tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post2681843904673416941..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: 'Should' and 'Good'Alonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-34557359779190813582007-04-07T06:55:00.000-06:002007-04-07T06:55:00.000-06:00MaryThanks for stopping by.Actually, it is quite e...<B>Mary</B><BR/><BR/>Thanks for stopping by.<BR/><BR/>Actually, it is quite easy to demonstrate that your motivation for doing good is almost certainly not, in fact, your own happiness.<BR/><BR/>Doing good may make you happy. However, it is not your motivation.<BR/><BR/>This is true in the same sense that eating chocolate may make one fat, but getting fat is (usually) not the motivation for eating chocolate.<BR/><BR/>This can be shown by showing you that there are instances in which you would likely (I assume) do that which good, even though it would not make you happy.<BR/><BR/>See:<BR/><BR/><A HREF="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2006/09/happiness-vs-desire-fulfillment.html" REL="nofollow">Happiness and Desire Fulfillment</A>:<BR/><BR/><A HREF="http://atheistethicist.blogspot.com/2006/09/more-on-happiness-and-desire.html" REL="nofollow">More on Happiness and Desire Fulfillment.</A>Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-14780198878168995912007-04-07T01:50:00.000-06:002007-04-07T01:50:00.000-06:00Hi, I'm the mary that created the post called `why...Hi, I'm the mary that created the post called `why should we be good'. Having read your post I now realise that although I wrote on the subject I wished to, I worded my title incorrectly, it should have been 'what is my motivation to do good' all I explored in the post was that my motivation is my own happiness and I would like to clarify that I am not implying that it is true for everyone that following their own desires will result in moral good. You seem to have taken this idea a stage further than I did by looking at the question of why (practical) should we do want to do moral good? Atheist observer asks what desires a person might have that being a good person might fulfill, I suggest that being good fulfills the desires of others and therefore makes them happier, if they are happy (particularly if they they know they are happy because of you) the happiness is likely to refect back on you, fulfilling everyones desire to be happy. However I accept that many people will either not realise this or decide that the benefit to themselves is not large enough to make the good deed worthwhile. <BR/> <BR/>I apologise for any awful spelling or grammer, this is the longest thing I've ever typed on the keypad of a mobile! (I don't know if I'll see a computer for a while)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-28818790646526441302007-04-06T06:07:00.000-06:002007-04-06T06:07:00.000-06:00"The sum of any subset of a set of numbers is equa..."The sum of any subset of a set of numbers is equal to the sum of the whole set."<BR/><BR/>If somebody were to make that claim, I am certain you would not accept it. It is easy to disprove. The sum of (1 + 2) is not equal to the sum of (1 + 2 + 3). All you need is one counter-example, and the claim has been discredited.<BR/><BR/>The claim that a person always (practical) should do what is (moral) good is just that type of claim. It is a claim that what has value relative to a subset of desires is equal to what has value relative to all desires.<BR/><BR/>There is simply no reason to accept that as true.<BR/><BR/>The (practical) should aspect considers only a subset of all desires - the desires a person has. The (moral) good considers a different set of desires - desires that tend to fulfill other desires. Unless everybody actually has desires that tend to fulfill other desires (good desires), it is not the case that some of them (practical) should do that which is (moral) good.<BR/><BR/>It is often the case that a person (practical) should change his desires. This is true when those desires come into conflict. If his desire for A thwarts his desire for B, C, and D, then his desire for B, C, and D give him reason to get rid of his desire for A. Not, his desire for A also gives him reason to get rid of his desires for B, C, and D.<BR/><BR/>Which should win?<BR/><BR/>It depends on which is the more and stronger desires.<BR/><BR/>Now, we can make it the case that a person (practical) should change his desires to good desires by manipulating the facts surrounding this equation. We can threaten to thwart desires B, C, and D for those people who cultivate desire A (giving him reason to get rid of desire A). We can do this through fines, imprisonment, and public humiliation.<BR/><BR/>Also, through praise and condemnation, we can directly bring it about a change in people's desires independent of any decision on their part to acquire those desires. Positive and negative feedback do not require the person's intentional participation to have an effect.<BR/><BR/>However, people do not all always <I>have a reason</I> to acquire good desires. Sometimes we have to <I>give them a reason</I> to acquire those desires or manipulate those desires directly.<BR/><BR/>You write, "You have made no case for what desires a person might have that being a good person would fulfill, or why a person would want to choose those desires."<BR/><BR/>This is because I have been arguing so heavily for the claim that a person <I>does not necessarily have any such desires</I>. It is like, after arguing against the existence of angels, I face the accusation, "But you have not presented any argument for the necessary existence of angels."<BR/><BR/>An evil person is somebody who, to some degree, does not have desires that being a good person would fulfill, and may not have a reason to choose those desires.<BR/><BR/>We can give him reasons to choose those desires - by threatening things that have universal instrumental value for the fulfillment of almost all desires (rewards and punishments). We have some power to influence the reasons he has directly (praise or condemnation).<BR/><BR/>But people do not necessarily have desires that being a good person would fulfill, or reason to choose such desires.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-61297735760123034902007-04-05T22:04:00.000-06:002007-04-05T22:04:00.000-06:00Alonzo,There is a difference between an isolated a...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>There is a difference between an isolated act and a behavior pattern. As you've shown, you can come up with a theoretical case where one can see no advantage accruing from a specific act of morality.<BR/>However a behavior pattern across many real situations in a real society, could easily lead one to the conclusion that expressing honesty, fairness, love, kindness, and tolerance of others results in many of one's own desires being fulfilled, whether or not one begins with a desire to express them.<BR/>You state:<BR/>"It is still the case that the only reasons that exist are desires, and the only reasons why you would want to be a good person are the desires that you have that being a good person would fulfill."<BR/>That is only true if you include getting the rewards in this society that a person known and respected as a good person receives.<BR/>You have made no case for what desires a person might have that being a good person would fulfill, or why a person would want to choose those desires.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-73285434987804746102007-04-05T19:34:00.000-06:002007-04-05T19:34:00.000-06:00If a asks me what reasons I have to act morally, a...<I>If a asks me what reasons I have to act morally, and I say, "I act to fulfill my desires, and since I'm a good person, I have good desires" I don't think that's going to get me very far in answering his question.</I><BR/><BR/>My concern is whether or not it is true.<BR/><BR/>The only reasons that exist are desires.<BR/><BR/>The only reasons that you have are the desires that you have.<BR/><BR/>The only reasons that you have to act morally are the desires that you have to act morally.<BR/><BR/><I>I think he would be looking for some specific reasons why I would want to be a good person and have good desires.</I><BR/><BR/>The question does not lend itself to any substantively different answer.<BR/><BR/>It is still the case that the only reasons that exist are desires, and the only reasons why you would want to be a good person are the desires that you have that being a good person would fulfill.<BR/><BR/>To the degree that those desires are lacking, to that degree you have no reason to be a good person.<BR/><BR/>Now, you do have reason to have others be good people. Good peole tend to fulfill the desires of others. Others have reason for you to be a good person since, if you are a good person, you will tend to act in ways that fulfill their desires.<BR/><BR/>So, people generally have reason to promote good desires and inhibit bad desires in society at large.<BR/><BR/>However, this does not change the fact that the reasons a person has for doing anything are his own desires. No other type of reason exists.<BR/><BR/><I>I believe it would be worthwhile to explain the advantages of behavior patterns that fulfill the desires of others.</I><BR/><BR/>This assumes that there are advantages.<BR/><BR/>Of course, behavior patterns that fulfill the desires of others has advantages for those others. That goes without saying.<BR/><BR/>And behavior patterns in others that fulfill the desires of others has advantages for the self. Again, that's axiomatic.<BR/><BR/>However, to claim that behavior patters that fulfill the desires of others <I>necessarily</I> provide advantages to the self?<BR/><BR/>That takes some argument, and I do not think that argument can be made.<BR/><BR/>Just consider an extreme case - somebody who has a desire to rape children, who is in a situation where he can get away with raping a child, and nobody can stop him. Say, he and the child are the last two people on the planet, and he has a disese that will leave him dead in two years anyway.<BR/><BR/>What advantages are there for behavior patterns that fulfill the desires of others?Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-44641629725859210542007-04-05T17:49:00.000-06:002007-04-05T17:49:00.000-06:00Alonzo,Perhaps we're answering this question at di...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>Perhaps we're answering this question at different levels. If a theist asks me what reasons I have to act morally, and I say, "I act to fulfill my desires, and since I'm a good person, I have good desires" I don't think that's going to get me very far in answering his question.<BR/>I think he would be looking for some specific reasons why I would want to be a good person and have good desires. I believe it would be worthwhile to explain the advantages of behavior patterns that fulfill the desires of others.<BR/>It was at this level it didn't seem like you answered the question.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-64109340563746195602007-04-05T14:42:00.000-06:002007-04-05T14:42:00.000-06:00Atheist ObserverI thought I answered (3).Let me tr...<B>Atheist Observer</B><BR/><BR/>I thought I answered (3).<BR/><BR/>Let me try again.<BR/><BR/>The good person (practical) should do what is (moral) good because, since he has good desires, what fulfills his desires will tend to fulfill the desires of others.<BR/><BR/>It is not the case that the evil person (practical) should do what is (moral) good because what will fulfill his desires will tend to thwart the desires of others. That is what makes him evil.<BR/><BR/>However, people generally have many and strong reasons to make sure that there are more good people in the world than evil people, precisely because the good person will tend to fulfill the desires of others and the evil person will tend to thwart the desires of others.<BR/><BR/>Threats of punishment can make it more likely that an evil person will do what he morally should, simply by making it more practical to do so. However, it is still not the case that the evil person (practical) should do what is (moral) good when he or she can avoid punishment.<BR/><BR/>The other way to make it that a person (practical) should do that which is (moral) good is to alter his desires. To the degree we are successful, then to that degree the person will still do what is (moral) good even when he or she can escape punishment, because it is what he or she wants to do.<BR/><BR/>However, to the degree that we are successful we are not giving an evil person a reason to do (moral) good. We are changing a person from an evil person to a good person, who does (moral) good becaues he wants to.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-91578594969130462772007-04-05T10:17:00.000-06:002007-04-05T10:17:00.000-06:00Alonzo,I'm not even sure you answered the question...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>I'm not even sure you answered the question. You did a philosophical parsing exercise that was correct, but spent virtually no time really answering question 3, which is what the non-philosopher would automatically assume the question was.<BR/>In my view the practical answers include external reasons, such as developing a reputation, recieving gratitude, setting an example, and creating good will, that make doing good as a pattern more desire fulfilling than making an immoral choice. The other reasons are internal ones of feeling like you are making the world a better place, being the kind of person you and others want to be around, and being able to treat others the way you want to be treated.<BR/>These are clearly not enough to determine behavior in every instance, but in reality I believe they are far more compelling than winning some after-life lotto game.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com