tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post6755616827833309629..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: The Proper Object of Moral EvaluationAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-79697243014662183492009-04-01T10:39:00.000-06:002009-04-01T10:39:00.000-06:00LukeThere is actually a continuum between full red...<B>Luke</B><BR/><BR/>There is actually a continuum between full reductionism and full eliminativism. That is to say, there are reductionist strategies that reduce some aspects of a phenomena but eliminate others.<BR/><BR/>I would say that desire utilitarianism is mostly (but not wholly) reductionist. It is eliminativist with respect to non-desire reasons for action, for example.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-92170780069001470702009-04-01T10:14:00.000-06:002009-04-01T10:14:00.000-06:00Again, thanks for your reply!In mind/brain dualism...Again, thanks for your reply!<BR/><BR/>In mind/brain dualism we have discovered that the mind IS the brain, or "what the brain does."<BR/><BR/>In body/soul dualism we have discovered simply that one of those, the soul, does not exist.<BR/><BR/>In your definition of "reasons for action", you have chosen the explanatory, not the prescriptive definition. Why should we think that this means that prescriptivism really means this particular descriptive thing, instead of assuming that prescriptivism doesn't exist, like the soul?Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-41775184014948913082009-04-01T08:09:00.000-06:002009-04-01T08:09:00.000-06:00LukeAgain, when people speak of minds most of them...<B>Luke</B><BR/><BR/>Again, when people speak of minds most of them would deny that they speaking about bodies. Yet, they are speaking about bodies.<BR/><BR/>Mind/body dualism is a conceptual possibility even if it is not a metaphysical possibility.<BR/><BR/>In addition, descriptive/prescriptive dualism is a conceptual possibility, even if it is not a metaphysical possibility.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-51177992339109842952009-04-01T06:48:00.000-06:002009-04-01T06:48:00.000-06:00Alonzo,Thanks for your reply. I'm still concerned ...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>Thanks for your reply. I'm still concerned that when you say people have been talking about "reasons for action" that exist, that sounds plausible if we mean "reasons for action" definition #2 (from the question I forwarded you recently):<BR/><BR/>2. There are reasons why people should act such that...<BR/><BR/>Most people can be persuaded that that's what they mean when they use moral terms. But this is differently from saying that they've been using moral terms to talk about:<BR/><BR/>1. There are reasons why people do act such that...<BR/><BR/>I think most people would deny that they've been talking about <I>explanatory</I> reasons for action rather than <I>prescriptive</I> reasons for action.Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-45508947974733944612009-04-01T04:43:00.000-06:002009-04-01T04:43:00.000-06:00LukeAlso, if we took a survey of people alive toda...<B>Luke</B><BR/><BR/><I>Also, if we took a survey of people alive today about what they are evaluating when they use moral terms, and "desire" or "motivation" is not even close to the #1 option, would that mean that desire utilitarianism is semantically incorrect, and should thus be discarded along with, say, non-cognitivism? </I><BR/><BR/>If we took a survey of ancient Greeks on what they were talking about when they talk about water, I bet the answer that they are talking about molecules made up of oxygen and hydrogen would not even be on the list.<BR/><BR/>Yet, this is what they were talking about.<BR/><BR/>When they talked about the planet Venus they would not have said that they are talking about an earth-sized rock orbiting the sun, but they were talking about an earth-sized rock orbiting the sun.<BR/><BR/>When people use moral terms what they are talking about are reasons for action that exist (not about desires). However, as it turns out, desires are the only reasons for action that exist. And relationships between maleable desires and other desires makes the most sense of the things they refer to using moral terms.<BR/><BR/>This is true in the same way that a liquid made of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen makes the most sense out of what people are talking about when they talk about water, and an earth-sized rock orbiting the sun makes the most sense of what they were talking about when they referred to Venus.<BR/><BR/>Whether they knew it or not.<BR/><BR/>All other options assert reasons for action that do not exist, or deny the relevance of reasons for action that do exist.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-75567250142317398012009-03-31T21:34:00.000-06:002009-03-31T21:34:00.000-06:00Hmmmm. I'll have to think more about that. I suspe...Hmmmm. I'll have to think more about that. I suspect there are counter-examples.<BR/><BR/>Also, if we took a survey of people alive today about what they are evaluating when they use moral terms, and "desire" or "motivation" is not even close to the #1 option, would that mean that desire utilitarianism is semantically incorrect, and should thus be discarded along with, say, non-cognitivism?Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-26166041569670904252009-03-24T22:03:00.000-06:002009-03-24T22:03:00.000-06:00Luke - basically, yes.To use Alonzo's oft-cited ex...Luke - basically, yes.<BR/><BR/>To use Alonzo's oft-cited example: the action of shooting someone dead. Whether this action is ultimately judged as good or bad depends on the desires of the actor. Was he acting as a soldier, in defense of his country? Was he acting as a victim, in defense of himself or his loved ones? In those cases, we view the action as good (or at least acceptable). Was he acting so that he could go through the now-dead person's pockets and take his money? In that case, we call him a murderer and punish him appropriately. It is not the action itself we are judging (the act of taking a life), it is the motivation for this action (ie: the desires of the agent).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-1448619811749471212009-03-24T20:40:00.000-06:002009-03-24T20:40:00.000-06:00Eneasz,You're saying that desires really have been...Eneasz,<BR/><BR/>You're saying that desires really have been the object of evaluation in our common moral language all along, but it just SEEMS like we were talking about actions because actions are what we see?Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-49132823204533682192009-03-24T10:57:00.000-06:002009-03-24T10:57:00.000-06:00Luke - I think that may be a matter of practicalli...Luke - I think that may be a matter of practicallity. It isn't possible to punish or reward a desire. Only people can be punished or rewarded. So if you want to motivate someone, you let him know that someone labeled as "bad" will be punished and shunned, and someone labeled as "good" will be rewarded and accepted. You can point out direct examples of such people, both to serve as role models, and as demonstrations of the consequences being applied in real life.<BR/><BR/>You can also let someone know what actions will result in them being labled either "bad" or "good".<BR/><BR/>Since it's impossible to detect someone's desires directly, it's much harder to label someone as "should be punished" or "should be rewarded" by those alone. However a person's actions will reveal his motivating desires. Thus it seems like the actions are the objects of moral evaluation, whereas they are actually being used as a means of determining the agent's desires, which is the real object of evaluation.<BR/><BR/>If I understand correctly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-89339211328164236942009-03-23T20:36:00.000-06:002009-03-23T20:36:00.000-06:00Or a Buddhist.1. Right view2. Right intention3. Ri...Or a Buddhist.<BR/><BR/>1. Right view<BR/><I>2. Right intention</I><BR/>3. Right speech <BR/>4. Right action <BR/>5. Right livelihood <BR/>6. Right effort <BR/>7. Right mindfulness <BR/>8. Right concentrationEmu Samhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05352556221263050952noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-39973373551412045302009-03-23T17:15:00.000-06:002009-03-23T17:15:00.000-06:00Gotcha. But is this really the correct convention,...Gotcha. But is this really the correct convention, the correct descriptive theory for moral language? Most people I know refer to good and bad actions (or right and wrong actions, as you've corrected me), and less often to good and bad people, and perhaps sometimes they refer to good and bad character traits. But I've almost never heard people speak of good and bad <I>desires</I> - not unless they're a desire utilitarian.Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.com