tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post4508979595524434881..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Desirism: Objections to Motivational InternalismAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-45803076792661890942014-06-12T22:39:34.969-06:002014-06-12T22:39:34.969-06:00Alonzo, I have read your discussion with Anonymous...Alonzo, I have read your discussion with Anonymous in the comments and I believe that I understand what you were trying to say. I think what you meant was something like this:<br /><br />There is a certain sort of double-think that people do in order to assuage their guilt. It goes like this:<br /><br />1. If I understand a valid moral argument I will be convinced by it.<br />2. Since motivational internalism is true if I am convinced by such an argument I will feel motivated to act on it.<br />3. Therefore, if I hear and understand a moral argument and find myself with no motivation to act on it it must be wrong.<br /><br />This isn't always an explicit logic of course. People who have never heard of the concept of internalism use an implicit form of this reasoning. The worst example I ever saw was a member of the Less Wrong community called "Vladimir M," a hateful bigot who refused to believe it was immoral to harm various outgroups he disliked. He often claimed that his lack of motivation to not harm outgroups proved that doing so was not immoral, and that anyone who disagreed with him was just trying to make themselves look high and mighty.<br /><br />I think that I have constructed a good steel man of your position. But I also think that your original formulation has some validity as well. Imagine someone who is convinced by a moral argument, and I mean genuinely convinced, not the halfway doublethink form of "convinced" in my steel man. However, they notice that they have no motivation to act morally. If they believe in internalism they may mistakenly be convinced that their lack of motivation is evidence that their convictions are false. <br /><br />I think that this is something like what you were trying to say.Evanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15661002375460378958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-83975582700573518582012-08-11T05:55:25.777-06:002012-08-11T05:55:25.777-06:00I edited the corresponding page on the Desirism Wi...I edited the <a href="http://desirism.wikia.com/wiki/Motivational_internalism" rel="nofollow">corresponding page</a> on the Desirism Wiki to correct this error.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-41603995504507343812012-08-08T15:51:45.672-06:002012-08-08T15:51:45.672-06:00Yeah, I'm going to have to accept this critici...Yeah, I'm going to have to accept this criticism as valid. I know what I want to say . . . and this doesn't say it. Thank you.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-57457848260253231932012-08-08T13:34:39.026-06:002012-08-08T13:34:39.026-06:00Sorry, as an absolutely cast-iron point of logic t...Sorry, as an absolutely cast-iron point of logic the statement "Under intenalism, 'I have an obligation to do X' implies 'I am motivated to do X'" is not true. Full stop.<br /><br />Believing a cake is rectangular implies believing it has four corners. A cake being rectangular does not imply believing it has four corners. Believing you have an obligation (if internalism is true) implies having a certain attitude. Having an obligation (if internalism is true) does not imply having that attitude.<br /><br />This is completely orthogonal to any particular view in metaethics being true or false. This is just about being able to state basic, basic concepts correctly.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-86174633323878968342012-08-08T11:55:11.614-06:002012-08-08T11:55:11.614-06:00Anonymous, your objection is handled a couple of p...Anonymous, your objection is handled a couple of paragraphs down, where "having all of the facts" includes having the relevants facts - which would include believing the relevant moral truths.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-87748639274808921832012-08-08T10:59:35.635-06:002012-08-08T10:59:35.635-06:00Under intenalism, 'I have an obligation to do ...<i>Under intenalism, 'I have an obligation to do X' implies 'I am motivated to do X'<br /><br />If this is true, then 'I am not motivated to do X' implies 'I have no obligation to do X'.</i><br /><br />Tell me this is parody.<br /><br />Internalism says <b>believing</b> a moral truth entails having a motivation, not that moral truths send out noetic rays that motivate people irrespective of their moral beliefs.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-49376581460183926472012-08-04T12:42:59.058-06:002012-08-04T12:42:59.058-06:00While I agree with your claims, the very thing und...<i>While I agree with your claims, the very thing under dispute with respect to motivatinal internalism is whether an agent can be motivated by beliefs alone; particularly the belief "I ought to do X".</i><br /><br />Actually, the claim of motivational internalism requires something much stronger than this: a belief that will motivate <b>any</b> agent that possesses it to act in a certain <b>specific</b> way. I suspect that this mistake arises from a failure to notice the agent's motivational system-- a pretty serious oversight, but one it's easy to make if you only look at yourself. From the inside, it doesn't feel like there's a separate step of getting motivated once one picks up a moral belief, because one's motivational system is already in place and ready for input.<br /><br />For any given belief, there's a mind design that responds in any way you can name, or doesn't care. But you don't need to resort to hypothetical creatures like Alph the stone-gatherer to see that moral beliefs have no intrinsically motivating properties. There's no shortage of humans who know that what they do is wrong, but don't care; there are people deliberately doing things that they know are wrong, for the very reason that they are wrong.Jesse Reevenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70587498291386977682012-08-04T05:34:27.335-06:002012-08-04T05:34:27.335-06:00Jesse Reeve
While I agree with your claims, the v...<b>Jesse Reeve</b><br /><br />While I agree with your claims, the very thing under dispute with respect to motivatinal internalism is whether an agent can be motivated by beliefs alone; particularly the belief "I ought to do X".<br /><br />Consequently, it would be question-begging just to assert that this is false. Even though I would agree with you that it seems obvious, there are a lot of things that seem obvious (e.g., that the earth is flat, that the universe revolves around the earth) end up being false. Not in this case, but one does need an argument.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-60312458407482616412012-08-03T21:17:19.063-06:002012-08-03T21:17:19.063-06:00Motivational internalism holds that if a person si...<i>Motivational internalism holds that if a person sincerely believes that X is wrong, then he is motivated not to do X.<br />...<br />A person who says 'X is wrong' when not motivated to refrain from doing X has not learned to use moral terms correctly.</i><br /><br />This summary of motivational internalism can be refuted succinctly: beliefs are not reasons for action. You don't need to be a desirist to see that just having a belief is not enough to motivate one to do anything. No belief has an intrinsic motivational property.<br /><br />This includes a belief that one has a reason to act. Believing that one has a reason to act, and having a reason to act, are two different things.Jesse Reevenoreply@blogger.com