tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post3644362187905772674..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: Sam Harris, Sean Carroll, and Deriving Ought from IsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-36088909852473391712011-11-17T19:10:02.125-07:002011-11-17T19:10:02.125-07:00David
Many things are not "a matter of obser...<b>David</b><br /><br />Many things are not "a matter of observation". We can watch a compass needle point north but, we can look frame by frame of the compass needle turning north and not see the magnetic fields causing the event.<br /><br />And morality, I argue, is a relational party. You can take a picture of Jim standing alone and not observe the relationship that Jim is taller than Sandy. You need to observe Sandy at the same time.<br /><br />Since (as I hold) the wrongness of Smith hitting Jones is in the relationship between the desires that motivate Smith to hit Jones (which we cannot see - regardless of how many frames we observe) and other desires (which are not even in the picture), Hume is looking in the wrong spot.<br /><br />Yet, Hume commits the fallacy of ignorance. "Since I cannot see the wrongness in this picture, it does not exist". Or, "Since I cannot see the tallerness of Jim in this picture that shows only Jim, he must not be taller than Sandy."Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-45945322904694814842011-11-17T16:06:33.142-07:002011-11-17T16:06:33.142-07:00Hume's point is simply this...moral imperative...Hume's point is simply this...moral imperatives cannot be derived from experience. for example (and in brief), if we observe Smith hitting Jones, we know that (1) Smith is hitting Jones. from this, however, we cannot infer that (2) Smith ought not hit Jones unless we add (3) if A is hitting B, then A ought not hit B (or the logical equivalent), but (3) is not a matter of observation; i.e., it is not know from experience (if we videotape Smith hitting Jones we will fail to capture the imperative in question, even if we review the video frame by frame).<br /><br />Hume doesn't commit a fallacy. rather, he demands rational from those who issue moral imperatives and upon whom the burden of proof properly lies.<br /><br />as for Sam Harris, and inasmuch as i agree with him on other points, his dismissal of Hume on this matter is at best philosophically naive.Davidhttp://daviddellagostino.infonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-59807732634660786102010-11-21T23:37:41.611-07:002010-11-21T23:37:41.611-07:00Prove that you cannot create leprechauns from nati...Prove that you cannot create leprechauns from nationalism, or fashion hope from water. If you cannot, that does not imply that an assertion that these things cannot be done is argumentum ad ignorantiam. And if you can prove it, then I suggest that a similar proof can be applied to the impossibility of deriving an ought from an is. (Hint: Gilbert Ryle.)truth machinenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-60927058975453347282010-09-07T09:22:52.519-06:002010-09-07T09:22:52.519-06:00Josef, Ophelia
I agree that another interpretatio...<b>Josef, Ophelia</b><br /><br />I agree that another interpretation is possible, and I have defended it. However, in the course of a blog post I do not have the space to enter into that controversy.<br /><br />I think that Hume's use of the phrase, "for what seems altogether inconceivable," is sufficient to support the interpretation that he considers the leap to the impossible. Though, as I said above, his only argument is an appeal to ignorance.<br /><br />I also hold that he has a false assumption in stating that bridging this gap involves a leap from one type of relation to another "which are entirely different from it." The way this gap is bridged is by pointing out that "ought" is not, in fact, "entirely different" from "is" but is a subset of "is".<br /><br />Since Hume does not correctly identify the problem it would be difficult to argue that he had a solution in mind.<br /><br />Ultimately, he offers a burden of proof claim (the burden of proof is on those who make the leap), with a second claim that this burden of proof challenge will never be met.<br /><br />Yet, in the end, I am going to repeat that there isn't space in the course of a blog post to debate this issue in detail. It is ultimately a red herring. The subject here is whether there is any reason other than Hume's claim that he finds it inconceivable that prevents us from deriving 'ought' from 'is', noting that what Hume could have conceived is a poor argument.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-27471339517185144502010-09-06T08:47:05.935-06:002010-09-06T08:47:05.935-06:00Like josef says, you're reading Hume all wrong...Like josef says, you're reading Hume all wrong. You've taken his criticism of those who jump from is to ought with nary an explanation as a statement that it is impossible to go from is to ought under any circumstances.<br /><br />That is not what he is saying. Try and find it anywhere in his writing, trust me you will fail. So your criticism of 'his' position is really a criticism of a position that he did not hold, nor espouse. It may be relevant to what other people say, but is irrelevant to what he had to say.Ophelianoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-2138946651588126932010-08-12T10:52:46.996-06:002010-08-12T10:52:46.996-06:00Hi Alonzo,
Your post was really helpful here, whe...Hi Alonzo,<br /><br />Your post was really helpful <a href="http://ronmurp.blogspot.com/2010/08/moral-facts-sam-harris.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>, where we've been having a belated discussion about the Harris video across three blogs. Feel free to contribute.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11039815765507965606noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-68934981694310155972010-05-13T17:03:58.096-06:002010-05-13T17:03:58.096-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.josefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06650991894634101445noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-41351725177513361512010-05-13T16:59:47.825-06:002010-05-13T16:59:47.825-06:00Alonzo, I read Hume differently. I agree with you ...Alonzo, I read Hume differently. I agree with you that the argument Sean Carrol reads from Hume is an argument from ignorance.<br /><br />But I think Hume himself wasn't making any assertion. Hume was just noting that moral philosophers move from 'is' to 'ought' without explaining how they did it. I think it is perfectly right to require moral philosophers to talk about how they cross "the divide".<br /><br />I think Carrol's reading is a misreading, and a tragic one.josefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06650991894634101445noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70660396898618735862010-05-13T11:01:15.550-06:002010-05-13T11:01:15.550-06:00Critical dualism is the view that there is no way ...Critical dualism is the view that there is no way to derive moral principles from matters of fact. The last time I checked there is no morality to a fact. It is what it is. In the traditional language of moral philosophy this dualism is often called “the is/ought problem”, as though philosophers have to find some way to get over it or solve it.<br /><br />The problem arises because philosophers want to find some way to justify moral principles and the best way would be to find some way to derive moral principles from some set of facts,thereby establishing an objective morality, unless it is believed that they can be handed down from some supernatural authority.<br /><br />Almost everyone who has dealt with this issue has tried to answer it by reference to human nature or to the nature of ‘the good’. But each of these forks leads to a dead end: the first because anything that anyone can conceivabely do can be attributed to human nature and the second because there is the question of defining ‘the good’.<br /><br />The same logical structure underlies the is/ought problem and the problem of induction which looms large in the philosophy of science. In each case the hope is to derive general principles (natural laws in the case of science, moral rules in the case of moral philosophy) from statements of fact. Deriving the general from the specific is inductive reasoning which will prove nothing. In each case the problem arises from the desire for justification based on facts and in each case the problem is insoluble in principle. The way forward is to aim to establish critical preferences for scientific theories or moral proposals based on their capacity to solve the problem that they are supposed to solve, and to stand up to criticism. <br /><br />When you say, "What the person raising this objection needs is not to find problems with Harris' specific theory, but some reason to believe that no theory is possible.", I would say that it's far more important to look for the problems in a specific theory which would falsify it. I don't need a reason to believe that something doesn't exist. I need a reason to believe that it does.Larry Allen Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04372707672454473473noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-51123942566199453022010-05-12T12:37:10.215-06:002010-05-12T12:37:10.215-06:00I hope Sam Harris reads this.I hope Sam Harris reads this.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com