tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post6434384473340897382..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Objections Considered: Why Should I?Alonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-86322377715288022702010-01-31T20:29:18.518-07:002010-01-31T20:29:18.518-07:00Alonzo> Moral language, I argue, makes the most...Alonzo> Moral language, I argue, makes the most sense in terms of discussing malleable desires relative to other desires.<br /><br />Clarification: you mean "...relative to all other desires that exist." But, what do you mean it "makes the most sense"? Do you mean that it's how people use the terms? That's precisely what I'm objecting to. It does not seem to me that people use the terms that way. You do, and maybe some other people do. But I don't even think a large group of people do much less a majority of people. It does seem clear to me that moral semantics is very diverse.<br /><br />If you mean something else by "makes the most sense", then please explain.<br /><br /><br />> However, as I have argued, this reduction is not worth a lot of time and energy to defend. We could abandon moral language entirely. Relationships between maleable desires and all other desires would still exist, and what is objectively true about those relationships will remain objectively true.<br /><br />I agree. But, it wouldn't be prescriptive, just descriptive. It may be true that non-human desires are thwarted when we do X, but that doesn't mean that we "morally-ought" not to do X if we don't use the term "morally-ought" to include the desires of non-humans. Again, this is the central point I'm questioning.<br /><br />To summarize and clarify: if moral-oughts are to be prescriptive and include all desires that exist in the moral calculation, then an apriori moral value must be the basis for making that judgement - that all desires that exist moral-ought to be used in moral calculations. Otherwise, if the moral-ought claims are not backed up by said apriori moral value, then there is no prescriptivity in the moral calculation -- just like your example of the earthquake thwarting desires might be "bad" in the sense that it thwarted desires, it wouldn't be "moral-bad" in the sense that it moral-ought not have done it. Similarly, if, for example, humans did not value including non-human desires in moral calculations, then there would be no moral prescriptivity coming to bear when non-human desires were being thwarted -- even if it were factually true and recognized by all humans that non-human desires were indeed being thwarted. Unless it is first wrong for non-human desires to be thwarted, unless that is "moral-bad", then there is no prescriptivity arising from the facts -- there will be nobody using social tools on those who are thwarting the non-human desires, and whereas any sort of tools were to be used against those thwarting the non-human desires, presumably in the form of thwarting of human desires, the rest of the human population would work to stop the non-humans from thwarting the human desires.<br /><br />This would happen until either 1) the non-humans became powerful enough that the humans would be better off including them in their system of morality, or 2) a group of humans used social tools to slowly change the desires of humans to start considering the desires of non-humans, or 3) the non-humans or humans become extinct, or some other level of relative power was shifted so as to change the group dynamics. (Or some other option.)<br /><br /><br />Alonzo> We can use moral language to talk about them . . . or not . . . what they are and how they work is independent of the language we choose.<br /><br />If we do use moral language to describe them, then we are including them in our moral system. If we don't, then we aren't. So, the decision is whether or not we want to include them or not -- not so much what word(s) we are using.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-6977847551183736692010-01-29T12:02:28.680-07:002010-01-29T12:02:28.680-07:00Which reasons for exist depend on the sense in whi...Which reasons for exist depend on the sense in which the word 'should' or 'ought' is used.<br /><br />It can be made quite specific. "If you want to get to the store before it closes, you should leave right now."<br /><br />This clearly does not refer to all desires but to the specific desire of getting to the store before it closes.<br /><br />Or, "You should order the prime rib. You would love it."<br /><br />That speaks only to the desires of the agent doing the tasting, not to all the desires that exist.<br /><br />Moral language, I argue, makes the most sense in terms of discussing malleable desires relative to other desires. However, as I have argued, this reduction is not worth a lot of time and energy to defend. We could abandon moral language entirely. Relationships between maleable desires and all other desires would still exist, and what is objectively true about those relationships will remain objectively true.<br /><br />We can use moral language to talk about them . . . or not . . . what they are and how they work is independent of the language we choose.<br /><br />Clearly, things can be good or bad in a non-moral sense. We can have a good knife - a knife that is such that it is useful to fulfill those desires that knives are typically used to fulfill.<br /><br />Earthquakes are bad, and are called bad, because of their tremendous desire-thwarting effects. To say that desires are bad is to say that we have reason to avoid earthquakes (or at least certain desire-thwarting effects of earthquakes through building codes and the like).<br /><br />We are not <i>blaming</i> the earthquake to say that it is a type of natural disaster. We are just acknowledging its desire-thwartingness.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-11212188587048695212010-01-29T10:07:16.231-07:002010-01-29T10:07:16.231-07:00Alonzo> I hold that 'should' (and '...Alonzo> I hold that 'should' (and 'ought') refers to reasons for action that exist<br /><br />You are implying "all", here, right? Why does "should" mean that? That's the question. Why do you hold that "should" refers to "all" reasons to action that exist. The structure of your sentence (the quotes around "should" and "ought, and the word "refer") seems to imply that you are talking about semantics, here. You are saying that when people use the word "should" that they are referring to all the reasons for action that exist. This is precisely the premise that I am questioning. It does not seem to me that that is the case. If it were, I do not think we would have so many moral disagreements. When a group says that "gays should not marry", they are clearly not referring to all the desires that exist. Are they? When a group says "women should not have abortions", they are not referring to all the desires that exist, are they? So, clearly, the moral language that people use is not referring to all the reasons for actions that exist. But, you say that "should" does refer to all the reasons for action that exist. Why do you say that, Alonzo?<br /><br /><br />Alonzo> ...even those of us who cannot make sophisticated plans to fulfill its desires still has reason to use social tools to create such interests in others. This remains a fact regardless of whether the agent to be praised or condemned cares about that fact.<br /><br />This argument works because the "us" using the social tools have motivational reasons to use our social tools to change the desires in others to cause them to consider the desires of the group that cannot use the social tools. However, cases exist where there are no people that are so motivated, and therefore those who cannot use social tools to mold desires are left having their desires thwarted. Nobody using the social tools will use moral language to call this "bad" or "immoral", however, the fact is still there. So, would the thwarting of those desires really be "bad" if there is nobody to use social tools to call it so? (I suppose this is a little like the tree falling in the forest making a sound question.) Is the badness of the thing in the thwarting of the desires, or is it in the causing of the use of social tools to change the desires causing the thwarting of the desires?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com