tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post2667808986401288480..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: The Persistence and Malleability of DesiresAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-24355715836951109232009-06-21T17:36:08.115-06:002009-06-21T17:36:08.115-06:00Today's quote, from Theism and Explanation by ...Today's quote, from <i>Theism and Explanation</i> by Gregory Dawes:<br /><br />A realist (about intentional explanations) is surely not committed to the idea that these terms - "belief," "desire," "intention," and so on - pick out natural kinds. It may be that a mature scientific psychology would replace these terms with others, which more accurately describe the workings of the mind. But this does not entail that there are no beliefs, desires, and intentions. The term "sea creature" does not pick out a natural kind - it embrace, for instance, both fish and marine mammals - but this does not mean there are no sea creatures.Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-31099432359118158282009-06-20T18:56:40.262-06:002009-06-20T18:56:40.262-06:00Hi Alonzo,
I'm particularly interested in the...Hi Alonzo,<br /><br />I'm particularly interested in the eating example you provided. I'm writing this in an attempt to see if I understand. <br /><br />The desire to eat is more basic than the desire to eat something in particular. "The agent desires to eat" is different from "The agent desires to eat a ham sandwich" but both qualify as propositional attitudes (I think).<br /><br />This is where I'm very uncertain--In a way, it is the object of a desire that is often the crux of moral claims. That is, the desire "to eat" is not necessarily something one would condemn or praise but the object (e.g. human flesh) could be. Whether it is worthy of condemnation or praise (or is simply permissible) would be dependent on whether (and to what extent) it thwarts the desires (and their associated objects) of others and/or of the agent.<br /><br />Eating, being a basic biological drive, is going to be largely persistent and unmalleable. The desire to eat a particular object on the hand may have a greater degree of malleability and/or "fleetiness".<br /><br />I wonder if most desires that have a particular object associated with them couldn't be traced back to a more basic biological drive (like the eating example) but that may be going too far (i.e. it is incorrect)<br /><br />I'm also wondering if it would be accurate to suggest that for any given propositional attitude, the persistence and malleability (for that particular person) could be plotted (conceptually anyway) on orthogonal scales creating a 2 by 2 grid. <br /><br />Jon NewmanAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-25495072298615870392009-06-20T15:59:35.474-06:002009-06-20T15:59:35.474-06:00Thanks, Alonzo. I have no disagreements. :-)Thanks, Alonzo. I have no disagreements. :-)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com