tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post4941166495791865738..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Why Worry about Morality?Alonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-53083577226032446132007-08-03T08:09:00.000-06:002007-08-03T08:09:00.000-06:00To be honest, in this answer I only see semantic q...To be honest, in this answer I only see semantic quibbles that are really unrelated to my question. So I’ll try again.<BR/><BR/>“To say that a person has an obligation to do X (where X is good) is to say that people generally have reason to promote those desires that will cause people to do X, using its social tools of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. If the latter is true, the former is true.”<BR/><BR/>The former & latter are compatible, yes, but they’re not synonymous. If I conclude that I want to promote X, it doesn’t necessarily follow that Person B is objectively wrong to refuse to do X.<BR/><BR/>I’m just looking for a clarification: does desire utilitarianism hold that somebody is objectively right or wrong to do or not do any given action, irrespective of the material effects to him personally?Calvinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08732753126859648649noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-63924198267138305772007-08-02T08:51:00.000-06:002007-08-02T08:51:00.000-06:00Well, I hold that desire utilitarianism (or any mo...Well, I hold that desire utilitarianism (or any moral theory) must be consistent with the descriptive facts of human nature. Anything that stands in violation of real-world facts, and in particular anything that obligates a person to act in ways that violate the laws of nature, has no merit.<BR/><BR/>So, desire utilitarianism is a system of morality that is intimately tied to an explanation of . . .<BR/><BR/>Well, 'human nature' does not actually work here. It is consistent with the facts about intentional action, but intentional action is not a distinctly human phenomena.<BR/><BR/>Now, I deny the implied exclusive 'or' in your question, that desire utilitarianism must be either a set of descriptive facts or a system of morality. Here, I hold that desire utilitarianism is a set of descriptive facts AND a system of morality.<BR/><BR/>Some would argue that this violates certain 'is/ought' distinctions and commits 'naturalistic fallacies'. Yet, I argue that an 'is/ought' distinction requires a highly implisible assumption of dualism, and the 'naturalistic fallacy' is built on an invalid assumption - a logical fallacy of its own called the Masked Man Fallacy. So, neither of these objections have any merit.<BR/><BR/>To say that a person has an obligation to do X (where X is good) is to say that people generally have reason to promote those desires that will cause people to do X, using its social tools of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. If the latter is true, the former is true.<BR/><BR/>However, when it comes to definitions, no definition is 'more valid' than any other definition. Look at what the astronomers have done with the definition of 'planet'. Imagine one astronomer asking another astronomer, 'What makes your definition of planet more valid than any other?'<BR/><BR/>The concept of a valid definition actually makes no sense.<BR/><BR/>Yet, this does not imply that all of astronomy is subjective, or that astronomers must somehow come up with some sort argument to show that their definition of 'planet' is the one right and true definition.<BR/><BR/>Understanding how astronomy can be an objective science even though all of its definitions are quite arbitrary and subjective goes a long way to understanding how morality can be objective even though its definitions are arbitrary and subjective.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-22810132296166497192007-08-02T08:25:00.000-06:002007-08-02T08:25:00.000-06:00So in effect, then, desire utilitarianism is simpl...So in effect, then, desire utilitarianism is simply an explanation of human nature, rather than a system of morality.<BR/><BR/>That said, would you say any person has an obligation to do good, and not do evil, contrary to his desires? And if so, how is our definition more valid than his?Calvinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08732753126859648649noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-35093522491555549302007-08-02T08:07:00.000-06:002007-08-02T08:07:00.000-06:00Thanks; I'll check it out.Thanks; I'll check it out.Calvinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08732753126859648649noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-5984645438215002692007-08-02T04:41:00.000-06:002007-08-02T04:41:00.000-06:00You will find a great deal of the answer to your q...You will find a great deal of the answer to your question in a post I wrote called, <A HREF="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2006/12/hateful-craig-problem.html" REL="nofollow">The Hateful Craig Problem</A>.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-31057642038444018672007-07-30T14:30:00.000-06:002007-07-30T14:30:00.000-06:00You're absolutely correct that cultivating aversio...You're absolutely correct that cultivating aversions to destructive tendencies is a vital investment if we want to enjoy freedom from those tendencies. But is reaping pragmatic future rewards the extent of society's interest in morality? Or is there another component?<BR/><BR/>Let's say you have someone with total indifference to the fulfillment of others' desires. Let's say that he only regards others' desires to the extent that he's directly rewarded in some way. As for his indifference's detrimental effect on society, he's willing to take some near-future inconvenience, and he's confident the more serious deterioration that would be problematic to him won't go into effect until after he's dead.<BR/><BR/>What does morality say to/about such a man? Why should he care about the betterment of the world around him?Calvinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08732753126859648649noreply@blogger.com