tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post6911741093156826173..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Desirism and Objective Moral FactsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger33125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-67765510597882881852012-07-27T16:27:15.860-06:002012-07-27T16:27:15.860-06:00Matthew Fuller
Your point is correct. I have defe...<b>Matthew Fuller</b><br /><br />Your point is correct. I have defended desirism piecemeal for a while. I have just started a project of putting it in a more organized form on a <a href="http://desirism.wikia.com/wiki/Desirism" rel="nofollow">desirism wiki</a>.<br /><br />There is no sensible way to deny the claim that a part of this project will require links and references to research in neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and other fields of study. I cannot make any sensible argument to the contrary.<br /><br />However, a sound argument not only needs true premises but valid reasoning. A demonstration of which forms of argument are valid and which are invalid - which types of objections make sense and which are nonsense - is also important.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-33768017465629520732012-07-27T16:17:40.707-06:002012-07-27T16:17:40.707-06:00I mean, really: can you read the following quote a...<i>I mean, really: can you read the following quote any way that doesn't make it out to be a flagrant contradiction? "What I said in no way implies that habits are a trivial part of explaining intentional action. However...it is sometimes easier to remove confounding and confusing elements [i.e., habits] that do not actually affect the conclusions one is trying to communicate [i.e., intentional action]."</i><br /><br />There is a distinction to be made between, "I do not see how this fails to be a contradiction" and "Obviously this person is advancing a view that is not only laughable, but he knows it is laughable and is obviously trying to use some sort of deception to advance a position that even he knows to be absurd."<br /><br />I think that the appearance of a contradiction can be handled by recognizing two different types of "reasons" - commonly recognized in the philosophy of mind - between causal reasons and end- or goal-reasons.<br /><br />For example, gravity causes the river to flow into the ocean. However, gravity does not have a goal to deliver the water to the ocean. Gravity, in this sense, is a causal reason but not an end- or goal-reason.<br /><br />Habits are an important part of intentional action. However, they provide causal reasons for intentional action, not end-reasons or goal-reasons. In the example that I mentioned earlier, habit may cause me to type the letter 'x' when I tried to type my name. However, it does not give me a goal-reason or end-reason to type the letter 'x'.<br /><br />In the sense of a causal-reason, habits are quite important. They explain a great deal of behavior.<br /><br />In the sense of goal-reasons, habits are entirely insignificant. They utterly fail to provide goals or ends.<br /><br />There is no contradiction.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-53920063408340745242012-07-27T15:34:01.801-06:002012-07-27T15:34:01.801-06:00Josef - sorry you feel that way, but I tend get a ...Josef - sorry you feel that way, but I tend get a little peevish when people abruptly change their position in the middle of a conversation and then deny having done so. That, to me, is not fair play, and it significantly disincentivizes any further attempts on my part to pretend that the opposing view is one that merits any kind of serious attention.<br /><br />I mean, really: can you read the following quote any way that doesn't make it out to be a flagrant contradiction?<br /><br />"What I said in no way implies that habits are a trivial part of explaining intentional action. However...it is sometimes easier to remove confounding and confusing elements [i.e., habits] that do not actually affect the conclusions one is trying to communicate [i.e., intentional action]."<br /><br />Cause I can't.<br /><br />If somebody is going to tell me that such-and-such a thing is nontrivial <i>but also</i> that it does not matter, I'll begin to suspect that they're trying to put one over on me - or, at the very least, that they aren't actually worth conversing with (because they care more about sticking up for their preconceived opinion than they do about avoiding even the most basic logical errors). I don't really care whether you're sympathetic to me personally, but at least do yourself the favor of not confusing the accuracy of my opinions with the (perceived) validity of my approach. Maybe you think that any old view merits serious attention just for existing, or for having come from the brain of a complicated thinker, or something. If so, I would be very interested in seeing you explain why you think that (say, over at my place) because I've never understood <i>that</i>, either; otherwise, I'm not sure what there is to get upset about.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-71293041004894194562012-07-27T14:57:17.542-06:002012-07-27T14:57:17.542-06:00Matthew, I must be a counter-example then, because...Matthew, I must be a counter-example then, because this particular critic felt like a possible ally. At least before he went nuts.josefjohannnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-7701266854665930952012-07-27T14:02:26.796-06:002012-07-27T14:02:26.796-06:00Yep. Critics can feel like enemies. But if desiris...Yep. Critics can feel like enemies. But if desirism, or something like it, is ever going to be taken seriously one must actually use data rather than word-arguments.<br /><br /><br />A blog comment post is not the way to do that. Very complex ideas don't get communicated well in this format. I'd say it would be a good idea to meet a collaborator in person. <br /><br />I guess the science of ethics isn't mature enough yet.Matthew Fullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11794612505531904382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-59625826581365041922012-07-27T13:24:24.074-06:002012-07-27T13:24:24.074-06:00Eli, I started reading this thread (and your comme...Eli, I started reading this thread (and your comments in the previous one) and thinking to myself, "this is a guy following a line of thought that is important to me." Specifically, I have a lot of sympathy for your point about whether desires are "a secondary good that's parasitic on something more basic for its value."<br /><br />But I think for the second half of this thread you've lapsed into derision, condescension, and general abrasiveness which was completely uncalled for and my sympathy for you has evaporated.josefjohannnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-1580159684949931462012-07-27T10:41:01.892-06:002012-07-27T10:41:01.892-06:00"What I said in no way implies that habits ar..."What I said in no way implies that habits are a trivial part of explaining intentional action. However, in the same way that physicsts talk about frictionless pullies and massless strings, it is sometimes easier to remove confounding and confusing elements that do not actually affect the conclusions one is trying to communicate."<br /><br />Seriously? Are you serious? "Habits are not trivial, they just 'do not actually affect the conclusions one is trying to communicate'"? Just which definition of "trivial" are you using, here? Cause here's the one that I'm familiar with:<br /><br />"Of little value or importance"<br /><br />You just said that habits are of so little importance to explaining human action that they can safely be ignored, and that they are of no value - how is that not an assertion that habits are trivial?<br /><br />I guess you're giving up on this, which is fine, but you really have some serious work to do to make this even <i>begin</i> to make sense. Let me know if you ever decide to do that work, cause I feel like you're smart enough to do good things once you get some of the basics straightened out.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-84870979211624849212012-07-27T10:36:31.137-06:002012-07-27T10:36:31.137-06:00"Actually, this is false.
Take a concerned p..."Actually, this is false.<br /><br />Take a concerned parent and give him two options..."<br /><br />Um, no, I don't think you understand how this works. You can't say, "Your conclusion does not follow from your premises" and then proceed to show that a different conclusion follows <i>on different premises</i>. That is not a valid strategy of argumentation.<br /><br />"It will matter to the parent in the well that their child is well cared for. The parent will not know, but it a mistake to claim that the parent no longer cares."<br /><br />I didn't say that he would no longer <i>care</i>. I said that it wouldn't <i>matter</i>. Caring whether or not P happens is not the same as it mattering that P in fact did happen. The two are very clearly distinct. So I ask again: what physical reality corresponds to it mattering that P happened to an individual who is entirely ignorant that P happened?<br /><br />"I would have thought that basketball players (insofar as they are basketball players) were hired to win basketball games."<br /><br />I've been over this already: if you're talking about which desires people tend to fulfill, that makes hiring a red herring. It's not entirely irrelevant, but it is definitely not as central as you're making it out to be.<br /><br />"'Hired' focuses attention on the reasons why carpenters actually exist - on the desires-fulfillment that is built into the definition of the word 'carpenter'."<br /><br />Oh boy...<br /><br />Carpenters don't exist because people hire them. Indeed, that's impossible: you couldn't hire a carpenter without there being a carpenter already, so carpenters must exist prior to being hired as such. Carpenters exist because people do (what we call) carpentry, period.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-19479994963658665492012-07-27T10:33:09.667-06:002012-07-27T10:33:09.667-06:00Eli Horowitz said...
Don't lie to my face lik...<b>Eli Horowitz said...</b><br /><br /><i>Don't lie to my face like that, it's disrespectful.</i><br /><br />It's been a great discussion so far - one of the best discussions I have become involved in. However, it seems that this is coming to an end.<br /><br />What I said in no way implies that habits are a trivial part of explaining intentional action. However, in the same way that physicsts talk about frictionless pullies and massless strings, it is sometimes easier to remove confounding and confusing elements that do not actually affect the conclusions one is trying to communicate.<br /><br />I provided my argument that habits do not provide ends. A habit may cause me to type 'x' but it does not give me a reason to choose to type 'x'. It is for this reason - not because of triviality - that it can be excluded.<br /><br />Have a pleasant day. This discussion has been very useful to me and I appreciate it greatly. Thank you.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-30006969664126456882012-07-27T10:22:35.225-06:002012-07-27T10:22:35.225-06:00So a basketball player who never wins but is insan...<i>So a basketball player who never wins but is insanely popular is, according to you, a better basketball player than one who wins every time.</i><br /><br />I would have thought that basketball players (insofar as they are basketball players) were hired to win basketball games.<br /><br />Okay, yes, you are correct, I used the word "hired" to focus attention on a particular set of qualities, but it is not actually "the reason why they are hired". A more detailed answer holds that many of our terms identify objects in part according to the desires those objects typically fulfill. A knife, for example, is so named because it is used to fulfill a particular set of desires. Something that does not fulfill those desires cannot properly becalled a knife. "Hired" focuses attention on the reasons why carpenters actually exist - on the desires-fulfillment that is built into the definition of the word "carpenter".<br /><br />In saying this, we are merely talking about the definition of terms - semantics. Some of the terms we invent include within them an account of the desires that they are meant to fulfill. A difference between an entertainer and a basketball player is defined in part in terms of the desires that entertainers are used to fulfill and the desires that basketball playes are hired to fulfill. Consequently, the person you talk about can be a good entertainer and a poor basketball player.<br /><br /><br />I have a suggestion. If you think that an answer is "slightly insane", it maybe useful to try for a less insane interpretation.<br /><br /><br /><i>I grant that you've been talking about objective facts, but it's a joke to call them moral.</i><br /><br />Then do not call them 'moral'. As I have said before, whether Pluto is a planet depends on your definition of planet. It is possible for "Pluto is a planet" to be true for one person and false for another because they use two different definitions of "planet". Similarly, "desirism is a moral theory" can be true for one person and false for another because they are using different definitions of the term "moral".<br /><br />When I use the term "moral", I mean that it works in a theory that makes sense of a large set of real-world events typically covered under the umbrella term "morality" - excuses, praise and condemnation, the types of reasons people bring to bear in defending moral claims, reasons for action that exist. It is not a joke to say that desirism can handle these practices that actually exist in the real world.<br /><br /><br /><i>If I throw a concerned parent down a hole and then proceed to take excellent care of his child without ever telling him about it, at no point will it matter to that individual that his child is, in fact, well cared for.</i><br /><br />Actually, this is false.<br /><br />Take a concerned parent and give him two options. "Your child will be well taken care of, but you will be caused to believe that your child is suffering horribly," or "Your child will be made to suffer horribly, but you will be made to believe that your child is well cared for." The concerned parent will choose the first option. The concerned parent seeks to make or keep the proposition, "my child is well cared for" true, and the first situation is the only situation in which "my child is well cared for" is true.<br /><br />It will matter to the parent in the well that their child is well cared for. The parent will not know, but it a mistake to claim that the parent no longer cares.<br /><br />Shout down the well, "Do you care whether your child is well cared for?" What answer to you expect? "Nah. Doesn't matter to me one way or the other."Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-31725440946516832732012-07-27T10:02:46.391-06:002012-07-27T10:02:46.391-06:00"I did not say that habit plays a trivial rol..."I did not say that habit plays a trivial role in explaining our actions."<br /><br />Don't lie to my face like that, it's disrespectful. Here's what you said:<br /><br />"The question is: What explains intentional behavior. Can one point to an actual example of an intentional act that cannot be explained by appeal to beliefs and desires?"<br /><br />That sure sounds like you're saying that habit is trivial. (Or, the other alternative that I already mentioned, that "intentional act" is an empty set.)Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-43071371004181128652012-07-27T09:59:38.934-06:002012-07-27T09:59:38.934-06:00. . . habit plays a nontrivial part in all of our ...<i> . . . habit plays a nontrivial part in all of our actions. In fact, I don't know how you can possibly have a brain-based theory of mind that tries to make habitual behavior into the exception rather than the rule.</i><br /><br />I did not say that habit plays a trivial role in explaining our actions.<br /><br />I said that habit does not does not give me a reason to type 'x' instead of 'z'. My reason to type 'z' remains fully dependent on my desire to type my name 'Alonzo'.<br /><br />Typing 'x' instead of 'z' frustrates my desire. That makes the habit a bad habit - a habit that I have reason to change. Desires are still the only things that are relevant in evaluating a desire and determine if one has a reason to change or to acquire a particular habit.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-31680400915985922582012-07-27T09:58:43.771-06:002012-07-27T09:58:43.771-06:00"The better basketball player is the player t..."The better basketball player is the player that fulfills the more and stronger of those desires that basketball players tend to satisfy. The best carpenter is the carpenter that fulfills the more and stronger of those desires that carpenters are hired to satisfy."<br /><br />No kidding. So a basketball player who never wins but is insanely popular is, according to you, a better basketball player than one who wins every time. Sorry, but that's slightly insane, and it flies in the face of every idea we have about value in basketball. The same exact problem will occur when you bring this over to morality; you can have your theory or you can have morality, but you can't have both at the same time. I grant that you've been talking about objective facts, but it's a joke to call them moral.<br /><br />"The desires for which carpenters are typically hired to fulfill are desires fulfilled by stable furniture."<br /><br />Ah ah! You're not allowed to just talk about why they're hired. You just said that it's about fulfilling the desires that people <i>tend</i> to fulfill. If it turns out that carpenters don't <i>tend</i> to fulfill people's desires for stable furniture, it doesn't matter that that's why they were hired. Especially given all of our unconscious desires, you can't just point to one conscious one and then dust your hands off as if you're done. Maybe you're right after all - but maybe you're not. And even if you're right about carpentry, you're for damn sure not right about basketball players (or in general).<br /><br />"'States of affairs in which P is true' is what matters. What matters to the person with the desire that his child is healthy is that the proposition, 'My child is healthy' is true."<br /><br />This is objectively disprovable by your own standards. If I throw a concerned parent down a hole and then proceed to take excellent care of his child without ever telling him about it, at no point will it matter to that individual that his child is, in fact, well cared for. In other words - again, by your own standards - there is nothing in physical reality that corresponds to "what matters to the person with the desire that his child is healthy is that the proposition 'my child is healthy' is true." So far as you're concerned, the opposite of "is" is "is not," right? So what causal, empirical, physical thing in the world corresponds to mattering-for-me when I'm ignorant of the event?Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-54389362064716646552012-07-27T09:48:51.378-06:002012-07-27T09:48:51.378-06:00Let me try it this way: on your desire-centric way...<i>Let me try it this way: on your desire-centric way of understanding things, how can we tell who is a better basketball player (or philosopher, or carpenter, or mountain climber, or whatever)?</i><br /><br />The better basketball player is the player that fulfills the more and stronger of those desires that basketball players tend to satisfy. The best carpenter is the carpenter that fulfills the more and stronger of those desires that carpenters are hired to satisfy.<br /><br /><i>So even if [I'm] a carpenter whose furniture is unusable . . . there's no way for you to say that I'm doing poorly at my chosen task.</i><br /><br />There certainly is. The desires for which carpenters are typically hired to fulfill are desires fulfilled by stable furniture. A carpenter who does not produce stable furniture does not fulfill those desires that carpeters are hired to fulfill.<br /><br /><i>[F]rom what I can tell - you think that following desires is all that matters.</i><br /><br />This is a common misunderstanding. If an agent has a desire that P, "following the desire that P" is not what matters. "States of affairs in which P is true" is what matters. What matters to the person with the desire that his child is healthy is that the proposition, "My child is healthy" is true.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-15442234535292457572012-07-27T09:41:58.208-06:002012-07-27T09:41:58.208-06:00"There is no requirement that all beliefs or ..."There is no requirement that all beliefs or desires are perceived. We clearly have unconscious desires."<br /><br />...he says, neglecting to argue in favor of unconscious beliefs. I'm with you on unconscious desires, but that still does not get you where you say you're going.<br /><br />"The question is: What explains intentional behavior. Can one point to an actual example of an intentional act that cannot be explained by appeal to beliefs and desires?"<br /><br />Sure - just read any behavioral economics study out there and you'll see them for yourself. You can reply that these don't count as intentional because of the mitigating factors, but then all you've managed to do is define "intentional action" into nonexistence, because habit plays a nontrivial part in all of our actions. In fact, I don't know how you can possibly have a brain-based theory of mind that tries to make habitual behavior into the exception rather than the rule.<br /><br />"If nothing in the real world - if no motion of any particle through space-time is ever caused to change course as a result of - this 'ought', then this 'ought' is not relevant to anything in the real world."<br /><br />Maybe and maybe not - again, I'm willing to have this conversation later. But first I'd like you to answer my question: do you believe that there's a real difference between good and bad carpenters (philosophers, mountain climbers, gardeners, surgeons, whatever) or not? If so, please tell me how that's possible given that you think normativity is a non-thing; if not, please at least admit as much so we can move on.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-26394647088634770672012-07-27T09:33:59.578-06:002012-07-27T09:33:59.578-06:00Eli Horowitz
Psychologically speaking, desires - ...<b>Eli Horowitz</b><br /><br /><i>Psychologically speaking, desires - reasons - do not determine our actions.</i><br /><br />Actually, the thesis is that a combination of beliefs and desires that determine our intentional actions.<br /><br /><i>Unperceived factors play a huge role in human decision-making...</i><br /><br />There is no requirement that all beliefs or desires are perceived. We clearly have unconscious desires. Furthermore, animals have desires without having the slightest idea of what a desire is or how to perceive one. Humans are not that different from animals. A lot of psychological evidence shows us that we do a very poor job of perceiving our own desires.<br /><br />Their is a reason for that. Evolutionary fitness requires perceiving the external world - seeing food, smelling danger, or feeling things that damage our skin. There is no particular value in a faculty that allows us to perceive our own mental states - and no physical evidence of such a faculty that we can disect and study. Consequently, most of our beliefs and desires are unperceived.<br /><br />The question is: What explains intentional behavior. Can one point to an actual example of an intentional act that cannot be explained by appeal to beliefs and desires? I would be quite interested if you can. I know that this is a young field subject to change, and I would like to make sure that I include relevant improvements in the field.<br /><br />(By the way, I do know of one - habit. Let us assume that switch two keys on my keyboard - the Z key and the X key. I watch you do it. I desire to type my name, "Alonzo". Even though I believe that they Z and X key have been switched, and I desire to type my name, I will sometimes type "Alonxo" out of habit. This is not fully explained by a reference to beliefs and desires. It cannot be explained without also referencing habit. However, habitual action has no value. Typing the 'x' instead of the 'z' is something I have no reason to do or refrain from doing except insofar as it objectively satisfies desires - such as the desire to type my name. Consequently, it provides no objection to desirism as a theory of value.)<br /><br /><br /><br /><i>A normative framework doesn't "apply" to people in that it causally affects their actions; once again, is/ought gap. It applies in that their actions fall under its purview.</i><br /><br />Then there is no sense talking about it. If nothing in the real world - if no motion of any particle through space-time is ever caused to change course as a result of - this 'ought', then this 'ought' is not relevant to anything in the real world.<br /><br />The opposite of "is" is "is not". If "ought" cannot be placed in the category of "is", then it goes into the category "is not." Proof that there is a gap between "is" and "ought" is proof that "ought" is a fiction. It belongs in the realm of fairy tales and make-believe and can be dismissed as irrelevant in the real world. The real world is the world of "is".Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70481521665895596892012-07-27T08:12:58.685-06:002012-07-27T08:12:58.685-06:00"'Strong' and 'Weak' refer to..."'Strong' and 'Weak' refer to motivational force. we can draw an analogy between the forces acting on a body moving through space...even though it is not normative, it is real and it provides reasons for action."<br /><br />Sorry, this is just false. Psychologically speaking, desires - reasons - do not determine our actions. Unperceived factors play a huge role in human decision-making, so if you're looking to use a physics analogy then you cannot just stick with desires.<br /><br />"In order to get this 'normative framework' to actually apply..."<br /><br />No - this is just wrong. A normative framework doesn't "apply" to people in that it causally affects their actions; once again, is/ought gap. It applies in that their actions fall under its purview.<br /><br />Let me try it this way: on your desire-centric way of understanding things, how can we tell who is a better basketball player (or philosopher, or carpenter, or mountain climber, or whatever)? I don't think we can, because everybody will just be following their desires, and - from what I can tell - you think that following desires is all that matters. So even if I happen to play like an idiot (or if I'm a philosopher who's terrible at logic, or a carpenter whose furniture is unusable, or a mountain climber who only ever gets a few hundred feet above sea level, etc.), there's no way for you to say that I'm doing poorly at my chosen task. Desires simply cannot achieve this. So do you think that there is a difference between good carpentry and bad carpentry (or whatever), or not? If not, I contend that you've got a much bigger problem than I have; if so, you need a different sort of "strong" and "weak" than the sort used when discussing bodies moving through space (as I've been saying).Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-53387134693897249012012-07-27T07:56:25.621-06:002012-07-27T07:56:25.621-06:00[I]t's a state of affairs that is an object of...<i>[I]t's a state of affairs that is an object of a stipulated definition. Nobody has to want to win a game of basketball in order for sloppy defense to be bad in basketball, there just has to be a coherent definition of basketball (complete with a normative framework).</i><br /><br />In order to get this "normative framework" to actually apply to people deciding not to "leave their feet before their man does" you are doing to need more than a coherent definition of basketball. You are going to need a desire to play. A simple desire to play for its own sake, a desire for exercise, a desire to make money and a belief that basketball playing will result in the accumulation of money, a desire for fame - something, or nobody will ever play basketball no matter how coherent your definitions and normative framework may be.<br /><br />I used to play a game as a child where my friends and I were camping in the Jurrasic period - dinosaurs all around. <br /><br /><br /><i>Huh??? Why "strong" reasons? That, again, is normative language; it means that there are "weak" reasons, as well as "stronger" and "weaker" and so on.</i><br /><br />"Strong" and "Weak" refer to motivational force. we can draw an analogy between the forces acting on a body moving through space. Stronger forces have a greater magnitude and a greater effect on the motion of the body. Weaker forces have a smaller effect. Stronger desires have a strong effect on behavior and can override several weaker desires.<br /><br />If you answer that this is "not normative" therefore "not moral" or "not good", we go back to that other debate. Of course it is "not normative" as you define the term. Nothing like that exists - so nothing like that is relevant in the real world. However, even though it is not normative, it is real and it provides reasons for action. So, at least it has relevance in the real world - something that a "coherent definition with a normative framwork" does not have in the absence of desires - and has only to the degree that the "coherent definition with a normative framework" objectively satisfies those desires.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79259382381319727922012-07-27T06:34:49.897-06:002012-07-27T06:34:49.897-06:00"However, you tell me why it is good not to l..."However, you tell me why it is good not to leave your feet before your man does? Eventually, you will get to a state of affairs that is an object of a desire."<br /><br />Nope - it's a state of affairs that is an object of a stipulated definition. Nobody has to want to win a game of basketball in order for sloppy defense to be bad in basketball, there just has to be a coherent definition of basketball (complete with a normative framework). That people do actually desire to win is probably the reason why people <i>play</i>, and so why this is more than a merely academic matter, but the fact that bad defense is bad has nothing to do with desires.<br /><br />"It's going to have to ultimately end up in somebody's brain states."<br /><br />Sure - that's correct. But not desire brain states, just brain states about what "good" and "bad" mean with respect to basketball. Again, it's tempting to just think that anybody who has some certain beliefs about value in basketball will necessarily desire to be good at basketball, but that's not true.<br /><br />"Using this definition, there is no such thing as a normative reason. Nobody has ever acted on one. Nobody has ever been pushed by one. It is not a useful part of any explanation of anything that has actually happened in the real world. It is, like ghosts and angels, a fiction."<br /><br />I mean, we can argue that separately, but at least you agree that there's a distinction. I happen to think that there can be facts and reasons that aren't brain states - just for a more reasonable definition of what it means to "be" a fact or a reason - but, again, it's good that you concede the difference between what you're doing and morality.<br /><br />"However, I can still identify desires and aversions that people have many and strong reasons to promote..."<br /><br />Huh??? Why "strong" reasons? That, again, is normative language; it means that there are "weak" reasons, as well as "stronger" and "weaker" and so on. But you've still not told me how this could possibly be the case! All you can say is that some things <i>are</i> reasons and that others <i>are not</i> reasons; once you've established that, you don't seem to be capable of rating or evaluating them. So I'll ask again: what makes for a strong reason as opposed to a weak one?Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-83835699943482562372012-07-27T01:35:23.579-06:002012-07-27T01:35:23.579-06:00You appear to have someone complaining about not e...You appear to have someone complaining about not enough social science and someone complaining about too much psychology.<br /><br />It's probably too simplistic to say that when people are pushing you to go both further into science and further away from it, you've hit a good moderation.Emu Samhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05352556221263050952noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-47204079520804452102012-07-26T22:35:52.446-06:002012-07-26T22:35:52.446-06:00Eli Horowitz
Again: in basketball, it is good not...<b>Eli Horowitz</b><br /><br /><i>Again: in basketball, it is good not to leave your feet before your man does whether or not you desire to do so - that is, whether or not there is any particular state of affairs in your brain.</i><br /><br />Since I am not much into sports, I actually don't know what this means.<br /><br />However, you tell me why it is good not to leave your feet before your man does? Eventually, you will get to a state of affairs that is an object of a desire. Winning is desired. Not leaving your feet before your man does contributes to winning. If you are not creating a state in which P is true and for which there is a desire that P, then there is no reason not leave your feet before your man does. It doesn't matter.<br /><br /><br /><i>But refusing to leave one's feet before one's man does is good (in basketball) for reasons that have nothing to do with the brain states of the people who are playing.</i><br /><br />It's going to have to ultimately end up in somebody's brain states. It doesn't have to be the brain state of the player. (Note: The player will act to fulfill the most and strongest of his own desires given his beliefs. That is to say, the player's brain states will determine when or whether he "leaves his feet before his man does" (whatever that means). However, the term "good" does not have to refer to the brain states of the player. It may refer to the brain states of the owners, or the audience, or the sponsor, or the NBA. You had better get somebody's brain states in there or there isn't even a reason to play basketball at all.<br /><br /><i>A normative reason, on the other hand, is something that would push any individual one way or the other if they had perfect (enough) knowledge of morality and wanted to be moral.</i><br /><br />Using this definition, there is no such thing as a normative reason. Nobody has ever acted on one. Nobody has ever been pushed by one. It is not a useful part of any explanation of anything that has actually happened in the real world. It is, like ghosts and angels, a fiction.<br /><br />If, using your definition of morality, morality requires normative reasons, then there is no such thing as morality. I am not going to give you "moral facts" that fit this definition. There are no moral facts that fit this definition.<br /><br />However, I can still identify desires and aversions that people have many and strong reasons to promote using social tools such as praise and condemnation - which they can do by using terms like, "good", "evil", "virtue", "vice", "right", "wrong" that make no mention of "normative reasons" - yet that still serves all of the same real-world purposes.<br /><br />You are free to deny that this is a moral theory and there is nothing that can be said against you. In the same sense, you are free to continue to say that Pluto is a planet - using the classic definition of "planet" - and nobody can say that you are wrong.<br /><br />However, if we stick to your definition of morality, morality does not exist. Because it does not exist, it is not worth talking about - and it certainly has no relevance in the real world of things that DO exist.<br /><br />Yet, malleable desires that people generally have many and strong reasons to promote do exist in the real world. Not only do they exist, they are important (since, by definition, they are desires that people have many and strong reasons to promote). So, they ARE worth talking about.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-54729623269568715012012-07-26T20:32:19.597-06:002012-07-26T20:32:19.597-06:00It's just the is/ought gap. For instance: &qu...It's just the is/ought gap. For instance: "all true claims that something us good (at least in the sense of worth pursuing or realizing) has to point to a desire or it does not point to a reason for action that exist." A "reason for action" in your sense is just descriptive, but when you say "worth pursuing" you're talking prescriptively. The two cannot be bridged so simplistically.<br /><br />"However, even without this normative content we can account for nearly all of the elements of our moral life."<br /><br />Sure - but so what? You said you were going to give us "objective moral facts," not merely a psychological account of ideas or feelings or behaviors that we just so happen to classify under "morality." You can't sanely expect moral theory to "account for nearly all the elements of our moral life," just as you can't expect a theoretical explanation of good and bad in basketball to provide explanations for why people play basketball the way they do. That's a fool's errand.<br /><br />Here's the fundamental problem, I think: objective moral facts are not first and foremost anything like reasons. They are just evaluations of states (or, if you prefer, actions or individuals or whatever) - e.g. lying is worse than truth-telling. How facts like that might <i>become</i> motivating reasons for action (in your sense) is a worthwhile question, but you can't just assume that moral facts are, in reality for the people who happen to exist, also motivating reasons for action. Description and prescription are two different categories, and it'll never work to just mash them together like this.Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-6308808475313817412012-07-26T20:32:04.864-06:002012-07-26T20:32:04.864-06:00"Here, too, I am going to have to ask what yo..."Here, too, I am going to have to ask what you mean by 'normative content.' I will need to know what it is that you think is missing."<br /><br />I dunno, man, you're the one who's using the word "good" to mean apparently nothing. How about <i>you</i> tell <i>me</i> what you think makes for a "good" (or "better") reason (as opposed to a "bad" or "worse" one). Cause right now you're just saying that some things <i>are</i> and <i>aren't</i> reasons, which tells me nothing normative.<br /><br />"To call something good is to say that some agent has a motivating reason to realize that thing."<br /><br />But no, it's not, at least not in the sense you mean "has a motivating reason." Again: in basketball, it is <i>good</i> not to leave your feet before your man does <i>whether or not you desire to do so</i> - that is, whether or not there is any particular state of affairs in your brain. When you say that somebody "has a reason," you apparently mean that they have certain sorts of brain activities that, when parsed by our cognitive machinery, end up as desires; fine. But refusing to leave one's feet before one's man does is good (in basketball) for reasons that have nothing to do with the brain states of the people who are playing. Similarly, "to call something good" with respect to morality (or even rationality) is <i>not</i> simply to match people's brain states up with states of affairs in the world. You can pursue this "motivating reason" line of thought if you like, but what morality requires is a <i>normative</i> reason. The difference is this: a motivating reason is something that, in actuality, pushes some individual one way or the other; motivating reasons describe, causally, how people work. A normative reason, on the other hand, is something that <i>would</i> push <i>any</i> individual one way or the other if they had perfect (enough) knowledge of morality and wanted to be moral. Again, basketball: wanting to block your opponent's shot is a <i>motivating</i> reason to jump like a fool whenever somebody throws a pump fake at you. But jumping like a fool is <i>bad</i> in the realm of basketball even if you want to do it because the (relatively) freestanding normative structure of basketball is such that you will tend to produce basketball disvalue (i.e., you will tend to lose) if you jump like a fool when playing defense. See the difference?Elihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03543293341085230171noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-32131454100287478102012-07-26T17:11:38.662-06:002012-07-26T17:11:38.662-06:00Give me social science data that was used, not phi...Give me social science data that was used, not philosophy. Why are you exempt from this? <br /><br />How would this theory work in practice? If you cannot do that, then why would anyone take you seriously? I know its a very hard thing to do. I cannot do it. You have too. Or with help, someone needs to.<br /><br />Saying you don't have too is a bit like the Intelligent Design folks who claim they needn't see if their theory does any work. Well, put your theory to work, or at least attempt to falsify and modify parts of it.<br /><br />How else can you know if it is right?Matthew Fullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11794612505531904382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-83976583125485528632012-07-26T16:52:29.211-06:002012-07-26T16:52:29.211-06:00Eli Horowitz
Here, too, I am going to have to ask...<b>Eli Horowitz</b><br /><br />Here, too, I am going to have to ask what you mean by "normative content." I will need to know what it is that you think is missing.<br /><br />Desirism incorporates reasons for action. To call something good is to say that some agent has a motivating reason to realize that thing. Desires are the only reasons for action that exist. Therefore, all true claims that something us good (at least in the sense of worth pursuing or realizing) has to point to a desire or it does not point to a reason for action that exist.<br /><br />If your "normative content" requires something else - some other type of reason for action other than desire, my claim is that a search for normative content is like a search for the fountain of youth. You will never find it.<br /><br />However, even without this normative content we can account for nearly all of the elements of our moral life. We can demonstrate that peopke generally have many and strong reasons to promote an aversion to responding to words with violence, for example (to defend a right to freedom of speech) and apparently without any need for what you would call "normative content"Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.com