tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post2302490003731358035..comments2023-10-24T04:29:23.693-06:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: The 1000 Sadists ProblemAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-8824715261273557592009-05-28T04:18:20.801-06:002009-05-28T04:18:20.801-06:00@Jayman
The answer to your last example is very si...@Jayman<br />The answer to your last example is very simple: after killing the one person with the desire to be killed, the remaining 999 people would have their desires thwarted.<br /><br />Same goes for your other questions.Marchttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08729858603831755459noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-34879294362092342412009-01-08T16:50:00.000-07:002009-01-08T16:50:00.000-07:00Why, according to desire utilitarianism, should we...Why, according to desire utilitarianism, should we attempt to remove the desire to rape from the 1000 instead of creating the desire to be raped in the one? Either way we would have a society where nobody's desires were being thwarted, correct?<BR/><BR/>You may say that, by definition, one cannot desire to be raped for it would become consensual sex. However, I think similar 1000 sadist problems could be constructed where the same basic question applies. For example, a world where 1000 people want to kill one person. Why not create the desire to be killed in the one person?Jaymanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06413844619464733681noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-10734659593419831682008-08-06T11:22:00.000-06:002008-08-06T11:22:00.000-06:00Anon - yes, you can choose between two competing ...Anon - yes, you can choose between two competing desires, or choose to not fulfill a certain desire. But why do you choose A over B? What reasons-for-action are there for you that compelled you to take action A over action B? I would guess that there are more/stronger reasons for A than for B, which explains why you chose A and not B. And if any reasons-for-action other than desires exist, they have yet to be demonstrated.<BR/><BR/>So sure, you have the freedom to choose, and you'll choose that which you feel fulfills the most/strongest of your desires. Freely. Or deterministically. Which word you wish to use is up to you.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-62332263889120074812008-08-05T01:37:00.000-06:002008-08-05T01:37:00.000-06:00Very few acts that we take are a result of only on...Very few acts that we take are a result of only one desire, or only conscious desires. At the precise moment that we make a decision, that choice fulfills the more and stronger of all our desires.<BR/><BR/>I think you are right that the possibility of desires being perfectly balanced should be considered. However, I suspect it is difficult for this perfect balance to last long. After a moment of consideration, the strengths of many of our desires might change subtly, which makes it possible to make a decision.Emu Samhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05352556221263050952noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-70556228746302054242008-08-04T21:05:00.000-06:002008-08-04T21:05:00.000-06:00Your assertion contra free will is wrong. Example...Your assertion contra free will is wrong. <BR/><BR/>Example 1:<BR/>I can have two desires that both have supporting beliefs and societal praise/indifference, but I can one fulfill one and the other is lost. I have the capability to make a choice between those two desires.<BR/><BR/>i.e. saving the life of two people, or being with a dying relative versus spending one night with the love of your life before she marries someone else, etc. etc.<BR/><BR/>Example 2:<BR/>I can have a desire that is backed up by a belief and that has either the praise or indifference from societal/legal pressures. I can choose to not fulfill that desire. I can even choose to thwart that desire and/or do the opposite.<BR/><BR/>i.e. getting married, saving a life, giving to charity<BR/><BR/>Both of these simple examples show that free-will/compatibilism are possible. Even if our desires, beliefs, mental states, and culture limit our choices we still have the cognitive and metaphysical ability to choose between alternatives.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-6726475866480357992007-05-15T12:29:00.000-06:002007-05-15T12:29:00.000-06:00Another question from the studio audience:These so...Another question from the studio audience:<BR/><BR/>These sorts of problems are facinating, but it almost goes without saying that the 1000 Sadists are always morally wrong. Seeing how a particular theory explains this (or fails to) can be very informative, but it's fairly irrelivant on a practical scale.<BR/><BR/>I'm interested in how a more contemporary issue would be tackled. For example, pornography (of the legal variety). Views on this seem to have flucuated in recent history, and vary widely right now from those who recoil in horror at the mere mention of it, to those who consider it a healthy indulgence. Would a desire to view pornography be considered good, bad, or neutral? Is it even a malleable desire to begin with?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-72825795627918744992007-05-14T22:25:00.000-06:002007-05-14T22:25:00.000-06:00First: The two universes are equivalent to whom?. ...First: The two universes are equivalent <I>to whom?</I>. In order to have a preference for one universe over another, one must have a desire. The only agent with a desire in my example is Agent A, who has a desire that P.<BR/><BR/>Now, if P is true in Universe 1, and P is false in Universe 2, then A will have a reason to choose Universe 1 over Universe 2.<BR/><BR/>However, it is also the case that if P is false in Universe 1, and true in Universe 2, he has a reason to choose Universe 2 over Universe 1.<BR/><BR/>However, a neutral third party, with no desires, has no reason to choose one universe over the other. Only an entity with a desire has a reason to choose.<BR/><BR/>Second: A state of affairs in which a desire exists can fulfill other desires - either directly (there is a desire that the desire exist) or indirectly (the desire causes an agent to act in ways that create states that fulfill other desires).<BR/><BR/>Desires are entities that exist or not, so they are parts of states of affairs. They also have effects - specifically, through their influence on intentional actions - thus creating states of affairs.<BR/><BR/>Third: I believe that the desire to compete exceeds any desire to win. Only one person gets to fulfill the desire of winning a tournament, but the everybody gets something of value from a tournament. Many people choose to participate even when they they have no chance of winning. This would be inconsistent with the hypothesis that there is only a desire to win.<BR/><BR/>Indeed, the desire to win is expected to be tempered to a level that it enhances, not detracts from, the value of participation.Alonzo Fyfehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-1307510899418621632007-05-14T22:06:00.000-06:002007-05-14T22:06:00.000-06:00Alonzo,I’m left with just a few problems with your...Alonzo,<BR/><BR/>I’m left with just a few problems with your arguments.<BR/>First In your alternate worlds, one has a desire and a state of affairs and a relationship, therefore as you say, value to an agent. Since one has something of value and the other does not, I fail to see how they are equivalent.<BR/>Second, you discuss desires fulfilling desires. Desires cannot fulfill anything, just as propositions cannot fulfill propositions. Only states of affairs, or acts can fulfill desires or propositions.<BR/>Finally your argument about wishing to extinguish a bad desire would also work with the desire to win a tournament. Only one person or team can win the tournament, leaving everyone else’s desire thwarted. To avoid this we should try to eliminate the desire to win?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com