treated as final ends. Other people's desires are only treated as means to achieving one's own ends.<br /><br />In practice, we can only approximate to the perfectly rational policy, given the limits of our knowledge, our inferential abilities and the time we're willing to spend analysing the situation. Apart from these sorts of limitations, deliberately choosing some other policy would not be rational.<br /><br />Some of the policies (methods of evaluation) that faithlessgod is proposing involve treating other people's desires as final ends. Since this is a deliberate deviation from the rational policy, they are not rational policies.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-21579785739847151442009-04-28T05:03:00.000-06:002009-04-28T05:03:00.000-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.com